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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
“If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can produce it, 
better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry …The general industry of 
the country … is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage, when it is thus directed 
towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make.” 1  
- Adam Smith, “The Wealth of Nations” 1776 
“Those nations which feel themselves to be capable, owing to their moral, intellectual, social, 
and political circumstances, of developing a manufacturing power of their own must adopt the 
system of protection as the most effectual means for this purpose.”2 
- Friedrich List, “National System of Political Economy" 
     Trade policy, most frequently reflected through tariffs, was the most important economic 
policy issue facing the United States between the Founding and the Civil War.  In the seven 
decades following the 1789 Philadelphia Convention, Congress considered sixteen major tariff 
bills.
3
  These efforts occupied more pages of the Congressional records than national banking 
and internal improvements combined, and frequently occupied newspaper front pages.  
American trade policy between 1789 and 1860 was a fluid, dynamic, and even raucous issue of 
the day. 
Thesis  
     Early American trade policy was influenced by two crucial forces: the First Industrial 
Revolution and the introduction of liberalized notions about “political economy.”  These two 
variables can be described as “interests” and “ideas.”  The two factors changed over time, 
causing shifts in the manner that Americans addressed foreign commerce.  At various times 
between 1789 and 1860, the nation experimented with high tariffs, low tariffs, and even 
suspension of trade. 
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     The First Industrial Revolution, starting in Great Britain around 1750, gradually made its way 
to the United States by the 1810s.  In 1789, the American republic was predominantly 
agricultural.  By 1860, it possessed the world’s third largest industrialized economy, eclipsed 
only by Great Britain and France.  Industrialization significantly altered the American economy, 
with important political and social implications.
4
   
     The process was disruptive, for many reasons.  First, entrepreneurial American manufacturers 
faced stiff European competition, particularly from British producers who were more 
technologically advanced and benefitted from economies of scale.  These advantages allowed 
foreign manufacturers to provide higher quality goods at cheaper prices than their American 
counterparts.  Factories required significant financial capital, and early American capitalists were 
confronted with high levels of financial risk.  Low sales volumes, combined with heavy 
investment in equipment, bricks, and mortar, often spelled financial doom.   
     American special economic interests formed in response to foreign competition.  As the 
national economy developed, capitalists began associating with one another on the basis of 
industry, and they encouraged the national government, through petitions and political 
representation, to provide valuable assistance in checking foreign competition.  Most of these 
special interest groups were linked to manufactures, the fastest growing economic sector.  
However, some agricultural interests also exerted political pressure on the federal government to 
provide them with assistance as well.          
     These interest groups were influenced by Great Britain’s trade policy example.  The former 
mother country was the world’s most powerful economy by the early nineteenth century, and had 
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become so through a mercantilist system.  The British model provided an empirical example of 
the potential benefits from a “nationalist” oriented version of trade policy. 
     Trade policy was complicated by ideas, because, coincident with American independence, a 
revolution in intellectual thought occurred as well.  In 1776, Adam Smith published An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  This work, published four months before 
the American declaration of independence, was as revolutionary for economics as the American 
conflict was for politics.  The Wealth of Nations challenged common wisdom regarding political 
economy, proposing to eliminate state sponsored mercantilism and replace it with laissez-faire 
free trade.  Smith’s ideas were warmly embraced and enhanced in the early nineteenth century by 
intellectuals such as David Ricardo and Jean Baptiste Say. 
     The mutually exclusive concepts of free trade and economic nationalism both claimed 
legitimacy in the newly evolving American economy.  Enlightenment inspired concepts of free 
trade resonated with many of the same men inspired by Locke and Montesquieu in their quest for 
political independence.  At the same time, Americans remained deeply influenced by British 
policy, and certain American leaders concluded that if the United States emulated Great Britain’s 
approach to international trade, the new republic would economically thrive. 
     These two factors, interests and ideas, underwent both continuity and change between the 
Philadelphia Convention and Fort Sumter.  A maturing American economy caused economic 
special interests to change over time.  The relative influence of the three major economic spheres 
of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures within geographic regions sometimes shifted 
dramatically in the space of only a few years.  Ideas tied to free trade and nationalism resonated 
differently over time, as American leaders responded to changing international circumstances, 
4 
 
 
 
ranging from the early 1800s, when the United States was practically an economic neo-colony of 
Britain, to the 1850s, when the nation achieved high levels of self-sufficiency. 
     The changing tides of interest caused many American capitalists, and by proxy their 
congressional representatives, to change their position on trade over time.  These shifts occurred 
throughout the country.  Both nationalists and free traders enjoyed intermittent periods where 
their respective ideas were ascendant.  Nonetheless, American trade policy remained unresolved 
by 1860, and would remain so even after the American Civil War.          
     By identifying interests and ideas as the dominant variables shaping American trade policy 
during the Early Republic and Antebellum years, this work rejects demarcating the tariff issue 
along a North-South geographical divide.  It also rejects the idea that the tariff was a proxy 
struggle between competing free-labor and slave-labor based economic systems.  Both systems 
proved compatible with all three economic spheres, including manufactures. 
Background  
     Early American policy makers confronted great challenges in choosing between the 
diametrically opposed strategies of free trade and protection.  The United States in 1789 was 
both politically and economically weak, a political experiment situated in a hostile, monarchical 
world.  The stakes were high, and the new republic’s future prospects greatly depended upon 
American economic strength. 
     The tariff was an important revenue source for the federal government, but it also was a 
potentially important tool to encourage or discourage segments of the national economy through 
governmental policy.  Tariffs could be used to “protect” specific American economic sectors, 
stimulating their economic development.  Although early American nationalists such as 
Alexander Hamilton envisioned protection for manufacturing interests, economic interest groups 
5 
 
 
 
formed and lobbied to protect an array of agricultural and other products as well, including, but 
not limited to, indigo, sugar, hemp and even whale by-products. 
     Changing economic interests in the United States were fueled by the industrialization of the 
American economy and by territorial expansion.  For example, in 1810, workers engaged in 
agriculture and manufacturing comprised 84% and 3% of the nation’s total labor force, 
respectively.  By 1860, those numbers were 53% and 14%, demonstrating the shifting nature and 
diversification of the American economy.  Over the same time frame, the United States expanded 
its population from 3.9 million to 31.4 million people, and its geographic size from 0.86 to 2.97 
million square miles.
5
   
     Industrialization, originally introduced in New England and the Atlantic states in earnest in 
the 1810s, eventually spread across all regions by the 1850s.  The process of technological 
applications spreading from one geographic region to another is known as “takeoff” by 
developmental economists, where the knowledge and expertise of a process is transferred from 
one geographic and/or national area to another, followed by sudden bursts in investment and 
activity.  This process occurred “inter-country” between 1790 and 1820, when British 
technological knowledge was transferred, often covertly, to the United States.
6
     
                                                 
5
 Susan B. Carter, Richard Sutch, et al., eds., Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, 
Millennial Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1:26, 2:110.   
6
 The term “takeoff” was popularized by Walter W. Rostow in Stages of Economic Growth.  Rostow loosely defines 
“takeoff:” as the point in time when a nation begins to accelerate its production of “secondary goods,” particularly 
relative to primary goods.  He cites the First Industrial Revolution in Great Britain in the middle of the eighteenth 
century as the first example of a takeoff.  The primary driver behind takeoff is industrialization, characterized by 
growing manufacturing segments within a nation.  Takeoffs are typically accompanied by growing entrepreneurship, 
a rapid rise of a few leading industrialized industries, increased political support for supporting the industrialization 
process, and increased capital investment (typically more than 10% of national income reinvested into industrial 
assets) into private sector infrastructure such as factories.  In the early American example the rise of manufacturing 
is demonstrated by the growth of cotton and woolen manufactures, and the iron industry, as well as by increased 
support for tariffs and trade policy protection.  Historical data from the early nineteenth century makes it extremely 
difficult to validate investment rates, but observing growth of manufacturing jobs and the total capital invested in 
manufacturing infrastructure provides helpful evidence to determine whether substantial growth in manufacturing 
took place.  See W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 2, 38, 59.          
6 
 
 
 
     Once technological knowledge associated with the First Industrial Revolution was introduced 
to the United States, further transfer “intra-country” from the American Northeast to other parts 
of the nation was much easier to accomplish.  The South and West experienced their own 
takeoffs between 1830 and 1860.  Technology and capital transfer was more readily achieved 
intra-country, allowing other regions to partially “catch up” with the Northeastern manufacturing 
capabilities in relatively short periods of time.        
     Ideas also shaped American trade policy, establishing an intellectual framework that 
economic interest groups used to advance their causes, or for others to argue that the federal 
government should never show economic partiality to any group or individual.  In 1789, 
Americans were primarily influenced by European thinkers and examples.  Over time, American 
thinkers developed variations of nationalism and free trade thought that took on a unique 
American flavor.   
     The Enlightenment introduced fresh ideas to the world of political economy.  Just as John 
Locke and the Baron de Montesquieu revolutionized politics, so too did French physiocrats 
Jacques Turgot and Francois Quesnay, Scotsman Adam Smith, and French economist Jean 
Baptiste Say in economics.  Quesnay’s Tableau Economique, published in 1759, asserted that 
economic value was founded in land and agriculture.  He took mercantilists to task for trade 
regulation which, he claimed, slowed down the transfer of economic surpluses throughout 
society, and therefore impeded national economic development.   
     Free trade gained intellectual credibility in 1776, when Adam Smith published The Wealth of 
Nations in 1776, revolutionizing the world of economic thought.  Smith rejected the physiocratic 
assertion of a land-based view of productivity and wealth.  He substituted a more complex 
economic paradigm, which considered the impact of the early Industrial Revolution.  In 1803, as 
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industrialization slowly expanded from Britain to the Continent and the United States, Jean 
Baptiste Say published Traite d’Economie Politique (“Treatise on Political Economy”), further 
legitimizing free trade principles.
7
  
     Smith and other liberal thinkers asserted that tariffs and other trade barriers should be kept as 
low as possible or not exist at all.  They believed that a national economic system would produce 
optimal results if economic activities followed a natural course, without interference or 
preferential treatment from a national government.  The key to this system was consistent and 
equal treatment of all members of the economy, providing economic freedom for all citizens.    
     Continental free trade thinkers made a substantial impact upon early American economic 
thought.  The Wealth of Nations was printed in the United States as early as 1789 and used at the 
College of William and Mary as early as the mid-1790s.
8
  Thomas Jefferson’s library included a 
third edition copy of The Wealth of Nations (1784) and a first edition of Say’s Traite d’Economie 
Politique (1803).
9
 
     The major alternative to free trade was economic nationalism, patterned after the British 
experience.  A national government’s role was to foster economic growth through policy.  High 
tariffs could shield domestic sectors such as manufactures and agriculture because competing 
foreign goods would become more expensive.  Tariff policy could even be constructed to target 
specific industries.      
     British intellectuals concluded that their mercantilist system was compatible with British 
liberalism.  The Glorious Revolution, transition to a Hanovarian constitutional monarchy, and 
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rise of the Whig and Tory parties did little to stifle mercantilist policies that had been in place 
since the mid-seventeenth century.  Throughout the eighteenth century Great Britain refined this 
system, adding necessary bureaucracy to manage ever increasing levels of trade and commerce.   
     The British economic example provided strong evidence to support a “national” style of trade 
policy.  Over the previous century, Britain had defeated France in a series of wars, embraced 
industrialization, and emerged as the world’s leading economic power.  A closed economic 
system had been a key factor in British ascendency.  Some American policy makers believed that 
replicating the British model to some degree could vault to United States towards prosperity and 
wealth in a short timeframe. 
     Americans gradually formed distinct notions of political economy along both nationalist and 
free trade lines of thought.  Economic nationalists were influenced by such figures as Alexander 
Hamilton in the 1780s and 1790s, Friedrich List in the 1840s, and Henry C. Carey in the 1850s.  
Free traders would be inspired by the examples of John Taylor in the 1800s through the 1820s, 
William Leggett in the 1830s, and William Gregg in the 1840s.     
Theoretical Framework  
     The various tariff debates between 1789 and 1860, and the related roll call votes, provide the 
foundational information for this study.  Jefferson’s trade restriction bills between 1806 and 
1809, while technically not tariffs, are also included.  These legislative acts were the visible 
manifestation of American trade policy.  American trade policy was shaped by economic forces 
in the form of special interest groups and by ideas put forth by leading political economists of the 
day, which, in turn, were quickly incorporated into leading publications as well as the tariff 
debates in both the Senate and House of Representatives.  
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     Senators and House members acted as proxies for the general economic interests of their 
constituents while voting on the plethora of trade bills that Congress considered between 1789 
and 1860.  Congressional elections, particularly in the House of Representatives, were held 
frequently enough that changing economic sentiments were quickly reflected within its 
membership.  Congress provided the political means through which special economic interest 
groups attempted to influence the policy-making process.  
     The study also utilizes United States census data from 1790 through 1860.  The collection of 
economic data during these years is inconsistent, but by 1840 the census reports were gathering 
useful economic information, which helps to measure the growth of industrialization throughout 
the nation.  The census data is augmented by the reports of Tench Coxe and Timothy Pitken 
during the early nineteenth century. 
     Ideas regarding political economy, and specifically trade policy, were shared extensively by 
way of books, newspapers, letters, and on the floor of Congress.  Free trade nationalist themes 
were constantly present in the various trade policy debates.  By 1820, American policy makers 
began solidifying distinct notions about trade policy.  The best example was Henry Clay’s 
American System, which offered nationalist trade policy initiatives that became a lightning rod 
for both economic nationalists and free traders during tariff debates from 1820 forward.      
     Trade also served to demarcate major political parties during the First and Second Party 
Systems.  During the First Party System Federalists and Republicans generally assumed opposite 
positions on trade policy, although these positions changed over time.  Trade policy differences 
were more acute during the Second Party System, as Whigs stridently sought protectionist policy 
while Democrats embraced free trade. 
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     The differences between the Whigs and the Democrats from the 1830s through the 1850s 
were shaped by contrasting views of the impact of industrialization and political economic 
theory.  Whigs prioritized the collective good of the nation and considered industrialization as an 
opportunity to increase American political and economic strength.  They believed industrializing 
the nation provided fertile ground for enterprising entrepreneurs, which created opportunities for 
American citizens seeking upward social and economic mobility.  The key tactic to achieve this 
strategic outcome was the American System, which drew its inspiration from the British example 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Democrats, on the other hand, celebrated 
individualism and concluded that the United States should pursue liberal laissez-faire policies to 
ensure that individual economic rights were protected.  They were not anti-manufacturing per se, 
but believed that government should not interpose itself to artificially hasten industrialization. 
Historiography  
     There has been scant literature devoted early American trade policy over the past century, 
although some historians tangentially considered the tariff while researching other topics.  This is 
perplexing in light of the tariff’s significance during the first half of the nineteenth century.  
Contemporary voters were as concerned about the tariff as the national bank, and yet the national 
bank has received more focused scholarly attention in recent times.  
     In contrast, the tariff greatly interested historians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.  Six significant economic histories regarding early American tariffs were written over a 
twenty year span beginning in 1884.  These works generally focus on economic theory, without 
heavily considering the role of the politics in the process, and include the following: David 
Hastings Mason’s A Short Tariff History of the United States from the Earliest to the Present 
Time (1884), Richard W. Thompson’s The History of Protective Tariff Laws (1888), Frank W. 
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Taussig’s The Tariff History of the United State (1888), considered the preeminent historical 
work on nineteenth century American tariffs, Dr. Orrin Elliott’s The Tariff Controversy in the 
United States, 1789 – 1833 (1892), William Hill’s The First Stages of the Tariff Policy of the 
United States (1893) and Edward Stanwood’s American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth 
Century (1903).   
     Taussig and Elliott wrote histories detailing the economic impact of American tariff bills.  
Taussig charged that both free traders and protectionists demonized each other too often, noting 
that protectionist claims of economic prosperity from high tariffs represented an “exaggeration 
… which is as common among their opponents as among their advocates.”10  Elliott offered 
sectional-based interpretation of tariffs, where “the South was traditionally jealous of 
manufactures, and opposed the tariff encouragement as partial and oppressive.”11   
     The remaining authors used their works to promote economic nationalism.  Mason 
acknowledged that “this history … is intended to prove conclusively [that] … all the prosperity 
enjoyed by the American people … from the foundation of the United States government down 
to the present time, has been under the reign of protective principles.”12  Thompson, who voted 
for the Tariff of 1842 as a House member, stated that his goal was to “desire correct and non-
partisan information, to understand what is involved in each of the opposing principles of free 
trade, and to decide intelligently between them.”  He concluded that if anyone would “take it [the 
tariff issue] out of party politics – free it from the dangers of sectional controversy – nationalize 
it in the broadest and most comprehensive sense,” they would realize that “protection will 
furnish abundant revenue for the Government, proper encouragement to industry, home markets 
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and fair prices for all surplus products, just compensation to labor, the continued development of 
our natural resources, and put a stop … to those periodical fluctuations in business.”13  Hill 
commented that “It was natural that almost the first act of the new Congress should be a measure 
for the protection and encouragement of American industries.”14  Stanwood identified “certain 
times when the financial situation of the government suggested the unwisdom of disturbing the 
then existing system of [protective] tariff taxation.”15     
     More recent scholarship on the antebellum period has accepted the notion that the tariff issue 
was regional in nature, including authors Avery Craven, David Potter, James McPherson, and 
William Freehling.  Craven, in Civil War in the Making (1959), noted that while Southern states 
outside of South Carolina rejected nullification in 1832 they “disliked the tariff as much” as the 
Nullifiers.
16
  David Potter, in The Impending Crisis (1963), stated that the tariff issue was an 
“apple of discord” that contributed, with the Mexican War and the Oregon treaty, to rising 
sectional tensions that were apparent by the mid-1840s.
17
  James McPherson’s Battle Cry of 
Freedom (1988) observed that protectionist efforts to raise tariff rates after the Panic of 1857 
were rebuffed by “an almost solid South combined with half or more of Northern Democrats.”18   
     Other recent historians have revived the Beardian interpretation of antebellum economics, 
claiming the tariff increased sectional tensions by pitting an industrialized North against an 
agricultural South.  Charles and Mary Beard asserted, in The Rise of American Civilization 
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(1927), that economic tensions, including tariffs, were a primary cause of the Civil War, noting 
Jefferson Davis’ claim that the North sought “by an unjust system of legislation, to promote the 
industry of the New England states, at the expense of the people of the South.”  They concluded 
that Southerners foresaw “an economic policy that meant the exploitation of the South for the 
benefit of northern capitalism.”19  Mark Thornton and Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., in Tariffs, 
Blockades and Inflation (2004), argue that antebellum “tariffs on finished goods … raised the 
prices paid by Southerner [and] the “terms of trade” were set against them by high protectionist 
tariffs.  Thus, from the earliest days of the nation, the tariff issue was paramount to Southerners.”  
They asserted that “Northern interests had a different perspective.  Some entrepreneurs supported 
high protective tariffs … using an “infant industry” argument.”20  Douglas Irwin states in a 
National Bureau of Economic Research paper that the Tariff of 1842 was an instance where “The 
House passed the measure by a single vote, with overwhelming support from the North, 
complete opposition from the South, and a majority against in the West.”21     
     Some historians have contested the sectional interpretation of antebellum American politics.  
Joel Silbey and Thomas Alexander studied congressional roll calls during the 1830s and 1840s, 
and both concluded that party loyalty and orthodoxy characterized the time period.  Silbey’s The 
Shrine of Party examined congressional voting patterns from 1841 through 1852, and the data 
demonstrated that voting unity correlated more strongly to political parties than regions, leading 
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him to conclude that “parties were united … sections were split.”22  Alexander’s Sectional Stress 
and Party Strength studied voting patterns in the House of Representatives from 1836 to 1860, 
and similarly concluded that “party antagonism dominated the divisions” on economic issues.23        
     Social historians, particularly Marxist writers, also viewed the antebellum economy as a 
North-South dichotomy.  Eugene Genovese concluded that “The South’s slave civilization could 
not forever coexist with an increasingly hostile, powerful, and aggressive Northern 
Capitalism.”24  John Ashworth linked the tariff to slavery, explaining that the South was 
consistently anti-tariff because “behind the tariff question lay the larger issue of federal power.  
And the concern with power was prompted above all by fears for slavery.”25      
     None of the aforementioned works carefully considers the progression of the industrialization 
process, an important component to fully understanding the impact of trade legislation on the 
United States during its early history.  Two twentieth century works, focusing primarily on 
historical examples outside of the United States, provide valuable contributions to fill this gap.  
W. W. Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth (1960) and Alexander Gerschenkron’s 
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962) study the industrialization process.  
Rostow concerned himself with modernization of twentieth century third-world countries during 
the Cold War, using a substantial number of historical examples, primarily from Europe and 
tangentially from the United States and Japan.  His theoretical concept of economic “takeoff” is 
relevant to interpreting the impact of industrialization during the American republic’s early 
history.  Gerschenkron studied how nineteenth century European nations industrializing later in 
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time were able to close the technological gap with nations that had industrialized earlier.  His 
primary thesis, where modernization laggards could “catch up” with those countries who had led 
the innovation process, will also be useful to this study.         
Conclusions  
     The thesis that early American trade policy was primarily shaped by economic interests 
arising from industrialization and by ideas about trade policy in a republican political framework 
differs from traditional interpretations of the tariff.  This study chronicles the introduction of 
manufacturing to the United States, where it initially “clustered” in New England and the 
Atlantic states.
26
  Eventually, through a “takeoff” process, industrialization spread throughout the 
nation.  Those regions where industrialization was introduced later chronologically were 
nonetheless capable of “catch up.”    
     Congress, when considering trade bills between 1790 and 1860, acted consistently with the 
above interpretation.  Over time, as manufacturing spread throughout the nation, the voting 
patterns in the Senate and House gradually changed as well, reflecting the changing fortunes and 
interests of the different regions.  The arguments during the many debates frequently referred to 
the opposing ideological schools of economic nationalism and free trade.  Although the rhetoric 
became increasingly sophisticated over time, the foundational elements of the respective 
arguments remained generally consistent. 
     If the above assertions are valid, many previous interpretations of the tariff deserve 
reconsideration.  For example, if interests and ideas fueled trade policy development, the Marxist 
view pitting an industrializing, free-labor North against a feudal, slave-based South must be 
flawed.  Industrialization did find its way to the South, and was compatible with slavery. 
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Likewise, the Beardian interpretation of competing economic interests between an agricultural 
South and industrial North should be rejected as well.    
     The thesis based upon ideas and interests also conflicts with the notion that the United States 
has always maintained a liberal political culture.  Louis Hartz, in The Liberal Tradition in 
America, concluded that the United States has always been liberal, stating that Americans “had 
the American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke.”27  He viewed the Whigs as a 
short-lived aberration, and that although early Americans possessed “a large measure of 
economic freedom, they still needed, because of America’s underdeveloped economy, state 
economic aid, and so they exchanged the cry of “laissez-faire” for the cry of tariffs and the 
“American System.””28  The continuous efforts by economic nationalists throughout the years 
from Washington to Lincoln, suggest that Hartz might be overly optimistic in characterizing the 
United States as “liberal.”  The American System was certainly inconsistent with Hartz’s notion 
of Lockean liberalism. 
     Three great political issues sparked regional tensions between the North and South leading up 
to the Civil War: slavery, states rights, and the tariff.  Slavery was the core issue behind the 
Missouri Compromise, the Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  On the surface, 
both states rights and the tariff sparked passions during the Nullification Crisis of 1832-33. 
     The Nullification Crisis, and its ties to the tariff, merits some initial comment.  John Calhoun 
and the Nullifiers characterized the Crisis as a response to unjust tariff policy, and used 
nullification as their remedy.  However, as William Freehling has posited, the real issue behind 
the Nullification was minority rights and the institution of slavery.
29
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     Nullifiers used the tariff as their proxy issue for defending minority rights because of 
coincidental timing.  The great initial “takeoff” in the United States was concentrated in the 
American Northeast in the 1820s.  The South eventually launched its own takeoff in the late 
1830s and throughout the 1840s.  Situated in 1832 and 1833, Nullification occurred during that 
brief interlude period separating the separate “takeoff” events.  At that point in time, the North 
was industrializing while the South had not yet started in a meaningful way.  The tariff and 
slavery issues briefly paralleled one another between 1828 and 1833.  By 1840, this was no 
longer possible because the South had commenced meaningful industrialization. 
     The Nullification episode has unfortunately tempted historians, as noted in the historiography, 
to mistakenly lump the tariff alongside slavery and state rights as a contributing factor to the 
American Civil War.  Trade policy had little, if any, bearing on the outbreak of the war.  The 
Compromise of 1850 and Kansas-Nebraska generated sectional antagonisms while the Tariffs of 
1846 and 1857 didn’t.  The Civil War may have been fought over slavery, its expansion, and 
state rights, but it was definitely not fought over tariffs and trade policy. 
     Instead, the tariff wars that raged from 1789 through 1860 were premised on interests and 
ideas.  These battles didn’t generate bloodshed, but economic nationalists and free traders 
nonetheless waged a vigorous fight over national trade policy.  By 1865, the slavery and state 
rights questions were effectively resolved.  Trade policy was not, and the interests and ideas that 
squared against one another antebellum eventually renewed their struggle post bellum.
30
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CHAPTER 2 – CONTRASTING PARADIGMS: EARLY TARIFFS, 1789 TO 1800 
“I think it both polite and just that the fostering hand of the General Government should extend 
to all those manufactures which will tend to national utility … I take it to be the policy of every 
enlightened nation to give their manufactures that degree of encouragement necessary to perfect 
them, without oppressing the other parts of the community; and under this encouragement, the 
industry of the manufacturer will be employed to add to the wealth of the nation.”1   
- Representative Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania (April 9, 1789 remarks to the House) 
 
“I own myself the friend to a very free system of commerce, and hold it as a truth, that 
commercial shackles are generally unjust, oppressive, and impolitic; it is also a truth, that if 
industry and labor are left to take their own course, they will generally be directed to those 
objects which are the most productive …” 2  
- Representative James Madison of Virginia (April 9, 1789 remarks to the House) 
 
     New Hampshire’s ratification of the Constitution in June 1788 brought the United States of 
America into existence, marking the beginning of the American experiment in government.  The 
new republic, unconstrained by past traditions or precedents, possessed a clean slate with which 
to create political and economic policies.  In light of the United States’ economic inferiority 
relative to Europe, the federal government made trade policy an early priority.      
     Over the next decade, the fledgling republic attempted to shape the beginnings of a trade 
policy.  The process was largely influenced by the nationalist ideas of Alexander Hamilton, and 
particularly his Report on Manufactures.  At the same time, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson 
and others maintained that the United States should embrace free trade.  By 1800, American 
trade policy remained an embryonic work-in-process, mixing features from both viewpoints.        
     One of the very first matters of business for the First Congress was the consideration of tariff 
legislation and the beginning steps towards establishing American foreign trade policy.  On April 
1, 1789, the new House of Representatives reached a quorum, and one week later, it considered 
its first piece of legislation, a bill to enact a national tariff to raise revenues.  The national 
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government had no significant revenue sources as of yet, and urgently sought to enact the tariff 
in order to pay for its operations.    
     In simple terms, a tariff is a tax levied upon either imported or exported goods.  The United 
States Constitution limited the Federal Government’s powers, only permitting it to lay duties 
upon imports.  Import tariffs could be determined in one of two different ways.  The first was to 
charge an “ad valorem” rate.  This tariff was calculated as a percentage of the value of the 
imported good.  The second method was to charge a “specific duty.”  This latter method charged 
a fixed dollar amount per either the weight or quantity of an imported good.
3
      
     Four significant tariff bills were presented to Congress during Washington’s two terms and 
John Adam’s single term in office.  An examination of the congressional debates and roll call 
votes provides strong evidence that American political leaders treated the tariff as an issue of 
republicanism.  The nation was not industrialized in any meaningful sense in 1789 and its 
geographic regions were free of manufacturing special economic interests that might sway their 
voting actions.  Instead, the executive branch and Congress concerned themselves with whether a 
new republic would be best served by either protectionist or free trade policies.  During the tariff 
debates between 1789 and 1800 opposing groups of economic nationalists, who advocated neo-
mercantilism (favoring tariff protection), and liberals, who preferred a laissez-faire approach 
(favoring free trade), presented contrasting versions of trade policy that each believed were most 
compatible with republicanism.  Importantly, these respective groups were more ideological, 
rather than regional, in nature.
4
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The Tariff and Its Importance 
     Tariffs played a critical part of eighteenth and nineteenth century economic policy because 
they were an important revenue source for the United States.  The Federal government raised 
$32.7 million dollars in revenues during the Washington Administration’s eight years in office, 
and tariffs comprised about 89 percent of that total.
5
  All politicians of the era acknowledged that 
some minimal level of tariff was necessary so that the Federal government could pay its 
expenses.   
     The tariff’s importance in the post-Revolutionary United States was magnified by 
international economic events.  The Industrial Revolution began in Great Britain in the 1750s.  
During the Confederation years the United States possessed no significant manufacturing 
capabilities and relied on Britain and the rest of Europe for finished goods.  If the United States 
was to become economically self-sufficient, protective tariffs would be critical to promote 
industrialization.  However, industrialization came at a cost.  Contemporary Americans 
recognized that industrialization could create social ills alongside economic wealth.  These costs, 
including the prospect of making workers dependent on employers, potentially undermined 
republican principles.  
     Great Britain was the world’s leading political and economic power by 1763, aided by 
nationalistic trade policies.  The vast British Empire conducted trade within a mercantilist 
system, where colonies only imported and exported goods with the mother country.  This 
arrangement “sought power rather than or much more than plenty … it valued plenty solely or 
mainly as an instrument or support of power.”  Mercantilist thinkers prioritized the stability and 
security of the state, leading them to conclude that “power was the sole ultimate end of state 
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policy, with wealth merely one of the means.”  The system required “subordination of economic 
to political considerations” and “subordination of the individual to the state.”6   
     The American colonies economically thrived in the British system because they were 
protected from foreign competition.  From 1700 to the early 1770s, British imports from its 
American and African colonies increased from 19% of its trade to 37%.  During the same time, 
exports increased from 12% to 42%.  The North American colonies were deeply, and 
successfully, integrated into the Empire’s economy on the eve of the Revolution.7 
     However, intellectual challenges to mercantilism, inspired by the Enlightenment, emerged in 
the eighteenth century in France from a loosely connected group of thinkers, the “Physiocrats.”  
The intellectual father of the movement was Francois Quesnay who published the Tableau 
Oeconomique in 1758.
8
  Quesnay proposed that all economic value derives from land, stating 
that “The earth is the mother of all our goods.”9  Physiocratic thought stressed the importance for 
a nation to export as much of its primary agricultural goods as possible, using the active 
involvement of government if necessary.  As Gianni Vaggi writes, the Physiocrats were “not 
fully committed supporters of complete laissez-faire,” and only regarded it “as the most 
convenient and profitable way of selling the products of French agriculture.”10 
     Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations went well beyond the Physiocrats and advocated 
eliminating state-dominated mercantilism, and replacing it with laissez-faire principles of free 
trade.  He argued that in the long-run a nation was better off and economically enriched by doing 
so.  Smith concluded that “the most advantageous method in which a landed nation can raise up 
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artificers, manufacturers and merchants of its own, is to grant the most perfect freedom of trade 
to the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of all other nations.”11 
     It might initially appear that the twin revolutions of 1776 would be totally compatible. 
However, the neophyte American nation thrived inside the British economic system prior to 
1775, and American disaffection with King George and Parliament did not necessarily generate 
equal levels of contempt for British economic policy.  Many Americans maintained a deep 
respect for Great Britain’s economic success, which they associated with British trade policy.12   
     Consequently, many Founders desired to emulate the same economic system that had been 
partially responsible for Great Britain’s rise to world power by the late eighteenth century.  Early 
American “economic nationalists” included Alexander Hamilton, George Washington and Fisher 
Ames.  They believed that true American independence did not end with the Constitution.  
Rather, without economic independence as well, the American nation was exposed to potential 
corruption by European powers.  The only way to stave off this danger was to enact policy that 
would make the United States economically self-sufficient.  The tariff was a key available tool to 
achieve this end.     
     Others believed that the republic would be strengthened by fully embracing Adam Smith’s 
egalitarian economic principles. Republican “virtue” would be enhanced by minimal 
governmental intrusion into the economic sphere.  This group, including James Madison, 
Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry and John Taylor, endorsed tariffs only sufficient to cover the 
necessary costs of the federal government.  They believed that no economic discrimination or 
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favoritism should be created by a tariff.  Jefferson even anticipated David Ricardo’s later theory 
of comparative economic advantage, endorsing free market principles, when he declared to “let 
our work-shops remain in Europe.  It is better to carry provisions and materials to workmen 
there, than bring them to the provisions and materials.”13      
Trade and the British Empire 
     The American colonies enjoyed economic prosperity throughout the eighteenth century as an 
important cog in the closed Atlantic trade of the British Empire.  Parliament originally passed the 
Navigation Act of 1651 to bolster British merchant shipping in the face of Dutch competition.  
Over time, the original act was strengthened.  The 1651 act was expanded in 1660 and 1662 and 
the collective Navigation Acts were instrumental in making Great Britain the world’s foremost 
economic power by the middle of the eighteenth century.
14
         
     The colonies grew rapidly throughout the 1700s.  Though quantitative economic data from 
the Colonial period is notoriously imprecise, it can still be safely asserted that the region’s good 
fortune occurred against a background of rapid demographic and economic growth.  In 1720, the 
British American colonial population approximated 467,000 individuals.  By 1774, the estimated 
population stood at 2,420,000, more than a five-fold increase over the course of a half century.  
The combined total of imports and exports between Great Britain and her American colonies also 
increased five-fold between 1720 and 1774.
15
  Over the same time frame, colonial gross 
domestic product (“GDP”) per capita increased in excess of seven times.16    As a result, on the 
eve of the Revolution, the average wealth of an American subject in the colonies was virtually on 
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par with counterparts living in the British Isles.
17
  The median free American colonist earned 
approximately £13 per annum compared to only £11 for Englishmen.  After factoring taxes, an 
average colonist enjoyed a standard of living about 20% better than that available in the mother 
country.
18
 
     Although the American Revolution established political independence, the war’s conclusion 
didn’t create a parallel economic independence.  The war between 1775 and 1783 severely 
disrupted trade between the rebellious colonies and Great Britain.  Previously, despite American 
discontent in the 1760s over the Stamp Act (1765) and Townshend Acts (1767), trade remained 
healthy, reaching a pre-war peak in 1771.  However, as tensions increased in the wake of the 
Boston Massacre (1770), the Boston Tea Party (1773), and the Intolerable Acts (1774), trade 
dropped precipitously.
19
  When rebellion flared in 1775, trade between Britain and the American 
colonies rapidly decreased to only 38% of 1771 levels.  By 1778, overseas commerce between 
the two parties virtually ceased, and trade fell to just 1% of the peak trade level.
20
    
     During the wartime period, many American leaders called for a corresponding revolution in 
economics.  They outright rejected British mercantilism, believing that system’s bureaucracy and 
distribution of privileges were the antithesis of virtuous republicanism.  In 1776, Thomas Paine 
argued in Common Sense that a “free trade” policy would serve the new nation well.  He noted 
that “Our plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship of 
all Europe; because, it is the interest of all Europe to have America a free port.  Her trade will 
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always be a protection.”21  A year later, he wrote that “The freedom of trade … [is] an article of 
such vast importance, that the principle source of wealth depends upon it.”22  
     Virginians Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry also endorsed free trade ideology.  In 1781 
Jefferson expressed a desire “to throw open the doors of commerce … giving perfect freedom to 
all persons for the vent of whatever they may choose to bring into our ports, and asking the same 
in theirs.”23  Henry declared in 1783 that the nation should “Fetter not commerce, sir, - let her be 
free as the air - she will range the whole creation, and return on the wings of the four winds of 
heaven to bless the land with plenty.”24  Paine, Jefferson and Henry all concluded that 
international trade was a mutually beneficial endeavor between nations, and anticipated that the 
United States would benefit from rejecting mercantilist policies and opening American ports.
25
        
Trade and the Confederation Period, 1783 – 1787 
     The Treaty of Paris in 1783 ended the Revolutionary War, leaving thirteen independent states 
loosely tied to one another through the Articles of Confederation.  The Articles were ratified on 
March 1, 1781, three years after the Continental Congress had submitted it to the states.
26
  
Article IX of the Articles clearly checked the central economic powers of the Confederation 
Congress, providing that “no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of 
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the respective states shall be restrained from imposing … imposts and duties on foreigners.”27  
Consequently, the states were left on their own to implement tariff policy.     
     The tariff policies of the individual states varied considerably during the Confederation 
period.  Between 1780 and the enactment of the Federal Constitution, Pennsylvania and Virginia 
passed at least fifteen and twelve tariff proposals, respectively.
28
  Massachusetts and many of the 
southern states charged very low tariffs intended to raise revenues only as necessary for the 
operations of their respective state governments.  Rhode Island and New Hampshire not only 
enacted tariffs on imports, but also crafted their laws to protect and/or encourage certain 
industries. In contrast, New Jersey embraced free trade, admitting all goods without duty.
29
  Low 
tariff states like New Jersey enjoyed a brisk import business, since foreign producers could land 
goods there and then transfer or smuggle them to other American states for only the cost of 
transport.  The disparate situation allowed foreign countries, and particularly Great Britain, to 
simply bypass those states charging high tariff rates.    
     As the Revolutionary War came to a close in 1783, Thomas Paine warned of the dangers of 
the decentralized nature of American trade policy.  British Parliament member Lord Sheffield 
had published “Observations on the Commerce of the United States” shortly after the war, and 
he declared that “It will be a long time before the American States can be brought to act as a 
Nation, neither are they to be feared as such by us.”30  Paine, in reply to Sheffield, noted that 
“The pamphlet has two objects; the one is, to allure the Americans to purchase British 
manufactures; and the other, to spirit up the British Parliament to prohibit the Citizens of the 
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United States from trading to the West-India Islands.”  Paine’s anti-British remedy called for the 
states to authorize Congress to impose a flat five percent duty upon all imports in retaliation.
31
  
     Paine’s concerns were well founded.  Immediately after the Treaty of Paris, the Atlantic trade 
between Great Britain and the United States quickly reestablished itself.  However, the United 
States’ independence now placed it outside of the British trade system.  Americans were stymied 
in their efforts to export their goods to British possessions because those goods were subject to 
heavy tariff rates, or outright prohibited.  By contrast, in the absence of any centralized tariff 
policy, British producers exported their goods to the United States at little or no tariff cost.  The 
trading relationship between the two nations changed dramatically, as shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Trade Patterns between Great Britain and the United States, 1763-1789 (in constant 
value pounds sterling)  
   Annual Average Annual Average Net US 
Time Period  Britain to States States to Britain Trade Balance   Ratio 
1763 to 1775   £2,079,316  £1,238,311  (£   841,005)     1.68:1  
1776 to 1783   £   482,670  £     77,000  (£   405,670)   6.27:1 
1784 to 1789   £2,123,180  £   796,347  (£1,326,833)   2.67:1 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:711-712.   
     During the Confederation Period, British exports to the United States quickly rebounded and 
soon exceeded pre-war levels.  In contrast, American trade to Britain shrank to roughly two-
thirds of pre-war levels.  These two trends created substantial trade deficits, causing severe 
problems for American businessmen and consumers, and severe specie shortages in the United 
States.
32
       
     As a consequence, American merchants slowly explored alternative trade markets during the 
1780s.  In 1784, the Empress of China successfully completed a journey to China that netted a 
25% profit on a capital investment of $120,000 on her very first voyage, demonstrating that 
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potentially lucrative markets exited outside of British circles.
33
  The growing importance of 
American trade occurred in spite the Confederation system.  
     Many Americans saw inherent weaknesses and problems with the decentralized economics of 
the Confederation era.  Alexander Hamilton, admiring the British example, called for a more 
active American federal government.  In April 1782 he authored Continentalist No. V, which 
bluntly described the Confederation’s problems with trade policy.  Hamilton stated that “vesting 
Congress with the power of regulating trade ought to have been a principal object of the 
Confederation … Commerce, like other things, has its fixed principles, according to which it 
must be regulated … To preserve the balance of trade in favor of a nation ought to be a leading 
aim of its policy.”34  James Madison also recognized deficiencies in the Articles, though 
confining his remarks to the practice of individual states charging duties on goods traded with 
other states.  He wrote in 1787, shortly before the Constitutional Convention, that “The practice 
of many States in restricting the commercial intercourse with other States … though not contrary 
to the federal articles … are destructive of the general harmony.”35  
     The Confederation Congress attempted to remedy its revenue problem, resolving in February 
1781 to request that the states agree to “vest in Congress the authority to levy an impost of 5 per 
cent on all goods imported.”36  This early attempt to grant tariff taxing and collection authority at 
a national level almost succeeded.  By the end of 1782, twelve of the thirteen states had 
acquiesced to the request.  Tiny Rhode Island held out, and the proposal failed to achieve the 
unanimous vote required for an amendment to the Articles.  In April 1783, Congress again 
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requested the five percent tariff, but offered the subtle change of allowing the states to collect the 
duties in place of a nationally administered administrative apparatus.  Nine states immediately 
ratified the proposal.  New York, Massachusetts, Georgia and Rhode Island failed to consent.  
Alexander Hamilton curiously cast the New York vote, even as he combined with Madison and 
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut to lobby for passage.  By 1786, twelve states provided approval 
for the measure, but now New York balked at ratification.  The two efforts to grant Congress 
tariff taxing powers narrowly failed, preventing the American government from raising tax 
revenues and establishing a uniform national tariff policy.
37
   
     The absence of a national trade policy, and massive trade deficits, contributed to American 
economic woes throughout the Confederation Period.  A Londoner was quoted in the May 27, 
1784 edition of the Boston Independent Chronicle as stating “If Americans continue involving 
themselves in debt to this Country, and for articles mostly of luxury and extravagance, from what 
sources are to arise their payments?  … What must be the natural consequences?  Nothing short 
of a poor impoverished country, having its very blood drawn from it, to pay for their extravagant 
importations.”  Later that summer, the same publication printed a letter from “A Friend to 
Commerce,” who noted that “if, instead of getting our balances in our favour, we make our 
importations of twice the value of our exports we cannot expect to flourish long.”38  The 
economic problems caused by trade imbalances served as a motivating factor for American 
leaders to organize the Annapolis Convention in 1786 and the Philadelphia Convention in 1787.  
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The Constitutional Convention, 1787-1788 
     When the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia on May 25, 1787, one of 
James Madison’s goals was to create a more powerful national government.39  A necessary 
prerequisite was providing the national government with reliable sources of revenue.  Granting a 
federal government the power to lay tariff duties would address this concern.  
     The Convention prioritized matters of representation, separation of powers, and the general 
structure of the proposed federal government throughout most of the summer.  The subject of 
tariffs was first considered on the Convention floor on the late date of August 16.  Although 
Madison supported granting the new government power to lay export duties, George Mason of 
Virginia immediately voiced objections, believing this practice was detrimental to Southern 
commerce.  He “was unwilling to trust to its being done in a future article … [and] hoped the 
Northern States did not mean to deny the Southern this security.”40   
     The issue was briefly discussed, and then tabled until August 31, when the committee 
recommended that “all duties, imposts & excises, laid by the Legislature shall be uniform 
throughout the U. S.”41  Duties were considered a final time on September 15 as the Convention 
raced to conclude its work.  Influenced by Mason’s objections, the Convention approved what 
became Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution; only Virginia cast a negative vote:
42
 
The Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts And Excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States.
43
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As further assurance to agricultural exporters, export duties were expressly forbidden by Article 
1, Section 9, Clause 5, which stated that “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from 
any State.”44 
     The delegates scattered to their respective states to participate in the ensuing ratification 
debates.  Pro-ratification forces were bolstered by the publication of the Federalist Papers, 
authored by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay.  Hamilton emphasized the need 
for strong federal control over commerce, noting the practicality of imposing tariffs on imports 
to raise revenues.  In Federalist 12 he stated “It is evident from the state of the country, from the 
habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is impractical to 
raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation … In America, it is evident that we must a 
long time depend for the means of revenue chiefly on … duties.”45  
     Other nationalists expressed similar views at the state conventions.  James Wilson declared at 
the Pennsylvania convention that “A very considerable part of the revenue of the United States 
will arise from that source; it is the easiest, most just, and most productive mode of raising 
revenue; and it is a safe one, because it is voluntary.”46  Oliver Ellsworth, in Connecticut, 
declared that tariffs were “the most fruitful and easy way,” where people would only be 
individually affected when “he is taking his pleasure, and feels generous; when he is laying out a 
shilling for superfluities, it takes twopence of it for public use.”47      
     Hamilton called for a high ad valorem rate.  He noted that “duties have not upon an average 
exceeded in any State three percent.  In France they are estimated to be about fifteen percent, and 
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in Britain they exceed this proportion.  There seems to be nothing to hinder their being increased 
in this country to at least treble their current amount.”48 
     The Federalist Papers addressed the need for import duties to fund the federal government, 
but Hamilton remained silent over the issue of protection for economic special interests.  He did, 
however, provide some clues about his later policy proposals once the Constitution was ratified.  
In Federalist 35 he admitted that duties “operate as an additional tax upon the importing State, 
whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the character of consumers … The States which 
can go farthest towards the supply of their own wants, by their manufactures, will not, according 
to their numbers or wealth, consume so great a proportion of imported articles as those States 
which are not in the same favorable situation.”49  At the state ratifying conventions, Federalists 
consistently argued that the tariff’s purpose was to cover the costs of the federal government.50    
     Anti-Federalists quickly pointed out potential dangers arising from the Constitution’s taxation 
powers.  “Centinel,” believed to be Samuel Bryan of Pennsylvania, warned that “though there is 
a provision that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform, that is, to be laid to the same 
amount on the same articles in each state, yet this will not prevent Congress from having it in 
their power to cause them to fall very unequal and much heavier on some states than on others, 
because these duties may be laid on articles but little or not at all used in some states, and of 
absolute necessity for the use and consumption of others.”51  Similarly, “Brutus” declared that 
“The legislative power is competent to lay taxes, duties, impost and excises; - there is no 
limitation to this power … the legislature … are the sole judges of what is necessary … for the 
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general welfare; this power therefore is neither more or less, than a power to lay and collect 
taxes, imposts, and excises, at their pleasure.”52  Robert Yates of New York, a Convention 
attendee believed to be the anti-federalist “Brutus,” harbored deep reservations that Congress 
would possess wide ranging and arbitrary power regarding the tariff.
53
 
     Anti-Federalist concerns about the power to set tariffs did not mean that they were opposed to 
industrialization.  In fact, a leading Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist, John Nicholson, was involved 
in manufacturing.  Their focus, as historian Saul Cornell shares, was that “Free governments … 
were not activists in economic matters”54  
     The ratification of the Constitution in 1788 meant that a coherent national trade policy was 
finally feasible.  While the Constitution created powers, primarily in the hands of Congress, to 
enact policy, it did not provide guidance in what policy ought to be.  That power, and those 
decisions, would be placed in front of the First Congress when it assembled in early 1789. 
The New Nation, 1789-1792 
     Fisher Ames of Massachusetts bemoaned the state of affairs in New York City in a letter to 
his friend Richards Minot in a letter dated March 25, 1789.  Ames was distressed that Congress 
had not yet established a quorum and was keenly concerned over the need for the new 
government to generate revenue.  He complained to his fellow lawyer that “This is a very 
mortifying situation … we lose £1,000 a day revenue.  We lose credit, spirit, everything … God 
deliver us speedily from this puzzling state, or prepare my will, if it subsists much longer, for I 
am in a fever to think of it.”55  
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     Ames was delivered from his distress a fortnight later.  James Madison of Virginia, on April 
8, 1789, introduced the very first American legislative act to the House of Representatives.  It 
was a tariff proposal, which he deemed “to be of the greatest magnitude, a subject, sir, that 
requires our first attention, and our united exertions.”56  Madison immediately keyed upon two 
points.  First, it was important to act quickly.  The federal government required money reserves 
to establish its financial credibility and the spring season was a time of increased shipping traffic.  
Further, whatever legislation was passed need not be permanent.  Congress could pass a 
temporary tariff to meet the government’s immediate needs and revise it at a later date, if 
necessary. 
     Madison’s proposals were generally consistent with the free trade principles advocated by 
Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations.  Tariffs would be as low as feasible and not favor any 
economic special interest.  His measure resembled the 1783 Confederation proposal, calling for 
an ad valorum rate on all imports at 5 percent.  He added that certain imported liquor and spices 
should be charged specific duties, including rum, molasses, wine, tea, pepper, sugars, cocoa and 
coffee.  Lastly, Madison added a proviso that extra duties be charged against inbound shipping 
vessels on a “per ton” basis corresponding to a three tiered rate schedule.  American ships would 
pay the lowest rate, ships from nations possessing trade treaties with the United States would pay 
a higher rate, and ships from all other nations would pay the highest rate.
57
   
     Madison intended a tariff structure that would prompt the United States to alter its trading 
patterns away from Great Britain and towards other foreign nations.  He hoped that 
discriminatory tariffs against British shipping would cause American commerce to become more 
diversified, preserving the “republican” nature of the United State.  As historian Drew McCoy 
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notes, he feared British industrialization, with its “new system of public finance, accompanied by 
the emergence and development of large moneyed companies … whose influence on government 
and society was pernicious.”58   
     Other congressmen offered similar “liberal” proposals.  Representative Elias Boudinot of 
New Jersey, the Confederation Congress president in 1783, immediately endorsed Madison’s 
proposal and moved that “the blanks be filled up in the manner they were recommended to be 
charged by Congress in 1783.”59  John Laurance of New York urged an even simpler 
methodology, proposing “a duty of a certain rate per cent on the value of all articles, without 
attempting an enumeration of any.”60   
     Other House members insisted that the tariff should incorporate protective elements.  Thomas 
Fitzsimons of Philadelphia shared that “I earnestly wish such a one [tariff] which, in its 
operation, will be some way adequate to our present situation, as it respects our agriculture, our 
manufactures, and our commerce.”61  Like many of the early economic nationalists, the forty-
eight year old Irish immigrant, and wealthy merchant, was a Revolutionary War veteran, serving 
during the Trenton and Princeton campaign.
62
   
     The comments by Boudinot, Laurance and Fitzsimons illustrate the wide array of existing 
views on the tariff.  Boudinot supported the precedents that had been established in the proposals 
of 1781 and 1783.  Laurance supported an equal tariff for all items, although his motivation was 
for expediency in putting the new tariff in place a quickly as possible as much as on any 
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ideological grounds.  Fitzsimons pleaded for a systematic set of duties in place to best advantage 
the three spheres of agriculture, manufacturing and commerce, a viewpoint influenced by the 
British example in place throughout the eighteenth century.   
     Arguments for and against the bill continued over the following month.  Madison reiterated 
the liberal viewpoint, arguing that “the system must be such a one, that, while it secures the 
object of revenue, it shall not be oppressive to our constituents … the general regulation of 
commerce … ought to be as free as the policy of nations will permit.”  He further emphasized 
that tariffs should be for “revenue alone.”63  Richard Bland of Virginia expressed concern that 
protection would result in “a tax upon the whole community, in order to put the money in the 
pockets of a few, whenever you burthen the importation with a heavy impost.”64 
     Madison conceded four potential conditions justifying departures from free trade.  The first 
was to raise funds necessary to fund the federal government in the absence of other reasonable 
alternatives.  The three additional exceptions were as a form of retaliation against a foreign 
discriminatory trade policy, on items necessary for national defense, and in times of war.
65
 
     Nationalists, in contrast to the liberals, wished to include some protective principle in the bill 
to promote manufactures, creating residual economic benefits for the nation.  Fitzsimons extolled 
that “the small protecting duties laid in Pennsylvania had a great effect towards the establishment 
of breweries; they no longer imported the article, but, on the contrary, exported considerable 
quantities.”66  George Clymer, also of Pennsylvania, related that “a furnace in Philadelphia, with 
a small aid from the Legislature of Pennsylvania, made three hundred tons [of steel] in two years, 
and now makes at a rate of two hundred and thirty tons annually.”  He added that the House 
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should be “disposed, under these considerations, to extend a degree of patronage to manufacture 
which a moment’s reflection would convince them was highly deserving protection.”67  Fisher 
Ames recognized the need for “the aid of the General Government to divert it [trade goods] to a 
more natural course … in America invitation and encouragement are necessary; without them the 
infant manufacture droops.”68 
     The public closely followed the first tariff debate.  As early as April 11, Representative 
William Smith of Maryland presented a petition form “tradesmen, manufacturers, and others, of 
the town of Baltimore” requesting tariff protection.  Their document suggested that Congress, 
“by imposing on all foreign articles … will give a just and decided preference to their labors.”69   
On the 18
th
 “the mechanics and manufacturers of New York” presented a similar plea.70 
     On May 16 the final version of the tariff bill passed the House on a vote of 41 to 8.
71
  The 
resulting bill was changed in important ways from the original proposal.  Madison had proposed 
an ad valorem tariff together with a short list of specific duties, all of which had been aimed at 
spirituous beverages.  In its place, specific duties were added for the stated purpose of protecting 
American manufacturing interests.  These included tariffs for manufactured goods such as 
unwrought steel, nails and cordage, agricultural goods such as cotton, indigo and hemp, and for 
consumer goods such as boots and shoes were all assigned specific duty rates.
72
  Table 2.2 
summarizes the House vote on a geographical basis: 
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Table 2.2. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1789 by Region 
 
Region   States    Ayes  Nays  
New England   (CT, MA, NH, RI)    11      3 
Atlantic   (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    11      5 
Chesapeake   (MD, VA)         14      0 
South    (GA, NC, SC)       5      0 
Totals         41      8 
Source: 1 Annals of Cong. 380 (1789).   
The eight nay votes were all cast by members from Northern states.  All three New Jersey 
representatives, led by Boudinot, voted against, as did two from Massachusetts, and one each 
from Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania.
73
  Historian Norman Risjord notes that “Anti-
Federalists, both in and out of Congress voiced objections” to any principle of protection and 
economic preference.
74
  However, these concerns did not translate into votes against the bill on 
the House floor, as shown in Table 2.3: 
Table 2.3. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1789 by Political Affiliation  
 
Political Affiliation    Ayes  Nays  
Pro-Administration        22      8 
Anti-Administration      19      0 
Totals        41      8 
Source: 1 Annals of Cong. 380 (1789); Rudolph Bell, Party and Faction in American Politics: 
The House of Representatives, 1789-1801 (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 252-
253. 
  
     The Senate introduced the tariff on May 21 and began debate five days later.  Immediately, a 
number of senators, including Tristram Dalton (MA), Ralph Izard (SC), Richard Henry Lee 
(VA), Robert Morris (PA), Caleb Strong (MA), and Paine Wingate (NH) attacked the House 
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bill’s feature charging different tonnage duties based upon a ship’s national origin, suggesting 
free trade tendencies.  Virginia’s William Grayson opposed import duties all together.75   
     Strong protectionist sentiments also existed in the Senate.  The Georgia and South Carolina 
delegations members successfully argued for an increase to duties on nails and spikes.  William 
Maclay of Pennsylvania desired higher discriminatory duties similar to those established by 
Pennsylvania during the Confederation period.  Maclay noted that a number of enumerated items 
on the 7.5% ad valorem federal schedule had been previously been charged by New York and 
Pennsylvania at 13% and 12.5%, respectively.  He reasoned that “to place the manufacturers of 
Pennsylvania, who had a claim on the faith of the State, on a worse ground than they stood 
before, would be injurious in a degree to their private property.”76 
     The Senate debate concluded on June 11 when its modified version of the bill passed.  Senate 
sessions were held in private, but Senator Maclay noted in his journal that Delaware, Maryland, 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania favored protection for manufacturing but there was opposition 
“from the North, and still more particularly from the South.”77  The Senate and House versions 
of the bill were resolved by committee.  Madison’s proposal to construct a tiered system of 
tonnage duties favoring nations that were parties to commercial treaties was rejected by the 
Senate, and the end result was a single schedule of rates for all imports.
78
  On July 4, 1789 
President Washington signed the bill into law.
79
   
     During the 1789 debates, nationalists argued that American commercial and manufacturing 
interests should be protected.  The preamble of the act stated that “it is necessary for the support 
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of government … and the encouragement and protection of manufacturers, that duties be laid on 
goods, wares and merchandises imported into the United States from any foreign port or 
place.”80  Nineteenth century historian William Hill contended that protection “was at least as 
important as any other motive in securing passage of the Act which laid the foundation of the 
tariff system.”81 
     Senator Fisher Ames of Massachusetts opposed protection to encourage manufactures.  
Instead, he expressed a desire to keep tariff rates low in order to promote commerce, a matter 
dear to his merchant friends and constituents back in Boston.  In the midst of the debates, Ames 
wryly informed his merchant friend Samuel Henshaw that “we are busy in contriving an act to 
get your money.  I fear that by straining duties too high, we shall find that you have tied hard 
knots in the purse strings.”    In the same letter, the Massachusetts representative complimented 
his House compatriots in the end by stating that “the general wish is to favor the agricultural 
trade & arts of the country by moderate duties on foreign ships and goods – Indeed, sir, the 
members are principally solid moderate men.”82  
     During the summer of 1790 it became clear to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton that 
the revenue stream from the 1789 tariff bill was insufficient to meet the nation’s projected 
expenses.  He suggested covering the shortfall by an excise tax, but this proposal died in 
Congress and in its place Hamilton introduced a new tariff bill.  The Tariff of 1790 was primarily 
aimed at increasing revenues using the structural platform established by the Tariff of 1789.  
Hamilton proposed raising most tariff levels by 50 percent over those established in 1789 in 
order to achieve added revenues.  The House passed the bill on July 19 after brief debate by a 
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vote of 39 to 13.
83
  The Senate approved the bill on August 5 and President Washington signed it 
into law on August 10.
84
  Tables 2.4 and 2.5 summarize the votes by region and political 
affiliation:   
Table 2.4. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1790 by Region 
 
Region   States    Ayes  Nays  
New England   (CT, MA, NH, RI)      5      9 
Atlantic   (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    14      1 
Chesapeake   (MD, VA)         10      2 
South    (GA, NC, SC)     10      1 
Totals         39    13 
Source: 2 Annals of Cong. 1741 (1790).   
     The 1790 bill included a 7.5 percent ad valorem rate for most enumerated goods.  A notable 
change from the 1789 act was a reduction to the stated duty rate on hemp (a raw material) and an 
increase on the stated duty rates on cordage and steel (finished products).  Also, a number of 
finished manufactured goods were taxed at a 10 percent ad valorem rate.
85
  Even with these 
modifications, the legislation handily passed and was strongly supported in the House by almost 
every region, New England being the exception.   
Table 2.5. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1790 by Political Affiliation  
 
Political Affiliation    Ayes  Nays  
Pro-Administration        19    11 
Anti-Administration       20      2 
Totals        39    13 
Source: 2 Annals of Cong. 1741 (1790); Bell, Party and Faction, 252-253. 
 
     An analysis of the House votes during the First Congress, which considered the Tariffs of 
1789 and 1790, reveals a highly fluid situation on the tariff issue.  Forty members of the House 
cast roll call votes on both bills.  Of this number, fourteen (35 percent) changed their voting 
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position between 1789 and 1790.  The reasons for vote changes were undoubtedly varied, but 
this pattern suggests that many members were still evolving their views of trade policy between 
1789 and 1790. 
     The 1790 tariff bill responded to short-term needs, and consequently Hamilton didn’t 
incorporate any significant features from his famous Report on Manufactures, published the 
following year.  By 1792 he was prepared to do so, and a new tariff bill was introduced to the 
House that included many of his recommendations.  The bill passed by a vote of 37 to 20.
86
  It 
was not strongly protectionist in nature.  There was no overt statement promoting protection, as 
there was in the 1789 bill.  Duties on cotton were eliminated, on hemp significantly increased, 
and most other rates were only slightly increased.  The preface of the bill innocuously stated that 
it was “An act for raising a further sum of money for the protection of the frontiers.”87        
     The brief debates indicate that many House members were interested in either significant 
protection for various special economic interests or eliminating all protective elements of the 
tariff, positions consistent with the ideological differences between the economic nationalists and 
liberals.  Representative John Steele of North Carolina, who eventually voted for the bill, argued 
that his state produced significant levels of hemp and cotton and believed that “the principles of 
reciprocity … [make it] just and equal to extend encouragement to the agricultural interest.”88  
John Page of Virginia, who voted against the bill, remarked that the bill was merely “an 
encouragement to the manufacturers and fisheries.”89 
     A breakdown of the 1792 roll call vote based on geography is summarized in Table 2.6: 
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Table 2.6. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1792 by Region 
 
Region   States    Ayes  Nays  
New England   (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)   14      2 
Atlantic   (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    13      2 
Chesapeake   (MD, VA)           6      8 
South    (GA, NC, SC)       4      8 
Totals         37    20 
Source: 3 Annals of Cong. 572 (1792).   
An initial review might suggest that Hamilton’s proposals sparked regional reactions.  His 
measure enjoyed significant support in the two northernmost regions and only tepid support in 
the two southernmost regions.  However, there was a strong minority vote favor of the bill in 
both southern regions, totaling 38.5 percent of the vote.  South Carolina actually favored the bill 
and every southern state except Georgia cast at least one vote in favor.   
     An alternate interpretation of this vote can be made.  By 1792, rudimentary semblances of 
organized political parties were emerging in the United States, partly prompted by Hamilton’s 
banking and tariff proposals.  Rudolph Bell’s Party and Faction in American Politics lists the 
unofficial party affiliations of House members during 1790s.  The fifty-seven House members 
that voted were categorized as Federalist (reported as “pro-administration”) or Republican 
(reported as “anti-administration’).  If the vote is alternatively analyzed by party affiliation, the 
pattern is as follows in Table 2.7: 
Table 2.7. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1792 by Political Party 
 
Party Affiliation    Ayes  Nays  
Pro-Administration      27      5 
Anti-Administration      10    15 
Totals        37    20 
Source: 3 Annals of Cong. 572 (1792); Bell, Party and Faction, 253-254. 
 
     The table shows that Hamilton’s Federalist faction overwhelmingly supported his program for 
establishing tariff protection for American manufactures.  The remaining Republican 
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representatives generally opposed the bill, but were more divided.  This breakout suggests that 
emerging party, serving as a proxy for ideological views, impacted the 1792 vote.         
Alexander Hamilton and Economic Nationalism  
     Only two months after signing the 1789 tariff bill, President Washington filled the post of 
Secretary of Treasury.  The concept of a presidential cabinet, and a treasury department, was 
absent from the Constitution and consequently required a legislative act, which passed in 
September.
90
  Alexander Hamilton, only thirty-two years old, was confirmed to the post that 
same month.
91
 
     In December 1791, the Secretary of the Treasury published the Report on Manufactures.  This 
was the third major report that Hamilton presented to Congress, following ones concerning 
public credit and a national bank.  The Report called for the United States to embrace and 
encourage industrialization in order to achieve national economic power and to provide the 
country with the means to defend itself against foreign powers. 
     The pressing problem Hamilton addressed was that the American economy, now separated 
from the British system, and with a paltry manufacturing base, was vulnerable.  In the face of 
this harsh reality, Hamilton felt it essential that United States be “independent of foreign nations, 
for military and other essential supplies.”92  The restrictive trade policies carried out by many of 
the most significant European powers created “the consequence … that the United States are … 
precluded from foreign Commerce.  They can indeed, without difficulty obtain from abroad the 
manufactures supplies, of which they are in want; but they experience numerous and very 
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injurious impediments to the emission and vent of their own commodities.”93  He added that 
“The regulations of several countries, with which we have the most extensive intercourse, throw 
serious obstructions in the way of the principal staples of the United States.  In such a position of 
things, The United States cannot exchange with Europe on equal terms.”94  Hamilton recognized 
the damages created by trade imbalances during the 1780s. 
     Like many early nationalists such as Washington and Fitzsimons, Hamilton served in the 
Revolutionary War and his nationalist opinions were shaped by that experience.  He witnessed 
the material shortcomings of the Continental army, and wished to prevent any recurrences in any 
future war.  The Report stated that “The extreme embarrassments of the United States during the 
late War, from an incapacity of supplying themselves, are still matter of keen recollection.”95   
     The Treasury Secretary argued that stimulating domestic manufacturing was essential for the 
nation’s security.  He emphasized that “Manufacturing … ought to be pursued respecting its 
encouragement … the establishment and diffusion of manufactures have the effect of rendering 
the total mass of useful and productive labor in a community, greater than it would otherwise 
be.”96  The Report laid out a deliberate and systematic argument for a national support of 
manufacturing.  The overriding theme is summarized in Hamilton’s declaration that “Not only 
the wealth, but the independence and security of a Country, appear to be materially connected 
with the prosperity of manufactures.  Every nation, with a view to those great objects, ought to 
endeavor to possess within itself the all the essentials of national supply.  These comprise the 
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means of Subsistence, habitation, clothing, and defence.”97  Hamilton argued that manufactures 
could produce wealth, rejecting Physiocrat notions that only agriculture could.
98
      
     Hamilton proposed two tactical approaches to encouraging manufactures: the placement of 
import duties to raise the price of imported goods, and subsidization of domestic industries 
through bounties and premiums.  He wanted to create “inducements to the promotion of 
Manufactures in the United states … which have been employed with success in other Countries 
… [including] duties on those foreign articles which are the rivals of the domestic ones, intented 
to be encouraged … [and] prohibition of rival articles or duties equivalent to prohibitions.”99  
The Report proposed increasing duties for a number of essential goods, including iron, steel, 
copper, glue, cotton and wool.  Hamilton believed that, in order to attract financial capital and 
skilled workers to nascent American industries, it was necessary to establish an economic 
framework that assured continuity and stability for long periods of time.  While he conceded 
high tariffs created higher domestic prices, these profits also generated stability and long-term 
growth.  Hamilton argued that, after a period of protection, “internal competition, which takes 
place, soon does away with everything like Monopoly, and by degrees reduces the price of the 
Article to the minimum of reasonable profit … in a national view, a temporary enhancement of 
price must always be well compensated by a permanent reduction of it.”100  
     The second methodology Hamilton sought was the use of bounties and premiums.  Bounties 
were, in effect, a bonus paid by the federal government to producers on a “per item” basis.  
Premiums were lump sum grants, dispensed by the federal government, to encourage investors to 
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develop new technologies and establish infrastructure for preferred industries.  Ultimately, 
import duties proved more politically feasible.  The proposal for bounties and premiums never 
garnered sufficient support to become an integral component of American trade policy.  
     The Report cited empirical evidence to validate why manufacturing was desirable.  Hamilton 
noted that “Since the Revolution, the States, in which manufactures have most increased, have 
recovered fastest from the injuries of the late War, and abound most in pecuniary resources.”101  
One success story was found in the iron industry, where “Iron works very greatly increases in the 
United States … the average price before the revolution was about Sixty four Dollars per Ton – 
at present it is about Eighty; a rise which is chiefly to be attributed to the increase of 
manufactures of the material.”102 
     Hamilton’s proposals were not totally adverse to the principles espoused in The Wealth of 
Nations.  Although he did not embrace Adam Smith’s call for free trade, Hamilton endorsed 
Smith’s call for economic specialization in the production process.  He observed that “the results 
of human exertion may be immensely increased by diversifying its objects.  When all the 
different kinds of industry obtain in a community, each individual can find his proper element, 
and can call into activity the whole vigor of his nature.  And the community is benefitted by the 
services of its respective members, in the manner in which each can serve it with most effect.”103  
     Hamilton insisted that manufacturing and agriculture economically complimented one 
another.  He stated that manufacturing increases benefitted farmers’ “productive powers, whether 
to be derived from an accession of Skill, or from the application of ingenious machinery.”  The 
farmer also enjoyed “an extensive domestic market for the surplus produce of the soil.”  In turn, 
manufacturers benefitted because “the labour of the Artificer consequently, may be regarded as 
                                                 
101
 Ibid. 
102
 Ibid. 
103
 Ibid. 
48 
 
 
 
three parts; one by which the provisions for his subsistence and the materials for his work are 
purchased of the farmer, one by which he supplies himself with manufactured necessaries, and a 
third which constitutes the profit on the Stock employed.”104     
     The Report on Manufactures is the first significant literature describing the key tenets of 
American economic nationalism.  Hamilton’s great goals were national security and economic 
prosperity.  He foresaw the consequences of the current British industrial revolution, believing 
that other nations needed to develop their own manufacturing base to preserve their political 
security.  He concluded that this critical national priority wouldn’t happen fast enough if left to 
natural market forces.  Governmental support was necessary to encourage manufacturing and to 
ensure that new industries enjoyed both near-term profitability and long-term continuity.   
     In some respects, the Report occupied common ground with Madison and the free traders, and 
in others it did not.  As Madison pointed out in the 1789 debates, national defense was an 
appropriate framework under which to craft discriminatory tariffs.  Where the sides essentially 
differed was in the preferential treatment for manufactures under an “infant industry” argument.       
     While Hamilton admired many British political and economic characteristics, and exhibited 
pro-British sympathies throughout the 1790s, he didn’t wish to replicate the British mercantilism.  
Instead, Hamilton viewed Britain industrialization as the economic example for the United States 
to follow.  He advocated achieving that end through protection.  
Trade Policy from 1793 to 1800 
     By Washington’s second term, American trade policy was established.  Its features mixed 
both nationalist and liberal ideas.  Import duty rates were low, accommodating free traders.  At 
the same time, mild discriminatory tariffs on a number of items placated economic nationalists.  
This arrangement worked, and historian Rudolph Bell concludes that “delegates, at least some of 
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them some of the time, compromised narrow economic interests and formulated policies they 
believed were in the national interest … in the late 1790s delegates felt no pressing need to 
produce new policy outputs.”105 
     Congress maintained these general trade policies through the remaining years of the 
Washington and Adams presidencies.  Two additional tariffs passed through Congress during 
this time period, one in 1794 and the other in 1796.  Both tariff bills gradually increased the 
overall tariff rate.  These bills, however, solely responded to the growing revenue needs of the 
federal government and didn’t represent any fundamental shift in policy.   
     Increased revenues became necessary because American diplomatic relations with the major 
European powers become increasingly strained, requiring added military expenditures.  The 
tariff bills of the 1790s succeeded in providing adequate federal revenues.  For the twelve years 
between 1789 and 1800, the federal government operated on a breakeven basis, and tariff 
revenues comprised 88% of total revenues.
106
 
     The major issue impacting trade policy during this period was relations with Great Britain.  In 
early 1794 the Royal Navy began interdicting American shipping to, and from, the French West 
Indies.
107
  A trade war, or worse, a direct military confrontation with Britain was problematic, as 
it represented about three-quarters of American foreign trade.
108
  The Washington administration 
dispatched Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate with the British in hopes of averting outright 
conflict. 
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     Jay’s Treaty was drafted in November 1794 and presented to the Senate for consideration in 
June of 1795.  While the treaty successfully defused a volatile diplomatic situation, it didn’t alter 
the trade situation between the two countries.  The British made minor concessions, allowing 
“the citizens of the United States to carry to any of His Majesty’s islands and ports in the West 
Indies from the United States, in their own vessels, not being above the burthen of seventy tons,” 
the privilege of trading within the British system.  The seventy-ton stipulation restricted access to 
relatively small ships, severely limiting the economic benefits to American merchants.
109
    
     The treaty preserved the status quo by stipulating that “no other or high duties shall be paid by 
the ships or merchandise of the one party in the ports of the other than such as are paid by the 
like vessels or merchandize of all other nations.”  This provision benefitted the British, as their 
immense and closed economic system was more capable of providing the Empire’s essential 
needs, allowing the British to place high duties on the imported products of other nations.  In 
contrast, the United States, bereft of a significant manufacturing sector, and reliant upon imports 
for various consumer needs, was unable to do the same.  British merchants continued to pay 
lower duties entering American ports than Americans did entering British ports.
110
    
     The Jay Treaty stabilized Anglo-American relations, but strained trade relations with 
revolutionary France.  The treaty abrogated all of the commercial pledges contained in the 1778 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce that had been executed between the Continental Congress and 
royal France.  Increased tensions with France culminated in the Quasi-War, lasting from 1798 to 
1800, where both the United States and France attacked each other’s shipping in an undeclared 
war upon one another.  Trade relations with France soured in 1798 when French privateers 
attacked American merchant ships.  In response, President Adams received congressional 
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approval to establish a Navy department.  American naval ships, operating in the West Indies, 
successfully captured a French privateer frigate and fought another to a draw, effectively ending 
the short-term crisis without need for a formal treaty.
111
   
     Despite tensions with both Britain and France, American foreign commerce dramatically 
expanded.  Imports increased from $23 million in 1790 to $91 million in 1800, a 396% increase.  
At the same time exports increased from $20 million to $71 million, a 355% increase.
112
  The 
nation continued running net trade deficits, but they were less severe than the 1780s.   
     Hamilton’s overall financial policies successfully created economic stability, stimulating 
foreign trade.  The great outflow of gold from the United States was stemmed.  Although trade 
deficits continued, Americans were more easily able to obtain credit from foreign sources due to 
an improved international perception of the American economy.           
 Conclusions 
     The most significant trade policy development between 1789 and 1800 was the emerging 
articulation of two competing schools of thought on how American trade policy should be 
conducted.  The discussion remained theoretical, as the United States did not yet possess any 
substantial manufacturing.  There were, at best, loose political coalitions developing on each side 
of the trade issue.  The tariffs enacted during the Washington and Adams administrations helped 
place American finances on a sound footing.   
     One of the greatest achievements of the American federal government in the 1790s was 
achieving economic stability.  One way to measure the overall economic progress of the new 
nation is the measure gross domestic product (“GDP”) on a per capita basis.  Figure 2.1 
illustrates how the American economy grew at a moderate pace over an eleven year period, 
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increasing at an annualized rate of 0.7% per annum in real terms.
113
  Importantly, there were no 
major disruptions reminiscent of the prior decade.  The overall national output per capita slowed 
in the latter part of the decade, perhaps adversely impacted by the trade issues arising from Jay’s 
Treaty and the Quasi-war, but was again trending upwards by its end.   
 
Figure 2.1. American GDP per Capita, 1790 to 1800 (in real dollars = 1996)  
(3 year rolling average)    
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 1:30, 3:23. 
 
     The tariff bills of 1789, 1790 and 1792 established moderate tariff levels, accompanied by 
slight protective elements.  Protection was not confined to manufacturing.  Some agricultural 
products, such as hemp, received preference as well.  Due to the relatively low tariff rates, 
American international commerce expanded and prospered throughout the Washington and 
Adams presidencies.  This can be demonstrated by the fact that imports carried on American 
ships increased from 355,000 tons in 1790 to 675,000 tons by 1796, while the corresponding 
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British share declined from 217,000 tons in 1790 to only 20,000 tons by 1796.  American ships 
accounted for 93 percent of goods imported into domestic ports in 1796.
114
   
     One way of assessing the impact of trade policy on the overall national economy is to 
measure and analyze what is known as the “Openness” of trade.  This measure is arrived at by 
combining the exports and imports compared to the national GDP for a given time period.  The 
result of this computation, when compared to the average tariff rates in effect for a comparable 
period, allows for comparison between the amount of foreign trade that is being conducted and 
the degree of protection that is being created by import tariff duties.  One can then analyze and 
assess whether trade policy might be having either a positive or detrimental impact upon a 
domestic economy.  The Openness of American foreign trade during the Washington and Adams 
administrations is presented in Figure 2.2.
 115
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Figure 2.2. American Foreign Trade, 1791 to 1800 (3 year rolling average) 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498, 510; “Measuring Worth,” http://www.mea 
suringworth.org/usgdp/. 
     
     Though tariff rates gradually increased throughout the decade in order to increase federal 
revenues, it is clear that this policy didn’t have any detrimental impact upon either foreign trade 
or the growth of the American economy.  Considering the information from Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
in tandem, one can conclude that the domestic economy grew at slow rate and that foreign 
commerce remained a fairly steady component of that economic activity throughout the decade.     
     The tariff acts of the 1790s established a system that provided steady federal revenues, and by 
1800 the new republic was financially stable.  In the course of the accompanying debates, there 
had been a variety of viewpoints expressed, representing differences in opinions about political 
economy as well as advocacies for certain special interests, particularly manufacturing.  Had the 
tariff debates exposed serious political rifts over the issue of economic policy?  Did a particular 
regional section embrace manufacturing while another rejected it?   
     Though tariff levels increased throughout the decade, the increases were quite modest by later 
standards.  While Hamilton encouraged manufacturing in his Report on Manufactures, his 
actions during his time as Secretary of Treasury suggest that he believed that establishing sound 
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national credit was a higher priority.  The tariff was secondary to establishing the Bank of the 
United States and paying Revolutionary War liabilities.
116
   
     There is some evidence scattered throughout the Early National period that some sectional 
tensions were present, aligned with particular regional economic self-interest.  George Mason 
resisted the idea of export duties that might prove harmful to the South during the Convention.  
William Maclay complained during the Senate debates in 1789 that his protectionist sentiments 
were “as usual, opposed by the Southern people.”117  Oliver Ellsworth, at the Connecticut 
ratifying convention, admitted that one objection to the powers in Section 8 was that it was 
“partial to the Southern States.”118  Even Alexander Hamilton addressed the existence of regional 
economic differences in the Report on Manufactures, where he declared that the “ideas of a 
contrariety of interests between the Northern and southern regions of the Union, are in the Main 
as unfounded as they are mischievious.”119   
     However, a careful delineation needs to be made between words and actions.  The British 
colonies maintained closer relations to the mother country, rather than one another, throughout 
the Colonial Era.  While the colonies eventually banded together during the Revolutionary War 
in the face of a common enemy, that bond was neither deep nor warm.  Jealously among the 
states remained common during the Confederation years and into the Early National period.  
Mason’s and Maclay’s words reflect the sometimes uneasy relations existing between the states 
during the late eighteenth century.   
     A look at the congressional record and the roll call votes between 1789 and 1800 reveal a 
situation where American economic interests and ideas regarding political economy remained in 
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their infancy.  The manufactures sphere comprised a miniscule portion of the national economy 
and political parties were new, emerging phenomena.  Historians Norman Risjord and Gordon 
DenBoer, using Virginia as an example, note that “from essentially personal factions in the early 
1780s there evolved by 1800 political organizations with a disciplined membership, able to 
formulate a comprehensive program,” adding that economic issues factored in the process.120  
     In 1789, Hamilton’s vision of national industrialism remained possible for any part of the 
nation.  No significant American manufacturing infrastructure was yet in place.  The South was 
not yet dominated by cotton.  It produced merely 3,135 bales of cotton in 1790 and Whitney’s 
cotton gin would not be invented until 1793.
121
  In short, there were no significant pre-existing 
economic special interest groups for or against manufacturing.  
     Tariff voting patterns in the 1790s reflect rather weak correlations to both geography and 
party.  For example, Georgia and South Carolina pressed for higher tariffs for manufactured 
items such as steel and nails, contradicting notions that the South rejected industrialization.  The 
Tariff of 1789 contained more protectionist features when it was signed into law than it did when 
originally proposed by Madison.  Yet the only source of nay votes in the House came from 
Northern representatives.  The final bill provided protection for cotton, indigo and hemp, 
demonstrating that the concept of protectionism could pertain just as easily to agriculture as to 
manufacturing interests.  The roll call for the tariff of 1790 yields similar results.  The voting 
patterns were largely unchanged.  Most opposition came from the North, and there was still 
significant protection offered on behalf of agriculture.  
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     In 1792, as the First Party System developed, competing Federalists and Republicans began 
taking opposite stances on trade policy.  However, “party” ties were far looser in the 1790s than 
they would become in the nineteenth century.  James Sharp notes that “two loosely formed 
antagonistic coalition had formed … each was no more than a proto-party, a premodern, preparty 
institution.”122 
     Southern political leaders demonstrated a willingness to embrace the possibility that 
manufacturing could evolve in the South just as easily as in the North.  They were as versed in 
complex commercial enterprise as any of their northern compatriots.  Thomas Jefferson, often 
thought of as the consummate agrarian, provides an example to assert that Southerners were 
open to the possibility of manufacturing.  In 1793, he provided favorable comments regarding Eli 
Whitney’s gin, believing that this improvement in technology would greatly benefit the nation.123  
One year later, he began operating a nail factory at Monticello, obtaining machinery to assist the 
process two years later.
124
  Historian Forrest McDonald notes that Southern “rice and indigo 
plantations were entirely commercialized operations, extremely profitable but no more self-
sufficient than a modern factory.”125   
     Hamilton and Madison, representing the de facto leadership of the nationalists and liberals 
during this period, did not differ greatly on “ends.”  Both sought American economic strength 
and diversity.  Where they strongly differed was over the issue of “means.”  Hamilton 
demonstrated some liberal inclinations, but ultimately concluded that nationalism was necessary, 
when he commented that “in matters of industry, human enterprise ought doubtless to be left free 
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in the main, not fettered by too much regulation, but practical politicians know that it may be 
beneficially stimulated by prudent aids and encouragements on the part of the government.”126   
     Hamilton espoused neo-mercantilist “means” in the Report on Manufactures, declared “that 
there is always a higher probability of a favorable balance of Trade, in regards to countries in 
which manufactures founded on the basis of a thriving Agriculture flourish … [those] countries 
… are likely to possess more pecuniary wealth.”127  He foresaw American greatness by 
emulating portions of the British economic system.  However, this system, in contrast to the 
British model, featured open trading with other foreign nations.  
     Madison also declared a desire for free trade “ends” during the debates.  He strongly believed 
this could only be achieved through liberal policy.  A pragmatist, he acknowledged that the 
United States precariously existed in an economically hostile world.  During the 1789 debates 
asked his fellow legislators to “review the policy of Great Britain towards us … have we not 
seen her taking one legislative step after another to destroy our commerce?”128  Madison’s fear 
of Britain and its influence on the American economy encouraged him to try to move away from 
the British economic sphere.  His failed 1789 proposal to enact tonnage duties on foreign vessels 
was an attempt to balance his dual objectives of free trade combined with a nationalist response 
to Britain’s dominance over American foreign commerce.  Historian Drew McCoy neatly sums 
up Madison’s outlook, stating that the future president “never doubted that American power was 
… fully capable of shattering British restrictions on American commerce that threatened the 
virtue and autonomy of the new Republic.”129  Both Jefferson and Madison believed that the 
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United States could use trade policy as an economic weapon against Britain.  This belief 
contrasted with Hamilton, who encouraged trade with the British in order to fill up the treasury 
coffers even as he attempted to encourage an self-sustaining American manufactures sphere.
130
   
     Historian Gordon Wood, in The Creation of the American Republic, stated that “perhaps 
everyone in the eighteenth century could have agreed in theory no state was more beautiful than 
a republic, whose whole object by definition was the good of the people.  Yet everyone also 
knew that it was a fragile beauty indeed.”131  Hamilton and Madison sought similar ends, but 
their differences hinged on the means to this goal.  Hamilton and the nationalists, deeply 
admiring Britain, sought to emulate it through active government support and preferences to 
emerging economic sectors.  Madison and the liberals, fearing the economic concentrations of 
power inherent in the British system, sought a more egalitarian approach to international trade 
policy.  They were willing to accept a slower pace of national economic development rather than 
face the feared consequences of a Walpolian system of influence, patronage, and favoritism.    
     Between 1789 and 1800, Congress successfully established the beginnings of a national trade 
policy.  The opposing views of nationalism and liberalism had been introduced.  The actual 
impact of that policy was, at this stage, minimal.  The American economy was small and still 
predominantly agrarian.  Foreign relations, particularly with Great Britain and France, influenced 
American policy makers far more than trade.  However, this introduction of ideas and legislation 
created a foundation of precedent and context for developing future trade policy as the national 
economy grew and developed.       
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     By 1789, Madison could satisfactorily state that the new Federal government had established 
a trade policy that “recovered [the country] from the state of imbecility that heretofore prevented 
a performance of … duty.”132  Nonetheless, as the Democratic-Republicans took over the 
executive branch from the Federalists in 1801, the ideological differences between nationalists 
and liberals remained unresolved.  Trade policy would soon be a prominent issue as Thomas 
Jefferson assumed the presidency and relations with Great Britain and France again deteriorated, 
this time with far greater consequences to American foreign commerce.            
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CHAPTER 3 – WAR AND EMBARGOES, THE JEFFERSONIAN EXPERIMENT: 1800 
TO 1816   
 
“where a nation is insulted, as we are, the stale doctrine of passive obedience and non-
resistance ill becomes an independent nation, much less the American character … my very soul 
is fired with just indignation at the unprovoked insults offered the American flag, and the 
piratical and systematic plundering system adopted by the Government of Great Britain against 
neutral rights.”1 
- Representative Joseph Stanton of Rhode Island (March 13, 1806 remarks to the House) 
 
“if she is your commercial rival, you are her commercial rival also.  This is the very view that I 
have been endeavoring to take of the subject, to impress on the Committee; to warn the nation 
against being drawn into a war of commercial rivalship … If she puts out her strength, you will 
feel it.” 2 
- Representative John Randolph of Virginia (March 6, 1806 remarks to the House) 
 
 “Under these impressions deem it an indispensible duty … respectfully to suggest to Congress 
that the act, at present in suspension, entitled “An act to prohibit the importation of certain 
goods, wares, and merchandise,” … should it go into operation, will not tend to promote the 
desirable results of national reparation, and amicable adjustment of our differences with Great 
Britain. ” 3  
- “Philadelphia Memorial,” authored by sundry merchants and traders of Philadelphia and 
presented to the House of Representatives November 27, 1807 
 
     Carl Von Clausewitz, the famed nineteenth-century Prussian military strategist, wrote that 
“war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political 
intercourse, carried on with other means.”4  The War of 1812 was the final military chapter of a 
much longer economic trade war between the United States and Great Britain that erupted during 
Thomas Jefferson’s first presidential term.  Jefferson, and his successor, James Madison, both 
strongly believed that trade could be successfully used by the United States against European 
powers, and specifically Great Britain, to achieve diplomatic ends.       
     During the sixteen years that Jefferson and Madison served as chief executive following the 
“revolution of 1800,” American trade policy was primarily influenced by political events in 
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Europe.  These close personal friends, and strong political allies, embarked on a radical 
experiment in American trade policy in reaction to increased tensions between the United States 
and the great European powers, and particularly to perceived grievances with Great Britain.  
Their response included attempts to restrict, and eventually halt, American foreign trade.  These 
efforts were accomplished through three major legislative initiatives: The Non-Importation Act 
of 1806, the Embargo Act of 1807, and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809.   
     Ultimately, this economic strategy, employed to achieve political objectives, proved futile.  
The United States went to war in 1812, suffering political and military embarrassments over the 
following three years.  The war’s scars influenced American attitudes towards trade policy for 
the remaining antebellum period.  Historian Bradford Perkins describes the efforts of these two 
presidents: “In an age of power, they appealed to abstract rights and employed – more precisely, 
misemployed – only weapons of economic warfare.”5  
     There would be one important economic side effect arising from the failed Jeffersonian 
Experiment.  The absence of British competition for almost ten years allowed an embryonic 
American manufacturing sphere to spring into existence.  The United States was introduced to 
the First Industrial Revolution and the initial “takeoff” of American industrialization was 
underway in 1815 as the War came to a close.       
     Both Jefferson and Madison openly expressed free trade sympathies during the 1790s.  
Jefferson was deeply influenced by his friendship with Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, who 
introduced him to physiocratic views of political economy.
6
  Du Pont, who came to the United 
States in 1799, had been a protégé of Quesnay, and his own writings stressed the need for nations 
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to engage in free trade that embraced both import and export activities.
7
  Jefferson and Madison 
viewed free trade as an indispensable component of the brand of republicanism they wished for 
the United States.  How then, could these men sympathize with free trade ideology, and yet enact 
a series of policies that represented the antithesis of free trade principles?   
     The answer is that both men believed that the “means” of restricted trade were justified by an 
“end” goal of free trade.  They were willing to assume the political risks associated with a 
contradictory short-term trade policy in the hope that the long-term benefits would result and far 
outpace the immediate economic pain and sacrifice.  Ultimately, both Jefferson and Madison 
shifted their personal stances towards a more nationalist view of trade policy by 1816.  In the 
process, they took most of their fellow Republicans with them.   
     Any analysis of Republican trade legislation between 1806 and 1808 should begin with 
understanding why they believed this policy could be successful.  Jefferson and Madison 
believed that trade policy could be manipulated under certain circumstances to achieve important 
political ends.  Madison had previously acknowledged this “carve out” exception to free trade 
practice during the 1789 tariff debates.
8
   
     Republicans unsuccessfully tried to implement retaliatory trade policies before.  As 
previously noted, Madison advanced his tonnage duty proposal in 1789.  This initiative, which 
Congress rejected, sought to establish discriminating import duties against the British in response 
to their high duties levied against American imports.  Madison again advanced tonnage duties 
against the British during the 1794 tariff debates, but his effort was stymied by Alexander 
Hamilton.  The tonnage proposals created an odd situation, where free-trader Madison sought 
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trade discrimination, and was opposed by Hamilton, who feared the consequences of outright 
conflict with Britain.
9
   
     Jefferson’s early beliefs on trade can be found in Notes on the State of Virginia, published in 
1781, and he anticipated that the United States would ultimately be capable of economic self-
sufficiency.  He commented that “It is not easy to say what articles either of necessity, comfort, 
or luxury, which we cannot raise, and which we therefore shall be under a necessity of importing 
from abroad.”10  Later, in 1793, as Secretary of State, Jefferson authored his Report on Foreign 
Commerce, where he stated that “Would even a single nation begin with the United States this 
system of free commerce, it would be advisable to begin it with that nation … But should any 
nation, contrary to our wishes, suppose it may better find its advantage by continuing its system 
of prohibitions, duties and regulations, it behooves us to protect our citizens, their commerce and 
navigation, by counter prohibitions, duties and regulations, also.”11  Both statements reflect 
Jefferson’s support of free trade principles.  At the same time, like Madison, he acknowledged 
the possibility that trade discrimination could be justified under certain circumstances.          
     In his inaugural address, Jefferson established the Republican Party stance on the challenges 
posed by tenuous relations with Europe, mentioning that the United States was “engaged in 
commerce with nations who feel power and forget right.”12  The Republican triumph in 1800 
marked a sea change in American politics.  Federalist Fisher Ames disparagingly described the 
Republicans: “The guides they take, are not fools but fanatics.  Political fanaticism has its run in 
Virginia … The extreme sensibility of the good men in Virginia to silly principles and silly 
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people, has ever been characteristic … They are not ashamed, in Virginia, of most of the 
disorganizing dogma of Tom Paine.”13   
     Ames’s concerns included trade policy.  In January 1801, while the presidential election was 
in the hands of the House of Representatives, Ames wrote “if Jefferson would provide … that he 
would not countenance … Madison’s empiricism in regards to trade … would it not be safer to 
take him?”14  He hoped that Jefferson would reject Madison’s strong free trade views when 
shaping the administration’s policies.  The United States, since 1789, had employed a “middle 
ground” approach appeasing both economic nationalists and free traders.  Low overall tariff rates 
included discriminatory rates offering mild protection to select industries.  The small federal 
government required low revenues, and “protected” commercial interests comprised a negligible 
portion of the national economy.   
     One of the Federalist fears arising from the “Revolution of 1800” was that Jefferson and the 
Republicans would shift trade policy towards free trade at the expense of Hamilton’s vision for 
active Federal government support to develop the nation’s infant industries.  Historian Drew 
McCoy described the Jefferson and Madison administrations as “a sustained Jeffersonian attempt 
to secure the requisite conditions for a republican political economy.”15  The Jeffersonian 
paradigm included free trade as foundational for any nation desiring to be politically free and 
economically prosperous.  Republicans earnestly believed that global free trade would tighten 
the bonds between nations, and increase prospects for international peace.
16
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The Emerging American Economy 
     Americans living between 1790 and 1820 generally acknowledged that the domestic economy 
was built on a foundation of three major activities.  These were agriculture, commerce and 
manufacturing.  When the United States census categorized citizens by occupation for the very 
first time in 1820, it used these categories.  
     The American population was predominantly agricultural throughout the early nineteenth 
century.  The 1820 census indicated that 83% of American workers worked on farms, and 
agriculture dominated economic activity throughout all of the nation’s regions.  In 
Massachusetts, the most industrialized state in the Union, a majority of 58% of the population 
nonetheless engaged in agriculture.
17
  Although agriculture was the largest economic sphere, 
manufacturing and commerce were growing in size and importance throughout the three decades 
after the Constitution.    
     American economic nationalists anticipated the emergence of these two newer economic 
sectors.  Historian Lawrence Peskin notes that the nationalists “valued social harmony over 
individual self-interest, frequently declaring that the various national economic interests should 
work together as a unified system.”18  Alexander Hamilton argued throughout the 1790s that 
government was a necessary guide in this process.  His vision was partially fulfilled during this 
time period as various congressmen argued for using the tariff to promote various economic 
interests from all three economic sectors.    
     Hamilton’s efforts to promote manufactures in the United States slowly took root, even after 
his untimely death in 1804.  In 1810, Tench Coxe was retained by the federal government to 
conduct a census of American manufactures.  Coxe was a logical selection, previously serving as 
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secretary of the Pennsylvania Manufacturing Society in the late 1780s and as Hamilton’s 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, beginning in 1790.  Coxe helped prepare the Report on 
Manufactures and was on close terms with early economic nationalists such as Thomas 
Fitzsimons.
19
 
     In 1814, Coxe published A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures of the United States of 
America, for the Year 1810.  This remarkable work provides a wealth of information regarding 
the early American manufactures sector.  It revealed that American manufacturing was highly 
decentralized and that there were no domestic industries yet on par with foreign competitors. 
     Coxe’s work measured manufacturing establishments and extrapolated an estimate of the total 
value of manufactures in the United States.  His findings are summarized as follows:  
Table 3.1. United States Manufactures, 1810 (asset values, in thousands)8 
      Reported    Estimated  
Region      Value  %  Value  %  
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)   36,096 28%    48,147 28% 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    52,352 41%    67,850 39% 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)     18,721 15%    27,833 16% 
South   (GA, NC, SC)     10,240   8%    13,936   8% 
West  (KY, OH, TN)       8,816   7%    12,686   8% 
Western territories        1,470   1%      2,311   1% 
Totals      127,695 100%  172,763 100% 
Source: Tench Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures of the United States of America, 
for the Year 1810 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: A. Cornman, 1814), 36, 38.    
 
Although manufactures were developing in all parts of the nation, the bulk of manufacturing 
assets were located along the nation’s northern Atlantic coast.  The greatest concentration was 
found in Pennsylvania, followed by New York and Massachusetts.  The initial “takeoff” of 
American industrialization was concentrated geographically in the Northeast.   
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     Coxe reported that the nation’s most significant manufacturing activity was finished clothing, 
comprising almost 31% of all domestic manufactures.  The next largest outputs were “hides and 
skins” (14%) and alcoholic beverages (13%).  Smaller portions of American production were 
dedicated to producing other capital goods, essential for an industrializing economy, including 
iron manufacturing (11%), and machine tooling (5%).
20
 
     The report contained detail accounting of manufactures by state and county, and its 
commentary described the economic specialization occurring in various regions in response to 
their respective natural advantages.  New England was home to a significant cloth manufacturing 
industry.  Pennsylvania and Virginia possessed many iron foundries.  Southern states specialized 
in activities ties to large scale agriculture, primarily cotton and rice.  Coxe prophetically noted 
that “the cotton branch will probably, nay certainly, become, very soon, the most considerable of 
our manufactures … Capitalists can most easily extend themselves in the cotton manufacture, 
because the raw material is abundant and capable of being conveniently and promptly 
increased.”21  
     A comparison of Coxe’s report to the 1810 census summarized the state of early American 
industry.  Table 3.2 confirms a higher level of industrialization in both New England and 
Atlantic states, but also shows meaningful levels of industrialization in other regions as well.    
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Table 3.2. United States Manufactures, 1810 (asset values per capita, in thousands)9 
      Estimated    Manufacturing Assets 
Region      Value  Population Per Capita  
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)  48,147 1,472  $32.71 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)   67,850 2,088  $32.50 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)    27,833 1,356  $20.53 
South   (GA, NC, SC)    13,936 1,222  $11.40 
West  (KY, OH, TN)    12,686    900  $14.10 
Western territories       2,311     n/a        n/a 
Totals      127,695 7,038  $24.22 
Source: Coxe, Statement of the Arts and Manufactures, 38; United States Census, 1810, 
http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/php/start.php?year=V1810.  
 
     While American manufacturing was slowly growing, American commerce was booming.  
Historian Curtis Nettels describes the period between 1793 and 1807 as “a golden age of 
American shipping.”22  American commercial sector growth can be demonstrated by the 
frequency with which American imports and exports were carried by American ships.  The 
percentage of carried cargoes increased steadily, from 40% in 1790 to 91% by 1805.  American 
domination of the shipping trade peaked in 1807, when American ships carried 1,090,000 tons, 
representing almost 93% of all American international trade.
23
   
     American trade policy during the Jefferson and Madison administrations revolved around 
commerce.  It was the country’s most vulnerable economic sector due to the threat of foreign 
interdiction on the oceans.  Importantly, the United States possessed insufficient naval power to 
contend with foreign navies, particularly with Great Britain.  Any major European power 
possessed the power to physically damage the American commercial sector.
24
 
     The Napoleonic Wars became the catalyst for European powers to project military power 
against American shipping, placing the Republicans in a dilemma.  Should they respond 
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militarily, or economically?  Their initial response was economic, but ultimately decisions 
pushed the United States towards a military response, culminating with the War of 1812.    
Grievances and Great Britain: The Non-Importation Act of 1806   
     American commerce in the early 1800s was impacted by two critical variables.  First, the 
United States was a net importer of goods.  The nation relied upon foreign sources for many key 
manufactured items, particularly finished products, which were not yet readily produced by the 
domestic manufactures sector.
25
  Exports greatly exceeded imports, summarized as follows: 
Table 3.3. United States Average Annual Imports and Exports, 1791-1819 (in millions)10 
   Annual Average Annual Average Trade 
Time Period  Imports  Exports  Deficit  Ratio 
1791 to 1799   $55.7   $27.3   ($28.4) 2.04:1  
1800 to 1809   $93.3   $36.9   ($56.4) 2.53:1 
1810 to 1819   $81.8   $45.3   ($36.5) 1.81:1 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498.   
Second, American international trade was concentrated with only a few countries, mostly 
western European nations further advanced in the Industrial Revolution.  The United States 
particularly relied on British manufactured goods.  Although detailed statistics on the national 
origin of imports aren’t readily available between 1800 and 1816, piecemeal data from before 
and after the Jefferson and Madison administrations are instructive as to the significant role 
British goods played.  In 1792 Great Britain shipped $15.3 million dollars of goods to the United 
States, accounting for 77% of all American imports.
26
  During the period between 1821 and 1824 
imports from Great Britain averaged $28.8 million each year, comprising 41% of the national 
total.
27
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     The United States exported fewer good to Britain than it imported, largely a consequence of 
the British imperial system.  Many American goods were prohibited from entering British 
possessions.  Throughout the 1790s, American goods shipped to British ports averaged only $9 
million dollars per annum.  However, exports began trending upwards between 1800 and 1804, 
reaching an average of $19.4 million dollars per year.
28
  These increases were an indirect 
consequence of the Napoleonic Wars and American merchants thrived from the increased trade 
and associated profits.        
     When Thomas Jefferson took office, it initially appeared that Great Britain and France were 
on the verge of peace.  The continental wars briefly halted in March 1802 when the French and 
British signed the Treaty of Amiens.
29
  A consequence of this treaty was that the United States 
resumed unfettered trade with both great powers, and consummated a new treaty with France in 
December.  Diplomatic efforts with Britain yielded settlement on a host of outstanding issues, 
including Revolutionary war debts owed to British citizens.
30
 
     Throughout Jefferson’s first term, American merchants enjoyed a lucrative “carrying trade” 
with Europe.  The carrying trade essentially cast American merchants as third-party traders on 
behalf of other nations, most frequently for France and its allies.  In 1805, American merchants 
carried $60 million worth of goods for the benefit of others.  The manner in which the carrying 
trade was conducted relied on legalistic distinctions.  American vessels would take on cargo at 
foreign ports, and then transport it to an American port.  Typically, they paid duties and received 
appropriate paperwork to document the landing of the cargo on American soil.  Frequently, 
import duties paid to the United States were rebated back to the merchant.  The cargo was then 
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“re-loaded” and transported to foreign ports.  This legal event was referred to as a “broken 
voyage.”  The transaction involved American merchants transporting goods for foreign nations 
on a contracted basis in substance, while in form the event involved importing goods to the 
United States and then exporting them out under the fiction of a separate transaction.  The legal 
doctrine that allowed this charade was known as the “Rule of 1756,” a doctrine upheld in British 
courts in 1800 in the Polly case.
31
   
      American merchants were perfectly content with European hostilities.  Europeans wars 
created an increased demand for goods by the combatant powers.  Since the British Navy 
effectively controlled the seas, Americans merchants were most willing to accommodate 
Britain’s foes in exchange for a profit.  Increased trade volumes, combined with American 
resourcefulness and efficiency, generated substantial merchant profits.  To illustrate how far 
American merchants had developed the carrying trade business, an 1805 British report 
acknowledged that American ships were able to operate an average voyage at about half the cost 
of their British counterparts.  American commerce was so successful, and the supply of qualified 
sailors so limited, that the wages offered by American merchants rose from $8 to $30 per 
month.
32
  These increased wages caused foreign sailors, including those in the Royal Navy, to 
consider gainful employment in the American merchant marine.  Secretary of Treasury Albert 
Gallatin acknowledged that American vessels possessed crews where an estimated 37% of the 
sailors were British citizens.
33
  
     The Amiens respite was short-lived, and in 1803 war broke out again across Europe.  Initially, 
American merchants benefitted from a revived carrying trade.  However, as hostilities on the 
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Continent escalated, both Britain and France sought to deprive each other of American trade.  
These efforts placed significant manpower stresses upon the Royal Navy as it tried to cut off 
French commerce.  A significant consequence was the Royal Navy’s increased use of 
impressments, particularly sailors on American ships.  From 1803 until war broke out in 1812, 
the Royal Navy impressed between three and eight thousand American sailors.
34
 
     Two major events in 1805 spelled trouble for the carrying trade.  Lord Nelson’s destruction of 
the French fleet at Trafalgar rid the oceans of any meaningful threat to British control of the seas. 
Secondly, British courts rendered the Essex decision, overturning the Rule of 1756.  This 
decision legitimized Royal Navy seizures of neutral vessels carrying goods to France or her 
allies.
35
  The Royal Navy began confiscating American merchant vessels, and Philadelphia 
merchants claimed that over one hundred of their vessels were seized in the latter half of 1805.
36
  
     Impressments prompted a sharp public outcry, and a serious political problem for Jefferson.   
He prudently concluded that war with Great Britain was not a viable option.  Instead, he believed 
that, consistent with his past writings, the United States could use its economic power to coerce 
Britain to a political settlement on American terms.  He resolved to effectively declare economic 
war on Great Britain by interrupting trade.  The Non-Importation Act of 1806 marked the first 
step in Republican efforts to initiate what might be considered the boldest trade policy initiative 
in the history of the United States.  The underlying premise was that American exports were so 
valuable to the British economy that the absence of American commerce would bring King 
George III’s realm into an economic and political crisis.   
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     The House of Representatives commenced discussing the British problem in late January 
1806.  Two major grievances dominated the House proceedings.  First, Great Britain’s actions 
threatened American merchants by effectively shutting down the carrying trade.  Second, British 
impressments of American sailors amounted to a direct affront to American sovereignty.  
Georgia’s Peter Early estimated that fifteen hundred American sailors were impressed, while 
James Sloan of New Jersey placed the number at closer to three thousand.
37
 
     The Republican trade offensive could only be effective if it proved more detrimental to the 
British than to the Americans.  This premise became the major dividing point between supporters 
and opponents of the proposal.  The initial resolution was offered on January 29, 1806 by fifty-
one year old Representative Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania, a Revolutionary War veteran who 
had served in Congress since 1791.  Gregg epitomized the transitory nature of the early 
American economy.  After the Revolution he engaged in commerce as a merchant, but had 
transitioned to being a gentleman farmer by the late 1780s, owning a farm near Philadelphia.  
Gregg’s proposal called for banning the importation of targeted British goods to force Britain to 
retract its carrying trade and impressments policies. 
     Gregg’s initial proposal called for a ban on all British imports, but with an effective date far 
enough into the future to leave open the possibility of a negotiated settlement.  It empowered the 
president to rescind the act by proclamation in the event a satisfactory resolution was reached 
after the importation ban took effect.
38
  On February 10, Joseph Nicholson of Maryland offered a 
companion resolution identifying only specific goods for non-importation in place of a general 
ban of all British goods.  Nicholson’s proposal attempted to capture items most closely 
associated with British manufacturing.  Nicholson had been goaded by his brother-in-law, 
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Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, to pare back Gregg’s proposal in order to preserve 
much needed tariff revenues that would be lost if all British imports ceased.
39
   
     Nicholson sought to inflict as much economic pain as possible to Britain while softening any 
side-effects to the United States.  He stated that “If … we adopt a system which is practicable, to 
which it is seen that we can adhere without injuring ourselves, and which will materially affect 
Britain, we may hope that measures will be taken by her Government for the adjustment of our 
differences, and the rendering us complete justice.”40  His modified version of the bill targeted 
goods that the United States theoretically could produce on its own, thereby denying British 
manufacturers substantial export profits.  The proposal supposed that Great Britain was 
dependent on trade with the United States given the ongoing Napoleonic Wars and the strains 
they placed on the British economy.      
     The bill’s proponents expressed outrage at British policy and actions.  New Jersey’s Sloan 
asked, “Where is the spirit that actuated the noble patriots of Seventy-six, at the great risk of life, 
to oppose the unjust aggressions of Great Britain?”  He added that “I want the United States to 
treat Great Britain as they would treat an individual, who, in his dealings, had evidently been 
unjust; break off all intercourse until reparation is made for past injuries … In the present state of 
Europe, can Great Britain do without our trade?  Certainly she cannot.”41  Fellow New Jersey 
House member Ebenezer Elmer, another Revolution veteran, declared that “We have suffered an 
invasion of a national right,” creating a need for “repelling their aggressions by lenient but manly 
firmness … we may assume a manly and dignified national spirit, we may recall the principles 
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and the habits of the Revolution, we may arm our Government with sufficient energy to 
vindicate and maintain our national right, we may command respect from other nations.”42    
     Representative Gregg was confident that the legislation would succeed.  He noted that “Great 
Britain is too well versed in the business of calculation, and too well acquainted with her own 
interest, to persevere in this lawless system at the hazard of losing customers, whose annual 
purchases of her manufactures and other merchandise exceeds, I believe, thirty millions of 
dollars.”  He explained that “If carried into effect, I believe it will strike dismay throughout the 
Empire.  Its operation will be felt by every description of people, but more especially by the 
commercial and manufacturing part of the community.”43  New York attorney Nathan Williams 
surmised that limited risk was involved.  He stated “To talk of offensive war is unnecessary, it is 
childish.  The weapons within our reach are not at present warlike, though capable of wounding 
deeply.  Some, however, are of the opinion that this measure will lead to war.  I think differently.  
It will, in my opinion, preserve peace and our commerce at the same time.”44   
     Proponents insisted that there was a pressing need for the entire nation to rally to the aid of 
American commerce.  Representative Gregg declared that “let us not withdraw it [protection] 
from the real American merchant.  Acting from motives of patriotism as well as of gain, he 
combines his own interest with that of his country … He is a necessary link in the chain of our 
society.  There is a mutual dependence betwixt him and the farmer.”45  New York representative 
Williams concurred with Gregg, noting that “It has been justly said that agriculture and 
commerce are handmaids to each other.  Indeed their interests are strongly and durably 
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interwoven.  Commerce has a direct tendency to raise the price of the product of the farmer’s 
labor, by seeking in every part of the world the best markets for our articles of export.”46   
     National interests also motivated the bill’s supporters.  Representative John Smilie reminded 
the House that American commerce was both large and lucrative, providing a cause for the 
British provocations.  He stated that “Her hostility is invigorated by another circumstance.  She 
is the first trading nation in the world – we are the second.  We interfere with her 
aggrandizement, and she has determined to crush us.  She is proceeding step by step in the work 
of destruction, and if we are so pusillanimous as to submit, she will push on to our ruin and 
disgrace.”47  Gregg agreed, expressing concern that “While we yield year after year, Great 
Britain advances step by step; yet a little longer and our commerce will be annihilated, and our 
independence subverted.”48   
     However, many representatives expressed doubts about the wisdom of the bill.  The greatest 
critic was John Randolph of Virginia.  Randolph was independent-minded, possessed an 
extremely sensitive personality, and was as formidable and fiery a public speaker as anyone of 
his era.  His passionate defense of liberal principles garnered him the description of “the Cato of 
the American Congress.”49  Randolph was a free trader in the strictest sense, and abhorred the 
idea that any economic special interest should receive preference over others.  Though a 
Republican, he defiantly opposed the Party’s trade initiative.  His cadre of supporters, dubbed the 
“Quids,” adamantly supported free trade principles and flatly rejected the non-intercourse 
proposal.  In early 1806, Randolph wrote his close friend James Garnett that “I have conversed 
very frankly (in confidence) with several well informed men … every one of them have 
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pronounced the minority to have been in the right.”50  In a separate letter, Randolph described a 
meeting at the Charlotte courthouse, where “all of whom I heard (with one exception) approved 
the course which we have taken.  They considered it as a case between Agriculture and 
Commerce … in my opinion the premises are so sound, as the conclusion is undeniable.”51    
     The term “quid” was contemporarily applied to a wide variety of state level political factions 
whose ideas diverged from either Federalist or Republican party orthodoxy.  Randolph’s faction, 
concentrated in the Virginia and North Carolina congressional delegations, represented an 
influential “loyal opposition” within the Republican ranks.  Jefferson and Madison may have 
viewed the Quids as party renegades, but Randolph and the Quids maintained remained that they 
were loyal to “Old Republican” political values even as the party was driting in other directions.  
Historian Noble Cunningham describes the Randolph faction as “nothing more than an informal 
association of political leaders; however great their influence may have been in the long run, they 
had neither organization nor mass support.”52  Norman Risjord more favorably described them as 
“men who took deeply to heart the compact theory of government and carried it to its logical 
conclusions … the Old Republicans are thus the missing link in the conservative tradition 
between the Anti-federalists of 1788 and the states rights Southerners of the Jacksonian era.”53 
     Randolph was philosophically wedded to original Republican principles, believing, as one 
historian notes, that a “struggle between individual liberties and the intrusive power of the state” 
was already taking place in the United States.
54
  Another states that he “believed the primary end 
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of any economic policy was the preservation of a patrimony of political and economic 
independence and virtue.”55  Randolph concluded that Jefferson’s trade initiative ran afoul of 
these core republican principles. 
     During Jefferson’s first term, Randolph was an entrenched Republican loyalist.  He served as 
the chair of the Ways and Means Committee and supported the Louisiana Purchase.
56
  However, 
Randolph broke with the administration on the trade issue.      
     The Virginian representative attacked the proposed legislation on three points.  First, could 
the United States government actually enforce non-importation?  Secondly, if so, was it wise to 
do so?  Lastly, was this the most efficient manner in which to procure satisfactory redress from 
Great Britain?
57
  
     Randolph suggested that the proposed legislation only benefitted the special economic 
interests of American merchants.  He warned that the legislation could provoke a military 
confrontation, protesting that “It is not for the honest carrying trade of America, but for this 
mushroom, this fungus of war – for a trade which, as soon as the nations of Europe are at peace, 
will no longer exist, it is for this that the spirit of avaricious traffic would plunge us into war.”  
He reminded the House that “if there be two professions in the world, which can be selected for a 
tendency to develop the pre-existing germ of imperfection planted in our nature, they are the 
profession of the lawyer and the occupation of the trader.  And wherefore?  Because they open 
the wide field of temptation.”58   
     Other opponents agreed with Randolph that the bill pandered to special economic interests.  
Representative David Williams of South Carolina, a cotton planter and manufacturer who built 
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the very first cottonseed-oil mill in his native state, complained that the only beneficiaries of the 
bill were merchants.  He declared that “when the people are invaded, we should think of war; not 
when a few merchants find themselves hampered by foreign commercial regulations.  There are 
other remedies for this disease.”59       
     Randolph also predicted that a British response would prove detrimental to the United States.  
He noted that “if she is your commercial rival, you are her commercial rival also.  This is the 
very view that I have been endeavoring to take of the subject, to impress on the Committee; to 
warn the nation against being drawn into a war of commercial rivalship … If she puts out her 
strength, you will feel it.”  He rejected the suggestion that the European conflict constrained 
Britain, and he retorted “We are asked, what Great Britain can do to annoy us?  We answer, at 
this moment, more than any other nation in the world, because she commands the ocean.”60      
     Others joined Randolph to criticize Gregg’s bill.  Joseph Clay, a Pennsylvania banker, 
brought up two significant objections, stating that “The first is, that if carried into effect, it places 
greater means of injuring us in the hands of the enemy than she already possesses; and the 
second, that we shall not be able to maintain the course it points out for any length of time.”  
Clay argued that “I will appeal to any gentleman conversant with the state of the country … to 
say whether there is any probability of our being able to endure a non-importation of British 
goods for any length of time; for more than about six or eight months.”61   
     Great Britain’s military prowess also concerned opponents.  Josiah Masters of New York 
questioned the wisdom of threatening a “nation who has two hundred ships-of-the-line, four 
hundred frigates … who can go to war with us without any additional expense to themselves, 
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who will sweep the ocean of American commerce, amounting to nearly one hundred million of 
dollars.  What then will be the situation of your carrying trade?  What then will be the situation 
of your commerce and your country?”  Masters summarized the potential consequences: “It 
seems a bad method of compensating injuries done to us, to do another worse injury to ourselves, 
which I believe will be the case by adopting the present resolution; it will have a natural 
tendency to retaliation and revenge.”62    
     The Non-Importation Act passed the House on March 26, 1806 by a comfortable margin of 
93 to 32, and the bill was forwarded to the Senate, where similar arguments were heard.  
Maryland’s merchant senator, Samuel Smith, concluded that “Great Britain looks with a jealous, 
envious eye at our increased and increasing commerce; at the immense commercial tonnage of 
the United States.  It is seen that we have capital equal to our trade, and that we have superior 
enterprise, and intelligence not inferior to their merchants.  Yes, sir, we do supplant (not rival) 
the British merchant everywhere where we can meet him on equal terms.”63  The Senate ratified 
the bill on April 15 by a vote of 19 to 9.  Jefferson immediately dispatched William Pinckney to 
join James Monroe in London to attempt a diplomatic settlement with the British.
64
 
     The final version of the bill contained Nicholson’s modified terms, with certain British goods 
subjected to the non-importation ban.  The bill would not to go into effect until November 15, 
1806, allowing time for negotiation, and the president was authorized to suspend its 
implementation if he believed that negotiations were proceeding towards resolution.  Although 
the bill went into effect on the prescribed date, it remained so for only five weeks.  Jefferson 
requested that the act be temporarily suspended in hopes that it would enhance chances for a 
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diplomatic resolution to Anglo-American tensions.
65
  Congress agreed to postpone the effective 
date for the Act until December 31, 1807.
66
   
     Randolph concluded that the Non-Importation Act represented governmental tyranny and that 
the federal government had overstepped its authority, trampling individual liberties. He remarked 
that “Never, in my opinion, has the cause of free government more to fear than now … its’ once 
best friends are converted into enemies … “damning, with faint praise,” the principles which 
they had sworn to support.”67  He noted the irony of Jefferson’ position, observing that “The 
administration may do as it pleases ... it favors federal principles … attach it upon this 
government, and you are for federalism.”68  
     The congressional votes, summarized in Table 3.4, shows that the New England states, with 
their significant commercial interests, had reservations about the Non-Importation Act.  All other 
areas of the country overwhelming supported the legislation, but New England hesitated.  Its 
House members voted against it, and Senate members were evenly split.  The various state 
delegations exhibited widely varying sentiments.  In the House, Connecticut and New Hampshire 
were unanimously opposed, while Rhode Island was unanimously in favor, and the 
Massachusetts and Vermont delegations favored with split majorities.      
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Table 3.4. Ratification Vote of the Non-Importation Act of 1806 by Region11 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)    14    20    4    4 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    33    3    5    2 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)      23    6      3    0 
South   (GA, NC, SC)      15    2    2        2 
West  (KY, OH, TN)         8    1    5    1 
Totals      93   32   19    9 
Source: 15 Annals of Cong. 240, 877-878 (1806).   
 
     New England was the most active commercial region in the country, though its prominence 
fell well short of a monopoly.  In 1807, Boston and Massachusetts were home to 149,000 tons 
and 354,000 tons of shipping, respectively.  Nearby New York City housed 269,000 tons.
69
  By 
1816, New England domiciled 568,000 tons of merchant vessels, representing 42% of the 
nation’s ocean faring tonnage.70  In the following year, New England manufactured almost 
47,000 tons of ocean going merchant vessels, 55% of the national total.
71
    
     Table 3.5 provides evidence that the dividing line on non-importation was primarily based 
upon partisan politics.  The overwhelming majority of Republicans favored the legislation, while 
the heavily outnumbered Federalists predominantly voted in opposition.  Republicans, who up to 
this time had staunchly advocated free trade principles, rallied behind the President’s short-term, 
restrictive trade policy objectives.  Federalists, previously the party of economic nationalism, 
stood in opposition.  Increasingly, they aligned their political interests with commerce, to the 
point of using the word “manufacturer” as a pejorative term against their political foes.72  The 
voting pattern suggests that party loyalty was a powerful motivator behind the final vote tally.  
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Table 3.5. Ratification Vote of the Non-Importation Act of 1806 by Party12 
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Republican  92     8  18        4 
Federalist    1  24    1    5 
Totals   93  32  19    9        
Source: 15 Annals of Cong. 240, 877-878 (1806).  
   
     At the time of its passage, the Non-Importation Act was merely a diplomatic and economic 
threat.  The delayed time frame for the legislation’s enactment was clearly intended to strengthen 
the bargaining position of American diplomats.  Republicans were supremely confident that the 
threat was both powerful and achievable. 
Humiliation, Embargo and Non-Intercourse 
     Pinkney and Monroe successfully produced a treaty with the British in December 1806.  
However, the document failed to repudiate impressments and included a provision requiring the 
United States to reject Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of November 1806.  Jefferson refused to even 
submit it to the Senate for ratification.  Britain responded to this affront in early 1807 by issuing 
Orders in Council requiring all American carrying trade to Europe to ship through British ports, 
directly challenging American rights to freely trade with other nations.
73
  
     Tensions between the United States and Great Britain escalated in June when the HMS 
Leopard fired upon the USS Chesapeake in international waters, seizing four sailors, and 
sparking American outrage.
74
  The British, instead of making conciliatory efforts after the 
Chesapeake affair, took a harder stance by issuing further Orders in Council in late 1807 
requiring ships trading with the Continent to obtain a license from Britain.
75
  France heightened 
tensions as well by tightening their enforcement of the Berlin Decree.  Forthwith, American trade 
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with Great Britain would be interpreted as a hostile act and American ships docking in European 
ports would be open to seizure.  Britain’s actions even outraged John Randolph, who stated he 
“would act with the most determined spirit against the enemy; for so I consider England at this 
moment; since we are as much at war as we can be without the intervention of Congress.  Having 
come to blows I would strike my hardest, however desirous I might have been to avoid the 
combat by honorable means.”76    
     President Jefferson banned British warships from American ports immediately after the 
Chesapeake incident.
77
  The Non-Importation Act remained a threat only, since it was not 
scheduled to go into effect until December 31, 1807.  The British and French pressured the 
United States to choose sides in the European war, but the administration hesitated, determined 
to avoid any commitments if possible.  Instead, the Republicans decided to escalate the stakes in 
this trade standoff by asking Congress to place a complete embargo on American foreign trade.  
Secretary of State Madison was the chief architect of the new legislation, which was strongly 
opposed by Treasury Secretary Gallatin.
78
  
     The White House shared the Berlin Decree and Orders in Council with Congress on 
December 18, 1807, with a recommendation for a complete embargo of American foreign 
commerce.
79
  Congress hurriedly approved the proposal almost without debate in either 
Congressional chamber.  The Senate suspended its rules in order to pass the act the same day it 
was received by a vote of 22 to 6.
80
  After a weekend respite, the House approved the measure on 
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the following Monday, December 21, by a vote of 82 to 44.
81
  The breakdown of votes by region 
is as follows in Table 3.6: 
Table 3.6. Ratification Vote of the Embargo Act of 1807 by Region13 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)    19    15    7    3 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    23  11    5    2 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)      18    8      2    0 
South   (GA, NC, SC)      14    8    3        1 
West  (KY, OH, TN)         8    2    5    0 
Totals      82   44   22    6 
Source: 17 Annals of Cong. 51, 1221-1222 (1807).    
In a curious coincidence, after numerous procedural modifications regarding its implementation, 
the Non-Importation Act again became active law just a few days earlier, on December 14, so 
there was no existing empirical evidence in place to measure the potential effectiveness of 
American trade restrictions.
82
    
     The Non-Intercourse and Embargo bills withdrew American merchant ships from 
international trade.  The United States still allowed imports, and certainly welcomed any 
associated import duties, but goods were required to arrive in foreign ships.  Because foreign 
ships were forbidden to take on American cargoes, they were forced to engage in one-way 
shipments to the United States.  The combined bills still allowed certain British goods to be 
imported into the United States and British trade persisted at about half of pre-embargo levels.
83
  
     Congress was less supportive of embargo than they had been of non-importation the prior 
year.  However, every section, including the New England and the Atlantic regions, favored the 
measure.  The voting patterns of the House members from the five major port cities resembled 
the previous year, as four ports’ representatives, all Republicans, voting for the measure, while 
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Federalist Josiah Quincy of Boston voted against.  New England shifted closer to a pro- 
administration stance as a result of the 1806 elections, when New Hampshire’s voters replaced 
their five Federalist members with five Republicans.  Both Rhode Island and New Hampshire 
unanimously voted in favor of the embargo, Massachusetts voted a majority in favor, Vermont 
was split, and only Connecticut voted unanimously against.    
     Although representatives from all of the regions supported the bill, a review of the voting 
patterns by party affiliation in Table 3.7 again demonstrates the strong sway of party loyalty:    
Table 3.7. Ratification Vote of the Embargo Act of 1807 by Party Affiliation14 
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Republican  82   19   21        2 
Federalist    0  25    1    4 
Totals   82  44  22    6        
Source: 17 Annals of Cong. 51, 1221-1222 (1807).    
Federalists were virtually unanimous in their opposition to the Administration’s initiatives.  
Jefferson sharply criticized the minority party, intimating that they “disapprove of the republican 
principles & features of our Constitution and would … welcome any public calamity (war with 
England excepted) which might lessen the confidence of our country in those principles & 
forms.”84  The only Federalist in either the Senate or House who dared support the bill, 
Massachusetts Senator John Quincy Adams, was punished for his intransigence when the state 
legislature selected a replacement for his seat in the summer of 1808.  Adams immediately 
resigned, switched political allegiances, and joined the Republicans.
85
          
     Republicans overwhelmingly favored the bill, though their party unity was less impressive 
than the Federalists because John Randolph and his “minority Republicans” broke with party 
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leadership on the issue.
86
  Randolph’s band was concerned by growing federal power, and non-
interference with trade was an important pillar in their belief system.  Randolph, writing to his 
friend and fellow House member James Garnett in October 1806, expressed grave reservations 
over the administration’s course.  He stated, “Never, in my opinion, has the cause of free 
government more to fear than now.  In Europe it has been long gone, past all hope.  Here, its’ 
once best friends are converted into … enemies, or lukewarm advocates, “damning, with faint 
praise,” the principles which they had sworn to support to the few scattered individuals whose 
attachment to the cause remains unshaken.”87  Jefferson, not fazed by Randolph’s defection, 
noted that “the late schism has made not the smallest impression on the public.”88 
     While Randolph lamented what he perceived to be excessive use of executive power, various 
groups of merchants complained to the House about their lost profits.   On November 27, 1807, 
almost a month before the embargo’s passage, Congressman Joseph Clay of Pennsylvania 
presented a memorial from various “sundry merchants and traders” from Philadelphia, who 
prayed for a repeal of the Non-Importations Act.  The petitioners hoped that “the commercial 
interests of the United States, with which the common welfare is inseparably connected, will not 
be committed by an unyielding adherence to doubtful or unsettled principles.”89   On December 
14, the day that non-importation took effect, Josiah Quincy presented similar petitions from nine 
hundred Boston merchants.
90
 
     Both groups of merchants protested the impact of trade interruption upon their property and 
livelihoods.  Commerce was a significant part of the American economy, and the capital 
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investment in ships was substantial, an estimated $100 million dollars.
91
  In 1808, Massachusetts 
merchants, owning almost 40% of the nation’s total merchant marine, lost approximately $15 
million in revenues from the embargo.
92
  In addition, Southern cotton exports dropped from 
almost 9 million pounds in 1807 to less than 1 million pounds the following year.
93
  The 
embargo seriously damaged the financial well-being of Americans from all commercial sectors 
and throughout the entire nation. 
     The administration received corresponding support for its policies as well.  In the Winter and 
Spring of 1808 President Jefferson received supportive memorials from nine state legislatures.  
Massachusetts and New Hampshire sent two such memorials, showing that the embargo had at 
least some level of support in the New England states.
94
  
     Near simultaneous enactment of the Non-importation and Embargo Acts in late 1807 put 
Jefferson’s policies into practice.  Differing predictions that had been expressed during the 
debates in 1806 would be resolved by experience.  The main question was over which nation the 
new trade restrictions harm the most, Great Britain or the United States?   
     The impact of the new legislation was dramatic.  In 1808, American imports dropped to $57 
million, compared to a record $139 million the previous year.  Exports also dropped 
precipitously, from a record $49 million in 1807 to merely $9 million in the next.
95
  Ordinary 
Americans felt the impact of the legislation.  Real GDP per capita, an inflationary neutral 
measure of economic productivity per person, fell 7.1% between 1807 and 1808, the worst year-
to-year economic decline since the Republic’s founding.96  Economist Douglas Irwin estimated 
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the impact of the Embargo as equivalent to a 60% tariff rate and that the “welfare cost” to the 
American economy was somewhere between 4% and 6%.
97
  
     The Embargo ruined the domestic economy.  The withdrawal from international commerce 
forced British born sailors, a major cause behind the impressment crisis, to leave the United 
States and return to Great Britain to find work.  American agricultural exports sharply dropped, 
causing a domestic supply glut.  In New York, the price of wheat fell over 60%.
98
  In Salem, 
Massachusetts, one hundred and thirty four ships cleared the port in 1807.  No ships departed in 
1808, putting almost 2,000 sailors out of work.  The following year, an estimated 1,200 citizens 
depended on charity for their meals.
99
 
     Salem’s example also illustrates how the Embargo’s impact extended across political lines.  
The Crowninshield family was one of the town’s wealthiest, and Republican Jacob 
Crowninshield represented Salem in the House of Representatives.  They staunchly supported 
the Jeffersonian Experiment throughout, while also providing assistance for the town’s soup 
kitchen.  Ultimately, the Jeffersonian Experiment ruined much of the family fortune.  One son, 
Richard Crowninshield, ended in debtor’s prison before turning his business interests to textile 
manufacturing.  Another, John, tried to stay in business despite debts that plagued him for the 
next two decades.  The family’s merchant business, the original source of the family’s wealth, 
was effectively destroyed.
100
     
     The embargo failed to harm Great Britain’s economy even though Anglo-American trade was 
severely reduced.  Total American shipments of cotton to Great Britain fell from 44 million 
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pounds in 1807 to only 12 million pounds in 1808.
101
  The British fortunately possessed 
significant amounts of imported cotton and wheat in its national inventories.  Britain’s cotton 
imports to Liverpool from Brazil increased from 3,500 bags in 1808 to 103,200 bags in 1814.
102
  
Although exports to the United States decreased, British manufacturers compensated for the 
deficiency through increased exports to Latin America, whose commerce with the mother 
countries of Spain and Portugal had been interrupted by French invasion.
103
   
     One consequence of the Embargo was to encourage American businessmen to consider 
alternate economic pursuits.  In particular, Philadelphia and Baltimore prospered during the 
Embargo.  Although Philadelphia domiciled almost 8% of American commerce, 1,000 new 
homes were built in the city in 1808 as entrepreneurs shifted financial capital towards 
manufacturing opportunities.
104
 
     The Administration attempted to enforce the embargo throughout 1808.  Numerous merchants 
and traders, desperate to maintain their economic livelihood, tried to circumvent it.  The federal 
government enforced the embargo through policing activities and the judicial system with 
inconsistent success.  It soon became abundantly clear that Americans were more adversely 
impacted by the legislation than were the great European powers.
105
   
     Great Britain responded to the Embargo by meddling with the new American policy.  
Parliament enacted temporary legislation allowing American ships to carry goods to British 
colonies on the North American continent.  The dual goals of the policy were to undermine the 
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American edict and to alleviate the growing shortage of imported foodstuffs and other goods 
desperately needed by British Caribbean island colonies.
106
   
     Enforcement of the embargo proved challenging.  It greatly depended on the determination 
and abilities of local officials, particularly state governors.  Most of the trade leakage from 
smuggling was concentrated in the far northern and southern states.  Some states, such as South 
Carolina and New Hampshire, had very few problems.  New York had many problems, partly 
due to its lengthy northern border, although Governor Daniel Tompkins’s diligent efforts tried to 
mitigate the illegal activities.  Eventually, Tompkins, Gallatin, and Jefferson were forced into 
authorizing the use of state militia and the regular army in the Fall of 1808 to ensure 
enforcement.  Matters were worse in Massachusetts, where Republican governor James Sullivan 
frequently ignored rampant smuggling, afraid to endanger the fragile Republican control of the 
state government.  Federalist Connecticut most boldly challenged the embargo, as the governor 
and legislature refused to cooperate at all with federal authorities.  They even threatened, in early 
1809, to use state resources to actively resist enforcement on the grounds that the Federal 
Government had overreached its constitutional authority.
107
   
     In August 1808, Jefferson and Congress received a new flood of petitions calling for the 
embargo’s repeal or easing.  In November, Representative Edward St. Loe Livermore presented 
the House with petitions executed by more than four thousand Massachusetts citizens. The 
petitions, from various towns, contained the exact same language, suggesting a highly organized 
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response.
108
  On December 22, 1808, various New England towns staged days of mourning to 
mark the one-year anniversary of the embargo’s passage.109   
     Federalists began a political offensive in sympathy with New England merchants.  In early 
November, Representative Martin Chittenden of Vermont motioned to repeal the embargo, with 
“no object in view but to bring the subject before the House, and excite a fair and liberal 
discussion.”110  In contrast to the rapid passage of the Embargo Act a year before, his proposal 
instigated a protracted debate in Congress over American trade policy, consuming most of the 
fall session from early November 1808 through the following March.  The discourse centered on 
the Embargo’s effectiveness and legitimacy.   
     Embargo critics maintained that the embargo was simply not working.  Great Britain was not 
succumbing, and worse, the policy was proving itself detrimental to the United States economy, 
and particularly to merchants.  Representative Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts characterized the 
embargo as an “abject submission, by which this country has for these eleven months been 
disgraced, and brought to the brink of ruin … by our dereliction of the ocean, the Continent is 
much more deprived of the advantages of commerce than it would be possible for the British 
navy to effect, and by removing our competition, all the commerce of the Continent which can 
be forced is wholly left to be reaped by Great Britain.”  Quincy remonstrated against Jefferson’s 
policies, declaring “I have not the words to express the matchless absurdity of this attempt.  I 
have no tongue to express the swift and headlong destruction which a blind perseverance in such 
a system must bring upon this nation.”111   
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     It was becoming evident that the embargo had little impact on Great Britain.  Barent 
Gardenier, a New York Federalist, characterized the Embargo as outright war with Great Britain, 
“not the old-fashioned sort of war, but a new-fangled philosophical kind of commercial war!  We 
thought we played a strong card, and now we are outrageous because our antagonist has been 
able to play above us.”112  James Hillhouse of Connecticut maintained that “all the 
inconvenience which she could feel from our measure had already been borne; and Great Britain 
was turning her attention to every part of the globe to obtain those supplies which she was wont 
to get from us.”  Hillhouse mockingly noted that “we have adopted the monkish plan of 
scourging ourselves for the sins of others.”  The Federalist senator seized on the problems 
enforcing the embargo, asking “How has it turned out?  Why, patriotism, cannon, militia and all 
had not stopped it.”113  
     Opponents argued that free trade principles should rule, and that the federal government 
ought to refrain from interdicting trade.  John Randolph, ever the thorn in the Administration’s 
side, reasoned that “there was one plain and obvious answer to every man who objected to the 
raising of the embargo … [if] the merchants are willing to run the risk; and if we do not choose 
to protect them, at least we may leave them and insurance offices to settle the business among 
themselves.”  He continued, stating that “It is then their affair … Our merchants believe that, if 
let alone, they could by their enterprise carry on a lucrative trade, and get us a better price for our 
produce … [I am] willing to indulge them in the experiment.”114  Randolph argued that an 
individual’s economic freedom was more important than national economic policy.     
     Others cautioned that the embargo must be maintained until the twin issues of neutral rights 
and impressments were satisfactorily resolved.  Senator William Giles of Virginia commented 
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that “The United States are now left alone to protect neutral principles against the belligerent 
encroachments of a warring world.”  George Troup of Georgia noted that New England 
merchants’ pain was shared by Southern plantation owners, “who raise seventy millions of 
pounds of cotton, and for which they have not a home market for ten millions.”  Republican 
representative Willis Alston of North Carolina stated “that there is but one sentiment on the 
occasion; that every part of this great community feel its effects, I readily admit; but that they 
wish its immediate repeal at the expense of our liberty as an independent nation, I positively 
deny.”  Alston shared the example of William Gray, a Federalist merchant and the wealthiest 
man in New England, who was reported to say that “if the embargo laws were repealed whilst 
the present restrictions remained in force against our commerce, that any trade would be so 
hazardous and uncertain, that no honest merchant could or would attempt it.”115  Gray was 
estimated to possess a net worth of $3 million and owned 115 ships.
116
  He was a noteworthy 
case, as he supported the embargo even though it was detrimental to his personal pocket.   
     Republican supporters feared long-term negative consequences if the United States backed 
down from the embargo.  John Rhea of Tennessee stated that a repeal of the embargo meant that 
“The neutral rights of the United States will be destroyed, and the right of navigating on the 
ocean, consistent with the rules of public reason, will be annihilated, and their commerce will be 
subservient to the rules, regulations, and laws of foreign powers.”117  Richard Mentor Johnson of 
Kentucky concluded that “If the merchants directed their course to any other ports than those of 
the British dominions and countries in friendship and alliance with her, then your property must 
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only float upon the ocean as materials for British plunder.  If they were to direct their course to 
the ports of the British dominions, they would be subject to capture by the French privateers.”118 
     Some argued that too little time had passed to judge the embargo’s impact fairly.  Senator 
Andrew Moore of Virginia remarked that “Under these circumstances, it appears to me that the 
embargo has not had a fair trial … but for evasions and miscalculations on our weakness, we 
should before this have been suffered to pursue our accustomed trade.”  Representative Nathaniel 
Macon of North Carolina pleaded that “The experiment is now making, and I am desirous that it 
should be fairly made; that if it succeed we shall know the value of the measure and if it fail, 
hereafter we may not depend on it.”  Virginian Thomas Gholson called for patience, anticipating 
that exclusion of British manufactures would have a crippling effect, and that “Such a state of 
things, sir, must inevitably tend to the universal impoverishment of Great Britain.”119     
     While some Republicans argued that economic pressure on the British and French must be 
continued, other party members expressed concerns over the embargo’s domestic political 
implications.  Kentucky Representative Matthew Lyon, imprisoned by the Adams’ 
administration under the Alien and Sedition Acts a decade before, lamented that “among the 
diversity of evils and calamities brought on by the embargo system … none has vexed me so 
much as the injury done to the cause of republicanism … my predictions have come to pass.  
Massachusetts has returned to that Federalism which she had shaken off.  New Hampshire has 
told her embargo delegation that she has no further occasion for their services.  Rhode Island has 
done the same.”120   
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     As the crisis escalated, some legislators called for a “third-way” proposal than neither 
affirmed nor rejected the embargo.  Representative Gurdon Mumford, of New York, suggested a 
partial restoration of American trade, with all countries other than Great Britain or France.  He 
proposed that “if we permitted this commerce to those countries who were disposed to receive us 
on friendly terms, Great Britain and France would indirectly receive their supplies,” which 
would relieve the United States.
121
  
     In the face of the embargo’s ineffectiveness and unpopularity, a majority of Republicans 
defied the administration by adopting Mumford’s “half-way” measure, hoping to mollify 
embargo opponents.  The resulting Non-Intercourse Act was passed in the waning days of the 
Jefferson presidency by a Senate vote on February 21, 1809 of 21 to 12, and on February 27 in 
the House by a vote of 81 to 40.
122
  This legislation negated the Embargo Act by restoring all 
American international trade except with Great Britain and France.
123
 
     Passing the Non-Intercourse Act immediately revived American commerce.  Within a week 
of the news, ships were pulling up anchor and departing the previously quiet Salem, 
Massachusetts harbor.  In all, ninety-eight ships departed the port within sixty days of passage, 
reemploying almost 1,000 sailors.
124
 
     The Non-Intercourse Act represented a face-saving tactical retreat from the Embargo Act 
debacle.  Albert Gallatin astutely pointed out that restoring trade with all nations except Great 
Britain and France was tantamount to restoring trade with all nations, as cargoes could easily 
move to the two great powers via third party ports, just Americans had done earlier in the decade 
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by use of “broken” voyages.125  Nathaniel Macon concurred, reasoning that “if your merchants 
go out under this bill, in my opinion they will evade it.”126   
     Voting in Congress on the Non-Intercourse bill was influenced by a number of factors.  If one 
were dogmatically for or against trade restrictions with the British and/or French, he was likely 
to vote in a similar manner as he had for the embargo bill in late 1807.  However, a free trade 
sympathizer might theoretically be willing to vote for the bill since it represented an incremental 
move towards a less restrictive policy.  Likewise, a protectionist might potentially vote against 
the bill for precisely the same reason.  Table 3.8 summarizes the Non-Intercourse vote by region:      
Table 3.8. Ratification Vote of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 by Region15 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)    13    14    3    6 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    28  11    6    2 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)      21    6      3    1 
South   (GA, NC, SC)      12    8    3        3 
West  (KY, OH, TN)         7    1    6    0 
Totals      81   40   21  12 
Source: 19 Annals of Cong. 436, 1541 (1809).  
     
     The 1809 aggregate voting totals were similar to those of 1807.  However, significant shifts 
occurred between regions.  In particular, New England voted against the bill in both the Senate 
and House, after supporting the Embargo Act two years before.  This shift suggests that the 
region hadn’t entirely abandoned the administration’s policies.  Substantial Republican 
minorities remained in the respective state congressional delegations.  The remaining regions, as 
they had fourteen months earlier, overwhelmingly supported the legislation.    
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Table 3.9. Ratification Vote of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 by Party Affiliation16 
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Republican  78   20   21        6 
Federalist    3  20    0    6 
Totals   81  40  21  12        
Source: 19 Annals of Cong. 436, 1541 (1809).    
       A review of the 1809 vote by party, shown in Table 3.9, illustrates that party discipline was 
again an important contributing factor.  Both the 1807 Embargo Act and the 1809 Non-
Intercourse Act votes were considered by the Tenth Congress and, although the overall voting 
patterns by region and party were consistent, there was significant movement among individual 
members.  In the House, 26 of the 107 representatives (24%) who voted on both bills switched 
their positions.  In the Senate, 3 of 25 (12%) did the same.
127
      
     Although the Administration’s trade policies economically hurt many Americans on an 
individual basis, Republicans successfully maintained their political dominance despite the 
contrasting positions of the two political parties on trade policy.  If Americans were terribly 
discontented over recent trade legislation, the Republicans should have been harshly rebuked in 
the elections of 1808 and 1809, which took place well after the embargo was in place and before 
the Non-Intercourse Act was passed.  They were not.   
     Madison, Jefferson’s hand-picked successor and primary architect of the trade restriction 
policies, easily won the presidential election in 1808, tallying 122 of the 176 electoral votes.  His 
primary opponent, Federalist Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, gathered most of 
his support (39 of 47 votes) from New England.
128
  The electoral vote, however, should not be 
misconstrued to suggest Federalists regained political ascendency in New England.  Despite the 
unpopularity of their economic policy initiatives in some circles, Republicans maintained their 
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relative positions in the state legislatures of the New England and Atlantic states between 1808 
and 1809.  The only state where the Federalists made significant political inroads was New York, 
and these gains were quickly reversed in 1810.
129
  The only other notable Federalist victories 
occurred in Connecticut, the most Federalist state in the nation, and New Hampshire, where the 
change of a few seats in the small state senate were neutralized by Republican control of the state 
house.  Massachusetts, allegedly bearing the brunt of the economic damage from the embargo, 
registered no significant changes in the state’s political landscape.  Republicans retained control 
of the State’s executive branch throughout the Embargo period.  Governor James Sullivan softly 
enforced the Embargo Act and his successor, Levi Lincoln, actively enforced it.
130
  Table 3.10 
shows the limited scope of Federalist gains in New England state legislatures at the height of the 
Embargo in 1808-1809: 
Table 3.10. Federalist Control of State Legislatures in New England and Atlantic States from 
1808 to 180917 
   Senate  Senate  House  House  --- Change --- 
State   1808  1809  1808  1809  Senate House 
New England: 
Connecticut  100%   100%   71%   77%   none +6% 
Massachusetts    58%     56%   52%   53%   -2% +1%       
New Hampshire   25%       58%   39%   40%   +33%   +1% 
Rhode Island     n/a     n/a  54%  57%  n/a +3% 
Vermont     n/a     n/a  46%  39%  n/a -7% 
 
Atlantic: 
Delaware    67%       67%   67%   67%   none none 
New Jersey    46%    38%  43%  40%  -8%  -3% 
New York    28%    38%  42%  57%  +10% +15% 
Pennsylvania    16%    19%  22%  15%  +3% -7%   
Source: Michael J. Dubin, Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary, 
1796-2006 (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2007), 33, 39, 
91, 120, 126, 134, 157, 164, 187.     
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     Republicans also maintained their overall dominance of the federal legislature despite minor 
Federalist election-year gains.  Their Senate control in the new Eleventh Congress was a 
resounding 28 to 6 majority.  In the House, even though Federalists gained 24 seats, Republicans 
retained a comfortable overall advantage by a 94 to 48 margin.
131
   
     The American trade war proved ineffectual, leading Congress to rebuke the administration by 
passing the Non-Intercourse Act, legislation that neither Jefferson nor Madison desired.  
Jefferson departed the White House a frustrated and discouraged man, confiding to James 
Monroe shortly before departing Washington D. C. that “There never has been a situation of the 
world before, in which such endeavors as we have made would not have secured our peace.”132  
To Pierre Dupont he wrote “After using every effort which could prevent or delay our being 
entangled in the war of Europe, that seems now our only recourse.”  Jefferson defended his 
actions, noting that “The edicts of the two belligerents, forbidding us to be seen on the ocean, we 
met by an embargo.  This gave us time to call home our seamen, ships and property.”133   
     James Garnett, John Randolph’s close congressional ally, decided not to run for office at the 
end of the Tenth Congress in 1809, and offered a sharply different assessment of the embargo 
than Jefferson.  In an open letter to his constituents, he shared his “deep, but unavailing regret, 
that this repeal could not have taken place before the violent and highly censorable conduct of 
some of the people had inflicted a wound on the integrity of our union … the embargo is off, and 
we are likely to still remain at peace.”  He further reflected that “you have been often told, that 
the Embargo was chiefly designed to get home our resources, amongst which were our seamen.  
But how has it operated in this respect?  The number of those unfortunate men, whose only 
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means of living was employment on the water, who from being too proud to beg or rob, have 
been compelled to seek a foreign service.”134     
Mr. Madison’s War 
     On Saturday, March 4, 1809, James Madison swore the oath of office, becoming the fourth 
president of the United States.  In his brief inaugural address, the new chief executive praised his 
predecessor.
135
  Although the White House now had a new occupant, executive branch policy 
changed little.  Madison, as Secretary of State, had been Jefferson’s chief lieutenant for eight 
years and the key architect of the trade restriction policies from 1806 through 1809.  
     Madison, in his first term, continued attempts to use trade policy for diplomatic ends.  His two 
major political objectives remained recognition of American neutral shipping rights and an end 
to British naval impressments.  These efforts suffered for lack of consistent application, a failure 
to cause any substantial economic pain to Great Britain and France, and very poor performances 
by Madison’s foreign diplomats.  Federalist James Hillhouse prophetically warned in 1809 that 
the Non-Intercourse Act “marches us to the precipice, from which the next step may plunge the 
nation into a war, incalculable as to calamity and duration.”136 
     A series of diplomatic misunderstandings led Madison, erroneously believing that Great 
Britain had removed all of its trade restrictions, to revoke American trade restrictions against the 
British in June, 1809.  When the news broke, more than six hundred American ships picked up 
anchor, anxious to restore active trade.  Unfortunately, later in the same month, word arrived that 
the British had issued revised Orders in Council, continuing the blockade of Continental Europe, 
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and challenging American insistence on neutral rights.
137
  The administration hastily re-imposed 
non-intercourse restrictions in the summer when it became clear that Great Britain hadn’t made 
any substantive concessions at all.
138
  American ships sailing in summer 1809 reported that they 
were only marginally profitable, and in some instances unprofitable, demonstrating that British 
policies continued to hold American commercial activities hostage.
139
    
     Any chances for retrieving the diplomatic breakdown or improving dialogue were hampered 
by temporarily vacant ambassadorships in both London and Washington in early 1810.
140
  In 
May 1810 Congress passed another trade-related legislative act, entitled Macon’s bill number 2.  
This legislation amended the Non-Intercourse Act to allow American shipping to engage in 
commerce with all nations, including the British and the French, although the two major powers’ 
warships remained prohibited from American harbors.  The most important provision of this new 
act declared that if either Great Britain or France rescinded their trade restrictions against the 
United States, the American government would reinstate an embargo against the other.       
     Napoleon quickly seized upon this new bill and declared that the Berlin Decree would no 
longer apply, effective November 1810.  However, the French declaration contained 
qualifications requiring the United States to cease all commerce with Britain.  The Madison 
administration hastily accepted the French offer and Anglo-American trade was again curtailed 
even though the French government failed to live up to its pledges.  British imports to the United 
States could now only be carried by American ships and all British shipping was banned from 
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American harbors.  American restrictions would only be rescinded when the standing British 
Orders of Council were withdrawn.
141
  
     Tensions between the United States and Great Britain continued throughout 1811 and into 
early 1812.  In March, Congress went into secret session, considering another embargo as a 
prelude to war.  Not surprisingly, word leaked out and an unusually large number of ships lifted 
anchor and sailed out of American harbors on March 31.
142
 
     The European projection of economic power on the United States during Madison’s first term 
was effective. Between the passage of the Embargo Act and the outbreak of hostilities against 
Great Britain in 1812, the two major European powers seized almost nine hundred American 
ships.
143
  In May 1812, dispatches arrived in the United States indicating that, despite ongoing 
diplomatic efforts, Britain was unwilling to modify their current version of Orders of Council.   
     The Republicans had escalated trade tensions in the name of American sovereignty, and the 
stalemated status of diplomatic efforts created an uncomfortable political situation for them.  
Madison concluded that there was no alternative but to request a declaration of war against Great 
Britain.  He did so on June 1, 1812, in a message to Congress asserting that British conduct 
“presents a series of acts hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation … it 
has become, indeed, sufficiently certain that the commerce of the United States is to be 
sacrificed, not as interfering with the belligerent rights of Great Britain; not as supplying the 
wants of her enemies, which she herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly which she 
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covets for her own commerce.”144  By June 18, both the House and Senate had approved the 
measure, officially commencing the War of 1812.
145
  
     Though many Americans embraced the declaration of war, others expressed reservations.  
John Randolph was aghast, confiding to James Garnett that “the die is cast, and the ruin of a 
nation is the cheap price brokering of the aristocracy, of a few of the most weak & worthless 
individuals in it.”  Writing financier David Parish, he complained that “affairs here are in the 
worst imaginable posture; to afford no room for those whom I believe to be true friends of the 
country.”  Garnett wrote Randolph that “it seems improbable to me that the delusion, may I not 
say the madness, can be much longer kept up … woe be to the author of this war … on ten years 
longer practice, you may come to do tolerable journeyman’s work at this game of hypocrisy.”146  
     Ironically, a little patience could have prevented the war.  After six challenging years of using 
economic policy to pressure Great Britain, the former mother country finally acquiesced.  Only 
two days prior to the American declaration of war the British government, under pressure from 
its iron making industry, agreed to suspend the Orders in Council.  The move came too late.
147
   
     The United States was ill-prepared for the outbreak of the war.  Many Americans believed 
that a conquest of Canada was a mere formality, ignoring that Republican policies left the army 
and navy both small and  poorly equipped in 1812, despite threats of hostilities the previous six 
years.  This was particularly true of the American navy, which possessed only three frigates at 
the war’s start to challenge almost eighty royal navy warships operating in the western side of 
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the Atlantic alone.
148
  Republicans, expecting that Canada would rapidly fall, failed to requisition 
sufficient funding for a navy they considered unnecessary.   
     Republican inattentiveness towards the American military became abundantly clear soon after 
hostilities began.  A three pronged advance into Canada in 1812 by way of Detroit, Niagara, and 
northward along Lake Champlain failed disastrously.  American military fortunes fared poorly 
again in 1813 in spite of a successful raid that sacked the Canadian capital at York in the spring, 
William Henry Harrison achieved a major land victory at the Battle of the Thames in the fall, 
effectively breaking remaining Indian military power in the Northwest Territories, but Harrison’s 
army returned to Detroit by year’s end.  By 1814, Britain was freed from the European wars by 
Napoleon’s abdication, and transferred additional troops to North America.  A British raid on 
Washington retaliated for the York raid of the preceding year, but the invading force was stopped 
at Baltimore.  The sole major American land success occurred in January 1815 when General 
Andrew Jackson’s decisively defeated British forces at the Battle of New Orleans. 149 
     American naval operations did not fare much better.  After Admiral Nelson’s 1805 victory at 
Trafalgar, the British navy dominated the Atlantic Ocean shipping lanes.  Although the 
American navy frequently bested their British counterparts in a series of single ship engagements 
early in the war, by late 1813 American warships were effectively bottled up in home ports and 
rendered ineffective.  The Royal Navy selectively applied the blockade in the hopes of fostering 
American political discontent, particularly in New England.  By the fall of 1812, Britain laid a 
blockade extending from Narragansett Bay southward, leaving the New England ports open.  
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This strategy was so effective that, in 1814, the customs houses in Massachusetts collected $1.6 
million in duties, compared to only $4,000 for the entire state of Virginia.
150
 
          As the war floundered, the Madison administration again considered using economic 
policy against Great Britain.  In December 1813, Congress imposed an embargo on all American 
shipping, with a goal to cut off shipments of export goods for the British war effort in Europe, 
particularly in the Iberian Peninsula.
151
  However, only three months later, Madison reversed his 
position and requested Congress to rescind the embargo except for British imports.
152
 
     Just as Madison suspended the new embargo, Great Britain tightened its naval blockade to 
incorporate all of New England and the Louisiana port of New Orleans.  The British attacked 
New England shipping, destroying merchant ships in various ports, and seizing key locations 
along the coastline.
153
  American commerce was brought to a virtual standstill and the active 
national merchant marine shrank from 948,000 tons in 1811 to only 60,000 tons by 1814.
154
   
     The United States and Great Britain commenced direct peace negotiations in August 1814, in 
Ghent, Belgium.  The American negotiating team was first rate, including former senator John 
Quincy Adams, House speaker Henry Clay, Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, Senator 
James Bayard and diplomat Jonathan Russell.  In contrast, the best British diplomats were in 
Vienna negotiating the future of post-Napoleonic Europe, and consequently their delegation at 
Ghent was comprised of less talented men.
155
   
     The two nations successfully concluded a peace treaty on December 24, 1814, returning the 
political situation to the pre-war status quo.  A draft treaty reached Washington on February 13, 
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1815, which the Senate ratified three days later.  American grievances of neutral shipping rights 
and impressments were not addressed, but they were now moot issues after Napoleon’s downfall.  
Madison’s government could not have been more fortunate under the circumstances.156   
     In late 1814, Federalist leaders met in Hartford Connecticut to consider their political options.  
The gathering was ill-fated from the beginning.  Early in the month news circulated that peace 
discussions were progressing.  Nevertheless, Federalists aimed to gain political advantage over 
national war weariness and economic difficulties.  The states of Massachusetts, Connecticut and 
Rhode Island sent delegations, though Vermont and New Hampshire declined.  A minority group 
in the Rhode Island legislature even called for a resolution criticizing the Hartford meeting, but 
they were voted down.
157
  
     The Hartford Convention produced a memorial recommending several constitutional 
amendments.  Trade was a major topic of concern.  One proposed amendment called for a two-
thirds majority requirement in Congress to interrupt trade with other nations, while another 
sought to limit embargoes to a maximum of sixty days duration.
158
  
     Overall, the Convention report’s tone was moderate.  The state legislatures in Massachusetts 
and Connecticut approved the report and sent a delegation, headed by Harrison Gray Otis of 
Massachusetts, to present it.  Before they reached the capital, news of Ghent and New Orleans 
began circulating.
159
  The Federalist Party, victims of bad timing, was branded disloyal in the 
aftermath of both great national successes, and lost its national influence after Hartford.   
     The Jeffersonian Experiment produced meaningful and important developments in the 
American economy, even though they were unintended.  Reduced international trade encouraged 
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entrepreneurial citizens to engage in small scale manufacturing to address consumer demands for 
finished goods.  The nation domiciled 15 cotton mills in 1808, but by 1814 that number 
increased to 243 scattered throughout the nation.
160
  
     Republicans waged war as ineffectively as they had trade policy.  Both efforts utterly failed to 
meet their objectives.  Although American self-confidence was restored by Jackson’s victory at 
New Orleans, any objective review of American military and economic policy from 1806 
through 1815 would have to conclude that the nation had come perilously close to disaster.               
Conclusions 
     The United States and Great Britain engaged in economic war between 1806 and 1815, 
including war by military force between 1812 and 1815.  American trade policy caused the War 
of 1812.  The result was an economic, military and diplomatic debacle.    
     Jefferson and Madison both expressed views in the 1790s that trade policy could be used 
effectively against stronger European nations in lieu of a military confrontation.  The 
Jeffersonian experiment ironically used draconian means completely opposed to free trade 
ideology in an attempt to achieve free trade ends.  They remained blindly devoted to pressuring 
Great Britain through trade restrictions, and war was the consequence.  Although ancillary issues 
such as impressments stirred American indignation and anti-British rhetoric, trade policy was the 
root cause of the conflict.   
     The Jeffersonian experiment failed.  Historian Gordon Wood noted that “The Republicans 
came to power in 1801 very much committed to the liberal principles of international commerce 
… Their ultimate aim, confused and confusing as it often was, was truly grandiose.”161  Jefferson 
and his followers sincerely believed that liberal economic principles, including free trade, could 
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be exported to all corners of the globe.  However, Republican efforts to put theory into practice 
created a confusing, and frequently shifting, series of legislative measures.  John Randolph, 
observing the administration’s efforts, commented that “It had unfortunately happened that 
during the whole course of the discussion there had been an extreme want of precision with 
respect to the object in view.”162  
     Between 1800 and 1816, Jefferson and Madison faced circumstances beyond their immediate 
control, and they struggled in their response.  British attacks on American sovereignty, mainly 
through impressment, so greatly strained Anglo-British relations that war broke out in 1812.  
Norman Risjord contends that “the War of 1812 was the most uneconomic war the United States 
has ever fought.”163  Risjord’s points out that the root cause of the War was national honor.  The 
use of trade restrictions was only the “means” that Jefferson and Madison employed to achieve 
adequate recompense. 
     During that time the two chief executives and a large number of Republicans gradually 
shifted from their free trade principles to a more nationalistic view of trade policy.  Historian 
Lawrence Peskin notes that “by the early nineteenth century, many pro-manufacturing 
Republicans began calling for the development of a new economy resting on domestic 
production, in contradistinction to the Federalists’ growing emphasis on overseas trade.”  This 
trend was hastened by the fact that important nationalists like Tench Coxe and Matthew Carey 
migrated from the Federalists over to the Republicans.
164
 
     The primary causes of American trade policy failure were inconsistent application and a lack 
of political will.  The confusing, and frequently changing, array of legislative acts and diplomatic 
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initiatives between 1806 and 1812 appeared indecisive and weak to the European powers.  The 
active and rancorous domestic debate encouraged Great Britain and France to patiently wait out 
American trade policy initiatives.  Republicans overestimated the short-term impact of American 
foreign trade restrictions on the European powers.  
     The American private sector contributed to inconsistent trade policy initiatives through its use 
of political pressure.  Representative George Washington Campbell of Tennessee ruefully 
inquired “What occasioned the passage of the non-importation act?  The numerous petitions of 
… merchants.”165  The greatest proponents for trade restrictions were initially the merchants, 
who later became the greatest critics when their economic self-interests were severely damaged.  
It would be wrong to assume that all merchants supported the Federalist perspective on the trade 
issue.  Some merchants supported the Jeffersonian experiment, either out of principle or financial 
self-interest.  The Crowninshields were one example.  William Gray was an example of a 
successful Federalist merchant supporting the Administration policies.
166
            
     Utopian Jeffersonian hopes to export free trade ideology failed.  The harsh reality was that the 
United States remained a second-class economic power, and perhaps an even lesser military one.  
Napoleon’s downfall and the Congress of Vienna began a reactionary period in European 
politics, and liberal trade ideas along Jeffersonian lines were little more welcome than French 
revolutionary notions of government.  
     American restrictive trade policies between 1800 and 1815 detrimentally impacted American 
economic growth and prosperity.  Figure 3.1 illustrates American real GDP per capita from the 
Founding through 1816, a proxy for the standard of living for average American citizens.
167
  The 
trend was modestly positive.  During the years between 1790 and 1800, the economy grew 
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0.80% annually.  From 1800 through 1816, however, the annual growth rate dropped to less than 
half of pre-1800 levels, increasing only 0.34% per annum.
168
  A short-term “bust” period 
occurred in the 1807 to 1808 time frame, coinciding with the embargo.     
 
Figure 3.1. American GDP per Capita, 1790 to 1816 (in real dollars = 1996) (3 year rolling 
average)3    
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 1:30, 3:23. 
 
     The United States maintained a fairly steady proportion of foreign trade relative to Gross 
Domestic Product (“GDP”) from 1790 through 1807, as depicted in Figure 3.2.169  During this 
time frame Openness ranged between 22% and 30%, with the high point reached in 1807, just 
before the embargo was put into force.  A comparison to the average tariff rate between 1790 and 
1807 suggests that rising tariff rates had minimal adverse impact upon overall trade.  American 
international commerce increased even as tariff rates rose, indicating that duties were not yet 
high enough to act as a protective agent for any significant portions of the national economy.      
     Trade patterns rapidly changed after 1807, when trade restrictions were initially put in place.  
Foreign commerce, relative to the American economy, dramatically fell between 1807 and 1815, 
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starting with the embargo, continuing with escalating international tensions with Great Britain 
and France, and reaching a climax with the War of 1812.  A collapsing trade situation with Great 
Britain, still the most significant trading partner of the United States, inevitably led to war 
between the two nations.  
     In the early nineteenth century the United States, though politically independent, remained in 
an economic neo-colonial relationship with Great Britain.  The bravado heard in the House 
chambers during the non-importation debates in 1806 proved empty.  The harsh reality was that a 
cessation of trade hurt the United States far more than the British.  New England merchant John 
Corlis exemplified the plight of those personally impacted by the embargo, war and blockade.  In 
a letter, he sadly observed that “I am well aware that you could not foresee the embargo & pray 
who in this nation could have anticipated an embargo on the coastal trade, it does indeed seem to 
me more a hostility to New England than Old England.  If it shall continue any length of time, I 
do not see how I shall continue”170  A foundational principle of Jefferson’s and Madison’s 
economic paradigm, that economic warfare was the United States’ greatest weapon in the arena 
of foreign policy, was debunked.  If anything, Republican trade policy accomplished the exact 
opposite.  Instead of forcing a peace, it instigated a war.  
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Figure 3.2. American Foreign Trade, 1791 to 1816 (3 year rolling average)4 
Source: Carter, et al, eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498, 510; “Measuring Worth,” http://www.mea 
suringworth.org/usgdp/. 
 
     The most important byproduct of the Jeffersonian Experiment was the rapid growth of 
American infant industries, including cotton and wool manufactures, as well as iron production.  
Economists Douglas Irwin and Joseph Davis have pointed out that while commerce oriented 
industries suffered between 1807 and 1815, enduring a 20% declination from expected growth 
results, the aforementioned newer industries enjoyed growth that was 20% in excess of normal 
expectations.
171
  These new industries grew in response to the vacuum created by the drop in 
trade with Great Britain, but remained at a comparative economic disadvantage relative to British 
producers at the close of hostilities.    
     The difficult experiences between 1800 and 1816 caused both Jefferson and Madison to make 
pragmatic shifts in their own thinking.  Jefferson’s flexibility in response to changing 
circumstances is exemplified by a November 1808 written address that he delivered to Congress: 
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The suspension of foreign commerce … has impelled us to apply a portion of our 
industry and capital to internal manufactures and improvements. The extent of 
this conversion is daily increasing, and little doubt remains that the establishments 
formed and forming will, under the auspices of cheaper materials and subsistence, 
the freedom of labor from taxation with us, and of protecting duties and 
prohibitions, [emphasis added] become permanent.
172
 
 
The President’s outlook represented a sea change from earlier positions on trade policy.  This 
paradigm shift was caused by changing circumstances; the Jeffersonian experiment resulted in 
outcomes that sharply diverged from its original intent.
173
           
     An important development during the Jeffersonian Experiment was the growth of private-
sector special interest groups, a side-effect of trade policy initiatives.  New England merchants 
stand out as the prime example of this trend.  Many of them were actively behind the petition 
movement that deluged President Jefferson in the latter part of 1808.  Common citizens also sent 
numerous memorials directly to Congress.  As an example, in February 1809, New York citizens 
from New York City’s Third Ward remonstrated Congress for the severity of the embargo 
enforcement laws.  In their memorial, they complained that the “excessive security required for 
vessels and cargoes, (being six times their value) is productive of various vexations and 
oppressions … the act operates as a total prohibition of the use of … property.”174   
     The Treaty of Ghent retrieved the United States from a dangerous political and military 
situation.  However, Republicans were disunited on how to proceed forward with trade policy in 
the post-war world.  While Jefferson and Madison shifted their stances on trade closer to 
economic nationalism, other Republicans such as John Taylor of Caroline, temperamental John 
Randolph and his Quid followers thought otherwise.  This minority branch of the party remained 
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steadfastly devoted to laissez-faire principles.  In the midst of the economic and military 
hostilities, Representative William Burwell of Virginia hearkened back to the trade debates of 
the 1790s, declaring that “I contend for nothing but free trade, and ask nothing more of them, nor 
will I ever be content with less.”175  David Williams of South Carolina stated that “I am for no 
high protecting duties in favor of any description of men in this country.”176 
     Historian Gordon Wood noted that “The War of 1812 did finally establish for Americans the 
independence and nationhood of the United States that so many had previously doubted … 
Americans thought of the War of 1812 as “the second war for American Independence.””177  
Yet, this second war differed from the first in many ways.  Although both wars featured the same 
foe, war aims were distinctly different.  The Revolution was fought for political independence, 
an issue that was totally absent in 1812.  Even the Duke of Wellington acknowledged that the 
United Stated could not be conquered.  The War of 1812 instead was a war for economic 
independence.   
     Although the Treaty of Ghent ignored the pre-war issues of neutral rights and impressments, 
the corresponding end of the European wars in 1815 marked a significant change in international 
politics.  Though the participants did not realize it at the time, the Pax Britannica was beginning.  
How would the United States, still weaker than Great Britain both commercially and militarily, 
fit into the new evolving world order?  Despite the national wartime traumas, some Republicans 
concluded that the recent national experience had fundamentally changed the American nation.  
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Representative Charles Ingersoll of Pennsylvania declared that “This holy war has advanced us a 
century per saltem in power and character,”178  
     The end of the war brought economic peace and Republicans now considered what new trade 
policy should succeed the discredited Jeffersonian experiment.  The poor military showing 
convinced many Americans to prioritize national security, in order to protect the nation against 
any future British military or economic threats.  Consequently, economic nationalism and 
protection began to be viewed in an ever more positive light.  Ingersoll correctly asserted that the 
country was changing.  For one, the new Fourteenth Congress was filled with many young faces 
reflecting a changing American political landscape.  President Madison, whose own political 
heritage traced back to the Constitution, would craft trade policy with a legislature that included 
the likes of recently elected Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and Daniel Webster, all less than forty 
years old.  
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CHAPTER 4 – SYNTHESIS: THEORIES, EXPERIENCES, NEW POLICIES, AND THE 
TARIFF OF 1816 
 
“Neither agriculture, manufactures, nor commerce, taken separately, is the cause of wealth; it 
flows from the three combined, and cannot exist without each … without commerce, industry 
would have no stimulus; without manufactures, it would be without the means of production; and 
without agriculture, neither of the others can exist … When our manufactures are grown to a 
certain perfection, as they soon will under the fostering care of Government, we will no longer 
experience these evils.”1 
- Representative John C. Calhoun of South Carolina (April 4, 1816 remarks to the House) 
 
“should the National Government, pursuing an enlightened and liberal policy, sustain and foster 
the manufacturing establishments, a few years would place them in a condition to bid defiance to 
foreign competition, and would enable them to increase the industry, wealth, and prosperity of 
the nation.”2   
- House Committee of Commerce and Manufactures Report (presented to the House on February 
13, 1816) 
 
“what do the principles about which such a contest is maintained amount to, but a system of 
bounties to manufacturers, in order to encourage them to do that which, if it be advantageous to 
do it at all, they will do, of course, for their own sake; a largesse to men to exercise their own 
customary callings, for their own emolument.” 3  
- Representative John Randolph of Virginia (January 16, 1816 remarks to the House) 
  
     The Jeffersonian Experiment and the War of 1812 exposed many weaknesses in the American 
economy.  Policies such as trade restraints and embargos produced disaster.  The American 
treasury desperately struggled to fund the war.  Although the Battle of New Orleans and the 
Treaty of Ghent salvaged a degree of national pride, prudent observers realized that the United 
States was quite fortunate to achieve a military and political stalemate. 
     Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo brought peace to Europe, but there were no assurances that the 
situation was permanent.  The United States remained in the midst of a hostile international 
environment, and the Congress of Vienna produced a political reaction against republican ideals.  
European nations still possessed sufficient military and commercial resources to harm the United 
States, a fact very apparent to all Americans.         
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     In 1816, a year after the Ghent peace, Congress reconsidered American trade policy with a 
goal to facilitate expanding and stabilizing the domestic economy.  It chartered the Second Bank 
of the United States, tacitly acknowledging that the absence of a national bank had harmed the 
war effort.  The Tariff of 1816 was a second move, rejecting the Jeffersonian Experiment and 
establishing protection for the nascent American manufactures sector.  
     Three major factors motivated Congress to consider a new course in trade policy.  First, the 
federal treasury needed revenues to repay the massive debts caused by the war.  Second, it was 
apparent that the United States hadn’t been adequately prepared for the recent war, and needed to 
economically prepare itself for a possible recurrence.  Finally, reestablished trade with Britain 
brought a sudden and substantial increase in imports, reintroducing foreign competition to the 
American marketplace, particularly in the area of manufactured goods.   
     A critical element differentiating the Tariff of 1816 from all previous tariff bills was the open 
effort to protect certain American industries, and especially manufactures established during the 
previous decade.  The Republican congressional majority, chastened by the experiences of the 
recent war, sought a pragmatic policy to enhance American economic strength and prosperity.  
However, some Republicans formed a “loyal opposition,” unwilling to abandon the free trade 
principles that had characterized Republican trade ideology in the 1790s.  
Calls for Protection     
     Republicans retained strong control of the Fourteenth Congress, which faced the task of 
establishing post-war policies.  The elections in late 1814, during the War’s last phases, 
improved the Republican House majority from a 112 to 68 advantage to a 117 to 65 margin.  The 
party lost Senate seats, but retained a comfortable 25 to 11 majority in the upper chamber.
4
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     James Madison asked Congress to reevaluate trade policy in his annual address on December 
5, 1815.  The president noted that “In adjusting the duties on imports to the object of revenue the 
influence of the tariff on manufactures will necessarily present itself for consideration … 
experience teaches us that so many circumstances must occur in introducing and maturing 
manufacturing establishments, especially of the more complicated kinds.”  Madison’s solution 
was “a protection not more than is due to the enterprising citizens whose interests are now at 
stake” which would allow American manufactures to become “safe against occasional 
competitions from abroad … [and] a source of domestic wealth an even of external commerce.”5     
     Madison’s call for increased protection was partly motivated by the many petitions that 
manufacturing interests sent to Washington.  The practice of submitting memorials in a large-
scale, organized manner began during Jefferson’s second term and continued into the post-war 
period.  In early 1816, the House received numerous petitions praying for protection of a variety 
of interests, including cotton manufacturers, jewelers, chemical manufacturers, copper 
manufacturers, and sugar planters.  At the same time, remonstrating petitions sought a repeal of 
duties, signaling a divided American public on the issue.
6
 
     The War’s end reinvigorated American foreign trade.  Imports and exports both rose 
dramatically in 1815 and 1816.  Total American international trade increased eight-fold in 1815 
and another 33% in 1816 (see Table 4.1).  Merchants happily experienced improved profits, 
including margins of 50% from some voyages.  Although increased trade benefitted merchants, it 
proved detrimental to American manufacturers.  International demand for Southern cotton 
pushed prices from thirteen cents to twenty-seven cents per pound between 1814 and 1816.
7
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Increased raw material costs, combined with more competition from foreign producers, created 
difficulties for American cotton manufacturers.  
Table 4.1. United States Imports and Exports from 1807 through 1816 (in millions)18 
 
Year   Imports Exports Total  Surplus/(Deficit) 
1807  139  49  188  (90) 
1808    57    9    66  (48) 
1809    59  31    90  (28) 
1810    85  42  127  (43) 
1811    53  45    98  (  8) 
1812    77  30  107  (47) 
1813    22  25    47     3 
1814    13    7    20  (  6) 
1815  113  46  159  (67) 
1816  147  65  212  (82) 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498.     
 
     British manufacturers returned to the American marketplace with minimal trade barriers.  
British Parliament member James Brougham aggressively endorsed economic war against the 
emerging American manufacturing sector.  He haughtily declared that “it was even worthwhile 
to incur a loss upon the first exportations, in order by the glut to stifle in the cradle these rising 
manufactures in the United States, which the war had forced into existence, contrary to the 
natural course of things.”8  
     From 1806, due to stifled international trade, American cloth manufacturing industries grew 
rapidly.  By 1815, an estimated that $40 million was invested in cotton manufacturing industry 
fixed assets and another $12 million in woolen manufactures.  The expansion was remarkable 
given that the nation domiciled just four cotton manufactories in 1803.
9
  By 1806, 13 cotton 
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manufactories had been established in the Northeast.  During the trade wars from 1807 through 
1811, another 32 were erected.  From 1812 to 1815, American investors built 108 more.
10
  
     On February 23, 1815, a week after the Treaty of Ghent was ratified, Congress requested 
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander J. Dallas to prepare a report with specific recommendations 
for tariff policy.
11
  Dallas submitted his report a year later on February 13, 1816.
12
  The Dallas 
Report ranks alongside Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures as one of the most important 
documents influencing American foreign trade policy.  Its sentiments and proposals paralleled 
Hamilton in many ways, but contrasted in others, reflecting economic changes brought on by the 
Industrial Revolution.  The Report rejected the Jeffersonian Experiment and proposed policies 
intended to make the United States self-sufficient in manufactures as rapidly as possible.   
     Dallas’s report approached the trade policy question in three ways.  First, it assessed the 
impact of the new peace on the American economy.  Next, Dallas defined necessary principles 
for national trade policy on a forward basis.  Lastly, he delivered a specific tariff proposal to 
Congress for consideration.  The second and third objectives were the most important, as they 
laid both the theoretical and practical foundation for a new tariff.  Dallas identified three distinct 
classes of goods and noted why, or why not, they were entitled to protection as follows: 
 First Class: Manufactures which are firmly and permanently established, and which 
wholly, or almost wholly, supply the demand for domestic use and consumption. 
 Second Class: Manufactures, which, being recently or partially established, do not at 
present supply the demand for domestic use and consumption, but which, with proper 
cultivation, are capable of being matured to the whole extent of the demand. 
 Third Class: Manufactures which are so slightly cultivated as to leave the demand of the 
country wholly, or almost wholly, dependent upon foreign sources for a supply.
13
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     Dallas argued that it was the second class that merited specific attention when crafting a new 
American trade policy.  The first class didn’t need protection, as it already competed on sound 
footing in international markets.  The third class produced goods that, due to natural resources or 
comparative advantages, the United States would always rely on foreign sources to provide.  
Items in the second class were, by definition, capable of eventually “graduating” to the first class 
category.  All that was required was tariff protection for a time.  The Dallas Report’s  underlying 
premise was that second class membership was temporary, limited only to enough time for a 
particular industry to mature to first class status, when protection wasn’t necessary any more.     
     The Dallas Report’s key principles were an important update to the Hamiltonian vision.  Its 
key contribution was to clearly articulate pragmatic guidelines to establish and manage trade 
policy now that the United States was experiencing the Industrial Revolution.  Hamilton’s Report 
was theoretical; the Dallas Report was far more specific in outlining exactly how policy should 
be established.  Like Hamilton, Dallas emphasized that imports of raw materials should be 
encouraged.  He also made it clear that start up American manufacturers required active 
governmental assistance.  In light of the domestic and international circumstances in 1816, the 
Dallas Report received a favorable reception from most Republicans. 
     In early 1816, the House considered various proposals to strengthen the nation’s economy.  
South Carolina’s Representative John Calhoun summed these discussions, noting that “the broad 
question was now before the House, whether this government should act on an enlarged policy; 
whether it would avail itself of the experience of the last war; whether it would be benefitted by 
the mass of knowledge acquired within the last few years.”14  In February, the House Committee 
of Commerce and Manufactures presented a report describing the state of cotton manufactures.  
The document described the sector’s significant growth from an output of only 500 bales in 1800 
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to 90,000 bales in 1815, and its employment of 100,000 workers.  The invested capital ($40 
million) in cotton manufactures, though far less than the value of the American merchant fleet 
ten years before, still represented a significant national economic investment, and was more than 
the annual federal budget at the height of the war.
15
    
     The Committee report stated that cotton manufactures was vital to national interests, and its 
presence benefitted all sectors of the economy.  It stated that “This natural order of things 
exhibits the commencement of a new epoch, which promises peace, security, and repose by a 
firm and steady reliance on the produce of agriculture; on the treasures that are embosomed in 
the earth; on the genius and ingenuity of our manufacturers and mechanics; and on the 
intelligence and enterprise of our merchants.”16  Agriculture would benefit from feeding 
increased numbers of laborers.  The report requested that “liberal encouragement … be afforded 
by agriculturalists to those who, by their labor, keep up a constant and increasing demand for the 
produce of agriculture … in the encouragement of manufactures, they find a stimulus for 
agriculture.”17  The underlying message was that, through the guiding hand of government, 
protective tariff policy would produce symbiotic benefits to all portions of the national economy. 
     Agricultural interests claimed that Dallas Report principles applied to them as well.  A good 
example is found in a memorial from Louisiana sugar planters, presented to the House in January 
1815.  The memorialists reasoned that “It is true, in a propitious season this culture affords 
greater profit than any other, but numerous and dreadful are the accidents that often blast the 
hopes of planter.  The climate is subject to hurricanes, the ravages of which not only destroys the 
crop in the ground, and often the expectation of the one ensuing it, but levels to the ground the 
buildings which had been erected at such an immense cost … with such serious evils to deal 
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with, it cannot be expected that the planter of Louisiana can, without some encouragement from 
the Government, stand in competition with those who rear the plant in its congenial 
environment.”18   
     The Committee of Commerce and Manufactures, using the Dallas Report to justify their 
conclusions, recommended temporary protection to the cotton manufacturing industry.  They 
pointed out that the American manufacturing establishments were “new and in their infancy, and 
that they have to encounter a competition with foreign establishments that have arrived at 
maturity, that are supported by a large capital, and that have from the Government every 
protection that can be required.”  Committee members warned that “the foreign manufacturers 
and merchants will put in requisition all the powers of ingenuity; will practice whatever art can 
devise, and capital accomplish, to prevent the American manufacturing establishments from 
taking root and flourishing in their rich and native soil … a reasonable encouragement will 
sustain and keep them erect; but if they fail, they fall to never arise again.”19      
     The report’s logic rested on an “infant industry” argument, arguing that new American 
industries could not economically compete with European rivals who enjoyed protection from 
their respective national governments and enjoyed significant economies of scale in production 
and cost.  Importantly, the report asserted that American manufacturers only needed temporary 
protection.  It stated that “should the National Government, pursuing an enlightened and liberal 
policy, sustain and foster the manufacturing establishments, a few years [emphasis added] would 
place them in a condition to bid defiance to foreign competition, and would enable them to 
increase the industry, wealth, and prosperity of the nation.”20    
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     John Randolph, back in the House after a one term hiatus during the War, was not impressed, 
and attacked the nature and impact of protection.  He described the Committee’s proposal as “a 
system of bounties to manufacturers, in order to encourage them to do that which, if it be 
advantageous to do it at all, they will do, of course, for their own sake; a largesse to men to 
exercise their own customary callings, for their own emolument.”  Randolph suggested that 
consumers and farmers ought to be considered just as much as the manufacturer, reasoning that 
“I will buy where I can get manufactures cheapest; I will not agree to lay a duty on cultivators of 
the soil to encourage exotic manufactures.”  He offered an alternative policy, composed of “none 
but an ad valorem duty on all articles, which would prevent the possibility of one interest in the 
country being sacrificed, by the manner of taxation, for another.”21   
     The maverick Randolph received support from influential allies, providing credibility to his 
stance.  They included Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer, and Spencer Roane, 
Patrick Henry’s son-in-law and state judge, who were acknowledged leaders of the “Richmond 
Junto.”  This informal group had long been the operating arm of Virginia Republicans.  The 
Junto defection, with a cadre of young Virginian politicians such as Philip Barbour, John Tyler, 
Wilson Cary Nicholas, and John Floyd lent prestige to tariff detractors.
22
   
     In 1816, the tariff discussion centered on those industries that Tench Coxe had identified a 
few years before.  Cotton and wool manufactures, representing over 30% of American 
manufacturing capacity six years before, headed the list.
23
  By 1815, the Boston Manufacturing 
Company introduced power looms, the most advanced industrial machinery of the time, at their 
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factory in Waltham Massachusetts.
24
  The breach of its technological monopoly forced Britain to 
adopt new strategies to maintain its manufacturing dominance.  Superior British economies of 
scale in cloth producing industries produced lower cost finished products than American 
competitors, the very point that Brougham made in Parliament.
25
  
The Tariff of 1816 
     The House of Representatives commenced consideration of a new tariff bill on March 20, 
1816.  One of the bill’s key characteristics was the temporary nature of certain proposed duties.   
For instance, a 25% ad valorem rate on imported woolen and cotton manufactures would last for 
only three years, after which the rate would be reduced to 20%.
26
  The design implied that only a 
few years of enhanced protection was needed for American manufacturers to compete.   
     Economic nationalists stressed that American manufacturers could not survive without 
protection, and their potential demise would greatly harm the United States.  Representative 
Henry Clay of Kentucky declared that “now is the time for encouragement … the domestic 
manufacturer has to struggle more at the end of a war, and at that moment the greater aid is 
necessary to support him against foreign competition.”27  The Kentuckian placed forth two 
motions to increase the new duty on cotton manufactures to 33.3% and 30%, respectively.  The 
first motion lost, but the second carried by a narrow majority of 68 to 61.
28
  Samuel Smith of 
Maryland proposed greater protection for iron and sugar manufacturers, with an increase on 
imported iron from a specific duty of $1.50 to $2.50 per hundred weight, and on various sugars 
from between 10 and 12 cents to between 12 and 15 cents per pound.
29
  Thomas Robertson of 
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Louisiana, claimed that his state’s sugar planting interests were “competent to furnish the United 
States with all the sugar they may require; but that this may be done with certainty and within a 
short time, some encouragement is indispensible.”  Only Smith’s proposals carried.30  
     While the original draft called for enhanced short-term encouragement, some legislators 
favored permanent levels of protection.  Erastus Root of New York “was opposed to the 
graduation, by which the manufacturing establishments would be sustained for two years, and 
then left to their fate.”  Artemas Ward of Massachusetts declared that “he was in favor of 
encouraging manufactures; and his object was to give a substantial and permanent support to 
them, and not a bounty for a short time.”31 
     Root and Ward, however, represented a minority view among the protectionists.  Daniel 
Webster of New Hampshire explained that “he was not prepared to say that Government was 
bound to adopt a permanent protection.”  Timothy Pitkin of Connecticut wished “not to give a 
monopoly to those now in existence, but to enable others to embark in the business of 
manufacturing.”  Clay believed that “three years would be sufficient to place our manufacturers 
on this desirable footing.”32    
     In the midst of serious business, legislators found room for humor.  Louisiana’s Robertson 
motioned to remove the duties on certain wines so that they would become more available and 
affordable for his constituents.  He noted that “claret was not a luxury alone in some parts of the 
country; but, from the nature of the climate, an absolute necessary to the health of the people” of 
Louisiana.  Benjamin Hardin of Kentucky, sensing an opportunity to promote a domestic 
alternative, reminded Robertson that “if the Louisianians could not obtain wine, they could 
obtain an abundant supply of whiskey from Kentucky in lieu of it.”  Robertson, not to be 
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outdone, responded that claret “was not only necessary to the health, but to the morals of the 
people.  They [Louisianians] were a sober people … it was to save them from the whiskey 
offered by the gentleman from Kentucky that he wished to reduce the duty on claret.”  Henry 
Clay ruefully observed that he “was sorry to hear his friend from Louisiana had declared war 
against the whiskey of the West; and regretted, if such was the fact, that the taste of the people of 
Louisiana was so bad as to prefer bad claret to good whiskey.”33  Clay, even at an early stage of 
his career, proved persuasive; Robertson’s amendment was rejected.  
     A proposal was made in the latter stages of the debate to protect raw materials when Hardin 
of Kentucky motioned to increase ad valorem rates on imported cotton to 25% for two years, and 
20% thereafter.  The motion carried by a vote of 84 to 60.
34
  This proposal curiously targeted a 
raw material commodity where the United States possessed a comparative production advantage, 
inconsistent with the tenets expressed in the Dallas Report.  
     John Calhoun delivered a powerful speech on April 4 that summarized the nationalist position 
for a protective tariff.  He argued that the bill provided improved national security.  Calhoun 
described the effect of the recent war, “our commerce annihilated … our agriculture cut off from 
its accustomed markets … all manufactured articles, the necessaries as well as the conveniences 
of life, rise to an extravagant price.”  The South Carolina senator concluded that for the United 
States to become economically self-sufficient, American manufactures must be encouraged.  
Calhoun concluded that “neither agriculture, manufactures, nor commerce, taken separately, is 
the cause of wealth; it flows from the three combined, and cannot exist without each … without 
commerce, industry would have no stimulus; without manufactures, it would be without the 
means of production; and without agriculture, neither of the others can exist … When our 
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manufactures are grown to a certain perfection, as they soon will under the fostering care of 
Government, we will no longer experience these evils.”35   
     Some Southern states were expressing interest in manufactures.  In 1812, Calhoun’s native 
South Carolina subsidized the founding of a cotton factory in Greenville.
36
  Southerners also 
recognized a need to repay the enlarged national debt through increased revenues and to preserve 
and support American manufacturing, which would be essential in the event of renewed 
hostilities with Great Britain.
37
  Historian Joseph Persky notes that in 1816 “young Southerners 
looked forward to building a diversified economy.  Their plan included both manufactures and 
commerce, to free the nation as a whole and the South in particular from British 
neocolonialism.”38       
     On April 8, the House passed the Tariff of 1816 by a comfortable margin of 88 ayes to 54 
nays.
39
  Atlantic states, possessing the nation’s greatest manufactures output in 1810, 
overwhelmingly supported the bill.
40
  The West and New England also strongly favored the 
legislation.  Support was weakest in the Chesapeake and Southern regions.   
     The Chesapeake and Southern votes against the bill are best understood at a state level.  
Chesapeake votes were heavily influenced by John Randolph and his fellow Quids.  Virginia’s 
House delegation rejected the bill by a 13 to 7 vote and Maryland by a 5 to 2 count.  In both 
states, tariff support emanated from areas where industry was most likely to flourish.  In 
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Virginia, it came from the congressional districts centered near the James and York rivers, 
extending westward towards Culpepper and Charlottesville, and then reaching the Shenandoah 
Valley and extending from Harpers Ferry southward to Lexington.  These districts would 
develop into the state’s most industrialized areas over the next four decades.  The Maryland aye 
votes came from the 5
th
 and 6
th
 districts, which included Baltimore and the northern end of the 
Chesapeake Bay at the mouth of the Susquehanna River.           
     Southern states provided a more varied voting pattern.  South Carolina, with Calhoun leading 
the way, voted in favor of the bill by a vote of 4 to 3.  Georgia split its six votes equally North 
Carolina’s outcome was decidedly different, as Nathaniel Macon Macon and a cadre of Old 
Republicans unanimously rejected the bill with their eleven votes.    
     The tariff bill was introduced to the Senate on April 12 and it passed it on April 19 by a vote 
of 25 to 7.  The bill was popular in the New England and Atlantic states.  Western states, 
including Kentucky, Tennessee and Louisiana, enthusiastically supported the legislation.  Only 
the Chesapeake and Southern regions resisted the tariff bill, as three senators supported and five 
opposed the bill.  Table 4.2 summarizes the House and Senate votes by region:        
Table 4.2. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1816 by Region19 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)    17    10    6    2 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    42    5    8    0 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)        9  18      1    3 
South   (GA, NC, SC)        7  17    2        2 
West  (KY, LA, OH, TN)     13    4    8    0 
Totals      88   54   25    7 
Source: 29 Annals of Cong. 331, 1352 (1816).    
 
     Table 4.3 summarizes the roll call for the Tariff of 1816 by party affiliation.  The data 
suggests that party discipline was far weaker than it had been during the Jeffersonian 
Experiment.  Federalists split on the issue in both the House and Senate, indicating that there was 
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no clear party position on the issue.  This lack of consensus on trade policy was one of the many 
symptoms that the Federalists were disintegrating.   
     Republicans, in contrast, strongly supported the Tariff.  However, their party vote revealed 
fractures, primarily involving the Quids.  In Virginia and North Carolina 18 of the 25 party 
members voted against the tariff.  Republicans in the other sixteen states emphatically supported 
the measure by an overall vote of 57 to 14.  
Table 4.3. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1816 by Party Affiliation20 
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Republican  64   32  18        2 
Federalist  24  22    7    5 
Totals   88  54  25    7        
Source: 29 Annals of Cong. 331, 1352 (1816).   
 
    The voting patterns associated with the Tariff of 1816 differ from the straight political-party 
pattern characterizing the 1790s and, to a greater degree, the Jeffersonian Experiment.  Both 
parties, and especially the Federalists, were less cohesive.  The changed patterns coincided with 
the beginnings of the breakdown of the First Party System.   
     By 1816, the Federalists were disintegrating as a national political force.  They had been 
savaged by fallout from the Hartford Convention.  In the 1816 elections, their House delegation 
was reduced from 64 to 39 members.  By 1818, Federalists held only 14% and 20% of the House 
and Senate seats, respectively.  Six years later, the party was gone from Congress.
41
   
     The Federalist internal division in 1816 is better understood in terms of geography.  The 
party’s political base was heavily skewed towards New England, home to over half of the party’s 
House members.  Seventeen House members hailed from the Atlantic and Chesapeake regions, 
representing just 23% of those region’s votes.  Federalism was virtually extinct in the South and 
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West, where the party held just three seats.  New England Federalists favored the tariff by a 
House vote of 16 to 10 and a Senate vote of 4 to 2.  Atlantic Federalists also favored the bill, 
voting 8 to 1 in the House and 3 to 0 in the Senate.   
     Federalist vote patterns were far different south of the Mason-Dixon Line.  All 8 House and 3 
Senate member from the Chesapeake opposed the legislation, joined by 2 compatriots from 
North Carolina and 1 from South Carolina, Benjamin Huger.  Northern Federalists embraced the 
Hamiltonian legacy of economic nationalism while the few remaining Southern members, 
frequently representing economically remote districts, did not.
42
   
     The Federalist voting patterns contradict some accepted notions of Federalist attitudes after 
the War.  Shaw Livermore suggested that by 1816, “one issue, in particular, evoked Federalist 
misgivings.  That was tariff protection for manufacturers.”  He added that “although Alexander 
Hamilton had strongly supported such a policy, the Federalist party as a whole was still too 
deeply committed to commercial interests to take up the cause.”43  Table 4.4 shows that 
Federalists, particularly those from the North, had not totally abandoned nationalism or 
manufacturing interests as of 1816.    
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Table 4.4. A Breakdown of Federalist Votes on the Tariff of 181621  
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  16   10    4        2 
Atlantic    8    1    3    0 
Total Northern  24  11    7    2 
 
Chesapeake    0    8    0    3 
South     0    3    0    0 
Total Southern   0  11    0    3 
 
Grand Totals  24  22    7    5        
Source: 29 Annals of Cong. 331, 1352 (1816).      
 
     Republicans didn’t share the geographic splits characterizing the Federalists.  The party 
generally favored the tariff, and their leading proponent was John Calhoun from South Carolina.  
However, a substantial minority bloc of Quids from Virginia and North Carolina opposed the 
measure.  These two states accounted for 56% of the Republican House votes and both 
Republican Senate votes opposing the bill.  The votes reflect greater division within Republican 
ranks than during the Jefferson and Madison presidencies.
44
   
     The Republican split was grounded in ideological differences more than geography.  Jefferson 
and Madison, the intellectual fathers of the Republican Party, founded their political organization 
on principles that included free trade.  During their respective administrations, both men shifted 
away from free trade and began to slowly embrace economic nationalism.  However, they failed 
to persuade all of their fellow Republicans to do the same.   
     Republican adherence to the party’s original trade policy principles remained strongest in 
Jefferson’s and Madison’s own political backyard.  As the two presidents gradually shifted their 
personal positions on trade, taking most of the party with them, John Randolph of Virginia and 
Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina argued that “Old Republican” principles, including free 
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trade, retained a legitimate place in the trade policy debate.  Both of these dissenters had argued 
the same position during the trade debates of 1806-1809.   
     Randolph, at forty-three, was in his political prime in 1816, and while he never wrested 
control of the Virginia Republican party from Jefferson or Madison, neither could they quash 
him.  A biographer, Russell Kirk, described his personal politics as a “quixotic opposition to the 
great political and economic powers of the day … proud, acutely sensitive, and animated by a 
darting passion, he was a natural champion of perilous causes.”45  Randolph clashed with 
Jefferson and Madison on the Yazoo land claim affair in 1805, the War of 1812, and most 
importantly, the restrictive trade policies of the Jeffersonian Experiment.  His Quid faction was 
concentrated in the states of Virginia and North Carolina.
46
   
     Randolph’s biggest ally was his good friend, Nathaniel Macon.  Macon was fifty-eight years 
old in 1816, and in the midst of a long political career, where he was first elected to the House 
1791, and served three terms as its Speaker.  In December 1815, he resigned to enter the Senate, 
where he would serve anther thirteen years.
47
  Randolph and Macon were close personal friends, 
and Macon served as executor of Randolph’s estate after the Virginian’s death in 1833.48     
     The Randolph – Macon alliance placed ideology ahead of party loyalty in regards to trade 
policy.  Quids cast the bulk of minority Republican votes against the Tariff of 1816.  Table 4.5 
summarizes the Republican votes:    
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Table 4.5. A Breakdown of Republican Votes on the Tariff of 181622  
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Virginia    7    9    1    0 
North Carolina    0    9    0    2 
Subtotal    7  18    1    2 
 
Remaining states 57  14  17    0   
 
Grand Totals  64  32  18    2        
Source: 29 Annals of Cong. 331, 1352 (1816).   
 
     The Congressional votes on the Tariff 1816 reflect widely varying correlations between pro-
tariff votes and industrialization on a regional basis.  Table 4.6 shows that the New England, 
Atlantic, and Western regions favored the tariff despite very different levels of industrialization 
per capita.  If the ideologically based Quid votes are removed from the Chesapeake and Southern 
regions, those regions also reflect high approval percentages.
49
          
Table 4.6. Analysis of Voting on the Tariff of 1816 to American Manufacturing in 181023 
      House  Senate  Manufacturing Assets 
Region      Vote  Vote  Per Capita  
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT) 63%    75%  $32.71 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)  89%  100%  $32.50 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)   33%    25%  $20.53 
West  (KY, LA, OH, TN)  76%    100%  $14.10 
South   (GA, NC, SC)   29%    50%  $11.40 
Totals      62%    78%  $24.22 
Source: Coxe, Statement of the Arts and Manufactures, 38; 29 Annals of Cong. 331, 1352 
(1816).      
 
     Tench Coxe identified the cotton and wool textile manufacturing industries, and iron 
production, as leading American manufacturing sectors in 1810.
50
  The tariff increases in 1816 
show that American lawmakers concluded that these “infant” industries required protection.  The 
final version of the bill taxed finished cotton and wool imports at 25% for a three year period, to 
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be reduced to 20% thereafter.  Duties on raw cotton were established at three cents per pound, 
and on bar iron they were set at forty-five cents per hundred weight.
51
  Overall tariff rates, 
however, did not increase significantly.  Over the next four years, duties averaged 31.4%.  By 
comparison, the average rates during the previous three presidencies from Adams through 
Madison had averaged 32.4%, 32.1%, and 30.2%, respectively.
52
  The Tariff of 1816 
undoubtedly contained protectionist aims, but it nonetheless moved cautiously in that direction.         
Conclusions     
     Thomas Jefferson admitted that his views on trade shifted over time.  In a letter to his friend 
Benjamin Austin in early 1816, Jefferson confided that “You tell me I am quoted by those who 
wish to continue our dependence on England for manufactures.  There was a time when I might 
have been so quoted with more candor, but within the thirty years which have since elapsed, how 
are circumstances changed!”  The Republican elder statesman explained, “Compare this 
[present] state of things with that of ’85, and say whether an opinion founded in the 
circumstances of that day can be fairly applied to those of the present.”  Jefferson now saw an 
urgent need for a more nationalist trade policy position, noting that “there exists both profligacy 
and power enough to exclude us from the field of interchange with other nations: that to be 
independent for the comforts of life we must fabricate them ourselves.  We must now place the 
manufacturer by the side of the agriculturalist … experience has taught me that manufactures are 
now as necessary to independence as to our comfort.”53   
     Many prominent American politicians of the time believed that encouragement of 
manufactures benefitted all sectors of the economy.  Madison endorsed locating “particular 
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manufactures where the materials for them are extensively drawn from our agriculture.”54  
Calhoun stated that the new tariff was “calculated to bind together more closely our widely-
spread Republic.  It will greatly increase our mutual dependence and intercourse; and will, as a 
necessary consequence, excite an increased attention to internal improvement.”55     
     Other national politicians disagreed, concerned over dispensing economic privilege in a 
republican society.  Benjamin Huger of South Carolina declared against protection because “the 
consequences … would be to tax the community to give a monopoly to a few manufacturers.”56  
Thomas Telfair of Georgia concurred, noting that “if the encouragement of manufactures be the 
object, it is, in effect, to plunge on the wide ocean of uncertainty, guided by factitious lights, 
emanating from the selfishness alone of those who tender them, and which can never be relied 
upon for the purposes of wise legislation.”  Telfair complained that manufacturing interests 
sought “to diminish competition, while they extended the sphere of their own market.  Hence, 
every suggestion flowing from this class of the community … should be examined with 
scrupulousness and even suspicion … their interest once identified with that of the Government 
… I do fear them.”57  
     The economic nationalists achieved a significant victory in 1816, because the resulting tariff 
represented the initial application of Alexander Hamilton’s ideas from the Report on 
Manufactures.  For the first time, trade policy incorporated active government encouragement of 
national industrialization.  The United States sought large degrees of economic power and self-
sufficiency to strengthen the American Republic’s future prospects. 
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     Alexander Hamilton would have been puzzled by the political coalition that passed the tariff.  
Trade tensions leading to the War of 1812 and the war itself caused a seismic shift in trade policy 
views.  His old political antagonists, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, led the effort 
towards economic nationalism.  These former free traders, influenced by their personal 
experiences as chief executive, led the Republican Party, with scattered support from Northern 
Federalists, in passing the legislation.  They were vigorously assisted by young House members 
such as Henry Clay and John Calhoun.   
     The passage of the Tariff of 1816 seemingly ushered in a new era of American trade policy.  
A national-based coalition, largely shaped by reaction to the disappointments from the War of 
1812 and the Jeffersonian Experiment, referred to the Dallas Report and its principles in shaping 
the new legislation.  The Old Republicans, who vociferously protested the more active role for 
the federal government, were a small and ineffectual minority.  The Dallas Report was the glue 
that bound the majority consensus together.  It would not hold for long.           
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CHAPTER 5 – ECONOMIC NATIONALISM CONSIDERED: THE BIRTH OF 
AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1817 TO 1820 
 
“in bottoming this bill on this national principle, that we ought to feed, clothe, and be able to 
defend ourselves, we placed it on ground that could not be easily shaken.  Our motives rise 
higher than the interest of manufacturers; whether they make or lose money now; whether it 
tends to enrich one or the other, or all classes of society, has scarcely entered into our 
consideration … the three great interests of the country are to be restored only by your 
interference; they call on you in sepulchral tones, equally to warn you of past errors and 
imploring for future aid … I repeat it, that the profits of manufactures had not been our leading 
motive, but the public national interest; this nation must command its own consumption and the 
means of defence.”1   
- Representative Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania (March 22, 1820 remarks to the House) 
 
“the specious, but delusory maxim of “restoring the freedom of trade” … is nothing more nor 
less than impoverishing a nation, and sacrificing its domestic industry at the shrine of avarice, in 
order to purchase goods “cheaper than they can be made at home.”2 
- Mathew Carey (“Addresses of the Philadelphia Society” - 1820) 
 
“the number that calls for this sacrifice of commerce is comparatively small; they are but the 
dust in the balance.  And what do they require of us?  It is, that we should consent to pay from 
one-fifth to one-third more for many of the great necessities of life than we otherwise should … 
do not our people understand that this is to render one portion, and a thousand times the largest 
portion of our people, tributary to the other? … it is certainly not for the interest of this nation to 
make any one class of men a privileged order, and allow them to live by extracting assistance 
from the hard earnings of others.”3  
- Representative Ezekiel Whitman of Massachusetts (April 25, 1820 remarks to the House) 
 
“All reflecting individuals, except those bribed by self-interest, believe that liberty can only be 
achieved by a frugal government, and by excluding frauds for transferring property from one 
man to another.”4   
- John Taylor of Caroline (“Tyranny Unmasked” - 1821) 
  
     James Monroe was elected president of the United States in the fall of 1816 by an 
overwhelming Electoral College majority, defeating Federalist Rufus King by a vote of 183 to 
34.
5
  Contemporaries dubbed the following eight years as the “The Era of Good Feelings.”6  
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When Monroe took the oath of office on March 4, 1817, a poignant symbol of post-war national 
unity took place when the new Republican president swore the oath of office in the presence of 
Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall.  The sunny skies and fifty degree weather starkly 
contrasted with times past when the two men bunked together while serving in the Continental 
Army during the frightful winter of 1778 at Valley Forge.
7
   
     At first glance, the image of a unified American body politic in 1817 might seem appropriate.  
Monroe’s Republicans increased their control of the House of Representatives from 117 to 141 
seats (64% to 77%) and the Senate from 25 to 34 seats (69% to 77%) in the 1816 elections.  
Republican majorities further increased during Monroe’s presidency, and by the Eighteenth 
Congress (1823-1825) the party occupied 88% of the House and 92% of the Senate seats.
8
  The 
president was re-elected in 1820 by an overwhelming Electoral vote of 231 to 1.
9
  
     However, the development of trade policy during the Monroe administration would prove to 
be the antithesis of good feelings.  The consensus understanding achieved through the Dallas 
Report and its principles was shattered during the debates associated with the Tariff of 1820.  
The tariff was voted down, but nationalists overreached in their desire to promote American 
economic independence, and in the process destroyed the goodwill that had been constructed in 
1816.  
     In addition, beneath the superficial bliss symbolized by the inauguration, two divisive issues 
acted as political tectonic plates below the surface.  The first concerned territorial expansion and 
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slavery, which erupted in 1820 during Missouri’s application for statehood, Thomas Jefferson’s 
“fire bell in the night” that marked the “knell of the Union.”10  A second matter was caused by 
the confluence of the First American Industrial Revolution with American trade policy.  In four 
short years, many leading nationalists determined that the Dallas Report and the Tariff of 1816 
were inadequate, and they sought to modify American trade policy in response to a sharp 
increase in imports from Great Britain.    
     The First Industrial Revolution took firm root in the United States in the late 1810s and early 
1820s, even though its’ American origins traced back to the 1790s and to Britain in the 1750s.  
However, the nation’s initial industrial takeoff was largely confined to the American Northeast.  
New England merchants, turned industrial entrepreneurs, created major factories at Waltham and 
Lowell.  Their factories initially lagged their British competitors in scale, efficiency, and 
technology, and under Dallas doctrine were eligible for short-term protection until such time as 
they could become globally competitive.  
     Monroe endorsed the protective principle in his inaugural address.  He declared that “our 
manufactures find a generous encouragement by the policy which patronizes domestic industry 
… such, then, being the highly favored condition of our country, it is in the interest of every 
citizen to maintain it.”  The President argued that “Our manufacturers … require the systematic 
and fostering care of government … it is important, too, that the capital which nourishes our 
manufacturers should be domestic … equally important is it to provide at home a market for our 
raw materials, as by extending the competition it will enhance the price and protect the cultivator 
against the casualties incident to foreign markets.”11      
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     Two significant variables influenced the course of trade policy between 1817 and 1820.  The 
first could be foreseen, as the Tariff of 1816 contained a clear pledge that tariff rates for key 
infant industries would be reduced in 1819.  The second was unexpected.  Just as duties on 
finished cotton and woolen goods were scheduled for reduction, the Panic of 1819 occurred.  
This calamitous event was caused by sharp post-war monetary expansion followed by an abrupt 
contraction when British creditors called in loans and the balloon payment on the Louisiana 
Purchase debt became due.  The Panic struck fear throughout the American manufacturing 
community, which desperately clamored for Federal Government assistance.  
     Trade policy became increasingly contentious, as the economic nationalists abrogated the 
pledges of the Tariff of 1816 and pressed for greater protection for American manufacturers.  In 
1818, they successfully passed a tariff bill providing incremental protection for the iron, cotton, 
and wool manufacturing industries.  They conducted a far more ambitious effort in 1820 to 
substantially increase protection for an extensive list of goods.  To date, tariffs had been 
primarily established to adequately fund the national government, alongside efforts to provide 
short-term protection to specified industries or trades.  This approach was epitomized, and 
reached its apogee, in the form of the 1816 Dallas Report.  By 1820, however, economic 
nationalists began insisting that permanent protective measures were a necessary prerequisite for 
building the industrialization that would ensure American economic strength. 
     The new nationalist arguments for long-term and potentially permanent protection radically 
changed the nature of the trade policy debate.  Southern members of the 1816 tariff coalition 
were quite willing to endorse protection based upon the infant industry concepts contained 
within the Dallas Report.  Long-term protection was another matter, particularly because New 
England and the Atlantic states were the largest and fastest growing manufacturing regions in the 
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nation.  Increasingly, individuals who had supported the Tariff of 1816 based on Dallas Report 
principles found themselves shifting to an anti-protection position because of the new arguments 
for long-term protection.  They increasingly found Old Republican ideas about less government 
involvement in the national economy appealing, as they concluded that the new nationalist 
arguments resulted in an arbitrary redistribution of wealth.          
Industrialization and the Tariff of 1818 
     Early American industrialists faced numerous challenges in establishing their long-term 
economic viability.  Three separate elements factored into the transition from an almost 
exclusively agricultural economy to one that was beginning to demonstrate “modern” 
characteristics between 1789 and 1820.  These included: (i) technology and machinery, allowing 
for increasingly efficient production of goods, (ii) a functioning banking system to make 
financial capital more readily available, and (iii) the expansion of American geographic 
boundaries which greatly increased the size of the American commercial marketplace.  
     The origins of the Industrial Revolution began in Great Britain around 1750, and its first 
phase lasted into the 1820s.  Changes brought about by this shift in the modes of economic 
production originally centered on essential consumer goods that could be mass produced by 
labor-saving machinery.  The first significant industrial application involved a basic necessity; 
people sought comfortable clothing at an affordable cost.  Early English capitalist Richard 
Arkwright developed spinning and carding machines, and the water frame, between 1768 and 
1775, sparking the mass production of cotton cloth.
12
  Other key British inventions during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century included James Hargreaves’ spinning jenny (1765), James 
Watts’ steam engine (1775), and Edmund Cartwright’s power loom (1787), which collectively 
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 Samuel Batchelder, Introduction and Early Progress of the Cotton Manufacture in the United States (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1863), 4-5.  
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created the technological foundation for British industrialization.  Eli Whitney’s patent of the 
cotton gin (1794) in the United States served to greatly increase supplies of raw cotton necessary 
to feed the rapidly growing British industrial complex.   
     The Industrial Revolution dramatically changed the characteristics of how business 
entrepreneurs approached finance and profit seeking.  Machines had the benefit of producing 
more goods at a faster rate than humans.  However, their financial disadvantage was that they 
required an expensive financial outlay at the time of purchase.  Thus, an entrepreneur could only 
expect to make maximize profits if he kept his factories and its machines as busy as possible, 
optimizing the efficient use of his factory’s capacity.13   
     Industrialization in the United States developed slowly.  The first operating cotton 
manufactory in the Unites States was established by the Cabot family in 1787, in Beverly 
Massachusetts, and George Washington visited the site in 1789, shortly before his election as 
president.
14
  Unfortunately, the owners of the Beverly operation could not sell sufficient 
quantities of output to make mechanization economically viable, and they eventually “put out” 
production to households.  The factory closed operations in the early 1790s.
15
  The American 
industrialization process began in earnest during the Jeffersonian Experiment and War of 1812.           
                                                 
13
 The machine was a “fixed cost,” whose capital outlay is final at the time of purchase.  Labor and materials are 
“variable costs,” which will only occur if units are produced.  A simple, hypothetical example can demonstrates the 
mechanics behind the principles.  Suppose a good has a material cost of 50 cents per item.  Labor costs $2.00 per 
hour, and a manual process requires one hour of time.  Assume that technology, in the form of a machine, is 
introduced costing $50,000, with a useful lifetime of one year, and which can produce up to 80,000 units per year.  
The worker, with the help of this machine, can now produce a good in 12 minutes, meaning they can produce five 
items per hour with the help of the machine.  The economic breakeven point in this scenario occurs at a production 
level of 31,250 units.  The equation to calculate this is the fixed cost of the machine divided by the reduction in 
variable costs (in this case the labor savings achieved per unit, which is $2.00 less $.40, or $1.60.  Thus, the $50,000 
cost of the machine divided by $1.60 of variable cost savings per unit, yields a calculated answer of 31,250 units.  
An entrepreneur purchasing the machine enjoys greater profits (and lower average costs per unit) compared to older 
methods once they produce more than 31,250 units.  However, if they fall short of this production level, they will 
experience worse economic results than they would have by simply retaining old methods without new technology.    
14
 Ibid., 31-32.  
15
 Caroline F. Ware, The Early New England Cotton Manufacture: A Study in Industrial Beginnings (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), 20. 
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     The Jeffersonian Experiment provided the impetus for entrepreneurs to establish factories.  In 
1810, 238 cotton manufactories operated in the United States, using water power to run their 
spindles, the same technology used twenty years before at Beverly.
16
  The price for cotton cloth 
rose from a price of almost twenty cents per yard to approximately seventy-five cents per yard 
during the War of 1812.
17
  In response to increased demand, American cotton manufactures 
produced 81 million yards of cotton cloth in 1815.
18
  However, American manufacturers trailed 
their British counterparts in overall competitiveness due to the smaller scale of their factories and 
the trailing technologies they put into use. 
     By the time of the Monroe presidency, the American consumer market for textiles was 
significant, and the American manufactures industry only partially met overall demand.  In 1820, 
with the Tariff of 1818 in place, American cotton textile manufacturers produced $6.39 million 
of finished cloth.  British cotton textile imports the same year amounted to $7.59 million, 
meaning that even with protection, Britain was supplying 54% of the total goods demanded by 
this important market segment.
19
   
     American manufacturers operated in a less-capital intensive manner than their British 
counterparts.  Their investments typically involved plant and equipment with shorter useful lives 
and lower inventories to minimize holding costs.
20
  The lagging nature of American technology 
caused most American manufacturers to produce coarser, lower-grade brands of fabric.  
However, Americans eagerly implemented new technologies as they became available.
21
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 C. Nick Harley, “International Competitiveness of the Antebellum American Cotton Textile Industry,” in 
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      Domestic infant industries faced genuine foreign competition for the first time during the 
Monroe administration.  They had rapidly grown during the Jeffersonian Experiment and the war 
for the better part of a decade, where it became increasingly attractive for entrepreneurial 
producers to utilize technology to meet the demands of a growing home market.  Increased 
demand for all sorts of products coincided with the rapid growth of the American population 
from 5.3 million in 1800 to 8.3 million in 1815.
22
   
     A new stage of cotton manufacturing technology was introduced in Great Britain during the 
first decade of the nineteenth century with the introduction of the power loom, which offered a 
significantly faster and more efficient way to weave cloth fabric.  American entrepreneurs 
quickly replicated this technology, and in 1814 a syndicate of investors formed the Boston 
Manufacturing Company, headed by Francis Lowell and Nathan Appleton. They established a 
new factory in Waltham Massachusetts, utilizing power looms.
23
  
     The Waltham factory was an economic success from the start due to its “state of the art” 
technology and well operated facility.  Annual sales increased steadily from its founding through 
the post-war period, in spite of renewed competition.  The ensuing Panic of 1819 only caused 
sales to level out, and soon after they resumed their upward trend.
24
   
     Waltham’s success led its investors to form a newer and larger venture, involving an 
expanding circle of Boston area merchant investors.  In 1821, the new group, named the 
Merrimack Company, began assembling land in what was to become the town of Lowell, 
Massachusetts.  The Company capitalized the new venture with equity of $276,000, far larger 
than the $170,000 that had capitalized Waltham.  The new company commenced operations the 
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following year.  Over the next twenty years, a series of related-party ventures established 
operations in Lowell, making it the premier antebellum industrial city in the United States.
25
     
     American trade policy was reconsidered just two years after the Tariff of 1816.  The resulting 
bill, the Tariff of 1818, wasn’t a single legislative act.  Instead, two separate bills were passed, 
intended to amend very specific features of the Tariff of 1816. 
     The first bill was entitled “An Act to increase the duties on iron in bars and bolts, iron in pigs, 
castings, nails, and alum.”26  This initiative was designed to assist American iron manufacturers, 
who claimed that British competition was flooding the domestic marketplace.  They argued that 
the Tariff of 1816 hadn’t established adequate tariff to protect their “infant industry.”  The bill 
proposed raising tariff rates on a host of raw and finished iron products. 
     A second act, simultaneously considered, was entitled “An Act to continue, in force, from and 
after the thirtieth of June, one thousand eight hundred and nineteen, until the thirtieth of June, 
one thousand eight hundred and twenty-six, the fourth paragraph of the first section of the act, 
entitled “An act to regulate the duties on imports and tonnage.”27  Its purpose was to extend the 
initial protective period established by the Tariff of 1816, which featured higher ad valorem 
duties for cotton and woolen goods for a three year period, by an additional seven years.  This 
initiative responded to pleas from cotton and wool manufactures, who insisted that the original 
time period was insufficient to allow their “infant” cotton and woolen industries to develop to the 
point where they could fairly competing with their British competitors. 
     These two initiatives involved the three domestic industries highlighted in Tench Coxe’s 1810 
report.  The best evidence demonstrating increased competition from Britain is found in Timothy 
Pitkin’s A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America, published in 1817.  
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Pitkin was a sitting House member from Connecticut in 1816 and the Statistical View was a 
compendium of a wide variety of economic observations about the United States, dating from 
colonial times to the present.
28
  The publication noted that in 1815, a year partially taken up by 
the end of the war, “the amount of goods imported, paying ad valorem duties (including woolens 
and cottons,) was about $86,000,000, of which about $71,000,000 was imported from Great 
Britain and dependencies.”29  The bulk of these ad valorem duties derived from cloth imports, 
and the American import levels in 1815 were the highest since 1807.
30
         
     American commerce was also hard pressed during the immediate post-war period.  Pitkin 
expressed disappointment with the economic impact of the peace on American shipping.  He 
noted that the treaty “has operated to the increase of British navigation, compared to that of the 
United States, in a double ratio.”31  The commercial sphere’s difficulties became an integral part 
of the 1818 debates, but the degree to which that sphere applied public pressure upon Congress  
paled in comparison to that from manufacturers.    
     Manufacturing advocates increasingly applied political pressure on Congress for more 
protection.  For example, in January 1818 the Senate received a petition from “a number of 
inhabitants” of Oneida County, New York.  The petitioners noted that over $600,000 of capital 
had been invested into establishments manufacturing cotton and woolen products.  Since the end 
of the war, they declared, three-quarters of these businesses had closed their doors, resulting in 
“some of the proprietors being wholly ruined, and others struggling under the greatest 
embarrassments.”32   
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     Oneida County’s citizens cast blame for their woes squarely upon Great Britain.  They 
explained that “that nation assumes to manufacture for all nations, but will receive the 
manufactures of none.  So tenacious, so jealous is she of the first dawnings of manufactures 
elsewhere, that she binds even the hands of her own colonists.”  The signatories reasoned that “it 
is in vain for any man to shut his eyes against the active rivalship and persevering hostility of 
British manufactures.”33  They maintained that increased tariff rates solved the problem, and 
recommended making such “duties on imported woolens and cottons permanent,” diverging 
from Dallas Report doctrine.
34
     
     Numerous petitions flooded the House as well.  For example, on December 15, 1817, 
petitions were received calling for permanent duties on cotton and woolen products (from Rhode 
Island) and increased duties on certain iron products (from New Jersey).
35
  More petitions were 
placed on the record on December 16, 18 and 22.
36
  Some petitions even pleaded to grant 
monopolies to certain American manufacturers.  Representative Richard Mentor Johnson of 
Kentucky introduced a resolution that “clothing the Army and Navy of the United States [be] 
exclusively in American manufactures.”37  The wide array of proposed goods, frequency of the 
petitions, and dispersed locales of origin all point to the formation of energetic economic special 
interest groups alongside early American industrialization.    
     The arguments presented in favor and against the 1818 bills were similar to those offered in 
1816.  South Carolinian Eldred Simkins reminded the House that trade restrictions from the 
Jeffersonian Experiment and the War of 1812 created a situation where “our supplies were most 
inadequate to our rising wants.”  He stated that “manufacturing establishments sprung to our 
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relief, in various parts of the continent, and we were supplied with cannon, arms, and other 
munitions of war, and our armies, to a considerable extent, were clothed from our own 
establishments.”  He expressed concern about the post-war environment, recounting that “when 
the war ceased, it was the true policy of Great Britain, who had viewed our rising establishments 
with great pain and jealousy, to throw into our market such a quantity of goods, of every sort, at 
low prices, as to sink to destruction these establishments.”38 
     Representative James Smith, a twenty-eight year old North Carolina doctor, exemplified the 
opposing view that protection was the brainchild of economic interest groups who were simply 
trying to maximize their profits through governmental legislation.
39
  He noted that “good iron 
cannot be imported, under the existing duty of nine dollars per ton, for less than one hundred and 
ten dollars per ton.  I have also information before me that, in New Jersey, where the greatest 
complaint is, that a ton of bar iron can be made from their bloomeries, at eighty-five dollars per 
ton.”  Smith insisted that “They had no pledge from this legislature, that duties should be laid 
and continued for their support; nor are we bound to sacrifice the great interests of this country to 
prop such fungus establishments.  They like other speculators, expected to profit by the 
necessities of their neighbors.”40    
     Smith’s declarations aside, there was evidence that British iron goods were inundating the 
American market.  The House received reports stating American iron consumption totaled 
approximately 45,000 tons per annum.  Domestic manufacturers, to meet this demand, had 
produced 30,000 tons and 40,000 tons in 1810 and 1814, respectively.  In 1817, domestic 
production dropped to only 15,000 tons due to foreign competition.  In contrast, Britain produced 
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200,000 tons of iron in 1816 alone.
41
  This information, in the context of the Dallas “Second 
Class” infant industry standard, suggested that the tariff levels established in 1816 for iron were, 
in fact, insufficient to adequately protect the iron industry.        
     On April 15, the House voted on the bill to increase duties on iron.  The measure comfortably 
passed by a vote of 88 to 47.
42
  This final voting margin paralleled the 1816 tariff vote, which 
had passed 88 to 54.
43
 
     A roll call analysis by region in Table 5.1 highlights the similarities to the Tariff of 1816.  
New England and the Western states backed the proposal by comfortable margins.
44
  Atlantic 
states, where most American iron manufacturers domiciled, overwhelmingly supported the 
measure.  The greatest concentration of negative votes again centered in the Chesapeake and the 
South, where the Quid dominated Virginia and North Carolina delegations collectively opposed 
the measure by a vote of 16 to 5.       
Table 5.1. Ratification Vote – The 1818 Iron Bill by Region 24  
        House  House    
Region  States        Ayes  Nays   
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)      16    14    
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      47    0    
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)           8  16      
South   (GA, NC, SC)          6    8    
West  (IN, KY, LA, MS, OH, TN)   11    9    
Totals        88   47    
Source: 32 Annals of Cong. 1740-1741 (1818). 
   
     Likewise, similar patterns to 1816 emerge by political party, shown in Table 5.2.   Many 
Federalists abstained from the roll call, as only 24 of the 42 party members voted on the 
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measure.  They again split their votes.  Republicans, after carving out Virginia and North 
Carolina, overwhelmingly supported the measure by a wide margin of 70 ayes to only 19 nays. 
Table 5.2. Ratification Vote – The 1818 Iron Bill by Party Affiliation 25 
     House  House    
Party     Ayes  Nays   
Republican    75   35   
Federalist    13  12   
Totals     88  47      
Source: 32 Annals of Cong. 1740-1741 (1818). 
  
     Later that day, the House considered the second bill to extend the initial period of higher 
duties from the middle of 1819 to the middle of 1826.  The measure passed by an overwhelming 
majority of 106 to 34, winning almost unanimous support in the New England and Atlantic 
states, alongside a solid Western majority.
45
  Once again, the opposition was centered in the 
Republican delegations from Virginia and North Carolina, who voted 15 to 5 against the 
legislation.  Other Southern delegations generally approved the measure, as Georgia supported 
the bill and Maryland and South Carolina featured split delegations.  Table 5.3 summarizes the 
roll call by region:   
Table 5.3. Ratification Vote – Extending Initial Cotton and Wool Protection Period from Three 
to Ten Years by Region 26 
        House  House    
Region  States        Ayes  Nays   
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)        29        1   
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)        49      1   
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)            6    14     
South   (GA, NC, SC)            9    13   
West  (IN, KY, LA, MS, OH, TN)     13      5   
Totals        106     34    
Source: 32 Annals of Cong. 1742-1743 (1818). 
     
     An analysis by party affiliation shows that both Republicans and Federalists approved the 
measure by substantial margins.  Although the pattern might appear to affirm the “Era of Good 
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Feelings,” a review confirms the same tensions within party that were present in 1816.  For 
Republicans, it remained a matter of ideological differences.  The bulk of the party members, 
sans the Quid dominated Virginia and North Carolina delegations, favored the bill by an 81 to 10 
majority.  Federalist votes divided geographically, just as two years before.  Their vote was 20 to 
2 in favor north of the Mason-Dixon Line, while Southern members voted 7 to 0 against.  Table 
5.4 summarizes the votes by party affiliation: 
Table 5.4. Ratification Vote – Extending Initial Cotton and Wool Protection Period from Three 
to Ten Years by Party Affiliation 27 
     House  House    
Party     Ayes  Nays   
Republican    86   25   
Federalist    20    9   
Totals              106  34        
Source: 32 Annals of Cong. 1742-1743 (1818). 
       
     The Senate immediately considered both bills.  On Saturday, April 18, only three days after 
the House votes, both bills were read the requisite third time, and approved by voice consent.   
Consequently, there are no available Senate roll calls for either bill.
46
    
     The 1818 legislation modified only a few imported items, but these changes were significant, 
because tariff rates on the impacted goods substantially increased.  These changes are 
summarized as follows: 
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Table 5.5. Summary of Changes in Tariff Rates resulting from 1818 Tariff Legislation 28 
       1816  1818  
Item    Measure  Rate   Rate  Change 
Cotton    Ad valorem  25% to 1819 25% to 1826 7 years 
Wool    Ad valorem  25% to 1819 25% to 1826 7 years 
Pig Iron
47
   Ad valorem/  20% /$ .30 $  .50  67% increase 
    Hundred Weight 
Iron bolts, bars & castings Hundred Weight $  .45  $  .75  67% increase 
Alum    Hundred Weight $1.00  $2.00  100% increase 
Nails    Pound   $  .03  $  .04  33% increase 
Spikes    Pound   $  .02  $  .03  50% increase 
Source: 32 Annals of Cong. 2582 (1818); Northrup and Turney, eds. Encyclopedia of Tariffs and 
Trade, 3:19-20; Taussig, Tariff History, 50-53. 
  
The changes added substantial protection for the cotton, iron, and woolens manufacturing 
industries.  Detailed information on the specific “mix” of American imports prior to 1830 is 
virtually non-existent.  From available information, total duties raised compared to total value of 
imports, shows the following pattern in Table 5.6: 
Table 5.6. Tariff Duties as a Percentage of Total Imports: 1816 to 1824 29 
  Total Imports  Dutiable Imports    Goods Dutiable  Tariffs Duties   
Year   (millions)  (millions)             (%)            (%) 
1816  $134   not available   n/a         24.6%  
1817  $  82   not available   n/a         26.8% 
1818  $108   not available   n/a         24.1% 
1819  $  74   not available   n/a         28.4% 
1820  $  57   not available   n/a         29.8% 
1821  $  44   $  42    95%         43.2% 
1822  $  68   $  65    96%         35.2% 
1823  $  51   $  49    96%         43.7% 
1824  $  54   $  51    94%         47.4% 
Source: Carter, et al., eds. Historical Statistics, 5:510; note that the information separating free 
and dutiable imports is only available commencing in 1821. 
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 The 1818 tariff bill changed the duties charged for imported pig iron from an ad valorem rate to a fixed rate.  
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     This information provides clues about the Tariff of 1818’s effectiveness.  The United States 
did not materially change the duties schedule between 1818 and 1824.  The data from 1821 
forward shows that almost all foreign goods reaching American ports were subject to the tariff 
and it is reasonable to assume that the pre-1821 situation was similar.  In 1819 and 1820, the 
average tariff rate on imports rose, but only slightly.  For the period from 1821 through 1824, the 
average tariffs relative to imports significantly increased.  Ceteris paribus, it appears that foreign 
imports of iron, cotton and woolen goods, now charged at higher rates, likely decreased for the 
first two years after the Tariff of 1818 was enacted.  This is consistent with data showing that 
overall imports decreased those two years, in part arising from the Panic of 1819 and its 
contracting effect on the American economy.  However, the return to prosperity in 1821 
coincided with sharp increases in the average duty, suggesting that importation of iron, cotton 
and woolen goods substantially increased.  This circumstantial evidence suggests the Tariff of 
1818 ultimately failed to reduce foreign imports of its enumerated goods.       
Economic Expansion and the Panic of 1819     
     American industrialization after the war was accompanied by a rapid expansion in general 
economic activity.  This expansion was short-lived, and was abruptly halted by the Panic of 
1819.  The economic and psychological scars from the Panic would influence future trade policy 
debates, as both nationalists and liberals argued that their particular brand of tariff policy best 
insulated the country from future panics     
     The American “boom” economy between 1815 and 1819 was significantly influenced by a 
speculative appetite for western lands.  Settlers flocked to the Northwest and across the 
Mississippi River after the war effectively ended Indian threats in the area.  In addition, easy 
credit offered by the Bank of the United States and the numerous state banks, many of which 
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first opened their doors after the war, made loans for investment in industrial machinery and real 
estate readily available.        
     Modern economic business cycles originate from excessive “boom” periods that lead to 
malinvestment in non-liquid assets such as land and factories, and eventually result in economic 
“bust” periods once speculative prices are exposed as unsustainable and shrinking demand leaves 
capital investments such as factories with underutilized production capacity.
48
  The Panic of 
1819 was characterized by the sudden scarcity of specie.  As the monetary contraction occurred, 
loans were called in and specie flowed generally from debtors to creditors.  The West suffered 
greatly, because it was a debtor region, where significant tracts of land were surveyed, sold on 
credit, and then settled.  Land sales were heavily influenced by the many speculators operating in 
the marketplace and the easy availability of credit from banks.   
     President Madison had expressed a view that a national bank was needed in his seventh 
annual address: “The benefits of an uniform national currency should be restored to the 
community.”49  On March 13, 1816 the House approved a Bank Bill by a vote of 81 to 65, and 
on April 3, 1916 the Senate approved the bill by a vote of 22 to 12.
50
  The Second Bank of the 
United States opened for business in January, 1817.
51
 
     The objective of the Second Bank was to restore order and discipline to the national financial 
system.  The issuance of substantial amounts of new state bank notes during the War of 1812 led 
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to inflation.  Pro-bank forces argued that a re-charter of the Bank of the United States would 
bring order and compel state banks to resume specie payment, which they had suspended during 
the war.  In practice, this did not happen, as Treasury Secretary William Crawford constantly 
pressured the Bank to accept depreciated state notes in lieu of specie and/or treasury notes.
52
  By 
1818, shortly after receiving its charter, the Second Bank had already issued $10 million in notes 
of its own, and loaned out $41 million, despite having only $2.5 million in specie reserves.  The 
South utilized 57% of this circulation and the West 22%.
53
  Contrary to original intent, the 
Second Bank was promoting a lack of discipline within the financial system. 
     State banks also contributed to monetary expansion in the post-war era.  Reserve ratios 
declined dramatically, in part due to a drain of specie out of the country.  In 1815, the total 
number of banks operating in the country increased almost 20%.  Bank notes in circulation 
expanded to $68 million, an increase of 48%.
54
  Overall, state bank’s reserve ratios (specie 
relative to deposit and note liabilities), which were .43 in 1813, sharply declined to .19 by 
1819.
55
  Fueled by the monetary expansion, the country’s economy boomed, fueled in the South 
and in the West by land speculation.          
     One of the initial triggers precipitating the end of the boom occurred in late 1818 and early 
1819 when the Bank of the United States Treasury paid off the final $4 million balloon payment 
for the Louisiana Purchase debt, payable in specie.  To meet this obligation the Bank reversed 
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course and initiated contractionary monetary policies.  The Bank not only provided funds for the 
Louisiana payment, it also increased its own specie reserves to $8 million by spring of 1821.
56
    
     The Bank’s change in policy improved its own financial condition, strengthening its reserve 
ratio from .33 in 1819 to .61 the following year.
57
  However, the buildup in specie caused a 
corresponding reduction in the Bank’s circulating notes, which fell from a peak of $8.3 million 
in late 1818 to only $3.6 million in 1820.
58
  The Bank’s policies quickly reduced the amount of 
money in circulation in a very short timeframe, sparking the Panic.
59
   
     The depth of the Panic, particularly in the West, was profound.  Hezekiah Niles estimated that 
50,000 people in New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore were either unemployed or 
underemployed.
60
  The Nashville, Tennessee county court processed over 500 foreclosure 
actions during a single term.  In Pennsylvania, better off than most western states, nearly 15,000 
foreclosure actions were commenced in 1819.
61
  The proceeds from the sale of public lands by 
the federal government fell from $13.6 million in 1818, to only $3.0 million in 1820 and 1821 
combined.
62
  In Missouri, prominent businessman Moses Austin, made wealthy from 
investments in the lead mining industry, was forced into bankruptcy in 1820, and soon left for 
Texas to start over.  A city lot in St. Louis that had sold for $1,000 in 1820 garnered only $140 in 
1821.
63
  A Franklin Intelligencer writer noted “I do not recollect any period when so many 
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persons were without employment as at present.  These are not mechanics or farmers, but clerks, 
gentlemen and professional characters.”64  
The Tariff of 1820 
     The Panic of 1819 put pressure on American political leaders to consider ways to relieve the 
economic stress faced by citizens.  At the state level, political activism took the form of stay and 
replevin laws, designed to relieve beleaguered real estate debtors by forestalling the collections 
and foreclosure process.  At the national level, cries for relief were loudest from manufacturers, 
who were particularly hard pressed.  Memorialists bombarded Congress with pleas for relief 
throughout 1819 and continuing through 1822. 
     Entrepreneurs slowed down the construction of new factories in the face of British imports 
and the Panic of 1819.  In New England, an average of eighteen cotton mills opened every year 
during the war from 1812 to 1815.  In the following five years, from 1816 through 1820, the 
expansion continued, but at a much slower rate of just four new factories per year.
65
     
     Memorials poured into Washington, crying for increased tariffs.  The vast majority were 
received from local groups citizens employed in a wide array of manufacturing interests.  The 
memorialists frequently reasoned that by reducing the amounts of foreign imports reaching the 
United States, domestic producers could economically recover by increasing their market share 
and enjoy increased production levels. 
     An example of a typical memorial was sent to Congress in December 1819 from “a 
convention of the friends of national industry, assembled in the city of New York, to take into 
consideration the prostrate situation of our manufacturers.”  This meeting included delegates 
from a wide variety of states, including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, 
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New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ohio, and Maryland.  The “friends” described the plight of 
American manufacturing.  They noted that “many of our manufacturers are thus ruined; our 
working people destitute of employment, and of the means to support their families; our 
manufacturing establishments falling to ruins; and our water powers, with which we are pre-
eminently blessed, unemployed, - our cities and towns are filled with the manufactured 
productions of other nations, by which we have been and are ruinously drained of our wealth.”66     
     The memorial called for increased tariffs on a variety of items, including, but not limited to, 
cotton, wool, silk, and iron.  It pointed out that other economic spheres would indirectly benefit, 
declaring that “independent of every consideration in favor of the policy of affording adequate 
protection to domestic industry … and the protection due manufacturers … we are convinced 
that the farmers and planters would largely participate in the benefits of the system we advocate.  
The planter would have a steady market for his raw material, not subject to those destructive 
fluctuations which have produced such extensive ruin within the present year; and the farmer 
would have an equally steady and increasing demand for the productions of his farm.”67   
     The pro-tariff memorials coincided with the introduction of concerted efforts to justify 
protective policy through the press.  This was a significant development because, instead of 
merely advocating for a given interest as the memorials did, newspapers and books served as 
conduits for building systematic arguments to support the protective cause.  The foremost 
publisher for protection in the 1820s was Mathew Carey. 
     Carey was born in Dublin, Ireland in 1760.  The ardent Catholic nationalist ran afoul of 
British authorities at the tender age of nineteen, when he published a seditious work entitled 
Appeal to the Roman Catholics of Ireland.  Carey’s family smuggled him away to France, where 
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he was introduced to Benjamin Franklin.  He returned to Ireland in 1780, and wrote for the 
Hibernian Journal, a leading anti-British publication.  Carey ran into trouble with Great Britain a 
final time in 1784 and, in the face of likely treason charges, he fled to the United States, where 
he became a successful printer.  The new Irish immigrant initially allied with the Federalists, but 
moved over to the Republicans during the 1790s.
68
  
     In 1819, Carey forayed into the issue of trade policy when he published a number of tracts 
collectively entitled Addresses of the Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of National 
Industry.  The Addresses attracted a national audience.  John Adams commented that “the 
gentlemen of Philadelphia have published a very important volume upon the subject, which I 
recommend to … careful perusal.”  General William Henry Harrison praised the work, stating 
that “I should be wanting in candour not to acknowledge, that I have been converted to my 
present principles in favour of manufactures, by the luminous views upon the subject which have 
been published by your society.”69   
     Carey preached both the virtue and necessity of protection.  The preface to Addresses argued 
that promoting manufactures benefitted the entire nation.  Carey framed the question as “whether 
we shall be really or nominally independent – whether we shall persevere in a policy, which in 
four or five years has done more to prostrate our strength and resources than a fierce war … that 
fosters and promotes the wealth, power, resources, industry, and manufactures of foreign nations, 
and sacrifices those of our own country.”  He remarked that “It is a great error to suppose, as 
unhappily is too frequently done, that it is the cause of manufacturers alone. Nothing can be 
more foreign from the real fact.  It is the cause of the nation.”70      
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     Addresses aggressively attacked free trade.  Carey proposed “to establish the utter fallacy of 
some maxims, supported by the authority of the name of Adam Smith, author of the Wealth of 
Nations, but pregnant with certain ruin to any nation by which they may be carried into 
operation.”71  The Essays took issue with Smith’s version of political economy on four points.  
First, Carey asserted that “Industry is the only sure foundation of national virtue, happiness, and 
greatness: and, in all its useful shapes and forms, has an imperious claim on governmental 
protection.”  His second claim was that “no nation ever prospered to the extent of which it was 
susceptible, without due protection of domestic industry.”  Third, the tract maintained that “there 
are few, if any, political evils, to which a wise legislature, untrammeled in its deliberations and 
decisions, cannot apply an adequate remedy.”  Finally, the Essays commented that “The interests 
of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, are so inseparably connected, that any serious 
injury suffered by one of them must materially affect the others.”72   
     Carey, despite his personal hatred of Britain, greatly respected the British economic model. 
He believed that Britain had elevated itself “to a degree of wealth, power, and influence, far 
beyond what her population or natural resources would entitle her to” as a direct consequence of 
her highly protectionist policies.
73
  He argued that the British tariff system, which featured much 
higher rates, encouraged importation of raw materials and exportation of manufactured goods 
produced by a well-supported domestic manufactures sector which he concluded was the source 
of British economic superiority.  For example, he compared Great Britain’s tariff of 85% ad 
valorem on manufactured cotton cloth in 1819 to a substantially smaller 27.5% ad valorem rate 
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in the United States.  Carey concluded that “the annals of legislation and revenue cannot produce 
a stronger contrast between the most profound policy and its direct opposite.”74 
     In spite of the impact of the Panic and the flood of British exports, many Americans 
maintained that free trade was preferable to protection.  Congress received many anti-tariff 
memorials.  Agrarians complained that they would be burdened with higher prices if less 
expensive imports were prevented from reaching the American market.  Merchants were 
concerned that higher tariffs meant reduced commercial shipping.    
     A typical agricultural memorial was sent in 1820 by the Roanoke Agricultural Society, based 
in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley.  It declared that “The tariff bill introduced at the last session of 
Congress, and which, it is apprehended, may again be introduced at the present, could not fail to 
agitate the feelings and excite the alarm of your memorialists.”  The tariff proposal, in their 
opinion, ran afoul of common sense, because “It is an axiom of political economy that when a 
nation can import cheaper than she can manufacture, she should not pretend to set up workshops 
of her own, but should rely on those of her neighbors.”  The petitioners pointed out increased 
tariffs provided unfair economic advantage to one economic interest to the detriment of others.  
They complained that “For the purpose of forcing and pampering a puny and comparatively 
insignificant manufacturing interest, agriculture is attempted to be grievously taxed, our revenue 
diminished, and commerce, in a great measure, destroyed.”75 
     An example of a commerce-based remonstrance arrived from Philadelphia the same year.  
These memorialists dubbed themselves “a convention of delegates representing the merchants 
and others interested in commerce, assembled at Philadelphia.”  Their document compared and 
contrasted the merits of free trade with the pitfalls of governmental interferences with trade.  The 
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signatories insisted that “the nation, through its highest public functionaries, is called upon to 
determine whether we will plunge still deeper into all those measures of prohibition and 
restrictions upon trade; of duties premiums and bounties; of stimulants to rear exclusive interests 
at the national expense.”  The Philadelphia delegates proudly proclaimed that “commerce is to 
the body politic what the circulation of the blood is to the body natural; to check either 
materially, is to produce disease; and to augment such check, in any degree, is to destroy the 
healthful existence of both.”  In contrast, manufacturing inevitably led to conditions where 
workers “are forced to labor from fourteen to seventeen hours in the twenty-four, and to live 
almost exclusively on vegetable diet, in order to earn a miserable pittance of wages, scarcely 
sufficient to keep body and soul together?”76     
    Free trade advocates, similar to protectionists, were also supported by substantial writings in 
addition to the many memorials.  The most notable writer for their cause during the 1820s was 
John Taylor of Caroline.  Taylor published Tyranny Unmasked in 1822 and New Views of the 
Constitution of the United States the following year.  Tyranny Unmasked directly assaulted 
protectionism on the grounds that it amounted to the preferential treatment of certain economic 
spheres at the expense of others.  In New Views, Taylor suggested protectionist tariffs were 
unconstitutional.
77
    
     Taylor’s background sharply contrasted with Carey’s.  He was a close friend and confidant of 
both Randolph and Macon.  Taylor was deeply integrated into the Virginia social aristocracy, 
and after his father died he was raised by his famous uncle, Edmund Pendleton.  The young 
Virginian attended the College of William and Mary, practiced law, and served in the 
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Revolutionary War.  He retired from the law at an early age and spent the rest of his life as a 
gentleman farmer, as well as serving three partial terms as a United States senator.
78
   
     Tyranny Unmasked circulated two years after Addresses of the Philadelphia Society, and 
directly responded to an 1821 report from the House Committee of Manufactures recommending 
increased protection for American industry.
79
  Taylor equated protection with economic tyranny, 
because government became a conduit for redistributing economic wealth to manufacturers at the 
expense of the other economic spheres.  He feared recreating a Walpolian system that would 
poison the American republic, which required a virtuous citizenry and impartial government to 
thrive.  The committee report was flawed because it “entirely overlooked by far the most 
important branch of political economy, namely, the economy which teaches nations not to 
expend the principles which secure their liberty, in search of money.”80  Taylor added in New 
Views that special economic interest groups “would moreover change our federal system into an 
aristocracy of states or of capitalists, interested to commit frauds … [with] the federal 
government converted into an engine for committing the partialities it was designed to 
prevent.”81   
     Taylor predicted that each request for protection would be followed by more and more 
requests, doubting that manufacturing interests would ever operate in good faith.  Taylor 
complained that “the remedy for over-grown power, constantly proposed, is more power to 
suppress the disorders it produces; so the remedy for exclusive privileges, as constantly 
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proposed, is more exclusive privileges, under the pretense of removing the oppressions they have 
caused.”82      
     Tyranny Unmasked concluded that protective tariffs endangered the Republic.  Taylor 
asserted that “All reflecting individuals, except those bribed by self-interest, believe that liberty 
can only be achieved by a frugal government, and by excluding frauds for transferring property 
from one man to another.”83  He accused the manufactures lobby of manipulating the nation 
through legislative acts containing “many contrivances for transferring property, under pretence 
that that capital creates industry; and for impoverishing the people to create an order of rich 
capitalists, under pretence that this order will enrich the people.”84      
     Taylor exhorted his fellow Americans to “restore a free trade; abolish exclusive privileges,” 
and “surrender legislative patronage.”  He pointed out that “Athens, Carthage, and Holland, 
being deficient in commodities, both agricultural and manufactured, resorted to a free trade, and 
availed themselves of their maritime situations to excite industry by the utmost latitude both as to 
exports and imports.  These examples of political economy have been admired by all the world 
… we should unite the policy by which they flourished.”85  
     Against the backdrop of these differing views, American economic nationalists, led by House 
Speaker Henry Clay, commenced a tariff initiative in 1820 to increase protection offered to 
American manufactures.
86
  The nationalists offered a number of reasons to support their effort, 
but the most critical one echoed Carey’s insistence that the United States needed to use 
protection to ensure its economic independence.  Clay argued that the unequal economic 
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relationships that foreign nations established with the United States through trade barriers 
justified a reciprocal American reaction, particularly true when the nation was deprived of goods 
vital to national sovereignty.  He explained that “The wants of man may be classed under three 
great heads – food, raiment, and defence … the country, then, which relies upon foreign nations 
for either of these great essentials, is not in fact, independent.”87  
     Clay was a shining example of what Americans were accomplishing in the modernizing 
American economy.  He owned “a hemp and cotton spinning mill; he was director of two banks; 
he owned and rented out town lots; he had a tavern.”88  Clay stalwartly supported like 
opportunities for all citizens, and he persistently championed nationalism over sectionalism 
throughout his long and distinguished legislative career.    
     On March 22, 1820, Representative Henry Baldwin, the chairman of the Committee on 
Manufactures, and an investor in iron manufacturing, presented a new tariff bill to the House that 
called for higher tariffs.
89
  Cotton, wool and iron duties would be substantially increased.   The 
ad valorem rate for cotton and wool would be increased from 25% to 33%.  Duties on pig iron 
would be increased from 50 cents to 75 cents per hundredweight and on iron castings from 75 
cents to one dollar and 50 cents per hundredweight.  The duties on various other forms of iron 
were to be increased as well.
90
    
     Baldwin framed the bill as a search for long-term national prosperity.  He stated that “we have 
thought that this nation can never be flourishing or independent, unless it can supply from its 
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own resources its food, its clothing, and the means of defense; that, to be dependent on foreign 
nations for the articles essential for these purposes, is inconsistent with true policy; and that the 
system which has entailed on us this dependence, must be radically changed.”91  Baldwin pointed 
out that European peace changed the nature of world trade.  He reminded Congress that “Europe 
can now feed herself, and can compete with us in other markets for our provisions.  Those 
nations from whom we import the most, now refuse to receive our produce at any price.  Thus, 
there has been a radical change in those relations with other nations, which gave the turn to our 
national industry.  A wise legislature will and must change its internal policy to meet the changes 
which make a revision necessary.”92      
     The Pennsylvania congressman argued that national interest should supersede individual 
interest.  Baldwin explained that “the committee have thought that, in bottoming this bill on this 
national principle, that we ought to feed, clothe, and be able to defend ourselves … our motives 
rise higher than the interest of manufacturers; whether they make or lose money now; whether it 
tends to enrich one or the other, or all classes of society, has scarcely entered into our 
consideration … this nation must command its own consumption and the means of defence.”93   
     Nationalists insisted that while the Tariff of 1816 had appropriate protectionist goals, its duty 
levels weren’t high enough to accomplish them.  Representative Louis McLane of Delaware 
explained that “considerable capital is already embarked in manufacturing establishments, and if 
it be our interest to preserve it there, and to cherish its employment, it is indispensably necessary 
that we should inspire the capitalists with confidence in our policy, to prevent them from 
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withdrawing it, or to save it from actual loss … [at] all times and ages … the success of 
manufactures has depended upon governmental aid; they have never flourished anywhere 
without it.”94 
     Protection advocates also maintained that the bill benefitted all three economic constituencies, 
and accordingly benefitted the entire nation.  Charles Kinsey of New Jersey, a paper 
manufacturer, reminded his colleagues that “the great agricultural States of New York and 
Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania, ever attentive to their true interests, and well acquainted with 
their sources of wealth, have instructed their representatives to protect manufactures.  The States 
of Ohio and New Jersey have unanimously done the same.”95   
     Liberals were not persuaded by the nationalist arguments.  They particularly feared the 
consolidation of economic power, believing that it would endanger the republic more than any 
European power could.  Consistent with John Taylor’s views, they saw the great enemy of the 
republic emanating from within, not externally.         
     Free traders concluded that the proposed bill catered to special economic interests.  John 
Tyler of Virginia envisioned an endless plea for greater and greater protection in the future.  He 
predicted “that, after a lapse of a very few years, we shall be assailed by as urgent petitions as 
those which have poured in on us at the present session.”  He charged that the legislation 
amounted to wealth redistribution, stating that “it adds to the profits of those who at this time 
have their capitals invested in manufactories; and while other classes will labor under severe 
pecuniary embarrassments, they will enjoy comparative prosperity.”96  
     Tyler suggested that manufacturers were experiencing the ordinary risks of business, which 
didn’t merit special treatment.  He queried, “Do not all producers experience fluctuations in their 
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markets?  Today, from the deficiency of the supply, high prices are obtained; tomorrow the 
market is better supplied, and a diminution in the value of the product takes place.  These are 
calculations which all men must make.”  Tyler attributed the current economic problems to the 
ordinary course of business, stating that “The present extraordinary condition of the world, 
almost all Christendom being now at peace, is one of the great causes … all classes are greatly 
oppressed.  For one, I wanted such information as would have enabled me fairly to contrast the 
condition of the manufacturing with the other interests of the country.”  He concluded with a 
question: “shall we adopt this wicked and injurious course of policy? … No sir, I do still hope 
that we shall not resort to expedients which bloat the body politic, and, in the end, enervate and 
destroy … this bill proposes a new direction to the capital and industry of your citizens.”97 
     Commercial interests expressed concern that the bill would harm their economic interests.  
Ezekiel Whitman of Massachusetts anticipated that the measure would lead to higher consumer 
prices, and asked “what do they require of us?  It is, that we should consent to pay from one-fifth 
to one-third more for many of the great necessities of life than we otherwise should … it is 
certainly not for the interest of this nation to make any one class of men a privileged order, and 
allow them to live by extracting assistance from the hard earnings of others.”  He described the 
bill as “mad schemes for depressing commerce, and ruining the merchants, and burdening 
agriculture,” which would inevitably “guard the rich so that the means of acquiring wealth 
should be exclusively with them.  Have we not, in this country, an aversion to aristocracy?  And 
yet, here is to be erected a moneyed aristocracy – the worst of all aristocracies.”98  
     Liberals also argued that a high tariff caused an unjust redistribution of wealth.  Mark 
Alexander of Virginia described the legislation as an example of “appeal to public authority for 
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the relief of private distress.”  He noted that “by enhancing the value of the foreign commodity, 
the price of the surplus produce of the land is diminished, and a monopoly is given to the home 
manufacturer and artificer, at the expense of the landed interest, by diverting a portion of its 
capital to another employment … I must confess, that I do not understand this way of taxing the 
right hand to support the left.  Let nature work her course, and she will work out her own safety.”  
Alexander warned that the tariff road led to the same special interests that corrupted British 
politics.  He prophesized that  an “interest which will be created in society as powerful and 
ungovernable as the waves of the sea, whose very scowl, we are told, like the rude tempest, 
carries terror to the heart, and holds a British Parliament in duress.  And whenever that interest 
shall predominate, the little liberty that we now breathe becomes as the taper of life – “out, out, 
brief candle!”  You tax them; they make the people pay it.”99  
     The performance of the now six-year old Waltham factory served as an example of American 
manufactures, and both pro and anti-tariff factions used it to press their arguments.  Henry Clay 
presented Waltham as an example as to why manufactures should be further encouraged.  He 
described “a visit which I lately made to the Waltham manufactory … hundreds of girls and boys 
were occupied in separate apartments.  The greatest order, neatness, and apparent comfort, 
reigned throughout the whole establishment.  The daughters of respectable farmers … were 
usefully occupied.  They would come down to the manufactory, remain perhaps some months, 
and return with their earnings.”  Clay argued that Waltham’s success represented the potential, 
though not the current reality, of American manufacturers.  Comparing Waltham to a competitor 
in Brunswick, Maine, he insisted that “owing to this extraordinary combination of favorable 
circumstances, the Waltham establishment is doing pretty well.  Whilst that of Brunswick, not 
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possessing all of them, but perhaps as many as would enable it, under adequate protection, to 
flourish, is laboring hard.”100 
     Anti-tariff forces seized on Waltham’s financial success, in spite of the Panic of 1819, as 
sufficient reason not to provide more protection.  Philip Barbour suggested that “This, surely, is a 
result which any capitalist ought to be content with; and accordingly, we are all informed that the 
owners of this establishment are satisfied, and ask no protection from the Government … here, 
then, is the very principle for which I am contending, namely, that when we have the best kind of 
machinery, we do, in point of fact, a prosperous business.”101  Representative Lowndes 
concurred, noting “an establishment (at Waltham) which was understood to have divided 12 
percent and reserved a considerable surplus.”102    
     On Saturday, April 29, the House voted on the bill, passing it by a margin of 91 ayes to 78 
nays.
103
  The Senate Committee of Commerce and Manufactures quickly reported the House 
version of the bill with minor revisions on May 3.
104
  The lines of argument offered in the Senate 
mimicked the House, with proponents arguing that increased protection would spark increased 
manufacturing activity to revive the national economy, while opponents stressed that special 
privileges granted to a particular economic sector ran contrary to republican political economy.  
     New Jersey Senator Mahlon Dickerson, of the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures, 
stressed the present danger to national security.  He reminded colleagues that during the War of 
1812, with the nation in economic crisis, “A large portion of commercial capital, for want of 
other employment, was immediately invested in manufacturing establishments; and, wherever 
those establishments were made, the country flourished beyond any former example, even under 
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the pressure of war.”  This prosperous trend was shattered in the post-war period when “the 
overflowing warehouses of Europe were emptied on our shores … we now witness the extreme 
distress of our country, produced by pursuing commerce to the exclusion of manufactures.”       
Dickerson added the nationalist view that the three economic spheres all benefitted from 
protection in a symbiotic manner where “commerce and manufactures must be encouraged, but 
especially the latter, which may, in time, afford to the farmer a steady home market for his 
produce … a nation may be great and independent by agriculture and manufactures … if foreign 
commerce be added, it gives strength and activity to the whole, and adds greatly to the wealth, 
prosperity, and happiness of a nation.  All three must be combined to produce the best effect.”105   
     The bill’s Senate opponents reiterated the charge that the tariff was tantamount to economic 
redistribution.  Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts, one of the last Federalists in Congress, 
concluded that the legislation intended “to divert that capital, by artificial means, into a new 
current … [amounting to] … a manifesto of the disposition of a committee, and of one branch of 
the Legislature, to listen to the claim of the manufacturers, for a bounty of five millions of 
dollars.”106  He warned that “the claims to protection, which are now so earnestly pressed upon 
you, will become irresistible, and considered justly as springing from your deliberate patronage; 
and if enough shall not have been done, you must persevere, and do more, otherwise a fearful 
ruin will indeed overwhelm those who will have trusted to your proffered bounty.”107    
     After a full day of debate on May 4, opponents called for a postponement.  The motion 
carried by a tally of 22 to 21.  In sudden and dramatic fashion, the Tariff of 1820 was dead.  
Supporters unsuccessfully tried to resurrect the bill during the second session.  Nonetheless, 
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Henry Clay prophesied that the protectionist lobby would ultimately succeed, declaring that “It 
may be postponed; it may be frustrated for the moment, but it must finally prevail.”108  
     The voting patterns in the House and Senate in 1820 strongly correlated to geographical 
region.  In general, the Northern states favored of the tariff bill and Southern states opposed it.  
This pattern represents a significant shift from both 1816 and 1818, when political party 
affiliation remained the defining feature of the roll call.   
     There are three significant factors that deserve consideration in explaining the changing 
voting patterns.  The most obvious event was the recent Missouri Compromise, which had 
spurred a divisive and bitter dialogue along sectional lines over the slavery issue.  Secondly, the 
Federalist demise and end of the First Party System led to a breakdown of party discipline.  
Third, the voting patterns based on geography strongly correlated to predominant regional 
economic spheres.  This recent development occurred because by 1820 the Northeast was in the 
process of an industrial “take off,” in advance of all other regions. 
     Missouri’s admission to the Union forced the slavery issue, quietly present since the 
Constitutional Convention, out into the open field of American politics.  The Missouri debates 
dominated the Sixteenth Congress from the day its session opened on December 6, 1819.  
Missouri’s statehood request tied to slavery, and many Senate and House members waged a 
bitterly partisan, sectional based fight over the issue.  James Barbour informally polled his 
colleagues about a possible national convention to consider breaking up the Union and John 
Randolph openly spoke of disunion.  Despite the rancorous politics, Henry Clay successfully 
maneuvered a collection of separate bills that became known as the Missouri Compromise by 
March 3, 1820.  The Missouri question was the most volatile and contentious political event in 
the American history to date.  Unquestionably, many senators and representatives retained bitter 
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feelings over Missouri during the course of the tariff debates, which started less than a month 
after the Compromise passed.
109
        
     Southern concerns over the Missouri question centered upon the threat created by an 
increasingly powerful federal government.  Historian Robert Forbes noted that “the Missouri 
crisis reignited generation-old fears among some slaveholders that the entire project of a strong 
national government posed a deadly threat to slavery.”  He concluded that southern leaders 
feared “the threat to slavery’s future posed by an Adams-Clay alliance.”110 Nathaniel Macon 
summarized this threat from nationalist-oriented federal power by commenting that “if Congress 
can make canals, they can with more propriety emancipate.”111  
     The death of the Federalist Party proved a mixed blessing for the Democratic-Republicans.  A 
common political foe, previously acting as a source of party unity, was now removed.  The 
assimilation of so many politicians and citizens into the party created a situation that led to 
increased factionalism.  Many Federalists migrated to the Democratic-Republican Party, but that 
didn’t necessarily mean a conversion of political ideas and beliefs.  John Quincy Adams 
represents a good example of this point.  He joined the Republicans during the first decade of the 
1800s, but his beliefs on trade remained strongly Hamiltonian.  By 1820, he was a loyal 
Democrat-Republican, but also a firm economic nationalist.  The Party was no longer as unified 
on trade policy as it had been in the 1790s when it supported free trade, or as it gradually shifted 
towards economic nationalism during the Jefferson and Madison administrations.  The party now 
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featured a “big tent” that incorporated both nationalists like Quincy Adams and free traders like 
Macon.  The administration couldn’t effectively enforce discipline in face of such diversity.112 
     The sectional characteristics of the 1820 vote are summarized in Table 5.7.  In the House, the 
Atlantic and Northwestern states overwhelmingly supported the measure while the Chesapeake 
and Southern regions opposed it just as strongly.  The Southwest opposed the measure, though 
an appreciable minority favored the bill.  Only New England exhibited a divided pattern.  The 
Senate voting patterns were similar to a lesser degree. 
Table 5.7. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1820 by Region 30 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)    18    17    6    4 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)    55    1    8    0 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)        3  25      0    3 
South   (GA, NC, SC)        2  25    0        6 
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)     8       0    4    2 
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MS, TN)   4  10    3    7 
Totals      90   78   21  22 
Source: 35 Annals of Cong. 672 (1820); 36 Annals of Cong. 2155-2156 (1820); note that 
although the Annals reports the House roll call vote as 91 to 78, only 90 aye votes are recorded.   
 
     New England was conflicted because of its significant ties to both commerce and 
manufacturing.  It was the leading commercial region of the country, but that sphere was 
beginning to wane in the post-war era.  In response, many prominent merchants began shifting 
their investments towards manufacturing.  Waltham, and later Lowell, were both primarily 
capitalized by investors who made their original fortunes in commerce.  Historian Caroline Ware 
noted that “Capital for manufacturers was most easily secured in New England from mercantile 
wealth which could be directed into other channels … with the destruction of foreign trade by the 
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War of 1812, New England’s commercial capital was forced to seek new investment outside the 
field of trade.”113  New England’s divided votes reflected the dual presence of strong 
manufacturing and commercial interests.    
     The 1820 census was the first to measure certain national economic attributes.  In particular, it 
tabulated workers by general occupation, utilizing the three spheres of agriculture, manufactures, 
and commerce.  This methodology created the most reliable picture of the American economic 
landscape to date.   
     The data, presented by region in Table 5.8, is ordered based on working population in 
manufacturing, from the most industrialized to the least.  The Atlantic states were the most 
industrialized, making clear why they supported the tariff so strongly.  The South was the most 
agricultural, providing circumstantial evidence for the region’s opposition, though Quid ideology 
likely played a role as well.  New England, as previously mentioned, featured strong economic 
interests in both commerce and manufacturing.  The Chesapeake was manifesting very early 
signs of industrialization, but the lack of well-developed industrialization in 1820 created a 
situation where the Quid ideological tradition trumped economic interests.   In the Northwest the 
numbers demonstrate that industrialization was already starting on a small scale, foreshadowing 
that manufactures would eventually become an integral part of that section’s future.  Finally, 
both the manufacturing and commercial totals for the Southwest were greater than that of the 
original South, suggesting that this region, through still predominantly agricultural, had the 
potential to embrace new spheres of economic activity. 
 
 
                                                 
113
 Ware, Early New England Cotton Manufacture, 15. 
179 
 
 
 
Table 5.8. Regional Distribution of Economic Spheres in 1820 31 
      Total   Percent Percent  Percent 
Party      Population  Agriculture Manufactures Commerce 
Atlantic     600,094  73.7%  23.2%  3.1% 
New England     391,090  72.8%  20.9%  6.2% 
Chesapeake     415,813  85.5%  12.3%  2.2% 
Northwest     210,014  87.9%  11.0%  1.0% 
Southwest     399,567  90.0%    7.5%  2.5% 
South      466,108  93.7%    4.7%  1.6% 
Totals   2,482,686  83.1%  14.0%  2.9%       
Source: United States Census, 1820, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/.  
 
     Table 5.9 illustrates the breakdown of party discipline in 1820, where the voting correlation 
was much weaker than 1816 and 1818.  The Monroe administration took a passive stance on the 
legislation, and the president did not express an official position.
114
  This left congressmen free 
to consider economic interests of their states and constituents.    
Table 5.9. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1820 by Party Affiliation 32 
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Republican  76   68  14      20 
Federalist  14  10    7    2 
Totals   90  78  21  22        
Source: 35 Annals of Cong. 672 (1820); 36 Annals of Cong. 2155-2156 (1820); note that 
although the Annals reports the House roll call vote as 91 to 78 only 90 aye votes are recorded.   
 
     The 1820 vote patterns show that political demarcations were most often determined at the 
state level.  In the House, virtually all states voted either as blocs or near blocs.  Twelve states 
produced unanimous votes, five states features only one dissenting vote, and just three states 
featured multiple minority votes.  Maryland’s delegation voted against the bill by a 7 to 2 vote, 
leaving only Massachusetts and Kentucky with sharply split voting patterns.  In Kentucky, the 
House delegation vote was 4 to 3 in favor of the tariff bill.  There was little correlation between 
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the nature of the aye and nay votes to levels of industrialization.  The following table lists the 
Kentucky votes by district in order of the percentage of workers engaged in manufactures: 
Table 5.10. Kentucky House Votes by District: The Tariff of 1820 33 
        
District  Vote  Member Manufactures Commerce Agriculture 
8
th
 District  Nay  Anderson 13.9%  1.9%  84.2%  
4
th
 District  Aye  Metcalfe   9.9%  1.0%  89.1% 
7
th
 District  Nay  Robertson   8.2%  0.9%  90.9%  
3
rd
 District  Aye  Brown    7.5%  1.0%  91.5% 
1
st
 District  Aye  Trimble   6.7%  0.5%  92.8%  
10
th
 District  Nay  Hardin    6.1%  1.6%  92.3% 
5
th
 District  Aye  McLean   5.0%  1.0%  94.1%     
Source: United States Census, 1820, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu; Stanley B. Parsons, 
William W. Beach, and Dan Hermann. United States Congressional Districts, 1788-1841 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 90-92, 160-167, 224-227, 230-233, 236-241. 
 
     The Massachusetts House delegation voted in favor of the tariff bill by a vote of 10 to 7.  
There, the situation was complicated by the fact that both the manufacturing and commercial 
spheres were integral components of the state’s economy.  Again, there is no strong correlation 
between the levels of industrialization in Massachusetts and the voting pattern on the tariff bill.  
The three most industrialized districts cast votes against the legislation.  Likewise, the upper half 
of commercialized districts produced a mixed pattern of votes as well.  A review of 
Massachusetts votes reveals the following: 
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Table 5.11. Massachusetts House Votes by District: The Tariff of 1820 34 
        
District  Vote  Member Manufactures Commerce Agriculture 
1
st
 District  Nay  Fuller  50.0%  40.5%    9.5%  
2
nd
 District  Nay  Silsbee  46.8%  21.6%  31.6% 
3
rd
 District  Nay  Nelson  46.8%  21.6%  31.6% 
13
th 
District  Aye  Dowse  43.7%    4.0%  52.2%  
4
th
 District  Aye  Mason  33.5%    4.3%  62.2% 
7
th
 District  Aye  Sampson 31.3%  14.4%  54.3% 
11
th
 District  Aye  Kendall 27.8%    1.4%  70.8% 
10
th
 District  Aye  Adams  27.0%    1.1%  71.9% 
12
th
 District  Aye  Shaw  20.8%    1.4%  77.9% 
8
th
 District  Aye  Folger  19.2%  51.8%  29.0% 
16
th
 District  Aye  Parker  16.8%  10.3%  72.9% 
15
th
 District  Nay  Whitman 16.6%    7.4%  76.0% 
17
th
 District  Nay  Hill  13.6%  12.3%  74.2% 
9
th
 District  Aye  Morton 12.9%  15.1%  72.0% 
19
th
 District  Nay  Cushman 11.6%    1.9%  86.6% 
18
th
 District  Aye  Kinsley 10.2%  12.5%  77.3% 
14
th
 District  Nay  Holmes   7.5%    5.4%  87.1%     
Source: United States Census, 1820, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu; Parsons, et al. 
Congressional Districts, 1788-1841, 90-92, 160-167, 224-227, 230-233, 236-241. 
 
     The Kentucky and Massachusetts examples suggest that industrialization levels were not yet a 
strong variable for determining voting patterns on trade policy legislation.  American 
industrialization had not yet grown large enough to strongly influence tariff voting patterns.  
More likely, the defeat of the Tariff of 1820 was due to the fact that many legislators decided 
that the proposed higher duties crossed the line from revenue purposes and short-term protection 
to long-term protectionist policy. 
     The assertion that ideological concerns factored into the 1820 vote is supported by the 
number of legislators who shifted their positions on the tariff between the 1816 to 1820 votes.  
There was considerable turnover in the Senate and House over the four years separating these 
bills, but thirty-eight legislators cast a vote in both roll calls.  Eleven of these individuals (29%) 
changed their tariff stance.  Ten shifted from a pro to anti position.  The predominance of the 
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shift in one direction versus the other suggests that the protectionist initiatives offered in 1820 
went beyond what many lawmakers were previously comfortable with in 1816.
115
 
     The failure of the Tariff of 1820 was narrow.  It comfortably passed the House, but was 
rejected in the Senate by the barest of margins.  Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that 
the tariff question would appear again in the near future.    
Conclusions       
     American trade policy significantly shifted during the immediate post-war era, prompted by a 
wave of manufacturing expansion, beginning at Waltham and soon expanded to Lowell and other 
locales.  This “takeoff” was concentrated in the New England and Atlantic states.  Significant 
financial capital was invested in manufacturing, which was noted during the 1816 debates.  
     The American debates during the previous thirty years had been largely influenced by foreign 
policy.  The economically weak United States constantly reacted to the economic policies of 
much stronger European nations.  New and growing American manufactures represented a 
national asset that changed the focus of trade policy debates in 1816 and onward from an 
external perspective to an internal one.  The salient question now centered on the manufactures 
sector’s importance to the nation, and the appropriate role of the federal government in fostering 
its further growth.     
     The Dallas Report and Tariff of 1816 produced a national-based consensus that temporary 
protection would place American manufactures on secure economic footing.  The Tariff of 1816 
garnered broad support, including the South and West, even though these regions were not yet 
sharing in the Northeastern takeoff.  These regions’ political leaders, including John Calhoun, 
realized the potential of industrialization.  Dallas Report principles established objective criterion 
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to qualify goods for transitory federal support, which was exemplified by the timetables 
established in the 1816 bill.   
     Unfortunately, the Dallas “compact” began crumbling by 1818 and 1820, when economic 
nationalists, reacting to the Panic of 1819 and British competition, abandoned Dallas principles. 
They called for stronger protection for American manufactures and even hinted that it should be 
permanent.  When nationalists also considered protection for raw materials, they clearly diverged 
from the Dallas Report and even the from Alexander Hamilton’s writings.  
     The trade policy debates between 1816 and 1820 reflected concerns about the nature of 
protection and its impact on a republican society.  Nationalists prioritized economic strength and 
the good of the community over that of individuals.  They concluded that if the United States 
failed to become economically and politically strong, the nation would inevitably fail.  They 
were heavily influenced by the nation’s precarious relations with European powers from the end 
of the Revolution to the War of 1812.  Free traders disagreed, maintaining that individual rights 
were a higher priority, and that economic favoritism to any group or individual over other 
citizens was the antithesis of the republican model.  They pointed out numerous times that the 
nation should fear the creation of an “economic aristocracy.” 
     Great Britain shaped the views of both sides.  Nationalists believed that the United States 
should emulate the British model, and that her economic accomplishments produced economic 
prosperity while maintaining a free society.  Laissez-Faire proponents, observing the same 
model, were repulsed.  They concluded that working and living conditions in factory cities such 
as Manchester, Birmingham, and Liverpool were totally undesirable, and incompatible with 
American republican ideals.   
184 
 
 
 
     The acceleration of American industrialization thrust trade policy to the forefront of 
American politics by 1820.  Interest groups such as manufacturers, farmers, and merchants 
bombarded Congress with memorials petitioning for their respective interests.  Writers like 
Mathew Carey and John Taylor contributed fresh intellectual perspectives to the issue that were 
becoming increasingly sophisticated.     
     In the wake of the War of 1812, there was a general consensus that domestic manufactures 
required support.  The recent war had not gone well, and the disparity of economic resources that 
Great Britain and United States successfully mobilized made an indelible impression on 
American policy makers.  National security became a prominent issue, and protective trade 
policy was an essential component to solving the problem.  The Dallas Report and Calhoun’s 
support of it in1816 summarize the national outlook.      
     However, the Panic of 1819 and flood of British exports convinced nationalists that the Tariff 
of 1816 provided inadequate protection.  They dramatically changed course in 1820, pleading for 
privileges well beyond the original 1816 trade policy parameters.  American “takeoff” was still 
confined to New England and the Atlantic states, and the increased demands by Northeastern 
manufacturers caused serious concerns in other regions and economic spheres.  
     The increased nationalist demands in 1820 ruptured the consensus established four years 
earlier.  The Missouri Crisis aroused sectional tensions over slavery.  By 1824, when the tariff 
was next revisited, the scars of the Missouri Compromise and increasing demands by 
manufactures served to inflame sectional differences and raise the economic stakes and, ensuring 
that the next round of debates would be more contentious and partisan.     
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CHAPTER 6 – NATIONALISM APPLIED: THE TARIFF OF 1824 
“the protection of these establishments, which originated in the war, is not the object of the 
present bill.  It does not even assume the modesty of pretension.  Doctrines are now advanced, 
which never entered into the conception of those who advocated the tariff of 1816. … we are now 
told that it is the duty of a paternal government not only to protect existing interests against 
extraordinary reverses which it has contributed to produce, but to create new manufactures and 
new pursuits, by the mere energy of legislation.”1  
- Representative George McDuffie of South Carolina (April 16, 1824 remarks to the House) 
 
“to interfere with any of the branches of human industry, by protecting one or more at the 
expense of the rest, will be productive of evil; and that such interference on the part of a 
republican government like ours, which guarantees to every man the liberty of pursuing such 
occupation as to him may seem the best, provided he does no injury to others, must be fraught 
with manifest injustice.”2   
- Memorial of the merchants and other citizens of Richmond, Virginia (November 24, 1820) 
 
“the object of the bill … is to aid the industry of the country, by adjusting the proportions of the 
several branches to the state of the country … it will not be denied that it is the duty of 
Government to exercise its powers in such manner as will be most conducive to the interests of 
the country … the interference of Government to procure employment for the surplus population 
is required to increase the wealth of the nation.”3  
- Representative Silas Wood of New York (April 2, 1824 remarks to the House) 
 
“it is my decided conviction, that, in a few years, by a competition among our own 
manufacturers, we shall have the various articles that we may want, where we raise the raw 
materials, in great abundance, cheap, and of excellent quality.  The good effects are already self-
evident, in relation to our coarse cottons and woolens.  We are furnished with the domestic 
fabric cheaper, and of far better, because of far more substantial quality, in consequence of the 
duty imposed upon the foreign importation.”4 
- Senator Richard Mentor Johnson of Kentucky (April 29, 1824 remarks to the Senate) 
  
     American economic nationalists, undeterred by the defeat of the Tariff of 1820, passed the 
protectionist Tariff of 1824.  The new law provided discriminatory protection for a number of 
industries, clearly breaking from Dallas Report principles.  Many nationalists went so far as to 
argue that protection should become a permanent component of trade policy, and that the United 
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States should strive for economic self-sufficiency.  The consequence of their successful effort 
was increasing section-based tensions over the course of the next decade.       
     Americans successfully recast the nation’s self-image in the wake of the war and Panic.  The 
United States survived these twin crises, and became increasingly self-assured in cultural, 
political, and even economic terms as the 1820s progressed.  This process conspicuously 
manifested itself in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. 
     Between 1820 and 1824 American industrialization accelerated.  Table 6.1, divided into half 
decade increments, illustrates the dramatic “takeoff” of American manufactures beginning 
around 1810.  Initially, war spurred development.  From 1815 to 1820, the trend briefly slowed 
due to renewed foreign competition and the Panic of 1819.  However, American industry 
boomed again as the effects of the Panic wore off and despite the failed 1820 tariff initiative. 
Table 6.1. The Pace of Early American Industrialization35 
   Opening  Closing Total     Multiplier 
Period   Davis Index Davis Index Increase % Growth from 1790 
1790 to 1795    4.29    6.58  2.29  53.4%  x 1.53 
1795 to 1800    6.58    7.27    .69  10.5%  x 1.69 
1800 to 1805    7.27    8.70  1.43  19.7%  x 2.03 
1805 to 1810    8.70  10.26  1.56  17.9%  x 2.39 
1810 to 1815  10.26  13.56  3.30  32.2%  x 3.16 
1815 to 1820  13.56  14.83             1.27    9.3%  x 3.46 
1820 to 1825  14.83  19.89  5.06  34.1%  x 4.64 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 3:23.  The above information was compiled by 
Joseph H. Davis and represents the best estimates to date from somewhat imperfect data of what 
the United States manufacturing output was during the nineteenth century.  Note that the Davis 
Index uses base year 1849-1850 as 100.  
 
Economic nationalists, inspired by growing national optimism, changed their overall message 
from protecting nascent American industry from Britain to making the United States a direct 
competitor, and causing them to abrogate the Dallas Report.  American manufactures would be 
now supported by permanent trade barriers designed to replicate British policies.   
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     The break from Dallas Report principles, coupled with an emerging industrial takeoff in New 
England, produced a bitter tariff showdown in 1824.  The related debates dominated the 
Congressional docket from January through May.  An all-consuming battle over trade policy 
produced close roll calls in both the House and Senate.               
A Renewed Call for Protectionism    
     The Tariff of 1824 culminated a four year effort by economic nationalists to restructure trade 
policy.  Their efforts mixed several initiatives.  Memorials to Congress were an important grass 
roots element.  State legislatures appealed to the federal government for encouragement of 
manufactures.  Finally, pro-tariff advocates were found within the federal government.  James 
Monroe, in his second inaugural address in March 1821, noted that “imposts on foreign articles 
… would, without imposing any serious burdens on the people, enhance the price of produce, 
promote our manufactures, and augment the revenue.”5  The House Committee of Manufactures 
constantly promoted economic nationalism.  
     Memorialists inundated Congress with appeals for protection.  In December 1819, inhabitants 
from Caldwell County in Kentucky requested that Congress “revise the tariff in such a mode as 
to revive our drooping manufactures, and afford effectual protection to the national industry.”  
They noted that an examination of “the policy of Europe, (that portion of the globe from whence 
sound lessons of political economy can be derived) … [finds] that the system pursued in this 
country is in direct hostility with that of every wise nation there.”  The memorialists criticized 
current policy, declaring that it was “in a great degree predicated on the specious idea of Adam 
Smith, “to buy goods where they can be had the cheapest.”  It has had a fair trial, and its 
pernicious tendency has been clearly demonstrated.”6   
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     Nationalists increasingly expressed confidence that the United States could become 
economically competitive in the international market.  A petition from the western counties of 
Pennsylvania observed that “we are no longer a neutral nation busied in gathering the harvest of 
European conflicts.  The state of the world has changed … those who would limit the care of 
government to particular branches of Manufactures have taken a very imperfect survey of the 
wants and means of the country.”  They concluded that the federal government needed to 
“protect the whole people, to foster every branch of the national industry, and especially to guard 
the infancy of our Manufactures from the baneful competition of foreign nations.”7  The 
memorials included one in 1824 signed by famous early American industrialist Samuel Slater, 
“praying a revision of the tariff of duties, with a view to the encouragement of the manufacturers 
of the United States.”8  A memorial from Pennsylvania farmers posited an opposite view, stating 
they were “firmly persuaded that the solid interests of the nation require, that an efficient 
protection be afforded to the manufacturing portion of our fellow citizens.”9 
     State legislatures weighed in on the tariff by instructing their legislative delegations.  In 
February 1824, the Pennsylvania legislature notified its delegation to exert their influence, in 
establishing a tariff for the protection of our domestic manufactures and agricultural interests.”10  
Indiana’s legislature requested its Senate and House members to “unite in any effort that may be 
made to alter the tariff, so as to encourage the manufacturing of domestic fabrics.”11  Ohio’s 
                                                 
7
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general assembly followed suit, calling for “more effectual measures … for the promotion and 
protection of American manufactures.”12  
     Free traders also submitted memorials to Congress.  In late 1820, Richmond, Virginia 
merchants charged that “to interfere with any of the branches of human industry, by protecting 
one or more at the expense of the rest, will be productive of evil; and that such interference on 
the part of a republican government like ours, which guarantees to every man the liberty of 
pursuing such occupation as to him may seem the best, provided he does no injury to others, 
must be fraught with manifest injustice.”13  A trio of prominent South Carolinians, William 
Preston, Thomas Cooper, and William DeSaussure offered a criticism of protective tariffs in 
1823, maintaining that the “sole effect [of the tariff] will be to transfer capital from one stock to 
another – from a stock which the owner believes more profitable, to one he believes less so.”14      
     In 1824, captained by the House Speaker Clay and Representative John Tod of Pennsylvania, 
nationalists proposed a new tariff bill.  The legislation largely ignored the foundational principles 
that Secretary Dallas had laid out just eight years before.  The bill’s backers desired that 
domestic manufacturers, in all instances where a good could be produced in the United States, 
would receive sufficient tariff protection to ensure near-exclusive control of supply.  
      The nationalist initiative was presented to what had essentially become a one-party 
legislature.  Republicans, increasingly referred to as Democratic-Republicans, dominated the 
Eighteenth Congress.  A few token Federalists remained, but the party of Washington and 
Hamilton possessed scant influence, holding only about ten percent of the seats in both the 
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Senate and House.
15
  The new political reality was driven home in the 1824 presidential election, 
which featured three Democratic-Republican candidates and no Federalists. 
     This political situation, an interlude between the First and Second American party systems, 
was highly fluid.  In 1824, due to salutary neglect by the executive branch and the temporary 
absence of a functioning two-party political system, the tariff issue became a more wide open 
affair.  The result was a discourse that was more driven by ideology and economic self-interest 
than political party discipline.    
The Tariff of 1824: The House Debates 
     By 1824, nationalists were prepared to reintroduce a protective tariff bill to Congress.  In 
anticipation, both pro and anti-tariff forces bombarded Congress with memorials during late 
1823 and early 1824.  On January 5, 1824, Representative Tod presented a draft bill to the 
House.
16
  
     The bill proposed significant tariff hikes on a wide array of goods, including key industries 
such as cotton, wool, and iron manufacturing.  Cotton manufacturing would be protected by an 
ad valorem rate of 25%.  Manufactured wool products were to receive an ad valorem rate of 30% 
until the middle of 1825, when the rate would be further increased to 33.33%.  The proposed rate 
for raw wool was 25% through the middle of 1825, a 30% rate to the middle of 1827, and a 50% 
rate thereafter.  Pig iron was subjected to a specific duty of $1.12 per hundredweight.
17
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     Representative Tod motioned on February 5, 1824 to open debate and asserted that the bill 
followed previously established policy, only with increased rates.  He maintained “that there was 
nothing here proposed that was new in principle – nothing but to extend and equalize a system 
which experience had shown to be most beneficial … the most important duties proposed in the 
bill were for the purposes of protection, and were upon iron, hemp, lead, glass, wool, and woolen 
goods.”18   
     Henry Clay summarized why protection was necessary.  He reasoned that “protection comes 
first in the order of nature; it is while a thing is in feeble infancy that it needs protection.”  Great 
Britain had “prostrated us in 1816 and 1817, and they had the undisputed monopoly of our whole 
market until 1822, and they knew how to use it too.”19  Some nationalists concluded that the new 
tariff was a logical extension of the policies established in 1816 and 1818.  James Buchanan of 
Pennsylvania commented that “it was the settled policy of this country – we had advanced from 
one tariff to another on that principle, and we now had a third, but we should advance with 
cautious steps, and not injure the kindred interests of agriculture and commerce.”20  
     Although proponents asserted that the bill merely extended previous policy, they had actually 
significantly altered the doctrine of 1816.  Protectionists now argued that permanent tariffs were 
necessary for American industries to compete internationally, moving well beyond the short-term 
protection for infant industries that had been advocated in the Dallas Report.  Some nationalists 
even argued to exclude certain foreign manufactures from the American market, a sharp 
departure from previous arguments to simply make domestic manufacturers competitive with 
foreigners.  Clay claimed that “the home market is first in order, and paramount in importance.  
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The object of the bill under consideration is to create this home market, and to lay the foundation 
for a genuine American policy.”21  New Jersey’s George Holcombe added that “I would grant 
ample, and, as rapidly as circumstances would permit, exclusive protection.”22  Tod candidly 
admitted that the bill’s intent was “to protect home industry by preventing those imports which 
destroy it.”23 
     Nationalists insisted that the United States should replicate European policies to become 
economically powerful.  They identified Great Britain as an optimal trade policy benchmark.  
Clay attested that “Britain is herself the most striking illustration of the immense power of 
machinery.  Upon what other principle can you account for the enormous wealth which she has 
accumulated, and which she annually produces?”24  The House Speaker summed the British 
model’s benefits, stating “We have seen that, constructing her prosperity upon the solid 
foundation of her own protecting policy, it is unaffected by the vicissitudes of other States.”25  
Representative Tod stated that “It is notorious that the chief nations of Europe are wealthy and 
powerful almost exactly in proportion to the vigilance with which they exclude the products of 
foreign industry and cherish their own.”26   
     Pro-tariff supporters stressed the importance of the nation’s collective interests, and the need 
for groups and individuals to subordinate their self-interests for the good of the whole.  Henry 
Martindale of New York called for the House to “come to this investigation with calmness and 
deliberation, and with a single eye to truth and the good of our country.”  He interestingly 
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invoked the old British doctrine of virtual representation by exhorting fellow members to view 
the tariff bill as if “we had been elected en masse by a general ticket of the whole United States.  
The power of each is to affect every interest in the whole Republic.”  Members must “look at the 
whole … not to the present only, but to the future also … taking a survey of the permanent, ever-
during interest of the country.”27      
     National defense was also used to justify higher tariffs.  An example was bar iron, where the 
proposed increase was from $15.00 to $22.50 per ton.  James Buchanan favored the increase 
because “no nation can be perfectly independent, which depends upon foreign countries for its 
supply of iron.  It is an article equally necessary in peace and in war.  Without a plentiful supply 
of it, we cannot provide for the common defence.”28  Rollin Mallary of Vermont added that “no 
article named in the bill was of more importance than that of iron … it was essential to the safety 
and defence of the country.”29  
     Nationalists insisted that free trade principles were impractical in practice.  Clay used Mathew 
Carey to illustrate the point.  Carey had reported on Russia’s recent free trade experimentation, 
where they conceded that “events have proved that our agriculture and our commerce, as well as 
our manufacturing industry, are not only paralyzed, but brought to the brink of ruin” as a result 
of free trade.
30
  Clay concluded the United States would meet a similar fate under laissez-faire.  
New Jersey’s George Holcombe added that “the unrestrictive system of modern economists, the 
dissolution of all tariffs … is the real novelty of the day … captivating in theory, but totally 
inapplicable to the present state and temper of the commercial world.”31   
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     Interestingly, support for protection was not confined to manufacturing interests.  On March 
17, the Agriculture Committee published a short report, stating that “your committee consider 
the increase of duties on many foreign articles now imported in to the United States, would 
promote the agricultural prosperity of the nation.”  The report noted that “the home market … is 
at all times to be preferred to the foreign market, when the reward of agricultural pursuits is 
equal – the former is less precarious than the latter.”32  This line of thought argued that 
promoting manufactures “trickled” ancillary benefits to other economic spheres.       
     Free traders presented their own series of arguments for rejecting the bill.  These arguments 
covered a wide array of specifics, but shared the common thread that heavy protection catered to 
economic special interests.  They were highly concerned that concentrations of economic power 
threatened to disrupt the republican values of American political culture.  
     Tariff opponents charged that the tariff redistributed wealth from common citizens to a very 
small group of manufacturing capitalists.  James Hamilton of South Carolina pointed out that “to 
lay a duty on the imported article, was to put a bounty on the domestic article.”33  Fellow South 
Carolinian John Carter declared that “This is a policy unbecoming of the destinies of our rising 
and spreading Republic.  I do not … wish to see this country, by this kind of political quackery, 
enervating and destroying all the wholesome and natural energies of her physical constitution … 
such artificial stimulants as the present only suit the decline of life.”34        
     Other free traders feared possible domestic monopolies.  Churchill Cambreleng, of New 
York, noted that “the design of this measure is to prohibit the importation of our manufactured 
supplies – to confer on our own capitalists the exclusive privilege of supplying the country … the 
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system contemplated, is to be fashioned after the British model – the bill is framed for the 
avowed purpose of granting to our capitalists the exclusive privilege of supplying our country 
with manufactures to the value of millions.”35  
     Opponents specifically criticized the tariff bill for straying from Dallas Report criterion.  
George McDuffie, of South Carolina, noted “the protection of these establishments, which 
originated in the war, is not the object of the present bill.  It does not even assume the modesty of 
pretension.  Doctrines are now advanced, which never entered into the conception of those who 
advocated the tariff of 1816.”  He detected a major shift in the protectionist argument, where “we 
are now told that it is the duty of a paternal government not only to protect existing interests 
against extraordinary reverses which it has contributed to produce, but to create new 
manufactures and new pursuits, by the mere energy of legislation.”36 
     Free traders decried the efforts by economic “special interests” to use protective policy to 
enhance profits in industries that never would have qualified under Dallas principles.  One 
example was Clay’s efforts on behalf of Kentucky’s whiskey producers.  McDuffie pointed out 
that whiskey distilling “was not one requiring extraordinary machinery or capital to carry it on, 
nor was it one which was necessary to encourage in a national view, such as the manufacture of 
woolens … whiskey … was an article which could not be brought within the principle on which 
domestic manufactures rightfully claim protection.”37  Another example involved the Kentucky 
delegation’s proposal to protect “cotton bagging,” used to collect cotton from the fields.  These 
bags were made from hemp, indigenous to Kentucky.  David Trimble explained that protection 
was necessary because foreign bagging prices were so low, explaining that “during the war, 
Russia exported vast quantities of hemp, and England, with an extensive navy then in actual 
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service had use for it.  When peace came, a great quantity of the article remained on hand, and it 
was sold by the merchants at a low price.”38  Free traders scoffed at the proposal, judging it as a 
brazen effort to prop a non-competitive industry.  George McDuffie wondered where these new 
demands ended, reasoning that “hemp requires less protection than almost any other article; its 
cultivation requires little either of capital or machinery, and, if this article must be protected, that 
argument will go to every other article of human consumption.”39     
     Critics noted that the 1824 tariff proposal contained many theoretical inconsistencies because 
so many economic interests were trying further their own agendas.  Representative Arthur Smith 
of Virginia pointed out that import duties on raw materials ran contrary to the original principles 
of economic nationalism, remarking that “Alexander Hamilton … always enforced the idea, that 
the raw materials should come into this country clear of duty.”  He lamented that “the new 
political economists of the North, have found out that Mr. Hamilton was wrong,” and observed 
that iron manufacturers argued for high duties on raw materials while cotton manufacturers 
sought low duties for their raw materials.  Smith enquired, “why, then, is not Mr. Hamilton’s 
doctrine, as regards iron, true likewise?”40 
     Economic liberals pointed out that business enterprise entailed varying risks and rewards, and 
that attempts to immunize manufacturing from natural economic laws were fruitless.  McDuffie 
noted that this fact was well understood within the agricultural sphere.  He pointed out that 
cotton “had been a subject of the most disastrous speculation.  A vast amount of capital had been 
vested in it when it was thirty cents a pound; now it was twelve cents.”41   
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     Tariff critics alleged that excessive protectionism undermined republicanism.  They 
maintained that high tariffs and industrialization would import the social ills of Manchester and 
Leeds.  Samuel Foot of Connecticut sarcastically declared that “I will not believe that the zealous 
admirers of British policy; the warm advocates of this wonderful tariff bill – this patent 
medicine, which is to cure all diseases, really intended to hazard the operation of this “nostrum” 
as a mere experiment upon the healthy, youthful, and vigorous Constitution of our infant 
country.”42  He added that “The tariff of 1816, avowedly supported on the same principle, of 
giving a spring to domestic industry, and encouraging our infant manufactures, as the present 
tariff bill, has been in full operation for seven years; and if the picture of distress so ably drawn 
by the gentlemen, be a fair representation, we should suppose that gentlemen would be more 
disposed to abandon it, than to increase the evils, by extending this system of American 
policy.”43  
     The 1824 debates featured increased sectional-based rhetoric on the tariff.  Regional interests 
had been a minor factor since 1789, but in 1824 they became more prominent, undoubtedly 
exacerbated by the recent Missouri Crisis.  For example, Rollin Mallary of Vermont complained 
that Eastern states and commercial interests were unfairly penalized by recent tariffs.  He asked, 
“What equivalent have the Eastern people had for the almost total annihilation of the West India 
trade?  The West have been gainers, while the East have been comparatively the losers.”44  In 
another instance, Churchill Cambreleng of New York noted that “we had been told, that the 
agricultural interest of the South had been protected by duties, and that we must now legislate on 
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the basis of reciprocity.  This argument, according to the unhappy fashion of the times, is 
designed to excite our sectional prejudices and jealousies.”45     
     Nationalists downplayed these tensions, stressing the need to subordinate sectional interests to 
national interests.  Henry Clay acknowledged that “as to direct benefit, it is probable that the 
North and East will enjoy the largest share.  But the West and South will also participate in them.  
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Richmond, will divide with the Northern capitalists the business of 
manufacturing.”46  Clay insisted that “the East and West must co-operate, and the South must 
submit and contribute.”47  The Kentuckian appealed for cooperation from “the South – to the 
high-minded, generous, and patriotic South – with which I have so often cooperated, in 
attempting to sustain the honor and to vindicate the rights of the country.”48  Clay suggested that 
the South’s best remedy would be to embrace manufacturing.  Some Southern congressmen 
contended that slavery rendered the region incapable of industrializing, but Clay responded that 
“the circumstance alluded to may disqualify the South from engaging in every branch of 
manufacturing as largely as other quarters of the Union, but to some branches of it that part of 
our population is well adapted.”49    
     New England proved to be a conflicted region in the midst of the sectional tensions.  
Although the American industrial take off was starting in the region, substantial commercial 
special interests remained.  Arthur Livermore, of New Hampshire, noted this fact when he 
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declared that “between three and four millions have been invested in manufactures in the State of 
New Hampshire – and yet, not one of these manufactures has urged a duty on woolen or 
cotton.”50  He proceeded to explain that the tariff would be detrimental because it would benefit 
larger institutions at the expense of smaller ones. Mississippi’s Christopher Rankin declared 
“New England is the only manufacturing part of this country, and yet her people do not demand 
this tariff at your hands.”51  
     The House closed its debate on April 16, but not before two powerful anti-tariff speeches 
were delivered.
52
  Daniel Webster spoke on behalf of commercial interests, while John Randolph 
spoke on behalf of “old republican” ideas.  These odd political bedfellows delivered powerful 
indictments against protection.      
     Webster’s comments were motivated by his political ties to commercial interests.  He 
characterized Clay’s “American Policy” as an imitation of Europe, and further noted that 
Continental sentiments were shifting towards laissez-faire.
53
  Webster related that “unless I have 
greatly mistaken the prevailing sentiment in the councils of England, it grows every day more 
favorable to the diminution of restrictions, and to the wisdom of leaving much … to the 
enterprise and the discretion of individuals.”54   
     Webster attacked the notion that the nation was experiencing economic distress, an argument 
that nationalists had made.  He unapologetically maintained that “in respect to the New England 
States, with the condition of which I am of course, most acquainted, the present appears to me to 
be a period of very general prosperity … so far from acquiescing in these opinions, I believe 
there has been no period in which the general prosperity was better secured, or rested on a more 
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solid foundation.”55  Webster expressed concerns over the tariff’s consequences, noting that 
“agriculture, commerce, and navigation, are all branches of the same domestic industry; they all 
furnish employment for American capital and American labor.  And when the question is, 
whether new duties shall be laid, for the purpose of giving further encouragement to particular 
manufactures, every reasonable man must ask himself, both, whether the proposed new 
encouragement be necessary, and, whether it can be given without injustice to other branches of 
industry.”56  He hinted that special interests motivated the tariff issue, stating that “it becomes us 
at least to understand the real posture of the question.  Let us not suppose that we are beginning 
the protection of manufactures, by duties on imports.  What we are asked to do is, to render those 
duties much higher.”57     
     On April 15, John Randolph assaulted protectionist principles.  He asked, “When are we to 
have enough of this Tariff question?  In 1816 it was supposed to be settled.”58  Randolph insisted 
that governmental should refrain from intruding into political economy.  He maintained that “All 
policy is very suspicious … that sacrifices the interest of any part of the community to the ideal 
good of the whole.”  The consequences of the current bill would “reduce all the country south 
and east of Mason and Dixon’s line, the whites as well as the blacks, to the condition of 
Helots.”59  Randolph complained that the tariff benefitted special interests.  He recalled that the 
“tariff of 1816 was followed by that of 1819-20, and that by this measure of 1823-24, I cannot 
believe that we are, at any time hereafter, long to be exempt from the demands of these sturdy 
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beggars, who will take no denial.  Every concession does but render every fresh demand and new 
concessions more easy.”60 
     Randolph argued that free trade was a preferable alternative.  He noted that “I have heard the 
names of Say, Ganilh, Adam Smith, and Ricardo, pronounced, not only in terms, but in a tone, of 
sneering contempt, as visionary theorists, destitute of practical wisdom, and the whole clan of 
Scotch and Quarterly reviewers lugged in to boot.”  In response to these nationalist criticisms, 
Randolph offered that “I leave Adam Smith to the simplicity, and majesty, and strength of his 
own native genius which has canonized his name … we have been told that the economists are 
right in theory and wrong in practice; which is as much to say, that two bodies occupy at the 
same time the same space; for it is equally impracticable to right in theory and wrong in 
practice.”61      
     During the ten week period that the House used to consider the tariff opponents frequently 
tried to roll back duties on specific items.  Representative Timothy Fuller, of Massachusetts, 
attempted to revoke the duties imposed on bar iron imports, highlighting that the iron 
manufacturing lobby had an insatiable appetite for protection.  He noted that “in 1816 … the 
duty on iron was fixed at nine dollars a ton.  In 1818 … they prevailed upon Congress to increase 
it to fifteen dollars, with which, it was understood, they were then satisfied.  Notwithstanding 
this great concession, they have, for four years past, have been urging the imposition of a still 
higher duty, and seem hardly contented even with that now proposed.”62  Thomas Cobb of 
Georgia even proposed reducing tariffs on cotton and cotton bagging.  All of these motions 
failed.
63
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     On Friday, April 16, the House passed the Tariff of 1824 by a vote of 107 ayes to 102 nays.
64
  
The voting patterns illustrated a deeply divided country on the trade issue.
65
  The bill then passed 
on to the Senate. 
The Tariff of 1824: The Senate Debates 
     The Senate received the House bill on April 20 and opened debate on April 28.  A key 
element in the debate, as had been the case in the House, was the long-term, and perhaps even 
permanent, nature of tariff policy under the proposed legislation.  Nationalists tried to minimize 
the issue, but opponents sharply criticized what they contended was an encroaching reach of 
trade policy, and its commensurate increase in the power of the federal government.  Free traders 
tactically attempted to chip away at the duty schedules in the House version to minimize its 
impact. 
     The initial battle involved rates on iron.  Senator Elijah Mills of Massachusetts, representing 
commercial interests, moved to strike the duties on iron.  Iron was a major raw material for the 
shipbuilding industry, and his commercial constituents were keenly interested in keeping their 
material costs as low as possible.  New Jersey’s Mahlan Dickerson defended the duties, 
maintaining that they were essential for national defense.  He lamented that “during the late war, 
we manufactured four-fifths of all the iron consumed in the United States.  In 1817, we 
manufactured two-thirds; and in 1823, one-third of all consumed.”66  The amendment narrowly 
passed by a vote of 24 to 23.
67
  The Senate then considered a motion by Massachusetts merchant 
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James Lloyd to strike out the duty on hemp.  Again, by a vote of 24 to 23, the duty was 
stricken.
68
   
     Senate protectionists argued that the United States needed to emulate European trade policies 
to build the nation’s economic strength, just as their House brethren had done.  Dickerson 
declared that “some radical change in our system of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, is 
required … proved by the distressed condition of all those branches of industry.  To apply the 
remedy is the business of Congress … this is now well understood in most of the Governments 
of Europe.”69  He insisted that manufactures “require great capital and great skill – they have not 
proceeded in any country without the aid and protection of the Government.  In England, where 
they have arrived at the greatest perfection, they have received the greatest protection … the 
capitalist must be enabled to derive a reasonable profit upon his investment … let the capitalist in 
this country have the same advantages in the investment of his money, in all branches of 
industry, as they have in England.”70   
     Nationalists suggested that protection could actually lead to increased competition, ultimately 
benefitting consumers.  Richard Mentor Johnson, of Kentucky, cited anecdotal evidence as to the 
expected benefits.  He stated that “it is my decided conviction, that, in a few years, by a 
competition among our own manufacturers, we shall have the various articles that we may want, 
where we raise the raw materials, in great abundance, cheap, and of excellent quality.  The good 
effects are already self-evident, in relation to our coarse cottons and woolens.  We are furnished 
with the domestic fabric cheaper, and of far better, because of far more substantial quality, in 
consequence of the duty imposed upon the foreign importation.”71    
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     Tariff opponents argued against the bill on the grounds that protection, and a larger and more 
vigorous federal government, threatened republicanism.  John Taylor of Caroline, author of 
Tyranny Unmasked, argued that the tariff equated to preferential economic treatment of some 
citizens at the expense of others.  He insisted that “the object for which our fathers fought was to 
free their children from tyranny and oppressive taxation … this protection …. [is] merely a 
tribute to capitalists.”72  Taylor accused protectionists of making sophist arguments, observing 
that “A curious pair of reasons is urged in defence of the protecting tariff project.  It is often said 
that competition will destroy prosperity, and also that it will produce it.  In support of the first 
assertion, the manufacturing factories loudly urge the prosperity they enjoyed in periods of war 
and embargo.  In support of the second, they insist, that competition among themselves in time 
produce national prosperity, by recreating the violated justice of a fair principle.”73  He added 
that a protectionism was “calculated to raise up a pecuniary aristocracy, at the expense of labor 
and industry … we believe that this aristocratical pecuniary combination will constitute a more 
oppressive government here than in England.”74    
     Free traders expressed concerns that the new tariff created a closed domestic market, posing 
the danger of monopoly.  South Carolina’s Robert Hayne complained that “The principle 
contained in this bill is, that the importation of all foreign goods must be prohibited, which we 
are capable of making at home.”75  He recounted the original principles of the Dallas Report: 
“the argument then was, that in the infancy of any manufacture, it was necessary to give some 
assistance, to enable it to grow and acquire strength, but that such support would be soon become 
[un]necessary, and those establishments might then be safely left to the exertion of their own 
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energies.”  Hayne contended that the new bill was very different, and very dangerous, declaring 
that “the mask has now been thrown off.  The new principle of progressive duties has been 
introduced in this bill, and this amounts to a distinct acknowledgment that the object now is, not 
competition, but prohibition.”76  
     Hayne contrasted the impact of governmental economic encouragement with laissez faire.  He 
rejected the notion “that Government is capable of regulating industry, better than individuals – a 
position which is wholly untenable.  From the nature of things, labor and capital should be 
permitted to seek their own employment, under the guidance, entirely, of individual prudence 
and sagacity.”  He commented that the nature of “Government, from the very elevation of its 
position, is necessarily incapable of taking that close view of the subject, and obtaining that 
accurate knowledge of details, indispensible to a judicious determination of the relative 
advantages of different pursuits, in any community.”77      
     The South Carolina senator protested that the bill amounted to economic redistribution by 
legislative fiat.  He reasoned that “in attempting to gratify the wishes of interested individuals, 
we are legislating in the dark, distributing the national funds by a species of State lottery – 
scattering abroad bounties and premiums of unknown amount.”  Hayne predicted the 
consequences of the tariff bill, warning that “we are opening Pandora’s box of political evils … 
this system of regulating, by law, the private pursuits of men, or what amounts to the same thing, 
passing laws for increasing the profits of certain employments, and lessening the profits of 
others.”78   
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     The South Carolina senator concluded that manufactures had already proved their economic 
viability; what they asked for with the tariff amounted to an economic handout.  He noted that 
“Mr. Slater … who came to this country upwards of thirty years ago … almost immediately 
commenced the manufacture of cotton cloth on a small scale, and gradually enlarged his 
business, until he became the owner of an extensive manufacturing establishment … He is now 
the proprietor of several large establishments … lives in an elegant mansion … and is supposed 
to be worth, clear of the world, half a million of dollars.”  Hayne asked, “Will the gentlemen, 
after this, tell us that the cotton manufactures were brought into existence by the act of 1816, and 
must have perished without that act; or will they venture to assert that skill and prudence, aided 
by adequate capital, cannot now render profitable a pursuit which has, for thirty years past, 
handsomely the labors of this worthy man?”79   
     Tariff opponents also charged that manufactures sought to benefit through policies that 
harmed both agriculture and commerce.  Virginia’s James Barbour concluded that “This bill … 
was to let blood from two of the great interests of the country, in order to circulate it in the veins 
of the other interest.”  He decried the “injustice of building up a particular class – a special 
aristocracy – by the imposition of heavy taxes upon the community at large.”80   
     The Senate devoted two weeks to the tariff bill, and revisions were inserted that moderated 
the overall rates and breadth of the House version.  On May 13 the Senate approved the amended 
version of the bill by a vote of 25 to 21.
81
  The House and Senate, in committee, quickly agreed 
to a final version along Senate lines, and the Tariff of 1824 became law.  
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The Tariff of 1824: A Voting Analysis 
     The tariff roll call in 1824 reveals a highly fractured political situation whether assessed by 
region, party affiliation, or presidential nominee preference.  There were no clear factors uniting 
the pro and anti-tariff voting blocs.  Elements of party discipline, which characterized trade 
policy debates from 1789 through the Madison administration, were absent. 
     The results demonstrated significant diversity by region.  Certain regions, such as the Atlantic 
states, strongly supported the tariff bill.  Both the Chesapeake and Southern regions strongly 
opposed the legislation.  Virginia and North Carolina, with their sizable Quid factions, were near 
unanimous.  A significant change, however, occurred in the votes from Maryland, South 
Carolina, and Georgia.  These states, which produced split votes in 1816, 1818, and 1820, 
significantly changed their pattern in 1824, as virtually all senators and representatives opposed 
the bill.  The rhetoric emanating from Southern legislators like McDuffie and even Northern 
legislators like Cambreleng suggests that some politicians who had supported American 
manufactures in 1816 for nationalist reasons consistent with Dallas doctrine were becoming 
uncomfortable with the increasingly permanent and deepening features of new tariff proposals.  
The terms of the 1824 bill sharply departed from the nationalist arguments made in 1816.    
     New England, despite its growing commitment to manufacturing since the founding of 
Waltham, responded to the bill in mixed fashion.  A majority of House members opposed the 
legislation, while most senators favored it.  The various New England state delegations generally 
voted as blocs, with Connecticut, Rhode Island and Vermont in support and Maine, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire opposed.  This varied response highlighted the ongoing shift 
in the region for commerce to manufacturing. 
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     The Western states viewed the tariff more favorably.  Northwestern states unanimously 
supported protection.  Southwestern states delivered a split voting pattern, partially influenced by 
parochial economic self-interests.  The upper states of Kentucky and Missouri strongly supported 
the bill, Tennessee was mixed, and Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi were decidedly 
opposed.  This pattern aligned with their respective investments in manufactures (and hemp, in 
the case of Kentucky), evidenced by 1820 census data.  
     Although regional blocs such as the Atlantic, Chesapeake, South and Northwest produced 
strong support for or against the Tariff of 1824, the voting patterns in New England and the 
Southwest demonstrated that there was more to the debate than simple blind allegiance to a 
slavery based South or an industrializing North.  In New England’s case, merchants opposed 
protection since high tariff rates negatively impacted their economic interests.  Certain 
Southwestern states, despite slavery being an integral part of their economy and culture, foresaw 
potential future rewards from protectionism. 
     Table 6.2 summarizes the final House and Senate votes by region.  Although the overall votes 
on the 1824 tariff bill were closely divided, voting patterns within specific geographical regions 
were often times sharply skewed in one direction.  New England and the Southwest, as noted, are 
exceptions.  
Table 6.2. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1824 by Region36 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)      15      23    9    3 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      57      9    5    3 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)          4    27      0    3 
South   (GA, NC, SC)          0    29    0        6 
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)     17         0    5    0 
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MS, TN)   14    14    6    6 
Totals                 107   102   25  21 
Source: 41 Annals of Cong. 743-744 (1824), 42 Annals of Cong. 2429-2430 (1824).   
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     Political parties were also divided on the tariff issue.  Table 6.3 categorizes the House and 
Senate votes by party affiliation.  The results affirm the divided nature, and weaker central 
leadership, that characterized the respective political parties by 1824.   
Table 6.3. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1824 by Party Affiliation37 
    House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party    Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Democratic-Republican   96     89  25      16 
Federalist     11    13    0    5 
Totals    107  102  25  21       
Source: 41 Annals of Cong. 743-744 (1824), 42 Annals of Cong. 2429-2430 (1824).   
 
The strong party discipline of the Jefferson and Madison years was gone by 1824.  President 
Monroe did not exert personal influence in regards to trade policy, and consequently 
Democratic-Republicans were divided in the House, and a significant number of party senators 
opposed the legislation as well.  The Federalists, a small portion of the overall vote, could have 
nonetheless determined the outcome of the bill if they had displayed a semblance of party 
discipline.  They didn’t, and split their House votes.  Federalist senators opposed the bill in 
unison, but their lack of numbers failed to influence the upper chamber outcome.     
     The 1824 presidential election featured three Democratic-Republican candidates.   John 
Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, William Crawford of Georgia, and Andrew Jackson of 
Tennessee, offered differing viewpoints on trade policy.  Quincy Adams was clearly an 
economic nationalist.  Crawford, in contrast, harbored deep free trade sympathies.  Both men 
served in Monroe’s cabinet, Adams as Secretary of State, and Crawford as Secretary of Treasury, 
so neither of them cast a vote on the tariff bill.  Jackson, who generally took an ambiguous stance 
on trade policy, voted for the 1824 bill.  Table 6.4 categorizes the 1824 votes based upon the 
political allegiance of each senator or representative to the three major candidates:       
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Table 6.4. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1824 by Presidential Candidate Preference38 
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Adams     53     32    8        8 
Crawford    10    45  11    8 
Jackson    44    25    6    5 
Totals   107  102  25  21        
Source: 41 Annals of Cong. 743-744 (1824), 42 Annals of Cong. 2429-2430 (1824).   
 
     When the 1824 vote is dissected by presidential candidate affiliation, the correlation between 
a respective candidate’s view on trade policy and that of their legislative followers generally held 
true, particularly in the House.  Overall, Quincy Adams and Jackson supporters generally 
favored the tariff, while Crawford supporters opposed.  However, each candidate’s coalitions 
contained sizable minority factions, producing results far less cohesive than had been the case 
during the Jeffersonian Experiment.  The Senate votes were even less consistent.  Ironically, the 
heaviest support for the bill came from the Crawford faction.     
      The voting patterns in 1824 suggest that, for the first time since the Founding, economic self-
interest held greater sway than ideology.  In part, this can be explained by the growing weakness 
of political party discipline.  With that restraint removed, legislators were temporarily free to 
approach the trade policy issue solely with their constituent’s economic interests in mind.  The 
Northeast’s “take off” created new economic constituencies favoring protection for American 
manufacturing.  The Western states, potential beneficiaries from industrialization, also viewed 
nationalist policies in a favorable light.  The South, least touched by industrialization, and a 
remaining bastion of Old Republicanism, saw no immediate benefit to industrialization and 
bristled at the prospect of subsidizing the process through governmental encouragement.. 
Nationalist Trade Policy and American Trade: 1816 to 1824    
     Nationalists maintained that the Tariff of 1816’s goal was to stem the tide of British imports.   
The Tariff of 1818 reinforced trade barriers for the key industries of cloth production and iron 
211 
 
 
 
manufacturing.  Did the Tariff of 1816, as amended, significantly impact American economic 
trade?  Figure 6.1 shows that the average tariff rate on total imports fell in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, but rose again starting in 1818.  The average rate continued its rise during 
the remainder of the Monroe presidency. 
     It appears that nationalists correctly asserted in 1818 that the original legislation only slightly 
stemmed the flow of imports.  Increases in cotton, wool, and iron duties in 1818 succeeded in 
providing greater protection for American manufactures.  As a result, from 1818 through 1824 
average tariff rates substantially rose, causing “trade openness” to decline. 
 
Figure 6.1. American Foreign Trade, 1800 to 1824 (3 year rolling average)5 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 1:30, 3:23. 
 
     Beginning in the mid-1810s, legislators finally raised tariff rates high enough to impact the 
volumes of American international trade.  Tariff rates and trade openness from the end of the 
War in 1815 through 1824 shows an inverse relationship, where increases in average rates 
dampened international trade volumes.  This contrasts with the patterns from 1790 through 1815, 
where changes in tariff rates produced less correlated results.  During the 1790s, increases in 
tariff rates coincided with faster levels of trade growth, suggesting that the national economy was 
212 
 
 
 
largely unaffected by trade policy.  Between 1800 and 1815, the relationship between overall 
rates and trade was clouded by the impact of the Jeffersonian Experiment.  
     The largest short-term beneficiaries of the protectionist initiatives from 1816 through 1824 
were cotton, wool, and iron manufactures.  Tariff proponents advocated specific duties on behalf 
of these goods to provide “infant industry” protection.  Tench Coxe specifically identified these 
important industries in his Statement of the Arts and Manufactures only a few years before.   
     The empirical data suggests that economic nationalists succeeded in their goal to afford 
protection to certain American industries.  The average tariff rate increased throughout the 
Monroe presidency, and the consequence was a reduction in overall trade.  It is noteworthy to 
observe that although imports and exports both declined between 1818 and 1824, imports 
dropped more significantly.  Imports totaled $122 million in 1818, the fourth highest annual level 
to date in American history.  By 1824, they shrank to $72 million, decreasing 41%.  During the 
corresponding time frame exports fell from a record level of $74 million to $51 million, a drop of 
only 31%.
82
      
     Nationalists maintained that protective policy would foster growth of manufactures and 
provide symbiotic benefits to agriculture and commerce.  The evidence is ambiguous to this 
point.  One of the variables making a conclusive assessment challenging is the Panic of 1819, 
which disrupted the national economy soon after protective trade policies were established.  In 
1814, real GDP per capita (1996 dollars) peaked at an all-time high of $1,392.  This benchmark 
wasn’t achieved again until 1824, when real per capita GDP reached $1,401.83  Figure 6.2 
illustrates real GDP per capita on a three year rolling average.  These results highlight the 
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economic damage brought about by war, increased imports, and the Panic.  From 1814 to 1820 
the national economy contracted, and economic growth did not reappear until 1821. 
 
Figure 6.2. American GDP per Capita, 1800 to 1824 (in real dollars = 1996) (3 year rolling 
average)6   
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498, 510; “Measuring Worth,” http://www.me 
asuringworth.org/usgdp/. 
 
     Free traders contended that economic improvement after the Panic was a natural event 
following the original economic bubble, instead of arising from national trade policy initiatives.  
Representative Mark Alexander, in 1820, had attributed the current economic woes to a business 
cycle, which created “A general depression and distress [that] affected all classes of the 
community, the result, as conceived, of commercial over-action, and the operations of that 
system of paper currency.”84  He foresaw prosperity only where “the singular freedom of 
circulation which had been permitted to the productions of … industry and soil.”85  In the end, 
neither side could empirically prove their respective arguments.  The cause and effect 
relationship between trade policy and the economic recovery from the Panic of 1819 was 
speculative, at best.   
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Conclusions 
     Economic nationalists successfully altered American trade policy when they passed the Tariff 
of 1824, which rejected Dallas Report doctrine and established a highly protective tariff.  In 
1816, Americans tended to view trade from an external perspective, fearing British threats to 
infant American industries.  By 1824, the context of the debates changed, as confident 
nationalists sought to make the United States economically self-sufficient and a competitor in 
world economic markets by aggressively supporting American industrialization through trade 
policy.       
     After military hostilities ended in 1815, Great Britain and the United States engaged in a final 
economic skirmish during the years following the Treaty of Ghent.  American manufacturing, 
stimulated by the Jeffersonian Experiment and the War, was endangered.  Manufacturing 
interests lobbied Congress for assistance, which passed the Tariffs of 1816 and 1818. 
     The nationalist push for long-term and/or permanent tariffs, coupled with the uneven 
chronology of American industrialization, ignited passions over the trade policy issue.  
Industrialization impacted the debates because, consistent with Rostow’s observations, initial 
national industrialization is typically confined to a particular geographic region.  Early American 
industrialization in the Northeast during the 1820s divided the economic interests of the North 
and South.    
     The situation was further exacerbated by the Panic of 1819 and the Missouri Crisis.  In place 
of the unified nationalist outlook in 1816, where all regions of the country viewed Great Britain 
as a common threat to national security, the issue shifted towards the interests of the different 
economic spheres, and particularly manufactures.  Manufactures were particularly hard hit by the 
Panic because of the heavy proportion of fixed-cost capital required in their financial structure.  
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The factories and equipment that supported industrialization produced prodigious profits when 
running at full capacity, but exposed their investors to ruin when volumes precipitously dropped.  
The Missouri Crisis resurrected the dormant issue of slavery, and slaveholder defenses of their 
economic self-interests and “property” spilled over into the tariff debates, though nary a word on 
slavery was directly uttered during the debates.     
     Politics played an important role in the transition of trade policy voting patterns from party to 
geography based.  The greatest contributing factor was the breakdown of the First Party System.  
Up to 1820, the Republican Party, except for the renegade Quid faction, maintained a strong 
degree of solidarity on trade policy.  The demise of the Federalist Party during Monroe’s final 
term left the Democratic-Republicans as the only national political party.  Their new found 
dominance, however, served to weaken party discipline, as their “big tent” now included wide 
spectrums of political views, including on trade policy.
86
  Democratic-Republicans separated into 
competing factions favoring either nationalism or laissez-faire, which, because of the nature of 
industrialization in the 1820s, increasingly took on a sectional appearance.   
     American trade policy, though impacted by changing economic interests, shared continuity 
with the past in regards to ideas.  During the late 1810s and early 1820s, writers such as Mathew 
Carey and John Taylor of Caroline added to the foundational principles espoused during the 
Federalist Era.  Their increasingly sophisticated arguments began creating distinctively 
American approaches to trade policy that diverged from contemporaneous European thinkers.  
Their respective writings, though reaching different conclusions, considered the issues of 
republican virtue, national economic strength, and promoting general economic growth.      
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     A significant delineating factor between the nationalists and free traders was their impression 
of international trade in general.  Free traders embraced the concept that international exchange 
was a mutually beneficial proposition, while Henry Clay viewed it as a threat to American 
sovereignty.  He stated that “We have seen that an exclusive dependence upon the foreign market 
must lead to still severer distress, to impoverishment, to ruin.  We must then change somewhat 
our course.”  Clay’s solution involved a proactive federal government, and he stated that “it is 
the solemn duty of Government to apply a remedy to the evils which afflict our country … and 
that remedy consists in modifying our foreign policy, and in adapting a genuine American 
system.”87      
     The schism between nationalists and free traders centered on the question of whether all 
American manufactures, or just “infant industries,” should receive protection.  The Waltham 
factory serves as an example of why protection became controversial during the Monroe years.  
The factory was the best managed factory in the United States.  In 1817, three years after its 
founding, it already paid its investors a 12.5% annual return.  Annual dividends over the 
following years ranged between 16% and 26%.  Sales in 1818 totaled $125,000, leveled in 1819 
at $124,000, and boomed in 1820 to $261,000, despite the Panic of 1819.  By 1822, investors 
recuperated all of their initial equity capital.
88
     
     Nationalists, seeing Waltham as an example of the future prospects for American 
manufacturing, exerted political pressure to create a trade policy that encouraged the 
manufactures sector.  Jonathon J. Pincus’s Pressure Groups & Politics in Antebellum Tariffs 
studied special interest groups and their impact in shaping of the Tariff of 1824.  Pincus 
concluded that “protectionists benefitted until the 1830s from being members of a successful 
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coalition of interests, a coalition that had sectional lines – Northern manufacturers and 
Westerners whose voices were strengthened by westward movements of population.”89  His 
thesis, however, leaves room for ideological influence as well.  He states that “Congressional 
response to pressure was conditioned by belief in the efficacy of protection and its proper place 
in the development and defense of the nation.  The effectiveness of a particular industry’s claim 
depended systematically on the tension, exacerbated by sectional interests, between alleged 
national benefits and obvious “local” advantages to specific individuals, establishments, or 
districts.”90  Pincus observed that American infant industries were particularly adept at 
influencing national policy, because they frequently concentrated inside small geographic areas 
and/or were largely capitalized by limited numbers of investors.
91
  The many memorials arriving 
in Washington between 1816 and 1824 confirms that American manufacturers were well 
organized at using the political process to further their economic interests.  
     The nationalist successes from 1816 to 1824 sparked an increasingly active political reaction 
by those who viewed Waltham’s profits as proof that protection was unnecessary.  The Quids, an 
isolated minority during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, were now joined by a 
growing segment of Americans who viewed special economic privileges to manufactures, and 
the growing wealth of factory owners, with great suspicion.  They argued that Dallas Report 
principles should remain established trade policy, and that only temporary protection be afforded 
to infant industries.     
     In 1824, six months after the Tariff of 1824 passed, John Quincy Adams defeated Andrew 
Jackson for the presidency.  An election rematch in 1828 seemed likely after charges of a 
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“Corrupt Bargain” between Adams and Henry Clay.  Though Jackson had supported the 1824 
tariff, he was no trade ideologue, and his ardent support for democratic ideals made him a 
palatable bedfellow for most free traders.  Eventually, a “nationalist” faction, led by Quincy 
Adams and Clay, a “democratic” faction, led by Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, split 
the party up.  One key demarcating issue between these two factions would be trade policy.     
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CHAPTER 7 – NATIONALISM AND CRISIS: THE TARIFF OF 1828 
“I will not permit myself to believe that the Presidency of the United States will ever be bought 
and sold, by this system of bounties and prohibitions.  But I must say that there are certain 
quarters of this Union in which, if a candidate for the Presidency were to come forward with the 
Harrisburg tariff in his hand, nothing could resist his pretensions … the most immaculate patriot 
and profound statesman in the nation could hold no competition with him, if he should refuse to 
grant this new species of imperial donative.”1  
- Representative George McDuffie of South Carolina (April 19, 1828 remarks to the House) 
 
“we possess more abundant resources than any other People on earth, for the attainment of 
national wealth and power, no one denies … How are we to render these resources available?  I 
answer, by an extension of the American System of protection – by an efficient tariff.  By giving 
adequate protection to domestic manufactures.  By providing a home market for our raw 
materials; and by giving employment to the surplus labor and capital of the country.”2  
- Representative Samuel Anderson of Pennsylvania (March 27, 1828 remarks to the House) 
 
“to interfere with any of the branches of human industry, by protecting one or more at the 
expense of the rest, will be productive of evil; and that such interference on the part of a 
republican government like ours, which guarantees to every man the liberty of pursuing such 
occupation as to him may seem the best, provided he does no injury to others, must be fraught 
with manifest injustice.”3   
- Memorial of the merchants and other citizens of Richmond, Virginia and its vicinity (November 
24, 1820) 
 
     The Tariff of 1824 abrogated the Dallas Doctrine consensus and established a nationalist trade 
policy.  In 1828, the tariff issue was revisited, and a drastic increase in tariff rates and protection 
generated a disastrous result, creating a national crisis that dominated American politics from 
1828 through 1833.  The Tariff of 1828 was the byproduct of political ambition, and it badly 
deepened the sectional wounds festering from the trade policy battles of 1820 and 1824.  The 
measure was unpopular throughout the South, and its passage triggered an unfortunate course of 
events in the most politically radical southern state, South Carolina.    
     Neither economic nationalists nor free traders were fully satisfied with the 1824 act.  
Nationalists concluded the tariff inadequately protected American manufactures.  The wool 
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lobby was particularly dissatisfied almost immediately after the bill passed.  Free traders were 
equally unhappy over the dramatic increase in tariff rates.  Activists on both sides anticipated 
that another political showdown over the tariff issue was likely in the near term.   
     John Quincy Adams’ victory over Andrew Jackson in the 1824 presidential election was 
decided in the House of Representatives after a vitriolic campaign where Adams received fewer 
popular votes.  It was immediately apparent that a presidential election rematch was likely in 
four years.  These forecasts proved correct, and Jackson eventually bested Quincy Adams in the 
bitterly fought 1828 presidential election.   
     Between 1824 and 1828, nationalists persistently agitated for increased protection, leading to 
the Harrisburg Convention in 1827.  Their attempt to increase the tariff on wool in 1827 failed, 
but a new bill in 1828 proposing a steep and broad-based increase to the tariff narrowly passed, 
raising duties to unprecedented levels.  Like the Tariff of 1824, the vote highly correlated to 
region.  The lack of a two-party system created an environment that made internal fractures over 
issues such as trade policy inside Democratic-Republican ranks more likely.  
     The Tariff of 1828, (the “Tariff of Abominations”), owed its existence more to politics than 
trade policy.  It increased tariff rates on a host of manufactured goods, as well as for a number of 
raw materials.  The protection of raw materials not only broke with Dallas Report principles, but 
also with Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures.  Nationalists and free traders were 
even more dissatisfied with the new 1828 act than they had been with its predecessor.   
     Free traders quickly criticized the new tariff.  John C. Calhoun anonymously penned the 
South Carolina Exposition and Protest in late 1828, which sharply rebuked the new law.  The 
Exposition drew inspiration from the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of the 1790s in arguing 
for minority rights.  Tariff opponents initially hoped that Jackson’s election signaled a shift in 
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trade policy to their benefit.  Jackson opposed many issues involving a stronger and more active 
federal government, demonstrated by his opposition to the national bank and veto of federally 
sponsored infrastructure improvements.  Free traders were ultimately disappointed, as Jackson 
proved ambivalent on tariffs.  His vote for the Tariff of 1824 as a Tennessee senator served 
notice that he was no free trade ideologue.  The tariff simmered throughout Jackson’s first term.  
As tensions mounted, volcanic political pressures, particularly in South Carolina, threatened to 
erupt into a national crisis.
4
  
The Harrisburg Convention – 1827  
     During the mid-1820s, protectionist efforts to influence public policy developed well beyond 
the flood of identically worded memorials that flooded Congress from throughout the late 1810s 
and early 1820s.
5
  Frank W. Taussig, the leading tariff historian at the turn to the twentieth-
century, ascribed increased protectionist sentiment to popular backlash against the “great 
collapse in the prices of land and of agricultural products, which had been much inflated during 
the years from 1815 to 1818.”6  The shock of the Panic of 1819 led many individuals in the 
manufactures and agricultural spheres to view protection as an economic elixir for their financial 
woes.  Even though the American economy was largely recovered by 1822, nationalists argued 
that protection could prevent future panics.
7
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     Concurrently, the United States experienced significant technological changes, which 
increased the volume and reach of commercial activity between the nation’s regions.  The most 
notable example was the Erie Canal, opened in late 1825, which lowered the transportation costs 
for goods between New York City and Buffalo from about $100 to less than $10 per ton.  Three 
years late, the first tracks of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad were laid.
8
  
     In early 1827, nationalists introduced a tariff bill to amend the Tariff of 1824 by establishing 
added protection for woolens manufactures.  The effort resembled the Tariff of 1818, which had 
amended the Tariff of 1816 to benefit the iron, cotton and woolens industries.  On February 10, 
1827, the bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 106 to 95.  The effort, however, 
bogged down in the Senate, and on February 23 the bill was effectively killed when a vote of 20 
to 20 was broken by Vice-President Calhoun’s negative tiebreaker.  Table 7.1 summarizes the 
voting on the 1827 woolens tariff bill: 
Table 7.1. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1827 by Region39 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)     34        5  10    0 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      50    13    4    2 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)          3    23      0    4 
South   (GA, NC, SC)          0    27    0        6 
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)     14         4    5    1 
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MO, MS, TN)     5    23    1    7 
Totals                 106     95   20  20 
Source: 4 Reg. Deb. 496, 1099 (1827).  Note that the Senate “aye” votes (pro-tariff) were 
actually cast as “nays” on the vote to lay the bill on the table and vice-versa. 
 
     Although the final voting tally featured a sharp North versus South pattern there were some 
variations from previous roll calls because the legislation featured a single industry.  The 
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Atlantic States fell short of near-unanimity for protective principles.  New England, typically 
featuring mixed responses due to the competing spheres of manufactures and commerce, 
enthusiastically supported the measure.  
     A few months later, on July 30, 1827, prominent nationalists convened in Pennsylvania’s 
capital city of Harrisburg to advance protectionist efforts.  The event’s chief organizers included 
Hezekiah Niles of Baltimore, Mathew Carey of Philadelphia, and Pennsylvania lawyer/politician 
Charles Ingersoll.
9
  The gathering attracted almost one hundred individuals representing thirteen 
states.  Prominent attendees included Gideon Welles and Samuel Colt of Connecticut, as well as 
Bezaleel Taft and Boston Associates member Abbott Lawrence from Massachusetts.  National 
politicians at Harrisburg included House members William S. Young of Kentucky, Ichabod 
Bartlett of New Hampshire, Rollin Mallory of Vermont and Chauncey Forward of Pennsylvania, 
as well as Ohio governor Jeremiah Morrow and Senators Samuel Bell of New Hampshire and 
Asher Robbins of Rhode Island.
10
   
     Despite its national significance, the convention’s roster was decidedly Northern.  The Mid-
Atlantic States of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware were represented, as well 
as five of the six New England states, Maine being the only exception.  The Chesapeake states of 
Virginia and Maryland and the western states of Ohio and Kentucky sent delegations.  New York 
and Pennsylvania, at the forefront of the protectionist movement, contributed thirty-three of the 
convention’s delegates.11  Nonetheless, eleven states, mostly Southern, were not represented. 
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     The Convention’s stated goal was to lend support to the woolen industry.  Woolens, finished 
goods produced from raw wool, hadn’t received significant protection from the Tariff of 1824, 
and were now threatened by overcapacity and foreign competition.
12
  The Convention’s 
memorial to Congress called increased duties on a variety of goods, but woolens were 
particularly singled out.  Woolens would benefit from an ad valorem increase from 33.33% to 
40% immediately, to be followed by further increases to 50%.  The memorial also proposed 
minimum tariff levels for a series of tranches, creating tariff “floors,” effectively placing high 
duties on cheaper brands of woolen goods.
13
  The minimum value concept particularly galled 
slaveholders, who clothed their slaves with lower grade woolens.  In addition, the Convention 
proposed protection for domestic grains used for the production of spirits to attract western 
support.  These duties would block the importation of Caribbean molasses, so that American 
whiskey producers could capture an increased share of a lucrative market.
14
  
     Nationalists described a bleak economic situation to justify their proposals.  They reported 
that “the growers and manufacturers of Wool are suffering great pecuniary loss and ruinous 
embarrassment, from the pressure of circumstances which threatens the general destruction of 
interests whose annual product, in sheep and manufactures of wool, would amount to the sum of 
fifty millions of dollars … the committee cannot believe that these circumstances are of a 
temporary character.”  The Harrisburg delegates noted that a “vast capital, exceeding eighty, and 
perhaps amounting to one hundred millions of dollars … will be exceedingly diminished and lost 
to the national wealth, and a very numerous population dependent on these branches of national 
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industry will be dispersed, if protection, by the national legislature shall be longer delayed.”15  
They warned that the entire industry was exposed to collapse if additional protection were not 
quickly passed by Congress.  
     The Harrisburg memorial also considered the ideological elements of economic nationalism, 
and reiterated many past arguments for protection.  The writers stated that “man, in this republic 
… ordains and establishes rules for himself; and improvements of his condition are followed by 
unalloyed benefits … his aim is private prosperity and public honor, an exaltation of his own 
character, and an advancement of the power and glory of his country.”  It also noted that Great 
Britain had recently tightened its corn laws, establishing higher trade barriers against American 
food products, reminding its readers that Britain ignored free trade.  The report recounted that 
“Adam Smith … presents many sound propositions and matters of deep interest … and his 
countrymen … recommend his doctrines for our adoption, but will not permit them to influence 
their own actions.  They restrict trade in every way that it will bear … the principle of protecting 
the domestic industry has been adopted in most nations. … we offer experience in opposition to 
theory – practice against speculation.”16    
     The convention delegates also proposed that higher tariffs benefitted consumers through 
lowered prices of goods.  Protectionists argued that their policies created greater competition 
because they created a large pool of domestic producers.  They pointed to “the effect of 
competition in the manufacture of coarse cottons, of window glass, nails and other articles, 
which are now furnished, to the consumer at lower prices than when they were imported from 
England under the old tariff.”17         
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     Harrisburg attendees acknowledged the charged sectional attitudes towards the tariff.  They 
mentioned that “it is exceedingly to be regretted that … matters of a sectional character should 
have been introduced into discussions on the principle of protection.”  The nationalists argued 
that protection should not be a regional based matter, stating that “However common it is at the 
present time, (and we exceedingly regret it,) to draw “geographic lines,” we would avoid them; 
but it is difficult, if not impossible.”  They reiterated the symbiotic benefits of protection, noting 
that “there is as much a community of interest between the cotton and sugar planters of the south 
and the manufacturers of the east, as there is between the growers of grain in the west and tire 
makers of iron within the state of Pennsylvania – supplying, subsisting, and supporting one 
another, through the medium of many thousand channels, diffusing substantial benefits, and 
perpetually adding to the common stock of the national prosperity and individual wealth.”18    
     Though Harrisburg was convened to support protection, political overtones were present 
throughout the gathering.  Significant numbers of “Jackson men” attended, wishing to create the 
impression that their faction was protection friendly.  Contemporaries took note.  John Rowan of 
Kentucky, a nationalist and “Adams man,” asked in 1828 on the Senate floor “what was the 
origin of the Harrisburg Convention?  And who created the excitement?  It was known that the 
sole objective of that convention was not manufactures.  It was, although people do not like to 
speak out, got up for political purposes … how many Jackson men were in that convention?”19      
      The Harrisburg gathering occurred as the United States was beginning to realize the benefits 
of industrialization.  The nation embarked on a transportation revolution, and canals, steamboats, 
and railroads increasingly connected the regional economies to one another.  In 1824, the 
Supreme Court decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, argued by plaintiff’s attorney Daniel Webster, 
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successfully established a legal precedent supporting open competition on the nation’s 
waterways.  One year later, New York State opened the Erie Canal, a project eight years in the 
making.  By 1830, steamboats dominated riparian transportation and an initial seventy-three 
miles of operating railroad track had been laid.  Railroads rapidly expanded over the following 
decade, reaching 3,328 miles of track by 1840.
20
  
     American producers now reached distant markets from the improved transportation links, 
spurring the American industrialization process.  Figure 7.1 illustrates the rapid growth rate 
American manufactures achieved between 1820 and 1827, when American industrial output 
grew 42% between the Panic of 1819 and the Harrisburg Convention: 
 
Figure 7.1. American Industrial Production, 1820-1827)7    
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 3:23-24.  The above information was compiled 
by Joseph H. Davis and represents the best estimates to date from somewhat imperfect data of 
what the United States manufacturing output was during the nineteenth century.  Note that the 
Davis Index uses base year 1849-1850 as 100,000. 
 
The growth rates immediately preceding and following the Tariff of 1824 were similar, at 6.25% 
per annum on a straight-line basis between 1820 and 1824, and 5.67% annually between 1824 
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and 1827.
21
  However, while American manufactures experienced strong expansion between 
1820 and 1822, growth abruptly stopped in 1823-1824, which was undoubtedly noticed by 
business entrepreneurs.  In the wake of the Tariff of 1824, American manufacturing output 
increased again, and economic nationalists linked the tariff bill to renewed industrial expansion.      
     Harrisburg’s importance is validated by the frequency that it was referred to in subsequent 
Congressional debates.  Representative Andrew Stewart of Pennsylvania considered it as the 
genesis of the 1828 tariff bill, stating “the Harrisburg Convention and American System … 
represented the feelings and sentiments of a large majority of the people in this nation … the 
contest was no longer between federalists and democrats, but between the friends and enemies of 
domestic manufactures.”  He also acknowledged that the tariff remained a decidedly sectional 
issue.  Stewart noted that “a majority of the States of this Union have pledged themselves, by 
solemn legislative resolves, to support the one side or the other.  On the one side, we see most of 
the Southern States, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, 
etc.  On the other side, we see New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ohio, Indiana etc.”22     
     Southerners viewed Harrisburg as a blatant attempt by Northern manufacturers to exact 
economic subsidies from them through federal legislation.  Representative Wiley Thompson of 
Georgia described the subsequent tariff bill as a conspiracy, asking, “was it to effect this object 
that the Janus-faced monster, that mongrel tournament, called the Harrisburg Convention, was 
got up and exhibited in Pennsylvania during the last summer?  Is it to effect this object that the 
nation is now insulted, by manufacturing proprietors and their agents … making attempts to 
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electioneer with members of Congress in favor of adoption of the proposed system?”23  
Thompson concluded that higher tariffs failed to benefit his constituents, and added to the costs 
of goods throughout the South.  He concluded he tariff was a one-sided situation, brought about 
by unjust political majorities in Congress.   
The Tariff of 1828 
     By 1828, the deep political fissures within the Democrat-Republican Party were permanent.  
Shortly after Andrew Jackson resigned his Senate seat in October 1824, the Tennessee state 
legislature endorsed his candidacy in the next presidential election, setting in motion a partisan 
political tone for the next four years.
24
  Animosities between administration supporters and 
opponents became severe enough that Henry Clay and John Randolph dueled in spring 1826.  
Fortunately, Clay and Randolph proved poor shots, and bloodshed was averted.
25
 
     As the 1828 election loomed, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster organized a political alliance to 
oppose Jackson’s upcoming presidential bid.  A key principle bonding the newly emerging Clay-
Webster coalition was support for Clay’s American System, which incorporated the protectionist 
principle as one of its key tenets.
26
  Clay believed that American System supporters represented 
an important constituency in the upcoming election.  Representative James Buchanan, of 
Pennsylvania, recited a memorial from the Pennsylvania state legislature identifying the key 
tenets of the American System:  
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The legislature of Pennsylvania have given us what, in my opinion, is the correct 
version of the American System.  They have declared that the best interests of our 
country demand that every possible exertion should be made to procure the 
passage of an act of Congress, imposing such duties as will enable our 
manufacturers to enter into fair competition with foreign manufacturers, and 
protect the farmer, the growers of hemp and wool, and the distiller of spirits from 
domestic materials, against foreign competition.  The people of Pennsylvania do 
not ask for such a tariff as would secure to any one class, or to any section of the 
country, a monopoly.  They want a system of protection which will extend its 
blessings, as well as its burdens, as equally as possible over every part of the 
Union; to be uniform in its operation upon the rich as well as the poor.
27
  
 
     The American System, including the tariff, was a key demarcation point between pro-
administration and anti-administration camps.  Nationalist Adams and Clay supporters tended to 
support it, while Jackson supporters rejected it in favor of laissez-faire.  However, Jacksonian 
Democrats were willing to appear nationalist on the tariff in 1828.  Jackson’s “democrats” used 
ideological flexibility and better organization to win a number of key congressional, state and 
local elections after 1824, including a House majority in the Twentieth Congress that convened 
in December 1827.
28
   
     By this point in time, the American System had been intellectually codified through the 
writings of Friedrich List.  James Hamilton of South Carolina, a free trader, ruefully observed the 
irony of List’s influence upon economic nationalists and the trade policy debate when he stated 
that “we appear to have imported a Professor from Germany, in absolute violation of the 
doctrines of the American System, to lecture upon its lessons – to convict Adam Smith of 
stupidity, and Ricardo of error.”29  In 1827, List authored Outlines of American Political 
Economy, a manifesto for economic nationalism.  Outlines consisted of twelve letters that List 
wrote to Charles Ingersoll of Philadelphia, who had been an instrumental participant at the 
Harrisburg Convention.  List had arrived in the United States in 1825, leaving his native 
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Kingdom of Wuerttemberg in voluntary exile after serving six months in prison for revolutionary 
activities, and was soon introduced to Ingersoll, Mathew Carey, Henry Clay and John Quincy 
Adams.  List readily assimilated into American society, settling in Pennsylvania and gaining 
citizenship by 1830.
30
 
     List challenged Adam Smith’s free trade doctrines.  He stated that “I confine my exertions … 
solely to the refutation of the theory of Adam Smith and Company, the fundamental errors of 
which have not yet been understood so clearly as they ought to be … unfortunately, the founders 
of this dangerous doctrine were men of great minds, whose talents enabled them to give their 
castles in the air the appearance of strong, well-founded buildings.”  List added that “I believe it 
to be the duty of the General Convention at Harrisburg, not only to support the interests of the 
wool growers and wool manufacturers, but to lay the axe to the root of the tree, by declaring the 
system of Adam Smith and Company to be erroneous – by declaring war against it on the part of 
the American System.”31  
     The German author argued that Smith’s major error consisted of a glaring omission in 
considering the nature of political economy.  Outlines identified three areas relating to principles 
of political economy: Individual Economy, National Economy, and the Economy of Mankind.  
He maintained that while Smith addressed the first and third items, he had ignored the issues of 
National Economy.  List noted that “If the whole globe were united by a union like the 24 states 
of North America, free trade would indeed be quite as natural and beneficial as it is now in the 
Union.”32  But free trade was not practical in a world of competing national interests.  List 
concluded that in a synergistic fashion, “national wealth is increased and secured by national 
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power, as national power is increased and secured by national wealth.  Its leading principles are 
therefore not only economical, but political too.”33       
     List also rejected Smith and Ricardo’s ideas of specialization by way of comparative 
advantage.  Instead, he advocated a well-diversified national economy in order to achieve 
national economic independence.  He noted that “so are power and wealth, in equal parts, 
benefitted by a harmonious state of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures within the limits of 
the country.”34 
     The key tool to achieve wise national economic policy was an active government.  List 
declared that “Government, sir, has not only the right, but it is its duty, to promote everything 
which may increase the wealth and power of the nation, if this object cannot be effected by 
individuals.” In the case of the United States, the national goal “has for its object to bring into 
harmony the three branches of industry, without which no national industry can attain 
perfection.”35  Outlines argued that protection was a necessary part of this strategy.   
     List’s forceful arguments, combined with the deepening political animosity between the 
Jackson and Adams-Clay factions, contributed to making the tariff issue, and particularly the 
case for protection, an explosive political issue in the 1828 election.  Andrew Jackson voted for 
the 1824 tariff as a Tennessee senator, but his followers hoped to completely neutralize the tariff 
issue, a potential asset to the Adams camp, by appearing to be pro-tariff to Northerners and anti-
tariff to Southerners.  The strategy, however, carried the risk of deepening regional antagonisms.  
South Carolina, in particular, was becoming a hotbed of tariff opposition.
36
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     This political strategy was spearheaded by Senator Martin Van Buren of New York, who 
became the driving force behind the Tariff of 1828.  Van Buren’s goal was to aid Jackson’s 
cause in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and Kentucky, states where nationalist 
sentiments ran strong.  The Committee on Manufactures drafted a bill calling for tariff increases 
on a large number of items, including hemp, flax and iron, benefitting Atlantic and Western 
states, but hurting New England shipbuilders.  It also called for increased duties on molasses, a 
detrimental move for New England merchants importing the raw material for rum production.
37
  
Further, the proposed bill intentionally omitted protection for New England wool producers, to 
further alienate Adams from his strongest political base.
38
  In the event that the bill failed, Van 
Buren calculated that Democrats would reap political rewards from the Atlantic manufacturing 
states for attempting to pass the bill.  If the bill passed, upsetting Jackson’s Southern supporters, 
he concluded that Jackson’s pro-slavery views would prevent any major political defections. 
     Van Buren’s delicate maneuvers exploited a subtle, but important, development in the 
American industrialization process.  Domestic manufactures had now become significant enough 
to cause ancillary raw material supplier industries to develop, which in turn required significant 
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investment capital.  Finished goods producers and raw material suppliers possessed economic 
objectives that potentially conflicted with one another in regards to trade policy.   
     An example of conflicting interests can be found in woolen goods.  The 1824 tariff raised the 
ad valorem rate for finished woolen imports from 25% to 33.33%.  That was good news for 
owners of wool manufactories.  However, it also increased the tariff on raw wool from 15% to 
30% ad valorem, which simultaneously raised the cost of raw materials.  In the end, woolen 
manufacturers failed to reap significant net benefits, as the increased protection was effectively 
offset by increased costs of raw materials.  Wool manufacturers attempted to remedy this 
situation with the failed 1827 tariff bill.  Complicating matters, Southerners opposed tariff 
increases for either finished goods or raw materials, since wool typically clothed slaves.
39
   
     Another example was iron.  The American iron industry, centered in Pennsylvania, by the 
1820s developed into two segments: iron producers and iron manufacturers.  Producers forged 
the raw material while manufacturers used the raw material to produce consumer goods.  
Historian Paul Paskoff noted that “for producers, no amount of protection from imported British 
iron could ever be too much protection; for the manufacturers, who purchased foreign as well as 
domestic pig and bar iron, rates in excess of pro forma levels were “an excessive burden.””40    
     Clay’s American System markedly differed with its intellectual predecessors on one key 
point.  Alexander Hamilton and the Dallas Report both counseled that protection should be 
limiting to manufacturing, and that raw material imports should be encouraged.  The old British 
mercantilist practices of the past had encouraged easy access to raw materials, but the American 
System included protection for domestic raw material producers.  Silas Wright addressed this 
nuance by commenting that “one leading principle … in the formation of the present bill, is that 
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it is not, and cannot be the policy of this government, or of this Congress, to turn the 
manufacturing capital of this country to the manufacture of a raw material of a foreign country, 
while we do or can produce the same material in sufficient quantities ourselves.”41   
     Congressional members recognized Van Buren’s intentions.  South Carolinian Thomas 
Cooper admitted that “I fear this tariff thing … by some strange mechanical contrivance or 
legerdemain, it will be changed into a machine for manufacturing Presidents, instead of 
broadcloths, and bed blankets.”42  Charles Wickliffe of Kentucky complained, “is it designed to 
keep this subject open for another season – for another Harrisburg politico Convention? … it will 
be recollected that the Magician’s wand – by which great political results were to be produced in 
Kentucky last Summer – was a hemp stalk … recollect, sir, the political complexion of this 
committee; remember the political complexion of a majority of this House.”43  South Carolina’s 
George McDuffie exclaimed, “I will not permit myself to believe that the Presidency of the 
United States will ever be bought and sold, by this system of bounties and prohibitions.  But I 
must say that there are certain quarters of this Union in which, if a candidate for the Presidency 
were to come forward with the Harrisburg tariff in his hand, nothing could resist his pretensions 
… the most immaculate patriot and profound statesman in the nation could hold no competition 
with him, if he should refuse to grant this new species of imperial donative.”44  
     Congress received the usual flood of memorials from special interest groups as it became 
apparent that a new tariff would be considered.  The Agricultural Society of South Carolina 
petitioned that “the protecting patronage … is in direct hostility to the principles of the Federal 
compact … as they did not force the Manufacturers into their speculations, if any of them are 
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embarrassed, they cannot submit to extricate them at such a vast expense.”45  Certain citizens 
from Hillsborough, Pennsylvania taking an opposite view, lobbied for greater protection, arguing 
that “we advocate … the soundness of the maxim of Adam Smith, that “whatever tends to 
diminish in any country, the number of artificers and manufacturers, tends to diminish the home 
market, the most important of all markets for the rude produce of the land, and thereby still 
further to discourage agriculture.”  And hence, it clearly follows, that it is in the interest of the 
agriculturalists to increase the number of artificers and manufacturers, in order “to increase the 
home market.””46     
     Political maneuvering began as soon the Twentieth Congress convened.  Although Adams 
supporter Rollin Mallary of Vermont chaired the Committee on Manufactures, its overall 
composition included five Jackson supporters and only two Adams men.
47
  One of Van Buren’s 
key lieutenants, first-time congressman Silas Wright of New York, convinced the House to 
authorize the Committee to gain testimony directly from the private-sector, the first time that had 
ever been done.
48
  The tactic gained valuable time for the Jackson coalition to gather facts that 
could exploit clashing economic interests between wool producers of New England and wool 
manufacturers of the Atlantic states.
49
  
     On March 4, 1828, the Committee on Manufactures presented its draft tariff to the House.  
Authored by Silas Wright, it proposed tariff increases for several significant imported goods.  
Importantly, it included a large increase to the duties on molasses, but failed to increase the tariff 
rate on woolens, both designed to alienate New England.
50
  Committee chair Mallary 
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immediately illustrated the tensions within New England when he condemned commercial 
interests by stating: “Manufacturers, we all know, are constantly accused of being governed by 
sordid and selfish views.  They are charged with hostility to all other classes of the people.   
They are held up to observation, as a body of iron handed monopolists … I maintain that the 
tendency of protecting domestic manufactures, is to prevent a most dangerous and powerful 
monopoly; a monied aristocracy that would be resistless, overwhelming.  I mean, distinctly, the 
mercantile interest on the seaboard.”51  New England manufacturers and merchants, often 
intertwined economically, could be at odds with each other.  Van Buren and Wright intended to 
play on these differences, to the political benefit of the Democrat faction. 
     The bill’s proponents relied on many of the familiar arguments from previous debates.  They 
pointed out the need to place the American political community ahead of individualism, the dual 
British example and economic threat, the symbiotic nature of the economic spheres, and the 
impracticality of free trade.  They also tried to downplay the growing sectional tensions 
associated with the tariff, insisting that protection benefitted the entire nation.   
     Nationalists stressed that the bill addressed the collective national good.  James Stevenson of 
Pennsylvania declared that “Material alterations never have – never will be made in the Tariff, 
without being painfully felt in some quarter; and all that justice and wisdom can do, is to make 
the nearest approach to doing the greatest general good, with the least individual injury.”52  
Thomas Moore of Kentucky noted that his constituents “were in favor of a tariff for the 
protection of American industry, whether devoted to manufacturing or agricultural pursuits, 
against unfair foreign competition.  We do not advocate a tariff, which would sacrifice one 
section of the Union, for the purpose of enriching another.”  He asserted that protection was a 
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short-term policy, and that “the tariff may produce manufacturing, but they must ultimately 
sustain themselves … the manufacturers of plain cottons are now on that footing, and other 
branches are fast approaching it.  The higher prices induced by the tariff will cease; we shall 
have a domestic supply of goods, as cheap as we could get them abroad; and the tariff will stand 
on our statute book a dead letter.”53   
     Some nationalists argued that certain industries represented vital national interests.  John 
Reed of Massachusetts argued for both the wool and woolens industries.  He was “convinced, 
that a large capital of $40,000,000, invested in woolen manufactures, in different parts of the 
United States, was in great peril … if lost, it must be a great national loss.”  He pleaded that “the 
“wool and woolens” farmers and manufacturers, present a national interest, of so great extent and 
importance, that it commands our attention and regard.”  Reed maintained that “if an additional 
duty should enhance the price, as it undoubtedly will, (at least for a season) my constituents must 
bear the burden, as truly as inhabitants south of the Potomac.  For the public good, I shall 
consent, and will hope that my constituents will view the subject as I do, and be satisfied.”54  
James Strong of New York added that “the ruinous condition of our woolen manufactories is not 
owing to domestic competition, but almost altogether to foreign causes.  Hence there is no power 
but Congress that can interpose between us and other nations.”55   
     Proponents also asserted that the nation’s goals could only be achieved through an active 
national government.  Pennsylvania’s Samuel Anderson stated “that we possess more abundant 
resources than any other People on earth … How are we to render these resources available?  I 
answer, by an extension of the American System of protection – by an efficient tariff.  By giving 
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adequate protection to domestic manufactures.  By providing a home market for our raw 
materials; and by giving employment to the surplus labor and capital of the country.”56  
     Nationalists were motivated to support the American System and a high tariff partly out of a 
mixture of both admiration for, and fear of, Great Britain.  They argued that the United States 
should emulate the British example.  Delaware’s Kensey Johns pointed out that “this system of 
protection has become the policy of all other nations, and why should we reject it?  Has not 
England by legislation afforded important advantages, to her manufacturers, and shall we neglect 
and leave ours to contend on unequal terms?  To what cause except that of protection can we 
attribute the abundance, excellence, and cheapness of British manufactures?”  He concluded that 
domestic “manufacturing establishments, embracing a large and considerable amount of 
American capital, demand, and are entitled to our peculiar care and attention.”57 
     The specter of British industrial superiority still loomed in 1828.  Andrew Stewart of 
Pennsylvania asked “Was nothing required to counteract the effects of the premiums and 
bounties which were paid by the government of Great Britain to their exporters?  Nothing 
required to sustain the infant and rising institutions of our own country, struggling for existence 
against the immense capital, the skill, the experience, the combined power of the old and long 
established institutions of Great Britain, exerting every nerve to strangle them in the cradle? …   
We have millions, and hundreds of millions, at stake.  If these institutions go down for the want 
of protection, who will again be found willing to risk his capital in so hazardous an enterprise?”58  
New York’s James Strong voiced similar concerns, stating that “one of the controlling causes of 
the embarrassment to our manufactures of woolens is the unequal competition of European with 
American capital.  … We have probably 40,000,000 of dollars in the woolen business, invested 
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in land, buildings, and machinery; and England, France, and Germany, have, I suppose, at least 
500,000,000 of dollars invested in the same business.”  Strong concluded that “England is our 
greatest competitor; and the existence of her power essentially depends upon the spindle and the 
anvil.  Who, then, can doubt that she would sacrifice much, in order to command a market like 
ours, in which the whole annual consumption of woolens, exclusive of household manufactures, 
is not less than twenty or twenty-five millions of dollars?  The prostration of our woolen 
factories would give her this market.”59 
     American nationalists, fearing Britain’s economic and military power, concluded that the only 
antidote was an economically self-sufficient United States.  Once again, they argued for a 
permanent form of protection.  Daniel Barnard of New York explained that the American System 
led to a self-sufficient United States.  He asked, “How, then, are manufactures to be encouraged?  
I answer, by giving them a monopoly of the home market.  Yes, sir, it must be a monopoly … the 
object sought for, is the building up of our own manufactures – such as the country is prepared to 
enter upon as a regular and permanent business.  This, I contend, cannot be effected without an 
eventual monopoly of the domestic market … effectual protection always must amount to virtual 
prohibition.”60  Representative Chauncey Forward, of Pennsylvania reasoned that, at a minimum, 
reciprocity should dictate trade policy.  He concluded that “if we cannot have free trade in its 
unlimited sense, let us approximate it as nearly as circumstances permit, by placing our 
commerce on a footing equal to that of foreign nations.  If they exclude our agricultural products, 
from their markets, why not meet them on equal terms, by an equivalent exclusion?”61 
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     Tariff advocates also stressed that promoting a certain economic sphere provided residual 
benefits to the other spheres.  However, there was disagreement over which sphere should 
receive special consideration.  New York’s Barnard commented that manufactures benefitted 
commerce when he stated that “Manufactures have kept very exact pace with civilization.  And 
the history of commerce itself is little else than the history of the progress of manufactures … 
The prosperity of English commerce is dated from the encouragement which was given to the 
English manufactures.”62  Representative John Barney of Maryland, on the other hand, reminded 
the House that “Commerce is the twin sister of agriculture, the handmaid of manufactures.  Not a 
vessel floats the ocean, but is freighted with the produce of a fertile soil, the labors and the 
industry of the loom.”  He noted that with “iron, canvas, and hemp … and wood … being three-
fifths of the whole cost” of a new ship, the tariff created significant hardship for the American 
maritime industry.  Barney asked, “shall we jeopard this great and important interest by an 
experiment to ascertain whether we cannot force the successful cultivation of articles already 
amply protected by duties, as well as the enormous disproportion between the price of the 
foreign and domestic product?”63    
     Finally, pro-tariff forces asserted that free trade was simply not practical.  Pennsylvania’s 
Samuel Anderson recounted that “While the wars of Europe lasted, and the tide of our 
agricultural and commercial prosperity continued to flow, the doctrine of “free trade,” as might 
be reasonably expected, became popular.  Many eminent statesmen, who have since seen and 
acknowledged the fantasy of the doctrine, were then its zealous advocates.  No one apprehended 
the calamities that have since befallen us.”64  Taking a swipe at free trade ideas, and particularly 
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those of Smith and Ricardo, Delaware’s Kensey Johns inquired, “Can we be persuaded to place 
any confidence in the delusive declarations of England; or have faith in that profession which is 
contradicted by practice?”65    
     Rollin Mallary tried to assuage sectional tensions by arguing that all regions of the nation 
were potential future beneficiaries within the American System.  Though he acknowledged that 
New England and the Atlantic states were the first to heavily invest in manufactures, he 
maintained that “Establishments must be placed in the vicinity of the fuel they require. … in this 
country water power is abundant almost everywhere. … there is scarcely a portion of the Middle 
and Western and Southern States which have not equal or superior advantages to the North and 
East.”66   
      The anti-tariff forces also resorted to familiar themes in arguing against the bill.  They 
pointed out that the protective system improperly appropriated wealth from certain citizens to 
others.  Free traders expressed fear that high tariffs would create excessive concentrations of 
economic wealth, posing a great threat to American republicanism.  Finally, they argued that the 
empirical evidence did not sustain arguments that protection worked.  Representative Churchill 
Cambreleng of New York forcefully presented arguments on all of these grounds. 
     The tariff’s redistributive nature particularly upset opponents.  John Anderson of Maine 
maintained that he was “not willing to build up one class on the ruins of another.  Before we go 
farther in taxing this nation for the benefit of a limited number of individuals, we ought to 
inquire, seriously inquire, where we are to stop in this system of progressive protection … I 
believe the tariff of 1824, if its provisions were fairly carried into execution, will give all of the 
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protection the manufacturing interests of this country ought, at this time, to receive.”67 
Cambreleng joined, asserting that “I go against this whole American System, no matter where 
its’ supposed benefits are to be realized – I will not vote to tax the laborer for the benefit of the 
capitalist – for that is the beginning and the end of the American System.”68    
     Opponents pointed out that the manufacturing sphere was receiving exclusive economic 
privileges.  Nathaniel Claiborne of Virginia charged that such a course ran contrary to the natural 
order, and that the economy, left to its own devices, would industrialize in due time.  He insisted, 
“Let the people encourage manufactures as much as they please – as circumstances show they 
are necessary – manufactures are the creatures of necessity – the South, the North, East, and 
West will betake to them when indispensible.  What I complain of, is this, that our laws oppress 
other branches of industry to sustain them.”  Claiborne concluded that the American System 
created a moral hazard, because it “entices people to embark in manufacturing establishments, 
with the impression that the government will sustain them at all events.”69 
     Critics charged that special economic interests were lobbying Congress for protection to 
enrich their wealth.   Churchill Cambreleng charged that the American System was guided by 
personal political ambitions, stating that prior to 1812 “the interests of the country were not 
sacrificed to gratify the insatiate appetite of private interests, nor were our measures founded on 
its selfish suggestions.  One of the worst consequences resulting from this American system is, 
that however pure and respectable the witnesses may be, the evidence must be from its very 
nature fallacious and deceptive.  However honest they may be, the controlling influence of 
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private interest will unconsciously give a colouring to their testimony which it never would have 
received from the unerring pencil of truth.”70    
     The shift towards a “British” system of protection frightened free traders, because it logically 
would create a system of influence peddling and social ills.  Cambreleng recounted that “the 
errors of Parliament and the experiences of Great Britain are worthy our consideration.  If this 
system ever becomes the established policy of our country, it will inevitably perpetuate itself, 
and must have a tendency to accelerate that change in the condition of our population and 
character of our government, which even the most sanguine among us cannot but apprehend at 
some period, however remote.”71  Emulating Britain would import its political corruption and 
social problems.      
     Free traders suggested that empirical evidence demonstrated the failure of past tariff policy.  
Cambreleng asked “How has it affected the growth and condition of our woolen manufacture?  
Previous to 1824 that branch of industry had entirely recovered from the shock of returning from 
war to peace, and was moving on in steady prosperity … under our ancient policy, as no revenue 
was required, it would not have been disturbed in 1824 – but, sir, the American System was the 
order of the day, and its leading advocate was a candidate for the Presidency.  The tariff was 
patronized and carried through the House … with a zeal and ability corresponding to the 
magnitude of the prize. … from that measure, the woolen manufacture suffered those serious 
injuries.”72     
     Tariff opponents argued that the American economy was performing well and that additional 
protection was not necessary.  Cambreleng invited his fellow representatives to “take the 
testimony of Mr. Marshall, a cotton manufacturer.  This gentleman is of great respectability, 
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from Manchester, in England.  He was for thirty years a manufacturer in Manchester, left there 
only in August last, and is now interested in four establishments in one State … One would 
suppose, sir, that a gentleman of Mr. Marshall’s intelligence would not have transferred his 
industry from his native land to our country, if it had yielded him less profit here than in 
England.”73 
     The impact of industrialization also seeped into the debates.  Lawmakers took note of 
emerging technologies such as railroads.  John Barney of Maryland questioned whether the 
proposed tariff rate on iron might dissuade railroad construction.  He noted that “a company was 
recently established in France to make a railroad from Havre de Grace, its commercial 
emporium, for cotton, tobacco, rice, and other bulky articles, to Paris, in the vicinity of which are 
many large manufactories.  The experiment was in a successful train, when the duties on iron 
presented insuperable objections, and, the Government refusing to diminish them, the project 
was abandoned.  May we not apprehend similar results, and thus check be given to what now 
promises to unfold a new era in the prosperity of our country?”74  Barney noted that railroads 
were dotting the American landscape, mentioning that railroads were already present in South 
Carolina, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.  These locations 
stretched the length of the Atlantic seaboard, including two states whose economies were largely 
slave-based.
75
 
     Van Buren’s efforts to pit New England economic interest groups against one another proved 
effective.  As he intended, the House bill generated large excitements over the duties on wool, 
woolens, and molasses.  Massachusetts congressman John Davis, contrasted the bill with 
Harrisburg, noted that “the Harrisburg Convention attracted wool-growers and manufactures 
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from most of the United States … for the purpose of examining into the condition of these 
important interests, and devising the most suitable means for their relief … it is now discovered 
that the interests of the wool grower are like to suffer from the importation of an article which is 
not produced in the country … the manufacturer does not desire it – the wool grower does not 
ask for it.”76  Fellow Bay State Representative Isaac Bates attacked the proposed woolen duty 
since it impacted the cost of slave clothing, which typically featured coarse brand imports.  Bates 
noted that American sheep farmers only produced higher quality wool, and consequently “we 
have no such wool … as that used in the manufacture of these coarse cloths … the manufacturers 
say there is none.  The wool growers say there is none.”77  Bates could not reconcile a tariff duty 
diametrically opposite of Dallas Report principles from just twelve years before.       
     The wool and woolen duties were not likely to encourage American manufacturers to produce 
coarser woolens, either.  Peleg Sprague scoffed at suggestions that American farmers would 
grow lower-quality brands of coarse wool.  He lamented, “But does it benefit the farmer?  Sir, it 
would be preposterous – it would be an insult to ask him to raise such wool … would we keep 
them instead of the present flocks, when the expense would be equal, and the fleeces could be 
worth only one half or one third as much?  But how could our farmers raise such wool – if wool 
it is to be called?  Sir, I know not, unless they borrow from our neighbors of Nova Scotia herds 
of Newfoundland dogs, to substitute for their flocks of Merinos.”78  
     People familiar with the House proceedings anticipated a close vote.  Henry Clay admitted 
misgivings a March 21 letter when he stated “the House is now engaged in the discussion of the 
Tariff bill, reported by the Committee of Manufactures, which nobody believes has the least 
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prospect of passing in that shape.”79  However, on April 22, 1828, after seven weeks of debate, 
the House passed the Tariff of 1828 by a vote of 105 to 94.
80
  An even closer battle was expected 
in the Senate, where the bills of 1820 and 1827 had previously met rejection.   
     The Senate began deliberations two weeks later on May 5, 1828, and spent only eight days 
considering the new legislation.
81
  The arguments put forward by both pro and anti-tariff senators 
closely mirrored those in the House.  In particular, tariff proponents argued for special economic 
consideration for constituent interest groups while opponents criticized these proposals because 
they conferred special privileges at the expense of others. 
     An example of “economic interests” occurred when Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri 
motioned to raise the duty on molasses to encourage western distilling of whiskey.  He remarked 
that “whiskey was the healthiest liquor that was drank, as men were known who had been drunk 
upon it for forty or fifty years, while rum finished its victims in eight or ten.”  Senator John 
Chandler of Maine, speaking on behalf of competing New England merchants, replied that 
Benton’s rationale “was the reason why he would vote against the duty, as he was in favour of 
that liquor which would soonest dispatch the drunkard.”82     
     Senators representing commercial interests criticized the bill, arguing that it was openly 
hostile to their economic sphere.  Albion Parris of Maine reasoned that “no nation will find trade 
advantageous with us, unless we take their products.  We cannot carry on trade to advantage with 
others, unless they will take ours … is it wise to embarrass a trade that gives so much 
employment to our people, so much revenue to the Treasury?”83  He described the impact of the 
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tariff on the capital items required in the shipbuilding industry, complaining that “of the whole 
tonnage of the country, from one-eighth to one-tenth, is annually lost or rendered unfit for 
employment, either by decay or marine casualties: and that “two of the most expensive articles 
that enter into the construction of a ship, are hemp and iron.  It is estimated by those who are 
well acquainted with the business, that of the whole cost, one-third, at least, is in hemp, iron, and 
duck.”84   
     The commercial-based senators viewed the 1828 bill as a direct attack by manufacturing 
interests upon their sphere.  Albion Parris queried “Who originated the Convention at 
Harrisburg, to which this measure is to be directly traced, and which, in the course of this debate, 
has been eulogized as “the most enlightened and intelligent body that were ever assembled in 
this country? … No sir; it was the “Pennsylvania Society for the promotion of Manufactures and 
Mechanic Arts.” … Maine … had no representation in the Harrisburg Convention.  She has not 
petitioned for, but has remonstrated against, any change in the existing tariff.”85  Parris asserted 
that the tariff bill represented a blatant attempt by manufacturers to grab wealth.  He complained 
that “we have been told this is to be an equal, a “whole tariff;” that it is a great system for the 
benefit of the whole; and whatever of burthen may be involved in it, must be borne equally by 
all. … I deny peremptorily that there is anything of equality in the bill under discussion.”86     
     Southern agricultural interests echoed the criticisms that New England commercial interests 
levied against manufactures.  South Carolina’s George McDuffie agreed that the tariff amounted 
to economic redistribution.  He argued that “it is by this time apparent, that prohibitory duties, 
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even on those branches of manufacture, for which we have the greatest of facilities, and in which 
we have acquired the most skill, amount to an enormous and permanent tax upon the great mass 
of the community, for the benefit of a very small group of capitalists.”  He regarded “as one of 
the most daring attempts at imposture to be found in the history of any age … to allege that 
manufactures can be made in this country as cheap as they can be imported from Great Britain, at 
the very moment that it is asserted, by the same persons, that a duty of 37 ½ percent is utterly 
insufficient to protect the domestic manufacturer from absolute ruin.”87    
     Free trade advocates stressed that protectionism harmed the social well-being of the nation, 
and threatened to create an economic aristocracy.  John Rowan of Kentucky argued that “There 
is but one American System, and that is delineated in the State and Federal Constitutions.  It is 
the system of equal rights and privileges secured by the representative principle – a system, 
which, instead of subjecting the proceeds of the labor of some to taxation, in the view to enrich 
others, secures to all the proceeds of their labor – exempts all from taxation, except for the 
support of the protecting power of the government.”  Rowan characterized the tariff bill “as a 
system of bounties, for the encouragement of certain classes of industry” which, unfortunately, 
created “a correspondent depression upon other classes.”  He concluded that “manufactures 
produced wealth, and wealth unequally distributed, as an inevitable consequence, held by few, 
produced aristocracy, and aristocracy sapped the foundation of free institutions … inordinate 
protection to manufactures [is] dangerous to the best interests of the country.”88   
     Both protectionists and free traders occasionally exaggerated or misrepresented facts to 
further their cause.  Hemp was one example.  New England shipbuilders used foreign water 
rotted hemp, in preference to American dew rotted hemp.  James Buchanan considered 
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protection for American hemp absolutely necessary.  He declared “It has now been clearly 
ascertained, from the highest authority, that American water-rotted hemp is fully equal, if not 
superior, to that of Russia.”  Interestingly, Buchanan was not troubled by the fact that no water-
rotting hemp industry existed in the United States.  He rationalized, saying, “why is there no 
American water-rotted hemp in the market? … Our farmers have not hitherto been able to 
dispose of it at the same market price which Russia hemp has borne in the market.  Besides, they 
require some encouragement to induce them to abandon their ancient method of dew-rotting, and 
to take on water-rotting.”89  John Davis countered Buchanan, saying that “hemp was raised in 
Massachusetts many years ago.  Unless I am mistaken, that State once offered a bounty for its 
encouragement.  It was prepared in the best manner, by water-rotting, and it sold as high as 
Russia hemp.  But people disliked the business, and preferred other kinds of farming … The 
business would too much expose the health of the inhabitants.  Twenty tons of hemp put into a 
pond of stagnant water, would produce such a miasma, as to spread pestilence for miles about 
it.”90       
      The Senate debates increasingly featured regional overtones, pitting Northern manufacturing 
interests against Southern agriculture.  Robert Hayne charged the Pennsylvania manufacturing 
lobby with creating an uneven bargain.  He asked any of his fellow congressmen “to turn to the 
act of 1824, and put his finger on one single item of the bill which has benefitted the South? … 
There is not a provision that holds out a shadow of benefit to us, whilst Pennsylvania is to reap 
four millions from its operations.”  The senator hinted that the tariff issue placed the nation in 
political peril, stating “that unless we come back to the sound principles of the country, which 
have so long been abandoned, the harmony, the peace, and the prosperity of the Union are 
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endangered … I say that this system has created discordant feelings, strife, jealousy, and heart-
burnings, which never ought to exist between the different sections of the same country.”91    
     The Senate considered a number of amendments to satisfy enough senators to support the bill.  
A key amendment placed the duty on woolens at an ad valorem rate of 45%, instead of the 
House version, which had established a 40% ad valorem rate with minimum values set at 50 cent 
intervals.
92
  On Tuesday, May 13, 1828, the Senate finally cast its votes on the amended bill, and 
passed The Tariff of 1828 by a vote of 26 to 21.
93
  Daniel Webster provided a crucial vote in 
support of the bill.  As historian Frank Taussig pointed out, “political motives, or as Webster put 
it, “other paramount considerations,” caused them [New Englanders] to swallow the bill.  They 
were afraid to reject it, for fear of the effect in the approaching campaign and election.”94       
     The overall votes in the House and Senate, absent a functioning two-party system, were 
predominantly influenced by geography.  Table 7.2 breaks down the roll call vote:   
Table 7.2. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1828 by Region40 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)     16      23    6    5 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      56      6    8    0 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)          4    20      0    4 
South   (GA, NC, SC)          0    27    0        6 
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)     17         0    6    0 
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MO, MS, TN)   12    17    6    6 
Totals                 105     93   26  21 
Source: 5 Reg. Deb. 786 (1828), 6 Reg. Deb. 2471-2472 (1828); note that although the Register 
reports the House roll call vote as 105 to 94, only 93 nay votes are recorded.   
 
                                                 
91
 5 Reg. Deb. 746 (1828). 
92
 Taussig, Tariff History, 93-93, 100; the effect of the House version was to potentially place very heavy tariff 
levels on lower priced woolen goods, which potentially created a much higher effective rate.  For example, woolen 
imports costing $1.01per square yard would be subject to a valuation at $1.50.  Thus, a duty of 60 cents would be 
placed on a good valued at $1.01.  The end effect was a regressive tax.  As higher quality goods were imported, 
which Great Britain produced, the true impact of the protection came closer to 40%.  Thus, the Senate version 
appealed more to woolen manufacturers.  
93
 5 Reg. Deb. 786 (1828). 
94
 Taussig, Tariff History, 101. 
252 
 
 
 
The Atlantic and Northwest heavily supported the bill, while the Chesapeake and South opposed 
it with equal vigor.  The key to the bill’s passage was the fact that both New England and the 
Southwest regions closely split their votes in both chambers.  Local economic interests played a 
major role in determining the outcome.  In the Southwest, Louisiana sugar, Kentucky hemp, and 
Missouri lead all benefitted from the bill, and in New England, the woolens lobby was 
sufficiently satisfied with the Senate amendment to also provide support.     
     The Tariff of 1828 was widely criticized.  Maine’s Peleg Sprague observed that “the bill 
extends no relief to the manufacturer … as to coarse fabrics, those which are most important, it is 
worse than the existing law … this explains to us why it is that those very manufacturers and 
their agents, who poured in upon the House petitions beseeching that we should sustain their 
sinking establishments, now come here with remonstrances conjuring us to save them from the 
tender mercies of this measure.”  He noted that even friends of protectionism found the 
legislation objectionable, saying that “it shows us, too, why the bill is condemned by the fast 
friends of domestic manufactures, and among many others, by those champions of the American 
System, the veteran Niles and Carey.”95    
     The data in tables 7.3 and 7.4 analyze the House and Senate votes by region and factional 
loyalty and demonstrate the challenges that Van Buren faced in managing his tariff bill strategy.  
In the House, the Atlantic, Chesapeake, South, Northwest, and Southwest regions voted in 
predictable fashion.  The Atlantic region approved of the tariff because of its increased 
protection for iron and steel and the Northwest enjoyed the benefits of increased protection for 
grains and hemp.  The Chesapeake and South predominantly opposed the bill because they felt 
that the tariff benefitted other regions at their expense due to higher consumer prices, particularly 
from increased tariffs on wool and woolens.  The Southwest’s vote bifurcated because Clay’s 
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native Kentucky, which benefitted from increased grain and hemp duties, unanimously supported 
the bill while all other states in the region voted against. 
     New England was the only region exhibiting conflicted stances on the tariff.  The Jackson 
men, a distinct minority, voted against the measure 3 to 1.  The much larger Adams faction voted 
against the measure by a vote of 20 to 15.  In contrast with previous episodes, most of the New 
England state delegations cast split votes rather than blocs, suggesting that the economic interests 
of factory owners (manufactures) and merchants (commerce) conflicted with one another.  
Landlocked Vermont cast all five of its votes for the tariff and manufactures, while coastal 
Maine cast all seven of its votes for commerce and against the bill.  The other four states cast 
split votes, varying from favorable Connecticut (4-2) and New Hampshire (4-2) to split Rhode 
Island (1-1), to objecting Massachusetts (2-11).  
Table 7.3. House Ratification Vote – The Tariff of 1828 by Region and Political Faction41 
             Adams    Adams    Jackson    Jackson  
Party             Ayes    Nays     Ayes     Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)    15    20       1       3      
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)         26      0     30       6   
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)            4      7       0     13 
South   (GA, NC, SC)            0      4       0     23 
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)          13      0       4        0 
Southwest (AL,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)    4       3       8     14   
Totals             62    34     43     59   
Source: 6 Reg. Deb. 2471-2472 (1828); note that although the Register reports the House roll 
call vote as 105 to 94, only 93 nay votes are recorded.   
 
     Van Buren’s political plan anticipated that the bill would pass in the House, but die in the 
Senate, as had happened in 1820.
96
  He expected New England senators to vote against the bill, 
dooming its chances for passage.  However, the most influential New England senator, Daniel 
Webster, enjoyed very close ties with the Boston Associates, the merchant group who 
commenced large-scale New England industrialization at Waltham just a decade before.  In 
                                                 
96
 Taussig, Tariff History, 98-99. 
254 
 
 
 
1816, as a House member, he had not voted despite actively participating in the debate against 
the tariff, perhaps the result of torn loyalties between his commercial and manufacturing 
constituents.  In 1824 he delivered an eloquent speech on behalf of Massachusetts merchants, 
supporting free trade principles.
97
 
     The logical conclusion, based upon his past record, was that Webster would vote against the 
tariff, even though he had recently allied himself politically with Clay and Adams.  Pro-
administration senators were uncertain about Webster’s stance.  Senator Jesse Thomas of Illinois, 
an Adams man, beseeched the president to encourage Webster to cast an “aye” vote.98  Webster 
faced a difficult decision because the nature of his constituency was rapidly changing.  Boston 
merchants, who had long sponsored him, were now also deeply invested in manufactures.  As an 
example, Waltham had been capitalized with Boston Associates equity in the amount of 
$300,000, and the same investors began the Appleton Company in 1828 with an astonishing 
equity investment of $1,000,000.
99
  
     There were preliminary signs that Webster was altering his stance on the tariff.  James 
Buchanan stated during the House debates that Webster was an advocate of the American 
System, even while simultaneously acknowledging that he had spoken out in favor of free trade 
as recently as 1824.
100
  The majority of Webster’s rhetoric in 1828 was against the bill, but at the 
same time he had hedged his bets by declaring that the Tariff of 1824 had initiated an informal 
contract between the federal government and the manufactures sphere.  
     Webster voted for the Tariff of 1828, undoubtedly influenced by the economic situation in 
Massachusetts.  He was persuaded by many of his most important constituents, notable Boston 
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Associates member Abbott Lawrence, who decided that the Senate amendment on woolens 
positively served the interests of the that industry.  In doing so, Webster was clearly motivated 
by the economic self-interests of his region.  The vote also marked Webster’s permanent 
conversion from a free trade position to a nationalist one.
101
  
     Once committed to protection, Webster became an ardent proponent.  His new argument was 
now that the Tariff of 1824 amounted to a covenant between the nation and manufacturers.  He 
declared that “after this final declaration [in 1824] – this solemn promulgation of the policy of 
the Government, I again ask, what was she [New England] to do?  … She not only saw this 
herself, but had, all along, foreseen that if the system of protecting manufactures should be 
adopted, she must go largely with them.”102  In response to Southern criticisms, he lashed out 
that “this is one of the main “abominations of the bill” … Under the prospect of advantage held 
out by the law of 1824, men have ventured their fortunes and their means of subsistence for 
themselves and families, in woolen manufactures.  They have ventured investments in objects 
requiring a large out-lay of capital … events have occurred blighting their prospects and 
withering their hopes … they come here asking for relief against an unforeseen occurrence … 
they are told that what they ask for is an abomination!”103  
     Table 7.4 summarizes the Senate roll call vote by region and political faction.  While Adams 
supporters heavily favored the tariff, the Jackson faction generally split along regional lines. The 
voting patterns were sometimes complicated by the fact that some legislators, in the absence of 
party, felt compelled to follow the wishes of their native state governments.  Kentucky’s John 
Rowan serves as an example.  He offered a passionate indictment of protection during the 
debates, but eventually voted for the bill.  Rowan explained that “as the organ of the State of 
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Kentucky, he felt himself bound to surrender his individual opinion, and express the opinion of 
his State.”104   
Table 7.4. Senate Ratification Vote – The Tariff of 1828 by Region and Political Faction42 
             Adams    Adams    Jackson    Jackson  
Party             Ayes    Nays     Ayes     Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)    6     2     0     3   
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)         3     0     5     0  
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)          0     1     0     3 
South   (GA, NC, SC)          0     0     0     6   
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)          5     0     1     0 
Southwest (AL,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)  2     1     4     5   
Totals           16     4   10   17   
Source: 5 Reg. Deb. 786 (1828),  
 
The voting patterns in 1828 were strikingly similar to 1824.  Table 7.5 presents a side by side 
comparison of the two respective roll calls, and shows that latter bill received slightly greater 
support:  
Table 7.5. A Regional Comparison of the 1824 and 1828 Tariff Roll Call Margins43 
      1824  1828  Net   
Region  States      Vote  Votes  Change           
House of Representatives: 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)     15-23    16-23  +1  
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      57-  9    56-  6  +2 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)          4-27      4-20  +7 
South   (GA, NC, SC)          0-29      0-27  +2 
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)     17-  0       17-  0    0 
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MO, MS, TN)   14-14    12-17  -5   
Totals                 107-102 105-93  +7   
Senate: 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)       9-  3      6-  5  -5   
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)        5-  3      8-  0  +6   
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)          0-  3      0-  4  -1   
South   (GA, NC, SC)          0-  6      0-  6    0   
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)       5-  0         6-  0  +1   
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MO, MS, TN)     6-  6      6-  6    0  
Totals                   25-21    26-21  +1   
Source: 5 Reg. Deb. 786 (1828), 6 Reg. Deb. 2471-2472 (1828), 41 Annals of Cong. 743-744 
(1824), 42 Annals of Cong. 2429-2430 (1824).   
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     The 1828 tally demonstrated that trade policy remained highly contentious, with deep fissures 
along sectional lines.  The Atlantic and Northwest regions remained deeply committed to 
protectionism, while the Chesapeake and Southern regions remained deeply opposed.  New 
England was torn between the competing interests of a developing manufacturing sector and its 
long-standing commercial interests.  In the Southwest, proponents of agricultural protection for 
hemp and sugar, contributed to split regional views on trade policy.    
     Since the 1824 and 1828 votes were similar, why was the negative response to the “Tariff of 
Abominations” so much more severe?  Two points merit consideration.  First, the nature of 
American trade policy dramatically changed in just twelve years since passage of the Dallas 
Tariff.  Political scientist James H. Read, describing John Calhoun’s emerging views during this 
period, state that Calhoun’s shift from nationalism to opposition on the tariff to the tariff was 
prompted because trade policy “changed in magnitude and purpose between 1816 and 1828 … 
he believed that the 1816 tariff was motivated by reciprocal regard for the interests of all sections 
of the country.  The later tariffs were, he insisted, deliberately intended to benefit one section of 
the country at the expense of another”105  Second, although the roll call votes clearly show that 
the tariff bill was almost universally rejected in the South, only South Carolina was willing to 
eventually agitate outside of the normal legislative process.    
     Daniel Webster best summed up the Tariff of 1828, remarking that “this subject is surrounded 
with embarrassments, on all sides.”  He explained that the unfortunate situation resulted from a 
“diversity of interest … in different parts of the country.”  Webster described the process and 
impact of “interest” in shaping the “Tariff of Abominations:”106  
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Those who intend to oppose this bill, under all circumstances, and in all or any 
forms, care not how objectionable it now is, or how bad it may be made.  Others, 
finding their own leading objects satisfactorily secured by it, naturally enough 
press forward, without staying to consider, deliberately, how injuriously other 
interests may be affected.  All these causes create embarrassments, and inspire 
just fears, that a wise and useful result is hardly to be expected. 
107
  
  
     The 1828 tariff aggravated regional animosities tracing back to the Philadelphia Convention 
and deepened by the Missouri Crisis in 1820.  Representative James Hamilton of South Carolina 
intimated that the tariff issue tugged at the very bonds of Union.  He concluded that “we have at 
length reached a crisis from which, in surveying the intolerable evils of the past, they are in no 
way mitigated by the prospects of the future.  To this system, called American, there seems 
neither suspension nor limit.  The procurement of one exaction wrung from the consumers of the 
country, only justifies a fresh application, until our whole foreign trade is threatened with utter 
ruin by the steady march of a bigoted spirit of monopoly.”  Hamilton warned that South Carolina 
was debating whether “we can afford to belong to a confederacy in which severe restrictions, 
tending to an ultimate prohibition of foreign commerce, is its established policy?  That, whatever 
be our religious veneration for this Union, you are compelling us to ask ourselves, when you 
strike at our bread, to which we owe the highest obligation, the law of God, the law of nature, the 
law of necessity, or to that of artificial and political association?”108  
     Hamilton tried to legitimize his protest.  He asked, “Is this treason, sir?  I hope not.  I do not 
design it as a bare threat. … It is, moreover, treason, sir, to tell you that there is a condition of 
public feeling throughout the southern part of this confederacy, which no prudent man will treat 
with contempt, and no man who loves his country will not desire to see allayed?”  He extended  
both a figurative olive branch and a stick when he stated: “I trust, sir, that this cup may pass from 
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us: That in our firmness and enlightened patience – not base submission – and in your returning 
sense of justice, we shall find our remedy and relief … but, if an adverse destiny should be ours 
… if we are doomed under a tyrannous legislation, to be reduced, in effect, again, to a condition 
of colonial vassalage … you may rely on one thing – that, in a juncture so full of difficulty, 
South Carolina will be found on the side of … a free and sovereign people.”109      
     In the final measure, the Jacksonian Democrats desired a dramatic political victory, which 
they achieved when Andrew Jackson won the presidency in 1828.  In doing so, they politicized 
the tariff issue, but their strategy did not supersede the foundational ideas and interests 
characterizing previous debates.  Instead, the new political element simply added further 
complexities to the trade policy issue.       
A War of Words: Calhoun, Niles, Webster and Hayne 
     The Tariff of 1828 ignited a burst of political activity beginning soon after its passage.  John 
Calhoun quickly authored an anonymous critique of the new law, charging that it was 
unconstitutional.  In 1830, Daniel Webster and Robert Hayne engaged in a sharp exchange over 
the tariff law and its relation to the federal compact.   
     Vice President John C. Calhoun witnessed the Tariff of 1828 from his chair as Senate 
President.  Calhoun appears to have known Van Buren’s plans for the tariff issue 1828, and felt 
betrayed when the legislation actually passed.  While the South Carolina congressional 
delegation fumed over the Tariff of Abominations, Calhoun chose to temporarily stay out of the 
developing fray.
110
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     Calhoun’s native South Carolina faced economic challenges throughout the 1820s.  The great 
staple crop of cotton was the bulwark of the state economy and in 1825 prices averaged 21 cents 
per pound, and briefly peaked at 29.5 cents per pound at one point.  Unfortunately, increased 
supply through added planting brought prices down, and cotton prices precipitously fell to 12 
cents in 1826 and slightly less than 9 cents per pound in 1827.  South Carolinians such as 
Thomas Cooper and Robert Turnbull blamed the tariff for their state’s woes.  In 1827, the South 
Carolina legislature passed a resolution condemning any protective tariff as unconstitutional.  
When the Tariff of 1828 passed, separate meetings of citizens in the Colleton, Edgefield, and 
Abbeville districts protested the tariff’s passage.111  
     Calhoun spent the latter part of 1828 quietly researching and drafting what would become 
known as the South Carolina Exposition and Protest, anonymously published in December.  The 
Exposition primarily concerned itself with the United States Constitution.  Although its preamble 
stated “that it is expedient to protest against the unconstitutionality and oppressive operation of 
the system of protecting duties,” the report didn’t specifically address the economic impact of the 
tariff.  Nor did it call for nullification, even though it endorsed the “right” to do so.112  Historian 
Gerald Capers, no admirer of Calhoun, acknowledged that “rather than being a conscious 
justification for secession, it was avowedly an attempt to preserve the Union.”113      
     Calhoun’s case against the recent bill was built on Old Republican grounds.  He argued that 
“the whole system of legislation imposing duties on imports, - not for revenue, but the protection 
of one branch of industry at the expense of others, - is unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive, 
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and calculated to corrupt the public virtue and destroy the liberty of the country.”  The 
Exposition noted that “The Constitution grants to Congress the power of imposing a duty on 
imports for revenue, which power is abused by being converted into an instrument of rearing up 
the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another.”114   
     The Exposition described the tariff controversy as a clash of regional economic interests, 
brought about by the unequal expansion of industry.  Calhoun wrote “So partial are the effects of 
the system, that its burdens are exclusively on one side and its benefits on the other.  It imposes 
on the agricultural interest of the South … We cultivate certain great staples for the supply of the 
general market of the world: - They manufacture almost exclusively for the home market.  Their 
object in the Tariff is to keep down foreign competition, in order to obtain a monopoly of the 
domestic market”115  He concluded that the tariff pitted dichotomous economic interests of an 
industrializing North and an agricultural South against one another, noting that “It remains to be 
considered, in tracing the effects of the system, whether the gain of one section of the country be 
equal to the loss of the other … the interests of the two great sections is opposed.  We want free 
trade, - they restrictions.”116   
     Calhoun’s emerging views tied the constitutional elements of nullification inexorably to the 
tariff.  While the tariff was the formal issue, Calhoun’s substantive contention concerned the 
constitutional rights of minorities.  Slavery was threatened by majority rights, and as historian 
William Freehling points out, Calhoun “hoped state nullification would stop the federal 
government from overturning the social hierarchy.  Blacks had no right to a freedom that would 
Africanize America.”117  Slavery, rather than the tariff, was Calhoun’s true concern.   
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     Leading tariff proponents, including influential Baltimore newspaper editor Hezekiah Niles, 
flatly rejected the South Carolina complaints,  Responding to Southern criticism of the Tariff of 
1828, he wrote: “We have been much amused with seeing it roundly asserted in some of the 
southern papers, that the tariff robs the planters of sixty out of every hundred bales of cotton that 
he produces – but grieved to observe that certain men, spouters and writers, who ought to know 
better, advance so absurd a proposition.”118  Niles proceeded to dedicate three full pages to pick 
apart the exaggerated claim of a sixty percent tax with effective clarity.    
     The Baltimore editor steadfastly insisted that industrialization would eventually encompass 
the entire nation, including the South.  He commented that “We have had much intercourse and 
communication with manufacturers, and never once witnessed the show of a desire that the south 
should not build up manufacturing establishments for itself – but, on the contrary, have 
oftentimes heard gentlemen from Virginia and North Carolina, particularly, urged to erect 
them.”119  The Weekly Register sharply condemned the nullification murmurs circulating in the 
South after the Tariff of 1828 passed.  Niles attributed the South’s growing resistance towards 
the new tariff more to conspiracy than principled behavior.  He wrote that “the bill had no sooner 
passed, than a disposition to resist its provisions was shown in the south, and the “unconditional 
repeal” of all the protecting laws called for, with a clear intimation, that the call would be 
sustained AT ARMS.  These anti-republican, if not treasonable suggestions, are fanned by the 
whole herd of British agents in the United States.”120 
     The original South Carolinian complaints, and the responses from individuals such as Niles, 
were followed by a short interlude of quiet.  However, in early 1830, Daniel Webster of 
Massachusetts and Robert Hayne of South Carolina renewed the initial exchange when they 
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debated the nature of the American union on the Senate floor.  Their exchange touched upon the 
recent tariff.  On January 20, Webster responded to Hayne’s criticism of Eastern states by 
exclaiming, “The East! The obnoxious, the rebuked, the always reproached East! … we are 
charged with the crime of a narrow and selfish policy … and the cause of all this narrow and 
selfish policy, the gentleman finds the tariff.”121   
     Webster charged the South with responsibility for the tariff controversy.  He ascribed the 
controversy back to 1816, remarking that “The Tariff of 1816, one of the plain cases of 
oppression and usurpation, from which, if the government does not recede, individual States may 
justly secede from the Government, is, sir, in truth, a South Carolina Tariff, supported by South 
Carolina votes.  But for those votes, it would not have passed in the form in which it did pass … 
among the earliest and boldest advocates of the Tariff, as a measure of protection, and on the 
express ground of protection, were the leading men of South Carolina in Congress.”  Webster 
remarked that “We see it daily, in the list, side by side of those of 1824 and 1828, as a case of 
manifest oppression, justifying disunion.  I put it home, to the honorable member from South 
Carolina, that his own State was not only ‘art and part’ in this measure, but the causa causans.  
Without her aid, this seminal principle of mischief, this root of Upas, could not have been 
planted. … it passed on the principle of protecting manufactures, on the principle against free 
trade, on the principle opposed to that which lets us alone.”122      
     On January 27, Hayne replied, characterizing the Tariff of 1816 quite differently.  He stated 
that “The gentleman considers the Tariff of 1816, and the bonus bill, as the foundations of the 
American system, and intimates, that the former would not have prevailed, but for South 
Carolina votes.  Now Sir, as to the Tariff of 1816, I think a great mistake prevails throughout the 
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country, in regarding it as the commencement of the existing policy  … [under] that bill 
(reported, Sir, by the lamented Lowndes, a steady opponent of the protecting system,) the duties 
on woolen and cotton goods were at once reduced to 25 per cent, with a provision, that they 
should, in the course of three years, be further reduced, to twenty percent, while, by the tariff of 
1824, the duties on the same articles were at once increased to 30 percent, and were to go on 
increasing to 37 ½ percent; and by the tariff of 1828, have been carried much higher.”123  Hayne 
added that South Carolina’s votes did not, in fact, determine the final fate of the 1816 tariff, as it 
had been overwhelmingly passed in the House by an 88 to 54 vote.”124  
     The Tariff of 1828 prompted a constitutional crisis over the relationship between majority and 
minority rights within the American political system.  The tariff triggered the crisis, but slavery 
and minority rights were the end issues.  As Webster and Hayne concluded their exchange, 
Senator Edward Livingston of Louisiana warned that “Arguments for and against the dissolution 
of the Union are canvassed in the public papers; form the topic of dinner speeches; are 
condensed into toasts … Sir, it is a Gordian knot, that can be severed only by the sword.  The 
band cannot be unloosed until it is wet with the blood of brothers.”  He pleaded that “I cannot, 
therefore, conscientiously, be silent; and, humbly as I think my influence or powers of 
persuasion, I should feel myself guilty if there were not exerted in admonition to both parties in 
this eventful controversy.”125    
     Livingston’s pleas for compromise failed to carry the day in 1830.  Webster insisted that the 
federal government had the duty to uphold the protectionist successes of 1824 and 1828, 
declaring that “The duty of the Government, at the present moment, would seem to be to 
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preserve, not to destroy; to maintain the position which it has assumed; and, for one, I shall feel 
it an indispensable obligation to hold it steady, as far as in my power, to that degree of protection 
which it has undertaken to bestow.”126  The volatile crisis simmered, but only for the time being.  
Conclusions  
     The Tariff of 1828, among all of the tariff bills between 1789 and 1857, should be understood 
as an anomaly.  The Adams/Clay and Jackson factions of the Democratic-Republican Party were 
locked in a highly contentious battle for political control of the national government and 
Jackson’s supporters were eager to deny Adams and Clay any political advantage by appearing 
to support nationalist economic trade policy.  Martin Van Buren expected the bill to fail because 
New England would find the bill too onerous.
127
  The Jackson faction successfully neutralized 
the tariff issue in 1828, which contributed to his election. 
     Historian Frank Taussig, the preeminent tariff scholar at the turn of the twentieth century, 
recognized this point.  He noted that “the Adams men were more firmly and unitedly in favor of 
protection than their opponents …the position of the Jackson men, on the other hand, was a very 
difficult one.  Their party had at this time no settled policy in regard to the questions which were 
to be the subjects of the political struggles of the next twenty years.  They were united on only 
one point, a determination to oust the other side”128  The Northern wing of the Jackson faction 
temporarily embraced protectionism to neutralize the issue during the presidential campaign.  
This move was pure politics, and didn’t indicate what long-term stance the Jackson men would 
settle upon over the trade policy issue after the election.          
     The sectional animosity in 1828 was not exclusively based upon a North-South axis.  New 
England’s commercial economic interests vociferously objected to the tariff.  The Tariff of 
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Abominations was only fifteen years removed from the Hartford Convention, and still a full 
thirty-three years before Fort Sumter.  New England had ample evidence that her economic 
interests were being attacked.  For example, Charles Wickliffe of Kentucky maintained that “the 
People of Kentucky will not be contented to swallow this bill, stuffed with nothing but wool.”  
Wickliffe also attacked the New England molasses trade, declaring that “I have another reason 
for imposing this duty upon imported molasses.  I wish to protect and encourage the growth of 
the sugar-cane in the State of Louisiana and Florida.  In parts of Mississippi, Alabama, and 
Georgia, the sugar-cane can be grown.”129  These exchanges illustrate that regional economic 
interests were far more complex during this period of expanding economic growth and 
industrialization than just slavery.     
     There was also ample evidence that the interests of the different economic spheres still 
influenced tariff votes.  In December 1828 Senator Hayne presented a memorial signed by 1,562 
inhabitants residing around Boston, a location far apart culturally, socially and economically 
from the Palmetto State.  Hayne noted his satisfaction with “the unequivocal evidence afforded 
by this memorial, that the cause of “free trade and unrestricted industry” was not yet lost in the 
East.”  He hoped “that the united efforts of the agriculturalists, merchants, and “judicious 
manufactures,” might yet save the country from the evils of the “prohibitory system.”130  
Congressmen often felt bound to cast votes favoring the business establishments within their 
districts.  Pennsylvania’s Chauncey Forward bluntly declared that “I desire to advance the true 
interests of my constituents.”131  Kentucky representative Thomas Chilton maintained that the 
interests of his constituents dictated his approach to the tariff as well, stating that “it cannot be 
expected, that those who represent Kentucky, will so far lose sight of the interests of their 
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constituents, as to protect every other section of the Union, while their own lies neglected and 
exposed; or that they will render their own merely tributary to the advancement of others, and 
not of themselves.”132   
     The Tariff of Abominations ultimately created more problems than it solved.  Van Buren’s 
skillful political maneuvering neutralized the tariff issue in the upcoming election, and robbed 
the Adams/Clay coalition of a potentially important political asset.  Andrew Jackson’s election, 
however, came at a steep price.  The high tariff rates embittered free traders, ensuring future 
tariff confrontations.  The South Carolina political radicals, who eventually became nullifiers, 
were outraged by the bill’s passage.  Calhoun’s Exposition began the political reaction to the 
Tariff of Abominations.  The Webster-Hayne debates continued it.  In 1832, the issue would 
trigger a political crisis.  
     Events between 1828 and 1832 would demonstrate that the tariff was only a pretext for the 
emerging national political crisis.  The real issue at hand was the American Constitution, 
minority rights, and ultimately the institution of slavery.  For the next five years the symptomatic 
issue of the tariff and the national malady of minority rights would become intertwined as the 
United States dealt with its political crisis.   The Tariff of Abominations instigated the biggest 
American political crisis since the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts.     
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CHAPTER 8 – ACTION AND REACTION: THE TARIFFS OF 1832 AND 1833 
“The opinion advanced by the friends of the protective system is, that the tendency of 
aggravating duties of impost upon articles imported from abroad, and have no competition with 
similar articles of domestic manufacture, is to reduce, and not to increase, the price of the 
articles themselves.”1  
- Report of the House Committee on Manufactures (May 23, 1832) 
 
“The opinion sustained by the free trade party is, that the great mass of the duties of impost is 
paid, not by the consumer of the dutied articles, but by the producer of the article exported, to 
pay for the article upon which the impost was levied.”2   
- Report of the House Committee on Manufactures (May 23, 1832) 
 
“In the first place, I would remark that the bill contains no obligatory pledges; it could make 
none; none are attempted.  The power over the subject is in the constitution; put there by those 
who formed it, and liable to be taken out only by an amendment of the instrument.  The next 
Congress, and every succeeding Congress, will undoubtedly have the power to repeal the law 
whenever they may think proper.”3 
- Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky (February 25, 1833 remarks to the Senate) 
 
“There had been a good deal said during the discussion, how far this passage of the bill would 
involve a pledge as to the arrangement of the tariff which he had proposed.  He felt but little 
solicitude on that point.  He had little faith in pledges; he had experience enough to know that 
the most solemn compact, and even the constitution itself, would be violated – palpably violated, 
in his opinion – whenever the dominant party saw its advantage in such violation.”4  
- Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina (March 1, 1833 remarks to the Senate) 
 
      The Tariff of 1828 created a climate of political acrimony that virtually assured future 
confrontations.  Four years later, the Tariff of 1832 lowered overall tariff rates back to levels 
approximating the Tariff of 1824, though protective features remained.  John Calhoun and South 
Carolinian states rights advocates remained dissatisfied, precipitating the Nullification Crisis in 
late 1832 and early 1833.  Calhoun and his native state were primarily motivated by political, 
rather than economic, concerns.  Nullifiers focused on the constitutional issue of minority rights 
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and their relation to the institution of slavery.  South Carolina used the Tariff of 1832 as the 
pretense to test how far it might politically resist federal power.
5
 
     Calhoun transitioned from economic nationalism in 1816 to a free trade position by 1828.  
However, he operated on the fringes of the free trade movement, sympathetic in principle, but 
personally more concerned with state rights.  After the Nullification Crisis, his political career 
closely aligned with the growing sectional controversies over slavery and states rights, while his 
involvement with trade policy receded. 
     The Compromise Tariff of 1833 attempted to harmonize the respective interests of 
nationalists and free-traders and defuse the Nullification Crisis through a face-saving initiative.  
The 1833 bill scheduled tariff reductions over the next nine years.  It mollified nationalists by 
back-loading the tariff reductions and satisfied free traders by doing away with many of the 
discriminatory features of the American System. 
     Debates about trade policy between 1824 and 1833 were characterized by bitter factionalism, 
primarily the consequence of early American industrialization.  Because the process was largely 
confined to the Northeast in the 1820s, the tariff issue was fought along geographical lines 
during this period.  However, traditional differences over ideas of political economy remained an 
integral element of the tariff debates, linking these years with the past.   
     The Tariff of 1833 only amounted to a truce.  During the next nine years, the Second Party 
system emerged on the American political landscape.  Economic nationalists migrated with 
Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams to form the new Whig party.  Most free-traders and old 
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Quids allied themselves with Andrew Jackson’s Democratic Party.  The parties sharply differed 
on trade policy, causing the tariff to become a major issue in the 1840 election.           
The Philadelphia and New York Trade Conventions – 1831  
     Free traders and nationalists, anticipating that the tariff and trade policy would be revisited in 
the near future, attempted to garner enthusiasm for their respective causes and apply pressure on 
Congress through a convention process.  Their efforts were modeled off of the 1826 Harrisburg 
Convention, which had received significant national attention.  In late 1831, a pair of 
conventions, one for free trade and the other for higher tariffs, were held.        
     Free trade advocates assembled late fall 1831 to compose a memorial to Congress to promote 
tariff reform during the upcoming Congress.  The convention attracted notable attendees, led by 
seventy year old former Secretary of the Treasury and “Old Republican” Albert Gallatin.  
Virginian congressman James Barbour served as the Convention’s president.  Political economist 
Condy Raguet and noted Massachusetts merchant Henry Lee also attended.
6
        
     The Convention’s memorial, published in January 1832, summarized key tenets of free-trade 
ideology.  It called for reduced tariffs at a common ad valorem rate.  The memorial argued that 
(a) the extinguishment of the national debt would lead to less required federal revenues, and 
therefore would lower the costs of goods for American citizens, (b) economic favoritism created 
unintended and negative economic results, and (c) that the high cost of American labor served to 
stimulate industrialization as strongly, if not more so, than protective tariffs.
7
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     The Philadelphia authors sought significantly lower tariff rates, but understood that any 
reduction over a short time frame could be potentially disastrous.  Consequently, they endorsed a 
transitional period to “wean” American manufacturers off of the protective system.  The 
memorial’s two key proposals were “1st. That the duties be so reduced, as to leave, after the 
extinguishment of the public debt, only that amount of revenue which may be necessary to meet 
the ordinary exigencies of Government,” and “2ndly. That, allowing a reasonable time for a 
gradual reduction of the existing exaggerated duties on some articles, the duties on all the 
imported articles not free of duty, be ultimately equalized, so as that the duty on any such article 
shall not vary materially from the general average rate of all the duties together, or in other 
words, from a uniform duty ad valorem on all imported articles subject to duty.”8               
     At Philadelphia, free traders argued that lower tariffs benefitted ordinary Americans.  They 
maintained that protection hurt consumers, and particularly the poor.  The report attacked the 
regressive nature of protection, where “the principal commodities, which have been selected for 
special protection, iron and all the coarser woolen articles of clothing, are, as well as salt, coal 
and sugar, essentially necessary to all classes of society.  The duties laid on such commodities 
fall therefore, much more heavily in proportion to their means, on the less wealthy classes.”9         
     The Convention findings further contended that protection ran counter to the egalitarian 
principles of American republicanism.  The report pointed out that “the profits of the 
manufacturers are, by reason of the high duties laid in their favor, greater than the average profits 
in other pursuits, it is a simple transfer to them of the consumer’s property; a flagrant 
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injustice.”10  Free traders concluded that the tariff appropriated economic wealth from the 
majority of Americans to benefit a small group of manufacturing capitalists.   
     The memorialists noted that, absent the national debt, the federal government required only 
about $13 million of annual tariff revenues.  They concluded that an average tariff rate of 27% 
could achieve that amount, in place of the 40% existing blended rate.  Their recommendation 
would reduce tariff rates by a third and do away with discriminatory protection.
11
  
     The Philadelphia free-traders also pointed out the opportunity costs of protection.  They 
asserted that “capital and labor would, if there were no legislative interference, be employed in 
remunerating pursuits … the restrictive system is, in every instance, injurious to those branches 
of industry which do not want special protection.”  Anticipating modern economic concepts, the 
Philadelphia writers noted that “artificially enhancing the price of those commodities which are 
the products of such manufactures, necessarily enhances also the price of the products of every 
other branch of industry.”12       
     The convention delegates observed that American labor capital was scarce, which drove up 
wages.  The memorial noted that “The situation in the United States is the very reverse [of 
Europe] … the existing rates of wages stimulate industry with a greater force, than in any other 
country; and, as a natural consequence, a nation encumbered with less indolence or idleness, a 
population more active, industrious, and we believe, more productive.”13  In the high-wage state 
of the American economy, consumers were sufficiently affluent to create demand for products 
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and high wages provided capitalists with a motivation to explore wage-saving machinery through 
industrialization without a need for protective tariffs.   
     Shortly after the Philadelphia Convention recessed, nationalists convened in New York City.  
The “Friends of Domestic Industry” issued a report less than a month later, which presented the 
nationalist counterview.  The New York attendees included Senator William Wilkins of 
Pennsylvania as its president, former representative James Tallmadge of New York as treasurer, 
and Hezekiah Niles as secretary.  Other attendees included Mathew Carey, Charles Ingersoll, and 
Boston Associates member Abbott Lawrence.
14
   
     The New York Convention’s memorial, which extolled the economic benefits of protective 
trade policy, stressed four major points.  The first held that nation states were perpetually in 
economic competition with one another and that it behooved the United States to act 
accordingly.  Second, government possessed the power and capability to “engineer” positive 
national economic outcomes, and therefore ought to use these powers for the common good.  
Third, protective policies were responsible for recent economic prosperity in the United States.  
Lastly, free trade was simply impractical.
15
    
     The New York report argued that the communal needs of the American nation dictated a 
policy that would protect it from a hostile international world.  The document stated that 
“Nations are adversary to each other; their commercial intercourse is regulated by treaties always 
made with a view to relative advantage.”  Consequently, “national happiness and national wealth 
are, therefore, promoted in proportion to the active industry of the community; and that industry 
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is in proportion to the inducements to labour, arising from the amount and certainty of its 
remuneration. …  It is, therefore, thought to be a wise policy to multiply the inducements to 
apply capital to the employment of labour at home.”16  Their conclusions rejected democratic 
individualism in favor of community-centered economic goals.    
     Nationalists exuded an optimistic view that wise legislation could engineer favorable 
economic outcomes. They claimed that “by increasing the stimulus to labour, resulting from the 
application of capital, to home production, additional capital can “be generated by an act of 
legislation.”  It is said, that this system “oppresses the many for the benefit of the few.”  We, on 
the contrary, believe, that whilst it benefits all, its highest recommendation is found in its 
beneficial action upon the many – the laboring classes, the working men.”17 
    Finally, nationalists flatly rejected the practicality of free trade.  The report explained that 
“mistaken and preposterous assumptions of the merits of what is called Free Trade have, under 
the ever active delusion of British influence, afforded pretexts latterly to the opponents of the 
protective system, which it is proper to dispel.  … between nations, there is no free trade – there 
never was – there never can be.”  The authors suggested that “the dogmas of free trade, which 
are said to be taught in some colleges, may serve to inflame youthful imaginations, but, as they 
have never actuated a practical statesman ...”18   
     The ideas expressed at the Philadelphia and New York gatherings influenced trade policy 
discourse throughout 1832.  For example, Senator Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey called for a 
delay in considering the tariff “for the purpose of calling the Senate to avail itself of the views of 
the intelligent convention lately assembled at New York and Philadelphia … the views of the 
gentlemen assembled at these conventions, representing, as they did, a large portion of our most 
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active and intelligent population in every part of the country.”19  Representative George Mitchell 
of Maryland noted that the Philadelphia Convention recommended “such a gradual diminution 
of duties as would eventually reduce them to the exigencies of Government.”  He argued that the 
Philadelphia gathering “may be considered as fair evidences of public opinion.  It was composed 
of delegates from fifteen different States, from Alabama, on the Gulf of Mexico, to Maine, on 
the Bay of Fundy … farmers and planters – merchants and manufacturers – scholars and 
mechanics – abolitionists and slaveholders, found themselves jumbled together, having but one 
object in view, the settlement of the tariff on fair and equitable terms.”  He contrasted that with 
the New York convention, which “was composed entirely of Northern manufacturers, men who 
were up to all the mysteries of the system, and infected with its avarice.”20  Nationalists reached 
opposite conclusions.  Representative Nathan Appleton charged that the Philadelphia report was 
long on rhetoric, but short on practicality.  He noted that “The Philadelphia Convention of last 
summer, in their address to the people, make bitter complaints of the inequality, oppression, and 
injustices of the tariff, but without the slightest specification of the mode and manner in which 
this inequality and injustice is brought about.”21   
     The political agitation produced by the Philadelphia and New York gatherings, and the 
impending elimination of the national debt ensured that the tariff would be revisited in 1832.  
The new round of tariff debates was also impacted by a confluence of related issues.  Southern 
concerns over the political issue of states rights mixed with the economic issues of retiring the 
debt, the American System and the ever present issue of republican political economy.   
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American Trade and the National Economy: 1824 to 1833  
     Between 1824 and 1832, the United States established high tariff barriers, crafted to 
discourage, or even outright prohibit, the importation of certain foreign products.  The available 
data suggests that the tariff acts of 1824 and 1828 successfully provided some protection to 
domestic producers, but they fell well short of creating the self-sufficient domestic economy that 
the most ardent protectionists hoped for.  Americans continued to engage in significant trade 
with foreign nations.   
     Figure 8.1 compares the average tariff rate in effect on all imports (both dutied and “free”) 
from 1816 through 1835, comparing it to the “openness” of trade (the ratio of total imports and 
exports to gross domestic product).  The higher tariff rates reduced trade.  However, the 
reduction occurred at a diminishing rate, suggesting that the dream of an exclusive American 
economy was not feasible. 
 
Figure 8.1. American Foreign Trade, 1816 to 1835 (3 year rolling average)8  
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 1:30, 3:24. 
 
     One of the protectionist goals in the 1820s was to restrict imports.  Table 8.1 measures the 
degree to which American trade policy impacted imports between 1824 and 1835: 
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Table 8.1. Tariff Rates, Imports, and Imports per Capita, 1820-183544 
   3 year Trailing  Imports  Imports 
Year   Tariff Rate  (in millions)  per Capita  
1820   27.4%   $  74   $7.69 
1821   33.8%   $  55   $5.56 
1822   36.1%   $  80   $7.85 
1823   40.7%   $  72   $6.86 
1824       42.1%   $  72   $6.67 
1825        46.3%   $  90   $8.10 
1826           46.8%   $  78   $6.42 
1827         48.0%   $  71   $6.02 
1828   47.0%   $  81   $6.66 
1829   48.8%   $  67   $5.35 
1830   50.9%   $  63   $4.88 
1831   50.8%   $  96   $7.23 
1832     46.8%   $  95   $6.95 
1833   37.4%   $101   $7.17 
1834     29.9%   $109   $7.52 
1835   24.0%   $137   $9.18 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 1:30, 5:498-499, 510. 
 
The above data suggests that while the Tariff of 1824 failed to significantly slow down imports 
to the United States, the Tariff of 1828 temporarily succeeded in doing so.  The rate of imports 
per capita dropped sharply in both 1829 and 1830.  However, this protective shield wasn’t 
permanent, as imports per capita bounced back in 1831 and 1832. 
     A further review of tariff revenue sources after 1828 sheds some explanatory light on the 
dynamics influencing American imports.  Table 8.2 summarizes the annual duties collected as a 
percentage of all imported goods as well as those classified as “dutiable.”  The difference 
(“spread”) between these two measures represents imports exempt from duties.  A higher spread 
demonstrates that a greater proportion of imports were admitted duty free. 
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Table 8.2. Annual Tariff Rates on Imports: Dutiable and Total Goods, 1828-183545 
  Imports  Duty Rates on  Duty Rates on 
Year  (in millions)  Total Imports  Dutiable Imports Spread 
1828  $  81   44.74%  47.59%    2.85% 
1829  $  67   50.73%  54.17%    3.44% 
1830  $  63   57.32%  61.69%    4.37% 
1831  $  96   44.23%  47.38%    3.15% 
1832    $  95   38.97%  42.96%    3.99% 
1833  $101   28.99%  38.25%    9.26% 
1834    $109   21.83%  40.19%  18.36% 
1835  $137   21.25%  40.38%  19.13% 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498-499, 510. 
The spread remained fairly constant between 1828 and 1831, but increased significantly in 1832.  
This suggests that a significant shift in the composition of American imports took place after 
passage of the Tariff of 1832.  The mix of imports included greater proportions of “duty free” 
goods and a smaller proportion of protected goods such as iron and cloth manufactures.   
     Figure 8.2 measures the standard of living for average Americans between 1816 and 1835 by 
charting the real gross domestic product per capita on a trailing three year average.  The 1820s 
was a decade of modest growth rates, including some temporary small declines in national 
productivity, but this pattern changed in the latter part of the decade as growth rates boomed 
between 1828 and 1832.  Nationalists maintained that this empirical evidence validated a 
positive correlation between the American System and national economic prosperity.    
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Figure 8.2. American GDP per Capita, 1816 to 1835 (in real dollars = 1996) (3 year rolling 
average)9    
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498, 510; “Measuring Worth,” http://www. 
measuringworth.org/usgdp/. 
 
     The growth in real GDP per capital after the Tariff of 1828 was simultaneously accompanied 
by a dramatic increase in national industrial output.  Figure 8.3 illustrates the growth in 
American manufacturing from 1820 through 1835.  While national industrial output increased an 
impressive 42% in the seven years from 1820 to 1827 (a 6.0% straight-line rate per annum), it 
increased by an astonishing 76% during the seven years between 1828 and 1835 (a 10.9% 
annualized rate).  This data demonstrates that the Industrial Revolution was firmly rooting itself 
into the American economy.  It also provides strong circumstantial evidence to claim that 
protectionist tariff policy provided some assistance to American industrialization, though it 
should be noted that technological advancements in transportation surely contributed as well.
22
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Figure 8.3. American Industrial Production, 1820-183510    
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 3:23-24.  The above information was compiled 
by Joseph H. Davis and represents the best estimates to date from somewhat imperfect data of 
what the United States manufacturing output was during the nineteenth century.  Note that the 
Davis Index uses base year 1849-1850 as 100. 
 
     Consequently, the 1832 tariff debates opened against the backdrop of a national economic 
expansion.  Both nationalists and free traders confidently argued their cases within that context.  
Nationalists pointed to positive economic trends as evidence that the American System was 
working.  Classical liberals asserted that free trade would lead to even greater economic 
prosperity. 
The Tariff of 1832 
     Although the Tariff of 1828 raised American tariff duties to their highest level to date, 
imports did not significantly drop, to the surprise of both protectionists and free traders.  Imports, 
which totaled $81 million in 1828, initially dropped to $67 million and $63 million in 1829 and 
1830, respectively.  However, they quickly rebounded to $96 million in 1831 and $95 million in 
1832.
23
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     The unforeseen side benefit of this development was the rapid retirement of the national debt.  
In 1816, after the war, the debt stood at $127.3 million.  In the twelve years between 1816 and 
1828, the balance was slowly reduced to $67.5 million.  In the four years following the Tariff of 
Abominations, the debt was reduced by another $43.4 million.  By the end of 1832, the 
outstanding balance was only $24.3 million and at the end of 1833 it was only $7.0 million.
24
 
     Retiring the national debt impacted trade policy because, in theory, less tariff revenues would 
be needed to maintain the federal government.  Both free traders and economic nationalists 
agreed that, at a minimum, the tariff needed to cover the costs of the federal government.  
However, a reduced federal budget potentially encumbered the nation’s ability to provide 
protective trade barriers if tariff rates were correspondingly lowered.  
     A drastic change in the tariff structure was necessary if one accepted the premise that the 
federal government should not be accumulating surplus funds.  The United States paid $11.4 
million, $16.2 million, and $18.1 million in debt service (principal plus interest) in the years 
1830, 1831, and 1832, respectively, representing 45.7%, 56.7%, and 56.7% of total federal 
government revenues for those three years.
25
  Customs duties generated $21.9 million, $24.2 
million, and $28.5 million of revenues between 1830 and 1832, representing 88.2%, 84.9%, and 
89.3%, respectively, of all of the nation’s revenues.  It was mathematically impossible to 
substantially reduce federal revenues without reducing tariff duties.
26
     
     Free traders recognized that the debt retirement represented an opportunity to attack the Tariff 
of Abominations, and they called for a drastic reduction in the duties schedule.  They also sought 
to eliminate specific duties and replace them with uniform ad valorem rates.  These actions 
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conformed to the long-standing free trade position that tariffs should only be high enough to 
support a thrifty federal government, and without any preferential economic treatment.           
     Economic nationalists realized that retiring the national debt threatened the protectionist 
agenda.  They devised an alternate solution to the situation that addressed a treasury surplus and 
buttressed other parts of the American System by introducing the principle of distribution.  The 
American System was premised upon three major policy initiatives, including protective tariffs, a 
national bank and internal improvements.  Economic nationalists viewed all three elements as a 
rational role for government to encourage national economic growth.       
     Distribution, in contrast to national banking, was more closely linked to the tariff question.  
Economic nationalists believed that high-cost internal improvements, including the building of 
roads, canals, and other infrastructure investments, were important for the national economy, but 
difficult to accomplish through the private sector because of capital constraints.  Previously, 
states had provided some assistance for such projects, the most prominent example being New 
York’s Erie Canal.  However, there were concerns that federal sponsorship of internal 
improvements was unconstitutional.  In 1820, President Monroe vetoed the Cumberland Road 
Bill, which designated federal funds to repair the National Road and authorized tolls for the 
recovery of costs.  Monroe concluded that the federal government lacked the constitutional 
authority to engage in internal improvements short of a constitutional amendment.
27
  In 1830, 
Andrew Jackson vetoed the Maysville Road and Washington Turnpike bills, again arguing that a 
constitutional amendment was required, though he qualified his arguments to suggest that he 
personally viewed internal improvements as necessary and desirable.
28
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     The pragmatic solution to the constitutionality issue, in lieu of a constitutional amendment, 
was the concept of distribution.  Distribution involved a nuanced remedy: the federal government 
would supply funds to the states, which would serve as the conduit for making actual internal 
improvements.  There was no constitutional prohibition on what states could do, and under the 
distribution scenario, the federal government skirted the constitutionality dilemma.      
     Tariffs and distributions, therefore, were highly correlated issues because every dollar 
appropriated for the purpose of distributions translated to another dollar necessary for the federal 
government.  Since the tariff was the predominant source of federal revenues, a distribution 
program created a demand for higher tariff revenues.  Economic nationalists envisioned an 
aggressive distributions program funded by high tariffs, which would simultaneously render 
protection to targeted industries.      
     The upcoming 1832 presidential election year provided ideal conditions for the tariff to again 
be a prominent agenda item in Congress.  South Carolina’s George McDuffie suspected that 
Henry Clay and manufacturing interests had sufficient reason to make it so.  He noted that “By a 
singular fatality, illustrating the pernicious connexion between the Presidential election and the 
tariff, the protection of each successive tariff has only been deemed sufficient for four years, and 
the necessity of increasing it has always become apparent just in the midst of the canvass for the 
Presidency … I think it not improbable that a similar demand would have been made now.”29   
     The House of Representatives and the Senate simultaneously commenced tariff deliberations 
in early 1832.  Debate lasted well into the summer, competing with the re-charter of Second 
Bank of the United States for time.  These twin topics dominated the second session of the 
Twenty-Second Congress, with the tariff receiving the greater portion of the calendar. 
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     House proceedings were complicated by the fact that two different committees reported tariff 
bills.  On February 8, the Committee of Ways and Means, chaired by George McDuffie of South 
Carolina, presented a free-trade oriented tariff proposal calling for an ad valorem rate of 12.5% 
rate on all dutiable goods by 1834.  It was premised on establishing a low ad valorem tariff rate, 
affording only incidental protection, and producing revenues only for the minimally necessary 
costs of the federal government.  Three months later, on May 23, the Committee on 
Manufactures, chaired by ex-president John Quincy Adams, offered a competing nationalist 
oriented bill. The Committee on Manufactures draft proposed an approach similar to the Tariffs 
of 1824 and 1828, where industries such as cotton manufactures, woolens, iron, and specified 
others would be provided high tariff protection.
30
  
     The House tariff debates were conducted with the threat of nullification by South Carolina in 
the background.  South Carolina’s George McDuffie reacted to the Adams draft by arguing that 
“the people of the South, charged with disloyalty to the Union, agree that a tribute of twelve and 
a half percent, should be levied upon their productions … while the Union-loving people of the 
North are resolved to put the Union itself in eminent jeopardy, unless their brethren of the South 
will reduce themselves to absolute vassalage, by consenting to bring to the mercenary altar of 
this manufacturing idol three times the proposed amount of tribute.”  He warned that “South 
Carolina will not submit to the tariff … I beseech gentlemen, therefore, not in a spirit of menace, 
but of admonition, and “more in sorrow than anger,” to pause for a moment, and to calculate the 
consequences which may possibly ensue … the dissolution of the Union, come when it may, will 
be a calamity to us all.”31  Nathan Appleton retorted that “I am perfectly aware that this state of 
excitement exists in South Carolina.  I believe that a spark only is wanting to light it into a blaze 
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… I, sir, venture a counter prophecy … that it will be ranked with those delusions which should 
teach mankind a mortifying lesson of humility … is South Carolina prepared to abandon the 
Union, and meet the horrors of a civil war?”32 
     Tensions were heightened by renewed charges that South Carolina had inaugurated the 
protective system by supporting the Tariff of 1816.  Nathan Appleton declared that “The tariff of 
1816 was a South Carolina measure, introduced and advocated by the most eminent of her 
sons.”33  McDuffie countered, asserting that Southern nationalism was now “Blasted, sir, utterly 
blasted, by the consuming and withering course of a system of legislation which wages an 
exterminating war against the blessings of commerce, and the bounties of a merciful Providence, 
and which, by impious perversion of language, is called “protection!””34  . 
     Nationalists pressed their case for distribution and a protective tariff.  Congressman Andrew 
Stewart of Pennsylvania pointed out that extinguishing the federal debt was insufficient cause for 
changing trade policy, arguing that protection was still necessary to grow a strong national 
economy.  He remarked that “if the payment of the public debt is to be made the occasion of 
adopting an opposite system – of arresting the progress of internal improvement – of prostrating 
our manufactures – paralyzing our agriculture – depressing and degrading the free labor of this 
country – demoralizing its character … the payment of the public debt would be converted into 
the most blighting and withering curse that ever afflicted any people.”35  He reminded the House 
of the symbiotic nature of the economy, where “encouragement afforded to manufactures, by 
increasing the demand, would improve the price of agricultural productions, while, by increasing 
the quantity, it would reduce the price of manufactured goods.”  He remarked that in 1828 “we 
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were then told … by all its opponents, that this bill, if passed, would destroy the revenue, compel 
a resort to direct taxation, annihilate commerce, ruin the farmers, and crush the community under 
an intolerable load of taxes and burdens.”  Stewart then asked “what has been the result?  … it 
has paid off your national debt … Commerce, like the revenue, has increased and flourished 
beyond all former example.  Has it ruined the farmer and wool grower?  Let them answer; they 
will tell you their business was never more prosperous.”36   
     Economic nationalists pointed to a prosperous economy and tried to link it to their policies.  
Stewart noted that “manufactories have sprung up in a large portion of the country; not in one 
town, not in one district, but everywhere; and, like the dews, and rains, and sunshine from 
heaven, stimulating everything, and furnishing food for everybody … by which the farmer, the 
mechanic, the laborer, the merchant, the entire circle of society, is benefitted.”37  Appleton 
pointed out the residual benefits to consumers, noting that “the article which in 1816 sold for 
thirty cents the square yard, sold, in 1819, at twenty-one cents; in 1823, seventeen cents; 1826, 
thirteen cents; in 1829 nine and even eight and a half cents.”38  Stewart caustically added that 
“our manufacturers now supply the South with cotton goods at one-fourth of their former price, 
and this they call plunder; woolens at one half, and this is robbery; glass, paper, lead, and many 
other articles, at one-third of their former cost, and this is oppression!”39 
     Great Britain’s trade policies continued to deeply influence American policy makers.  Nathan 
Appleton argued that “The American system originated, perhaps, as much as anything, in the 
endeavor to counteract the constant tendency of our relations and trade with England to create 
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balances against us, which must be paid in specie.”40  He concluded that protection was 
absolutely necessary to offset British economic superiority. However, George McDuffie 
reminded the House that changes were underway in Great Britain, remarking that “the corn laws 
are almost the only remaining monument of the folly and injustice of former times … the spirit 
of reform is abroad in England … I hope to see the march of liberal principles illustrated in both 
hemispheres by the contemporaneous overthrow of the English corn laws and the American 
restrictions.  … free trade is the great doctrine of political reformation in modern times; it is to 
the commerce and the social condition of nations what the reformation of Luther was to the 
christian religion.”41  
     Tariff advocates warned that a sudden abandonment of protection would be economically 
catastrophic and would abandon implicit promises made to manufacturers.  Representative 
George Evans of Maine maintained that “this Government has enacted laws repeatedly, and with 
a declared intention to maintain them, for the protection of American industry.  It has held out 
inducements for the investment of capital in manufactures; and capital has taken that direction, 
agreeably to the anticipations and wishes of Government.  It is there fixed.”42  Representative 
Rufus Choate of Massachusetts added that “the relation of this Government to these interests is 
peculiar and responsible.  It is a parental relationship.  Your legislation created them.  You 
invited this property into this investment.  You enticed these laborers into this vineyard.  You 
called this capital from the land and the seas; you sought it out, and found it where it lay safe, 
diffused, and dormant, and embodied and fixed it in establishments and occupations from which 
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it cannot be extricated without ruin to its confiding owners.  This consideration, in a great 
degree, determines the duty of this government.”43 
     Growing American industrialization and increasing numbers of American factory workers 
introduced labor as a new issue within the tariff debates.  Chilton Allan of Kentucky posited that 
protection benefitted American workers, hinting that a form of class warfare between free labor 
and slavery was at the crux of the trade policy issue.  Allan reasoned that “if the protective 
system is abandoned, one of two things must follow – manufacturing must cease, or wages will 
be reduced to the standard of England and Ireland … let us not, in such a rash and foolish 
experiment, to gratify the insatiable avarice of the greedy planters, barter away the most precious 
of God’s gifts – that lofty, manly spirit of independence which swells in the bosom of the free 
enlightened laborer.”44   
       Free traders continued to critique the redistributive effects of protective tariffs.       
Virginia’s Thomas Bouldin charged that the tariff primarily benefitted the rich, remarking that 
“the influence exerted by the wealthy, as discovered in the process of the protecting system, is, in 
the highest degree, appalling.  How is it, sir, that sugar comes to be the great interest of the State 
of Louisiana?  A comparative few of her citizens get a share of the bounty; yet her whole 
delegation votes to burden her population, not with the duty on sugar only, but with this whole 
scheme of complex exaction.  A few hundred men in the receipt and disbursement of four or five 
millions annually, hold a commanding influence.”45   
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     John Bell of Tennessee added that the resultant protectionist policies allowed special 
economic interests to enjoy excessive profits.  He stated that “It has been over and over again 
admitted and avowed that the average profits upon the capital invested in the cotton and woolen 
manufacture is twenty per cent.”46  Bell charged that this situation threatened the American 
egalitarianism, stating that the wealth secured by this system to the manufacturing States is 
distributed in any equal degree, if at all, between the capitalist, or master manufacturer, and the 
operative laborer, agricultural or mechanical.  It is the capitalist who is benefitted … by this 
system the poor are made poorer, and the rich, richer.”47       
     Opponents were appalled at the prospect of adopting the forms of political economy practiced 
in Europe.  They charged that these practices ran counter to American republican principles.  
Bell asked “what must be thought of an American statesman who would model the policy of 
these United States upon the basis of the European System?  We have what is called an 
American System; but it is not clear that it is the European system transferred to America.”  He 
highlighted the tradeoffs arising from British policy, asking “What are the trophies of British 
polity?  A few thousand splendid palaces … three millions of Englishmen, or one-fourth of the 
population, are, throughout the year, relieved in workhouses or from the poor rates!”  Bell 
argued that the duty of the American federal government should be to promote a “perfect 
equality of rank, rights, and privileges.”  He concluded that the “fundamental object of the 
Governments established here is to secure the rights, and to promote the prosperity of all in the 
same degree.  All monopolies, all restrictions upon the perfect freedom of the citizen, in regard 
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to trade, and every other species of industry not essential to the preservation of the order and 
morals of society, are directly at war with the very end aim of all our political institutions.”48 
     Free traders challenged nationalist assertions that protection benefitted consumers.  Bouldin 
presented an opportunity cost argument, pointing out that “it is not true that the article is cheaper 
because it costs less money.  The fact is, that labor, and not money, is the true measure of value; 
and it will now cost me from one and a half to two days’ work to get the same quantity of sugar 
that one day’s work would have purchased in 1818.”49  William Drayton added that the true 
cause of reduced prices was “the diminished cost of production and transportation throughout the 
civilized world,” a by-product of technological innovation via the Industrial Revolution.50 
     Tariff opponents flatly rejected that any implied pledges had ever been made to 
manufacturers, referring back to Dallas Report Doctrine to make their point.  Richard Wilde 
noted that, after the War of 1812, “manufacturers, threatened, as they believed, with ruin, 
earnestly and humbly entreated that the amount [of duties] required as revenue should be so 
imposed as enable them to bear the shock.”  He asked, “What was that pledge?  How far did it 
extend?  This will be best seen by an examination of the public documents and speeches of that 
day.  The then Secretary of the Treasury, (Mr. Dallas,) whose zeal for the protection of 
manufactures was as well-known as his abilities and urbanity, presented a report, in which he 
divided the American manufactures into three principal classes.”  Since Dallas principles 
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implicitly considered protection as temporary, Wilde maintained that “I for one Southern man 
am willing to go back to the Tariff of 1816.  Will the representatives of the manufacturing States 
go with me?  You know they will not!”51  
     On June 28, 1832, the House of Representatives voted on a tariff bill modeled off of the 
Committee on Manufactures proposal.  Tariff rates would be lowered to levels approximating 
those of 1824, but the tariff would retain a protectionist nature.  The final vote was a decisive 
132 ayes versus 65 nays.
52
  The side issue of distribution was deferred to a later date. 
     Meanwhile, the Senate created its own version of a tariff bill.  Though the Constitution 
required that revenue bills originate in the House, the fact that proposals in both chambers 
featured reduced tariff revenues created confusion.  The Senate, taking the position that this was 
not technically a revenue measure, separately crafted its own legislation. 
     Senate free traders attempted a surprise legislative strike in December 1831, when Mississippi 
Senator George Poindexter laid a resolution on the table calling for the Committee of Finance to 
research “fixing a rate of duties on foreign imports, not to exceed on any article imported into the 
United States more than twenty percent.”53  This effort was intended to preempt a bill from the 
Committee on Manufactures.  The resolution contained the free trader goal of lowering tariff 
rates and establishing a system based on ad valorem rates.  The effort failed.     
     The Senate began formal deliberation of the tariff on January 11, 1832.  Henry Clay presented 
a long speech articulating the goals of the American System in detail, while confessing that “I 
am getting old; I feel but too sensibly, and unaffectedly, the effects of approaching age; and I 
have been for some years, very little in the habit of addressing deliberative assemblies.”54  This 
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was superficial modesty; Clay wanted to direct the course of the tariff debates in an election year 
when he would be running against Andrew Jackson.  Clay contended that the protectionist 
policies of the previous few years had been successful, noting that “it stands self-vindicated, in 
the general prosperity, in the rich fruits which it has scattered over the land … if the term of 
seven years were to be selected of the greatest prosperity which this people have enjoyed since 
the establishment of their present constitution, it would be exactly that period of seven years 
which immediately followed the passage of the tariff of 1824.”55   
     The Kentucky senator confidently explained why the country had prospered.  Consumer 
prices had fallen, and “the most efficient of all the causes of the prices of manufactures articles 
[was] … COMPETITION.  … By the American system this vast power has been excited in 
America, and brought into being to act in cooperation or collision with European industry.  
Europe acts within itself, and with America; and America acts within itself, and with Europe.  
The consequence is the reduction of prices in both hemispheres.”56   
     Clay contrasted the American system with free trade in practice.  He exclaimed, “When 
gentlemen have succeeded in their design of an immediate or gradual destruction of the 
American system, what is their substitute?  Free trade!  Free trade!  The call for free trade is as 
unavailing as the cry of a spoiled child, in its nurse’s arms, for the moon or the stars that glitter in 
the firmament of heaven.  It has never existed; it never will exist … we may break down all 
barriers to free trade on our part, but the work will not be complete until foreign Powers shall 
have removed theirs.”57   
     He then considered the consequences of retiring the national debt, and steadfastly insisted that 
the American System should not be compromised.  He remarked that “the first question which 
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presents itself is, whether it is expedient to preserve the existing duties, in order to accumulate a 
surplus in the treasury, for the purpose of subsequent distribution among the several States.  I 
think not.”58  This statement laid the groundwork for a nuanced manner in which to maintain the 
American System, and provide political advantage in an election year.  
     Clay’s rejection of tariff proceeds for distributions did not reject internal improvements.  
Rather, he wanted to use a different revenue source to achieve his objective, namely proceeds 
from the sale of public lands.  Clay hoped that “the appropriation of the proceeds of the public 
lands, effectual and permanent provision will be made for such internal improvements as may be 
sanctioned by Congress.”59  This position indirectly call for higher tariffs, as any redirection of 
land sales for distributions would require higher tariff revenues since the tariff would now 
become virtually the only revenue source for funding the national government.        
     This new structure to fund American System goals led Clay to articulate the specific 
proposals for the new tariff bill.  He tactfully noted that “we may safely assume that the revenue 
may now be reduced, and considerably reduced.  This reduction may be effected in various ways, 
and on different principles.”60  Clay identified three potential courses of action: 
1. To reduce the duties on all articles in the same ratio, without regard to the principle of 
protection. 
2. To retain them on unprotected articles, and augment them on the protected articles. 
3. To abolish and reduce the duties on unprotected articles, retaining and enforcing the faithful 
collection of those on the protected articles.
61
 
 
He reviewed each approach’s merits and weaknesses.  He quickly rejected the first option 
because it neutralized protective benefits to manufactures.  The second option was likewise 
unacceptable to free traders.  Clay concluded that the third alternative was best, noting that it “is 
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the most equitable and reasonable, and it presents an undebatable ground, on which I had hoped 
we could all safely tread without difficulty.  It exacts no sacrifice of principle from the opponent 
of the American system; it comprehends none on the part of its friends.”  He insisted that this 
approach should satisfy the South because “it will be relieved at once, as will be hereafter 
shown, from at least a fourth of its burdens.”62   
     Nationalists reiterated the economic multiplier benefit provided by protection.  Nehemiah 
Knight of Rhode Island stressed that the nation’s economic spheres remained dependent upon 
each other, insisting that “this thing called trade is so interwoven with the agriculture, 
manufactures, and navigation of the country, that I will not pretend to follow it in all its 
ramifications.  It is enough to know that each stimulates and promotes the other; that, by aiding 
and encouraging the one, you assist the other.”63   
     Clay’s supporters endorsed the House observations that consumer prices had fallen with 
protective tariffs in place.  Representative John Davis of Massachusetts pointed out that the price 
of cotton sheetings per yard had dropped from 28 cents to 8.75 cents between 1818 and 1830, 
satinets per yard from 90 cents to 55 cents between 1823 and 1832, and flannels from $18 to $12 
per piece.  He stressed that these items were mainstay pieces of typical American wardrobes.
64
  
     Nationalists stressed the importance of national defense and economic self-sufficiency in 
light of Great Britain’s military and economic superiority.  Senator George Dallas of 
Pennsylvania judged the American System as essential to national sovereignty when he 
explained that “its foundation … is the broad and impregnable principle of national 
independence; and its object and tendency are to give to the American people … employment of 
their own, resources of their own, strength of their own, and happiness of their own; which 
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cannot be injuriously affected in war or peace, through stratagem or design, by any other 
people.”65  Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey warned that abandoning protection created a 
scenario where “Great Britain makes war upon our manufactures with a perseverance that is 
without a parallel, and refuses to take the produce of the Eastern, Western and Middle States.  
These States have no defence against this system, but to exclude as far as they can the 
manufactures of Great Britain, by substituting their own.”66  
     A key premise underlying the pro-tariff argument was that the collective goals of the 
American community should take precedence over individual self-interest.  Senator Dallas 
criticized the egalitarian economy envisioned by many free traders.  In response to criticisms 
that protection catered to economic special interests, he commented that “Capitalists are to be 
found in every occupation.  The disparity of pecuniary means necessarily creates them … the 
capitalist, Mr. President, in any general and accessible occupation, is as one to ten thousand.  He 
alone cannot be the object of any law, made in a free and intelligent country.  The accident of his 
superior resources or opportunities is neither known nor regarded.”67    
     Protectionists asserted that their system left Americans free to pursue their personal economic 
avocations.  Thomas Ewing of Ohio noted that “no one is constrained to leave his agricultural 
pursuits, and become a manufacturer.  Agriculture is still open before him, with increased 
advantages.  Manufacturing interest invites him, with even better prospects; and it is this, the 
hand of beneficence – the hand of Government – which is extended to save the sinking hopes of 
its citizens.”68   
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     Free traders responded that eliminating the national debt should signal the end of protective 
tariffs.  Robert Hayne proclaimed that “the period so long and so anxiously looked for and 
desired, had at length arrived.  The public debt was paid for … and the question necessarily 
arose, what adjustment of the tariff of duties was to be made in this new and most gratifying 
condition of our affairs?”  Hayne readily responded to his own question, declaring that “upwards 
to $12,000,000 per annum … will cease to be a charge upon the country, and to this extent, at 
least, the people have a right to expect an immediate reduction of their burdens.”69      
     The anti-tariff forces charged that nationalists remained guilty of violating the original Dallas 
Report principles established in 1816.  Senator Hayne claimed that protectionists consistently 
misrepresented their policies as temporary, when their true intent was to make them permanent.  
He asked “where is there to be found a fulfillment of the promises held out to the South in 1824?  
We were then told that we had mistaken the true character of this system.  We were entreated 
only to try it for a short time.  We were told that the taxes imposed on foreign articles would be 
but temporary; that the manufactures would want protection for but a short time – only to give 
them a start … after the experience of four years, the tariff of ’28 came up for consideration, by 
which the protecting system was to be further extended and enlarged.  And what was found to 
have been the result of four years’ experience at the South?  Not a hope fulfilled, not one 
promise performed – and our condition infinitely worse.”70 
     The liberals contended that the American economy had thrived in spite of the American 
System, and that prosperity would have been greater in its absence.  They observed that 
industrialization lowered worldwide prices, and contended that protectionist policies limited the 
                                                 
69
 Ibid., 75-76; Hayne noted that Clay’s third alternative enriched special interests while placing economic burdens 
on ordinary citizens.  He also suggested that the tariffs of 1824 and 1828 must have failed, since large duty revenues 
collected since their enactment had rapidly paid down the national debt, see 76, 78, 91, 97-98. 
70
 Ibid., 81; see comments by Felix Grundy (TN), 394. 
297 
 
 
 
savings that American consumers should have enjoyed.  Senator Isaac Hill of New Hampshire 
argued that “it is not to the high tariff we are to attribute the prosperity of the country.  It is to 
other causes, which have produced an equal prosperity to the neighboring British provinces, 
where there are no protecting duties in force, and where the taxes on necessary articles are 
scarcely one-tenth what they are in the United States.”71   
     Supporters of a “revenue only” tariff charged that the American System was the antithesis of 
an egalitarian republic.  Senator Willie Mangum of North Carolina noted that, “to a superficial 
observer, ours seems to be … a Government of the many for the many.  A closer investigation 
discloses the truth, that it is, practically, a Government of the smallest possible majority over the 
largest possible minority … wielded by a combination of monopolists, capitalists, and 
adventuring politicians, who divide among themselves the richest spoils of their triumphs, and 
throw but a crumb – if, indeed, so much – to the mere serfs of party.”72  He considered the 
current tariff structure “essentially sectional and selfish, and as gradually, but surely, 
undermining the fabric of our noble institutions … equality under the present system of taxation 
is wholly unattainable.”73  Alabama’s Gabriel Moore added that “we have an overflowing 
treasury; but there are some wealthy owners of large sugar plantations in Louisiana, some cotton 
and woolen factories in the Eastern and Northern States, some wealthy owners of iron works in 
New York and Pennsylvania, salt works and salt factories, and some cotton bagging factories in 
Kentucky; they are all in a high state of prosperity, it is true, but they are not satisfied, and it is 
for their benefit we demand of you this tribute and tax.”74  Virginia’s John Tyler charged that 
Clay’s “system” operated beyond the federal government’s rightful role, maintaining that “this 
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system is calculated to win by high rewards, rather than by conviction.  It elevates the money 
principle above the influence of moral and just political causes.  It appeals to the motives of self-
interest, in place of those high and lofty motives which should alone control.”75  
     The threats of nullification and sectional animosities created high anxiety on the Senate floor.  
At times, exchanges became quite personal.  Senator Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey brought 
up an example of the increasingly confrontational attitudes gripping the nation.  He shared 
portions of an article circulating in the South entitled “Call to Arms.” It stated that “the crisis is 
now coming when our politicians – I mean our popularity hunters, will discover that none but 
whig principles will prevail … There will be a hard struggle for it. The United States’ bank, the 
sugar planter, the iron master, and the Lowells and Appletons, will die hard.”76  Another 
instance occurred when Henry Clay volleyed a vitriolic attack on Albert Gallatin, the chair of the 
Philadelphia Free Trade Convention, declaring that: 
the gentleman to whom I am about to allude, although long a resident of this 
country, has no feelings, no attachments, no sympathies, no principles, in 
common with our people.  Nearly fifty years ago, Pennsylvania took him to her 
bosom, and warmed, and cherished, and honored him; and how does he manifest 
his gratitude?  By aiming a vital blow at a system endeared to her by a thorough 
conviction that it is indispensable to her prosperity.  He has filled, at home and 
abroad, some of the highest offices under this Government, during thirty years, 
and he is still at heart an alien.  The authority of his name has been invoked, and 
the labors of his pen, in the form of a memorial to Congress, have been engaged, 
to overthrow the American system, and to substitute the foreign.  Go home to 
your native Europe, and there inculcate upon her sovereigns your Utopian 
doctrines of free trade, and when you have prevailed upon them to unseal their 
ports, and freely admit the produce of Pennsylvania, and other States, come back, 
and we shall be prepared to become converts, and to adopt your faith.
77
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     Clay’s comments sparked an uproar, and several senators vociferously objected to them.  
South Carolina’s Stephen Miller, sarcastically referring to Clay’s attack on Gallatin, stated that 
“I was the more surprised to hear the denunciation of this gentleman, since, at the Free Trade 
Convention, he was looked upon with some jealousy for his supposed political partiality to the 
Senator from Kentucky.  We live in strange times, and seem to be acting the Midsummer 
Night’s Dream – those we woo, turn from us; and those who woo, we turn from.”  Miller wryly 
noted that “The gentleman [Clay] is not backward in retaining foreigners in his ranks.  I will not 
say to Mr. Carey, “Go Home.”  I am willing that that he may still remain, and shed any light he 
may possess in favor of the principles he thinks right.”78  
     The political atmosphere surrounding Congress throughout the winter and the summer of 
1832, with threats of nullification, acrimonious political confrontation between the Jackson and 
Clay factions over the National Bank, and the tariff debates, was painful evidence that the 
Republic faced a severe political crisis.  Against this background, venerable Senator Samuel 
Smith of Maryland urged his colleagues to find a solution to the crisis at hand.  Smith, just shy 
of eighty years of age, was the last remaining member of the founding generation still active in 
national government.  He had served in the Revolution, sat in the Third Congress, and led the 
defense of Baltimore in 1814.
79
  Smith rose from his seat, stating “we have arrived at a crisis … 
at a crisis more appalling than a day of battle.”  He identified the salient issue, acknowledging 
that “South Carolina has expressed itself strongly against the tariff of 1828 – stronger than the 
other States are willing to speak.  But, sir, the whole of the South feel deeply the oppression of 
that tariff … the whole Southern States – all, consider it as oppressive.”  The Senate patriarch 
charged that economic interests were the problem.  The culprits were “the rich, who entered into 
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the business [of manufactures] after the act of 1824 … the capitalist who had invested his capital 
in manufactures, was not to be satisfied with ordinary profits, and therefore the act of 1828.”  
Smith concluded that workers were the losers in this situation; it was “the handicraft man – the 
blacksmith – the whitesmith – the workers of bar iron, [who] are all cruelly oppressed by the 
heavy duty on that all-important article [of iron]. … Why?  They are not rich – they must be 
sacrificed to the rich iron master … if you intend that this country shall be a manufacturing 
country, you must give the manufacturers the raw material (as England does) free of duty, or 
with very light duty.”80    
     Smith saw the root of the present crisis in the harmful impact of special economic interests.  
He observed that “when the Senate met [to open the present session], there was a strong 
disposition with all parties to ameliorate the tariff of 1828; but I now see a change, which make s 
me almost despair of anything effectual being accomplished.  Even the small concessions made 
by the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. Clay,] have been reprobated by the lobby members, the 
agents of the manufactures.  I am told they have put their fiat on any change whatsoever, and 
hence, as a consequence, the change in the course and language of gentlemen, which almost 
precludes all hope.  Those interested men hang on the Committee of Manufactures like an 
incubus.”81    
     Henry Clay redirected his verbal assault, seeking to discredit Smith by accusing him of 
holding inconsistent positions on trade policy over the course of his tenure in Congress.  Clay 
haughtily declared that “it comes, then, to this: The honorable gentleman was in favor of 
protecting manufactures, but he had turned – I need not use the word – he has abandoned 
manufactures.  Thus, “Old politicians chew on wisdom past, and totter on in business to the 
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last.””  Smith angrily retorted, “The last allusion is unworthy of the gentleman.  Totter, sir, I 
totter.  Though some twenty years older than the gentleman, I can yet stand firm, and am yet 
able to correct his errors.  I could take a view of that gentleman’s course, which would show 
how inconsistent he has been.”  Clay interrupted, exclaiming “Take it, sir, take it, I dare you.”  
As the Vice President attempted to bring the chamber to order, Smith cried “No sir … I will not 
take it.  I will not so far disregard what is due to the dignity of the Senate.”82  
     Even though the Senate was well aware of a crisis, finding a middle ground solution proved 
elusive.  The nullification threat served to harden positions.  Nationalists insisted that the 
majority view should prevail.  Rufus Choate argued that “the greatest good of the greatest 
number; regardless where or on whom the particular hardship which all general policy must 
produce shall fall … the moral right of the minority is that the majority shall exercise a sound 
discretion in good faith.  The moral duty of the minority is acquiescence.”83  A few free traders, 
searching for a compromise, acknowledged that some level of moderation in a reduction might 
be necessary.  Robert Hayne, the leading Senate spokesman for laissez-faire, made clear that 
“we do not propose to destroy, or even injure, the manufacturers.  We are willing they should 
have the incidental protection afforded by a fair revenue system … we do not insist on an 
immediate reduction to the lowest revenue standard.  As the public debt is not yet paid, we are 
willing that the reduction on the protected articles should be gradual, and spread, if gentlemen 
please, over two or three years.”84      
     Though the 1832 debates were characterized by loud rhetoric and unyielding positions due to 
the intensifying crisis, they also featured some degree of continuity with previous trade policy 
confrontations.  Many senators still viewed the trade policy debate as a competition between the 
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three great economic spheres of agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing.  Proponents of 
agriculture and commerce often concluded that economic favoritism for manufactures came at 
their expense.  John Tyler of Virginia, whose state was not heavily invested in commerce, 
nonetheless pointed out the general impact of the tariff upon the American maritime was 
“another of the bitter fruits of the American system.”  He noted that “This noble manufacture, 
the ship, in which America had outstripped the world, employing, as it does, twenty times the 
amount of domestic labor and capital, with the highly favored iron business, is made but a 
secondary matter, and is threatened with a continuance of the destroying influences of a system 
the most short-sighted, oppressive, and unjust, that civilization has ever tolerated.”85  
Tennessee’s Felix Grundy observed that American commerce was diminishing, and he attributed 
the trend to the American System.  Grundy reported that the nation’s tonnage engaged in foreign 
commerce was 809,724 tons in 1817, but had dropped to 650,142 tons by 1829.  In comparison, 
the national tonnage engaged in the coasting trade had increased from 519,186 tons in 1817 to 
610,654 in 1829.
86
   
     Agricultural interests complained that they also were economically harmed by the tariff.  
Stephen Miller of South Carolina, on behalf of agriculture, asked, “Shall the primary interest of 
the country be sacrificed to a secondary one?  Shall those who till the ground be made tributary 
to those who handle the shuttle?”87 
     On March 30, the Senate laid the tariff issue on the table, with the expectation that the 
Committee of Manufactures would report a final draft of a new tariff bill later in the session.  
The draft bill was subsequently returned on May 1.  However, the Senate waited until early July 
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to take up final resolution of the tariff and distribution issues.  One feature of the revised tariff 
bill was a series of amendments to the original draft adjusting the rates on various goods.
88
   
     The Committee of Manufactures draft essentially moved duties back from the levels 
established in 1828 to those put in place by the Tariff of 1824.  However, the Committee also 
proposed a series of amendments significantly increasing protection for certain enumerated 
goods.  These amendments were sharply debated by the two great oratory Senate protagonists of 
1832, with Henry Clay supporting the protection principle and Robert Hayne opposing it.  
Throughout the week of July 2, 1832, the opposing factions maneuvered against one another 
over the various amendments.  Table 8.3 tallies the Senate votes on these important 
amendments.  Key industries such as iron, sugar, hemp and wool all received added protection.  
Certain luxury goods such as coffee and tea were exempted from duties.  A few specialized 
industries, including silver and saddle goods received extra protection as well.   
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Table 8.3. Senate Votes on Key Amendments to the 1832 Tariff Bill46 
        Clay Hayne 
Issue          Stance Stance  Ayes Nays 
Votes held on July 3, 1832: 
Duty on flannels capped at 50% ad valorem   Nay Aye  19 26 
Votes held on July 5, 1832: 
Increase duty on silver from 5% to 25%   Aye Nay  22 21 
Increase duty on saddlery from 10% to 25%   Aye Nay  21 25 
Finished iron products minimum levy at raw iron rates Aye Nay  25 20 
Sail duck duty changed from 15% to $.08 per square yard Aye Nay  23 22 
Cotton bagging duty from $.035 to $.040 per square yard Aye Nay  22 22  
Brown sugar duty from $.025 to $.030 per pound  Aye Nay  24 18 
Eliminate all duties on coffee     Aye Nay  31 14 
Eliminate duty on Oriental tea    Aye Nay  28 15 
Increase duty on ladies hats from 30% to 50%  Aye Nay  22 22 
Increase duty on cordage from 25% to 80%   Aye Nay  26 16 
Add duty of 30% for musical instruments   Aye Nay  25 16 
Strike out clause charging non-enumerated imports 15% Aye Nay  24 21  
Votes held on July 5, 1832: 
Raise minimum wool ad valorem from 50% to 60%  Aye Nay  25 23 
Establish a 35% ad valorem duty on woolens  Aye Nay  25 23 
Establish a 60% ad valorem duty on woolens  Aye Nay  24 24 
Establish a 57% ad valorem duty on woolens  Aye Nay  25 23 
Votes held on July 6, 1832: 
Finished iron products minimum levy at raw iron rates Aye Nay  26 21 
Cotton bagging duty from $.035 to $.040 per square yard  Aye Nay  25 21 
Source: 11 Reg. Deb. 1177-1205 (1832).  Note that on tie votes, Vice-President Calhoun cast the 
tie breaking vote in the negative. 
 
     Henry Clay and the American System supporters routed Hayne’s free traders on virtually 
every amendment vote.  Three of the four successes that Hayne mustered on the above votes 
were the result of deadlocked roll calls, where Vice-President John Calhoun cast a tie-breaking 
vote.  Even then, Clay eventually got his way on cotton bagging.  Though overall tariff rates in 
the draft bill were lowered, economic nationalists successfully retained the highly protective 
attributes that had characterized American trade policy since 1824.  
     Hayne, frustrated in defeat, laid out three major objections to the bill.  The first was that the 
bill’s passage affirmed the protective principle.  Secondly, the bill retained the features of 
minimum values and specific duties for certain goods.  Lastly, he expected the bill to generate 
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far more revenues that were required to meet the expenses of the federal government.  Hayne 
summed up the just-finished debate by arguing that “the advocates of the American system insist 
that the only proper subjects for federal taxation are those foreign articles which enter into 
competition with similar articles made or produced within the United States, while we in the 
South contend that there is neither reason nor justice in subjecting to exorbitant taxation every 
article which we receive from abroad in exchange for our productions.”89  Edward Everett of 
Massachusetts, who cast a vote in favor of the tariff, attempted to mollify the minority, stating 
that “we are all willing to repeal duties; but I pray you be patient; be gradual; feel your way … 
above all, sir, do not nullify the law.  Do not expose the country to the uncalculated hazards of 
that step.”90  
     On July 9, 1832, the Senate ratified the Tariff of 1832 by a vote of 32 to 16.
91
  The Senate 
version of the bill included a total of forty-six amendments to the original House bill.  When the 
House received the revisions, it accepted thirty-nine amendments and rejected seven.  The 
House objections included a rollback of the increased duties for brown sugar, sail duck, cotton 
bagging, as well as reducing the ad valorem on woolens back to 50%.  Three days later, the 
Senate accepted the House’s proposals.92   
     Most Jacksonian Democrats hoped for substantive reductions to the tariff in 1832.  They 
were willing to make reductions gradual in order to prevent sudden negative economic 
consequences to manufactures.  Robert Hayne stated that “I adopted the principle sanctioned by 
the Free Trade Convention of Philadelphia, who declare their willingness to acquiesce in such a 
reduction of the tariff “as shall be prospective in its operation, thereby avoiding any sudden 
                                                 
89
 Ibid., 1208-1209. 
90
 13 Reg. Deb. 3769 (1832). 
91
 11 Reg. Deb. 1219 (1832). 
92
 Ibid., 1219, 1286-1290, 13 Reg. Deb. 3887-3888 (1832). 
306 
 
 
 
revulsion that might operate with undue severity on the manufacturing interest, but leading to 
the desired result with the least possible injury to the interests which have grown up under the 
system of protective duties.””93  But, if the Tariff of 1832 was a referendum on the American 
System, free traders clearly failed.  The liberals were aware that the nationalists held the upper 
hand early on.  Senator Felix Grundy of Tennessee wrote to Martin Van Buren that “The Tariff 
is underway in the other house – I was in the house some time this morning.  Bell of our State 
was making a very good speech on that subject – I induce to think, the Tariff will be reduced 
somewhat, not sufficiently.”94   
     Table 8.4 shows that the 1832 tariff voting patterns were mixed from a geographical 
perspective.  Many representatives from the Southern regions voted for it and a significant 
minority of House members from the Northern regions voted against it.  Almost one-third of the 
senators from the three Southern regions voted for it. 
Table 8.4. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1832 by Region47 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)      17    17    12    0  
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      43    18      8    0 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)        19      8        2      2 
South   (GA, NC, SC)        12    16    0    6    
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)     17      0      5    1 
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MS, TN)   23      6    5    7 
Totals                 131     65   32  16 
Source: 11 Reg. Deb. 1219 (1832), 13 Reg. Deb. 3830-3831 (1832); note that although the 
Register reports the House roll call vote as 132 to 65, only 131 aye votes are recorded.   
 
The Tariff of 1832 voting pattern was both unique and complex.  All of the tariff votes from 
1816 through 1828 represented efforts to progressively increase tariff rates, making it relatively 
easy to generally associate “aye” votes with nationalism and “nays” with free trade.  The 1832 
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bill reversed that trend, even as it retained very high duties.  Thus, a nationalist legislator might 
easily be motivated to oppose the bill because the overall level of protection had been reduced 
and free-trade sympathizers might likewise vote for the bill because it represented incremental 
progress in a long-term effort to reduce tariff rates.
95
   
     Table 8.5 summarizes the Tariff of 1832 voting patterns based on political loyalty, which was 
loosely correlated.  In the House, substantial numbers of the Jackson and Anti-Jackson factions 
took minority positions within their coalitions.  In the Senate, the Anti-Jackson forces exhibited 
firm solidarity for the Tariff, but they were joined by a substantial minority of the Jackson 
faction.   
Table 8.5. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1832 by Party Affiliation48 
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Jackson    87    30  11  14 
Anti-Jackson    36    24  21    0 
Anti-Mason      8      7    0    0 
Nullifier      0      4    0    2 
Totals   131    65    32  16  
Source: 11 Reg. Deb. 1219 (1832), 13 Reg. Deb. 3830-3831 (1832);  note that although the 
Register reports the House roll call vote as 132 to 65, only 131 aye votes are recorded.   
 
     During the 1832 debates, Senator Thomas Ewing of Ohio addressed changing economic 
circumstances which were causing corresponding changes in congressional voting patterns on a 
regional basis.  He specifically addressed New England, observing that the region “opposed the 
tariff of 1824, and, sir, she did present an almost undivided front against it.  Her capital was 
vested in other employment than that of manufactures; her enterprise directed to other pursuits; 
and a disposition to sudden change forms no part of the character of her people.”  Ewing 
explained that dynamic changes had taken place, leading to a changed political outlook.  He 
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recounted that “the direction of her capital was then gradually changed, so as to adapt itself to the 
legislation of the country; and the tariff of 1824, which she had dreaded as an evil, proved to be a 
blessing. Large sums of money were invested in manufacturing establishments.”96   
     The Senate finally considered Clay’s distribution proposal on July 3, 1832, just a few days 
before the tariff bill passed.  The Senate passed a bill that pledged a portion of the revenues from 
the sale of public lands to the states for the purpose of internal improvements by a vote of 26 to 
18.
97
  The House still needed to consider the bill, but the Lower House deferred consideration.   
     The passage of the Tariff of 1832 brought South Carolina’s nullification threat to the political 
forefront.  In the wake of its passage, George Dallas warned his Southern colleagues, that “The 
excitements of the day may be gratified: they may delude themselves into the belief that they are 
laboring to vindicate the constitution, or to uphold the principles of human liberty; but if they 
recklessly involve the American people in the horrors, uncertainties, and fatal consequences of 
civil war, and of violent disruption, they must be content to receive, as a merited reward, an 
immortality of detestation … the desolation of perpetual conflicts, and in the desolation of 
sectional bondage – will doom them to loud, deep, and everlasting execration.”98  A national 
crisis was at hand. 
Compromise: The Tariff of 1833 
     South Carolina’s George McDuffie hinted during the 1828 debates that the tariff issue 
threatened to rupture the political fabric of the United States.  He stated that “I do sincerely 
believe that neither this government, nor any free government, can exist for a quarter century, 
under such a system of legislation.  Its inevitable tendency is to corrupt, not only the public 
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functionaries, but all those portions of the Union and classes of society who have an interest, real 
or imaginary, in the bounties it provides.”99  
     Though the Tariff of 1832 retreated from the high rates established by the Tariff of 
Abominations, these concessions proved insufficient to satisfy South Carolina’s Nullifiers.  The 
state’s 1832 elections left Nullifiers in control of approximately 75% of the state senate and 80% 
of the state house.  Governor James Hamilton immediately called the state legislature into special 
session on October 22, and members quickly authorized a special convention to assemble on 
November 19.  On November 24, that convention approved reports authored by Robert Hayne 
and James McDuffie calling for nullification of the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832.  The Convention 
set February 1, 1833 as the date when the federal tariff acts would be nullified.
100
   
     South Carolina’s actions triggered a federal government reaction along two distinctly 
different lines.  President Andrew Jackson issued a Nullification Proclamation on December 11, 
1832, asserting his right as president to enforce the laws of the United States.
101
  He also 
supported a series of measures presented to Congress on January 16, 1833, collectively known as 
the “Force Bill.”  Among its provisions, the Force Bill requested approval to enforce the tariff in 
South Carolina by military means, if necessary.
102
  In the meantime, simultaneous efforts 
emerged in the legislative branch to seek some sort of compromise.  By December 1832, the 
Senate and House were both exploring possible remedies.   
     The Tariff of 1833’s purpose was to remedy a political crisis rather than establish trade 
policy.  The first efforts to defuse the Nullification Crisis took place in the House.  On January 8, 
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1833, Representative Gulian Verplanck, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
offered a new tariff bill designed to reduce duties in order to achieve a compromise.
103
  
Verplanck’s bill proposed rolling back the tariff to 1816 levels.  Unfortunately, the proposal 
contained two fatal flaws, which alienated a pair of critical constituencies.  First, manufacturers 
were upset over the short time frame of two years to accomplish significant tariff reductions.  
Liberals protested the fact that the proposal retained discriminatory protective principles rather 
than an ad valorem structure.
104
  As early as January 23, Treasury Secretary Louis McLane 
advised the President that the Verplanck bill had little chance of passage.
105
     
     As the House debates degenerated into a political quagmire, many congressmen scrambled to 
save the protective principle or defend their constituent’s specific economic interests.  Even 
Verplanck realized his bill was in trouble from “a long, ardent, and desultory debate … by those 
who were adverse to its whole policy … almost every item of the bill had been touched upon in 
some way or other, and transiently attacked.”106  Pennsylvania’s Thomas McKennan exemplified 
the trend when he warned that “If this bill is adopted, I venture to affirm that, as sure as the sun 
shines in the firmament, this important branch [wool growing] of American industry must go by 
the board, and the capital vested in it sacrificed and destroyed.”107  John Davis of Massachusetts 
added that the Verplanck proposal “will check the operations of capital; it will, I fear, stop 
investments, if it does not crush that enterprising, valuable class of young men who have entered 
upon business, relying upon their industry and capacity to carry them forward.  They are in debt, 
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and I fear timid creditors may fall upon them.”108  The Verplanck bill never even came up for a 
vote.  
      The volatile situation was also considered by the Senate.  John Tyler concluded that “a 
speedy action on the subject of the tariff was indispensably necessary … a great crisis had 
arrived, and definitive action – powerful, well sustained, and efficient action – was necessary to 
save the country.”109  The challenging task required utmost political skill, and it was Henry Clay 
that proved most instrumental in finding resolution.  Clay was an unlikely savior, having lost the 
Bank War and the presidential election the previous year.  His melancholy frame of mind is 
evidenced by two January 1833 letters.  In one, he stated “I am, and those with whom I converse, 
in a dense fog … one day we are told the Tariff now before the House will pass, and that orders 
have been given from Albany and the White House to that effect.  The next we are assured there 
is no prospect of its passage and that both the President and Vice-President elect are opposed to 
it.  Scarcely any two members of the House that you will meet, agree as to its fate.”  In another, 
Clay unhappily remarked that “As to politics, we have no past, no future.  After 44 years of 
existence under the present Constitution what single principle is fixed?  The Bank?  No.  Internal 
improvements?  No.  The Tariff?  No.  Who is to interpret the Constitution?  No.  We are as 
much afloat at seas as the day when the Constitution came into operation.”110  
     Nonetheless, Clay was drawn to the difficult challenge.  Less than one week later, he hinted 
that he was already at work to structure a solution.  He confided to a friend that “I have been 
thinking of some settlement of that question, but I have not entirely matured any plan; and if I 
had, I am not satisfied that it would be expedient to offer it.  Any plan that I might offer would 
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be instantly opposed because I offered it.  Sometimes I have thought that, considering how I have 
been and am hated by both parties (the Tariff and the Anti-Tariff) I would leave them to fight it 
out as well as they can.  The lingering hopes of my Country prevail over these feelings of a just 
resentment, and my judgment tells me that disregarding them I ought to the last to endeavor to do 
what I can to … re-establish confidence and concord.” 111    
     Clay quietly worked outside of the Senate chambers, and on February 12, 1833 he introduced 
a new tariff bill.  He explained that “I am compelled to express the opinion, formed after the 
most deliberate reflection, and on a full survey of the whole country, that, whether rightfully or 
wrongfully, the tariff stands in imminent danger … if the system can be preserved beyond the 
next session, it must be by some means now within the reach of human sagacity.”112  Clay 
realized that the preservation of the American System tariff structure was in jeopardy due to the 
crisis and that a tactical retreat might be prudent under the political circumstances.   
     The compromise bill’s key objective was to shield American manufacturing from the shock of 
any quick and dramatic reduction to tariff rates.  Therefore, it included a lengthened time frame 
where the bulk of the reductions were set as late into the time period as possible.  He was willing 
to accept ad valorem rates and abandon discriminatory protection to attain this primary objective. 
     Clay’s unlikely ally was John Calhoun.  The Vice-President resigned his office on December 
28, 1832 to return to the Senate, replacing Robert Hayne who, in turn, became South Carolina’s 
governor.
113
  Calhoun’s gain in the compromise mirrored what Clay was willing to barter away.  
The Gales & Seaton’s correspondent reported that “The general principles of this bill received 
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his [Calhoun’s] approbation.  He believed if the present difficulties were to be adjusted, they 
must be adjusted on the principles embraced in the bill, of fixing ad valorem duties.”114 
     Reactions to the bill varied widely.  Senator John Forsyth of Georgia proclaimed that “The 
Senator from Kentucky says, the tariff is in danger; aye, sir, it is in its last gasp … the whole 
feeling of the country is opposed to the high protective system.  The wily serpent that crept into 
our Eden has been touched by the spear Ithuriel.”115  However, Daniel Webster recalled implied 
promises, stating that previous tariffs created a “conviction which was forced on the East, and 
other portions of the country, that the protective system was to be the settled policy of the 
Government.”116  Others accepted that the bill offered no long-term policy answers, but were 
satisfied that it represented a practical and pragmatic solution to the political crisis.  Maine’s 
John Holmes supported the bill “because it proposed a truce for eight years, and provided the 
basis for a treaty to be carried into effect at the expiration of ten years.”117  
     As the legislative branch wrestled with compromise proposals, other events increased the 
odds for a successful resolution.  On January 21, South Carolina delayed the Nullification 
Ordinance effective date from February 1 to the end of the Twenty-Second Congress in March, 
buying time for the compromise efforts.
118
  The Senate passed Jackson’s Force Bill on February 
20 by a vote of 32 to 1, with John Tyler the lone dissident.  However, it was a pyrrhic victory for 
the President, as fifteen senators chose to abstain.
119
  Jackson, in the absence of a mandate, 
softened his stance.   
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     Clay and Calhoun quickly ran the Compromise through the Senate.  The bill was introduced 
to the House, where it was technically required to originate, and on February 26, the House 
passed the bill by a vote of 119 to 85.
120
  On March 1, the Senate approved the measure by a 
margin of 29 to 16.
121
     
     Table 8.6 summarizes the 1833 vote by region, and shows that the compromise was favorably 
viewed throughout the South and West.  Most of the dissent originated from New England and 
the Atlantic states, where 75% of the representatives and 50% of the senators voted against.  
These states, where American industrialization had taken deepest root to date along with 
significant outlays of financial capital, were lukewarm to the prospect of significant economic 
concessions, even in the face of political crisis.   
Table 8.6. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1833 by Region49 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, NH, RI, VT)      10    28    6    6      
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      15    47    4    4        
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)        29      1    3    1          
South   (GA, NC, SC)       28      0    4    0        
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)     10      7    2    3      
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MS, TN)   27      2  10    2    
Totals                 119     85   29  16 
Source: 14 Reg. Deb. 808-809 (1833), 15 Reg. Deb. 1810-1811 (1833). 
 
     Table 8.7 shows the roll call vote by political persuasion.  President Jackson’s supporters, 
along with the small group of Nullifiers, who would soon coalesce into the free-trade leaning 
Democrat Party, generally favored the compromise and a gradual reduction of the tariff.  The 
anti-Jackson bloc and Anti-Masons, who would eventually form into the nationalist-oriented 
Whig Party, proved less enthusiastic for the compromise, particularly in the House. 
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Table 8.7. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1833 by Party Affiliation50 
   House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party   Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Jackson    95    27  14    8           
Anti-Jackson    20    43  13    8 
Anti-Mason      0    15    0    0 
Nullifier      4      0     2    0 
Totals   119    85  29  16        
Source: 14 Reg. Deb. 808-809 (1833), 15 Reg. Deb. 1810-1811 (1833). 
 
     Another part of Clay’s compromise involved a renewed effort to pass the Distribution Bill as 
a concession to nationalists.  The Senate had passed the bill the previous July, but the House had 
not yet acted.  It finally passed the “land bill” on March 1, 1833 by a sparse vote of 96 to 40, 
with many members either not voting or absent.
122
  President Jackson pocket vetoed the measure 
and the internal improvements initiative died for the moment.
123
  
     An analysis of the Distribution bill votes, summarized in Table 8.8, shows that the Northeast 
generally favored, the Southeast generally opposed, and the West slightly favored the measure.       
Table 8.8. Ratification Vote of the 1832-1833 Distribution Bill by Region51 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)     20      2  11    1  
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      41          4      7    1 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)          8        11      1    3 
South   (GA, NC, SC)          3        7      0    6 
Northwest (IL, IN, OH)     13        3      3    2 
Southwest (AL, KY, LA, MO, MS, TN)   10    12      4    5 
Totals                   95    39  26  18 
Source: 14 Reg. Deb. 1174 (1833), 15 Reg. Deb. 1920-1921 (1833); note that although the 
Register reports the House roll call vote as 96 to 40, only 95 aye and 39 nay votes are recorded.   
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Table 8.9 shows the same vote by political affiliation.  The nationalist Anti-Jackson and Anti-
Mason factions overwhelmingly supported the measure.  The Jacksonian faction was less united. 
Table 8.9. Ratification Vote of the 1832-1833 Distribution Bill by Party Affiliation52 
Political    House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party       Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Jackson       34        36      5  16 
Anti-Jackson      49          1  21    0 
Anti-Mason      12      0    0    0 
Nullifier        0      2    0    2  
Totals                  95    39  26  18 
Source: 14 Reg. Deb. 1174 (1833), 15 Reg. Deb. 1920-1921 (1833); note that although the 
Register reports the House roll call vote as 96 to 40, only 95 aye and 39 nay votes are recorded.   
 
     The Compromise Tariff of 1833 slowly reduced tariff rates over nine years.  The bill retained 
duties at 1832 levels, scheduling a gradual reduction to a 20% maximum ad valorem rate by June 
30, 1842.  However, the rate of reduction was uneven.  The approximately 50% overall rate in 
effect in 1833 would be reduced in increments of 3% on each of the first days of 1834, 1836, 
1838, and 1840, to settle an effective rate to 38%.  This was to be followed by two more 
incremental reductions of 9% each on January 1 and July 1 of 1842, to arrive at a permanent 
effective rate of 20%.
124
  Thus, the Compromise retained the protectionist attributes of the Tariff 
of 1832 for an extended period, far longer than the two years proposed by Verplanck.
125
 
Conclusions  
     Ominously, the prospects for the Compromise Tariff of 1833 were not promising.  The 
Congressional Journal reported John Calhoun as stating that “There had been a good deal said 
during the discussion, how far this passage of the bill would involve a pledge as to the 
arrangement of the tariff which he had proposed … he had little faith in pledges; he had 
experience enough to know that the most solemn compact, and even the constitution itself, would 
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be violated … whenever the dominant party saw its advantage in such violation.”126  Clay 
validated Calhoun’s concerns by declaring that, “In the first place, I would remark that the bill 
contains no obligatory pledges; it could make none; none are attempted.  The power over the 
subject is in the constitution; put there by those who formed it, and liable to be taken out only by 
an amendment of the instrument.  The next Congress, and every succeeding Congress, will 
undoubtedly have the power to repeal the law whenever they may think proper.”127  As a 
temporary move, however, the bill was successful.  It averted a catastrophic political crisis and 
established a trade policy truce.  Nationalists were satisfied by the extended period of tariff 
reduction and free traders by the acceptance of an ad valorem tariff structure featuring low rates.   
     The Compromise Tariff of 1833 marked the end of a contentious period where the American 
trade policy debate was deeply impacted by sectional jealousies, powerful economic special 
interests, and individual political ambitions.  This chapter of the trade policy saga began with the 
Tariff of 1824, when Henry Clay’s American System, including high protective tariffs, became 
ascendant.  The following nine years featured a series of contentious tariff battles in 1827, 1828, 
1832, and 1833, roughly coinciding with the interlude between the death of the Federalist Party 
and the birth of the Whig Party.     
     Between 1824 and 1833 the three great issues of slavery, states rights, and trade policy briefly 
aligned with each another in American politics.  This came about because early American 
industrialization between 1820 and 1830 was largely confined to Northern states, and 
particularly to New England and the Atlantic states.  The American North and South sharply 
contrasted with one another in terms of labor force (free labor versus slave labor) and 
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industrialization (emerging industrialization versus pre-industrialization), creating a temporary 
scenario where trade policy divided along the exact same geographical lines as the slavery issue. 
     State rights became the weapon and the tariff the opportunity for Southern reaction to the real 
issue, threats against the Peculiar Institution.  Sectional tensions were initially triggered by the 
Missouri Crisis of 1820.  Southerners became concerned that faster population growth in the 
North, coupled with shrinking proportions of slaves in some of the northernmost Southern states, 
might create a situation where Northern political majorities could impose their will on the South, 
including slavery’s extinction.  The tariff battles in 1824, 1828, and 1832 created a pretext for 
the South to battle over the truly salient issue, which was slavery.  
      George McDuffie acknowledged that slavery was the real issue in 1832 and 1833.  He 
complained that “the moment the majority transcend the limits of the constitution, and act upon 
the separate and exclusive interests of the minority, the right to govern ceases, as well as the 
presumption upon which it is founded.”  McDuffie added that “with the people of the Southern 
States, this [tariff issue] is not a pecuniary question of profit and loss, but a question of 
constitutional liberty.  If they were to voluntarily surrender, to an irresponsible majority, the 
unlimited right of appropriating their property to its own use, they would be the slaves of that 
majority; for “no man has a right to that which another man has the right to take from him.””128 
     Northern contemporaries also recognized slavery as the underlying issue. Senator Thomas 
Ewing of Ohio plainly saw this in 1832, when he declared that “the curse of slavery, and not the 
tariff, is in truth the withering curse which blights the fair hopes of this fair and otherwise happy 
and favored land.”129  Pennsylvania’s George Dallas added that the very foundation of the 
Southern economy was at the root of its travails, commenting that “the great Southern staple, 
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cotton, is the product of an exhausting plant – a plant which feeds voraciously upon the fertility 
and strength of the best soils.”130   
     As Congress wrestled with sectional controversies and the tariff, it became apparent that there 
were differing opinions as to whether industrialization would be a national, versus regional, 
process.  Nathan Appleton concluded the South was capable of industrializing.  He observed that 
“the capital and industry of the South are equally open to the action of the stimulus of the tariff 
with those of the North.  Why are not the mountains of Virginia and North Carolina covered with 
flocks of sheep, as well as those of Vermont, for which, all admit, they are equally well 
adapted.”131  Many Southerners disagreed.  Robert Hayne declared that the South was incapable 
of embracing manufactures because of its labor system.  He remarked that “except as to a few 
coarse articles, slave labor is utterly incapable of being applied to such an object.  Slaves are too 
improvident, too incapable of that minute, constant, delicate attention, and that persevering 
industry which is essential to the success of manufacturing establishments.”132  Henry Clay sided 
with Appleton, declaring that “it is contended … that the people of the South cannot, from 
physical and other causes, engage in the manufacturing arts.  I deny the premises, and I deny the 
conclusion.  I deny the fact of inability, and, if it existed, I deny the conclusion that we must, 
therefore, break down our manufactures, and nourish those of foreign countries.  The South 
possesses, in an extraordinary degree, two of the most important elements of the manufacturing 
industry – water power and labor.”133  
     Although slavery and minority rights were root causes of the tariff controversies in the early 
1830s, it is important to note that there was also a continuity of themes in the debates that traced 
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back to the Founding.  Willie Mangum glumly noted that the crisis of 1832 was about economic 
interests and profit.  He asked, “Where is the sentiment of the slogan, once so dreadful to the 
enemy – “give me liberty or give me death!”  It is heard no more in the land.  It is money – 
money – give me money, or.  Sir, if I could coin my heart into gold, and if it were lawful in the 
sight of Heaven, I would pray God to give me firmness to do it, to save this Union from the 
fearful – the dreadful shock which I verily believe impends.”134  In the end, Southerners sought a 
rejection of the American System, particularly protectionist policies, on the grounds that 
discriminatory tariffs ran counter to true republican principles.  The structure of the Compromise 
Tariff of 1833 demonstrates this point.  Southerners overwhelmingly approved of a bill that 
retained high tariff levels for the next nine years in return for a promise to migrate national trade 
policy to an ad valorem structure.   
     The passage of the Compromise Tariff of 1833 established a truce that would last until 1841.  
In the near term, the Nullification Crisis was successfully averted.  Over the next eight years the 
economic landscape of the United States would undergo significant change.  As Clay and 
Calhoun had hinted, there was to be another confrontation over trade policy and protectionism in 
the future.  However, when the issue resurrected itself in 1841, circumstances would be much 
different.  Slavery no longer would overshadow the tariff issue.  The spread of American 
industrialization would. 
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CHAPTER 9 – IDEAS AND INTERESTS TRANSFORMED: THE TARIFF OF 1842 
“It [the Constitution] authorizes you to regulate … by the imposition of discriminating duties, or 
prohibitory duties on imports of foreign manufactures … for the purpose … of encouraging 
domestic manufactures, and any and every other form of domestic industry.”1  
- Senator Rufus Choate of Massachusetts (March 14, 1842 remarks to the Senate) 
 
“After the peace of Ghent, Congress, warned by the experience of 1786, decreed that for the first 
year the previous duties should be doubled, and during this period the country continued to 
prosper.  Coerced, however, by powerful private interests which were opposed to those of the 
manufacturers, and persuaded by the arguments of theorists, it resolved in the year 1816 to make 
a considerable reduction in the import duties, whereupon the same effects of external 
competition reappeared … viz. ruin of manufactories, unsaleability of produce, fall in the value 
of property and general calamity among landowners.”2 
- Friedrich List, “National System of Political Economy” (1841) 
 
“Instead of asking for protection to increase the prices of their products, they should produce 
cheaper, and this was the only way to become prosperous.  They could not, by legislation, 
change the laws of trade, which were of Divine origin. … the life of business was competition.”3 
- Representative Dixon Lewis of Alabama (July 11, 1842 remarks to the House)    
 
“The Journal of Commerce thinks we are getting “a little free-trade crazy.”  If this is so, we 
shall at least have the company, in our lunacy, of some of the soundest thinkers and purest and 
most prudent men in our country.  The malady, moreover, is spreading and we should not be 
surprised if the Journal of Commerce itself should be touched before long.  … Had Adam Smith 
lived in our day and our country, he, too, we apprehend, would have become “a little free-trade 
crazy,” or at least his sanity would have been called in question by certain journalists.”4 
- William Leggett, New York “Evening Post” (December 13, 1834) 
 
     The brokered compromise of 1833 lasted eight years.  Hopes for a new-found harmony over 
trade policy, however, would be dashed.  The major culprit was the Panic of 1837, the most 
severe American economic downturn since 1819.  The Panic’s consequences included difficult 
times for American businesses, particularly manufactures, and a threat to anticipated post-1833 
treasury surpluses.  Nationalists seized on both developments to renew arguments for protection, 
believing that it would cure the nation’s economic ills.   
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     In 1841 and 1842, just as the most significant portion of the Compromise tariff reductions 
were scheduled to occur, political friction over trade policy sparked again.  However, the newest 
round sharply differed from prior debates, representing a fundamental change in the core nature 
of American trade policy discourse.  Two major factors contributed to this development.  The 
first involved the expansion of industrialization from the Northeast to other regions of the United 
States, and importantly including the South.  A second major factor was the emergence of the 
Second Party System, where Whig and Democrat parties advanced mutually exclusive positions 
on trade policy.
5
  
     Consequently, the 1841 and 1842 debates were not played out on the regional lines that had 
characterized the recent debates of 1824, 1828, and 1832.  Rather, the demarcation point was 
based on party, and both the nationalist oriented Whig and free trade oriented Democrat blocs 
included constituent members from all parts of the United States.  Industrialization, which “took 
off” in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states only two decades before, was now integrated in 
varying degrees into the broad national economic landscape.   
The American Economy, 1833 to 1842 
     The American economy faced serious challenges by 1841.  American gross domestic product 
per capita, adversely impacted by the Panic, was lower in 1841 than it had been in 1833.  Despite 
lagging economic growth, however, American manufactures experienced continued “take off” 
during the period.   
     The Panic of 1837 defined the trade policy debates of 1841 and 1842, as nationalists argued 
that increased protection would counteract its impact, while free traders insisted that high tariff 
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rates were the cause of the Panic.  Trade policy, though, wasn’t the sole factor contributing to the 
Panic.  In similar fashion to the Panic of 1819, excessive land speculation created an economic 
“bubble” that burst in 1837.  Lenders in Great Britain advanced almost $100 million in credit to 
American borrowers.
6
  Public land sales were ten times greater in 1836 than they had been in 
1830.  Real estate values in New York City doubled between 1833 and 1836.  The land frenzy 
was facilitated by banks and lenders providing “easy” credit to the marketplace.7   
     The Panic devastated the American economy.  By June 1837, only three months into the Van 
Buren presidency, only six American banks continued to redeem bills for specie.  Over 500,000 
American workers lost their jobs and ninety-three New York cotton trading firms, with a 
combined capitalization value of $60 million, failed.
8
  The liquidated capital of these firms 
totaled two and a half times the annual Federal government revenues.
9
  The calamitous state of 
affairs was accompanied by falling wholesale prices, which dropped 29% between 1837 and 
1842.
10
   
     Government was adversely impacted by the Panic.  In 1836, Congress finally passed Henry 
Clay’s distribution act, where federal land sales revenues were allocated to the states in quarterly 
payments starting in January 1837.  The distribution was suspended after only three installments, 
due to a rapidly shrinking treasury balance.  The Panic’s impact was not confined to the national 
government; the bad economy forced the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Michigan, Illinois, 
Indiana and Arkansas to default on outstanding bond issues on January 1, 1842.
11
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     Despite the problems caused by the Panic, American industrialization proceeded at a very 
rapid pace.  Figure 9.1 illustrates American manufacturing production levels from 1820 through 
1842.  The industrialization process, which gained significant momentum after the passage of the 
Tariff of 1828, continued its upward trajectory throughout the 1830s and early 1840s.  The 
Panic’s impact on this trend was negligible.     
 
Figure 9.1. American Industrial Production, 1820-184211   
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 3:23-24.  The above information was compiled 
by Joseph H. Davis and represents the best estimates to date from somewhat imperfect data of 
what the United States manufacturing output was during the nineteenth century.  Note that the 
Davis Index uses base year 1849-1850 as 100,000. 
    
     The continuing industrialization process provided incentives for growing numbers of 
economic special interest groups to exert political influence.  During the 1830s and 1840s, these 
groups used the newly formed Whig Party as a vehicle for promoting protectionist ideas and 
agendas.  Historian Arthur Schlesinger noted this trend, stating that at the time of Whig Party 
candidate William Henry Harrison’s presidential victory in 1840 “Eastern industrialists, 
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mobilizing for a restoration of high duties ... succeeded the bankers as the chief patrons of the 
Whig party.”12     
     Overall American productivity failed to achieve the same results as the manufacturing sector 
between 1833 and 1842.  Average GDP per capita stalled throughout the 1830s and greatly 
fluctuated even on the three-year rolling average depicted in Figure 9.2.  American 
manufacturing was not sufficiently large yet to be capable of distributing its benefits across the 
overall national economy. 
 
Figure 9.2. American GDP per Capita, 1820 to 1842 (in real dollars = 1996) (3 year rolling 
average)12   
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498, 510; “Measuring Worth,” 
http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/. 
 
     Table 9.1 summarizes real GDP and nominal imports per capita during the years 1833 
through 1842.  The information illustrates that the general economy was mired in a state of 
malaise.  During the six years from 1837 through 1842, real GDP narrowly exceeded 1833 levels 
only once.  Americans imports of foreign goods sharply declined.  
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Table 9.1. Real GDP per Capita and Imports per Capita, 1833-184253 
    Real GDP    Imports   
Year    per Capita   per Capita  
1833    $1,711    $  7.17 
1834    $1,629    $  7.52 
1835    $1,691    $  9.18 
1836    $1,716    $11.54 
1837        $1,662    $  8.23 
1838         $1,647    $  5.92 
1839            $1,727    $  9.37 
1840    $1,642    $  5.72 
1841    $1,608    $  6.98 
1842    $1,594    $  5.30 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 1:30, 3:23. 
  
     A stagnant GDP per capita, combined with sharply decreasing imports, suggest that as 
American citizens coped with the Panic of 1837, they increasingly purchased manufactured 
goods from American producers.  However, whether the American consumer benefitted 
remained an unanswered question.  It was unclear whether protection had made American 
manufacturers internationally competitive, or simply made the cost of foreign goods so high that 
manufacturers were able to charge artificially high prices to consumers and enjoy high profits.  
     Figure 9.3 shows that tariff revenues in comparison to total imports fell dramatically during 
the early and mid-1830s even though the duty tables were not immediately modified.  The best 
explanation for this phenomenon is that “highly protected” goods were becoming a smaller 
portion of overall imports.  Americans were now purchasing these heavily protected goods, such 
as iron and cotton and wool manufactures, from domestic producers.        
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Figure 9.3. American Foreign Trade, 1820 to 1842 (3 year rolling average)13  
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 1:30, 3:24. 
 
Figure 9.3 also demonstrates that the American System’s increased tariffs were only marginally 
successful in lowering international trade.  Trade “openness” fell slightly throughout the 1820s, 
rose again in the early 1830s, and then fell slightly again in the latter 1830s.  By 1842, trade 
openness had gradually migrated to its lowest levels since the War of 1812.  The implication, in 
light of growing American manufacturing output, and a lack of foreign goods dumping after the 
Panic of 1837, was that American manufacturers were gaining market share.
13
   
Politics Matured: Whigs and Democrats 
     Trade policy contributed to the development of the Second American Party System in the 
1830s.  Two well-organized political parties maintained diametrically opposing views on the 
tariff.  The Whig Party supported Henry Clay’s American System and protective tariffs, while 
Democrats embraced free trade.  These mutually exclusive views made it likely that the two 
parties would come into conflict with one another in 1842, when 60% of the total reductions 
called for by the Compromise Tariff, as well as an end to the protective principle, were 
scheduled to occur.    
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     After the presidential election, Bank War, tariff battles, and Nullification Crisis in 1832 and 
1833, a growing anti-Jacksonian movement finally gravitated towards becoming a formal 
opposition party.  The process wasn’t easy, a feature that characterized the Whig Party’s entire 
existence.  A major problem facing the Whigs was reaching consensus on issues, because the 
common disapproval of President Jackson didn’t necessarily translate into agreement on 
important policy issues.  For example, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, two anti-Jackson 
nationalists, seriously disagreed about the consequences of the Tariff of 1833 after its passage.  
Webster was displeased with the compromise, believing it betrayed core nationalist principles.  
He even explored forging an alliance with the Jackson faction, which ultimately failed because 
of differences over the Second Bank of the United States.
14
           
     Henry Clay finally unified the disparate anti-Jackson elements.  The Kentuckian returned to 
the Senate in November 1831, where he would remain until 1842.
15
  In December 1834, a 
coalition of anti-Jackson senators acted in concert to seize committee chair positions in the 
upcoming Twenty-Fourth Congress, marking the nominal beginning of the Whig Party.
16
  Clay’s 
accomplishment culminated an ongoing process tracing back to the Quincy Adams/Jackson 
election of 1824, when permanent fissures began to destroy the unity of the Democratic 
Republican Party.  Historian Richard P. McCormick aptly describes the Second Party System as 
the result of “development within each of the states over the years between 1824 and 1840.”17   
     The Whig Party embraced nationalist principles from its founding.  Its leaders concluded that 
an economically strong and prosperous country provided economic opportunities and benefits to 
its citizens.  Alexander Stephens of Georgia declared that “Whig principles in Maine and 
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Louisiana, in Ohio, Georgia, and Virginia, are the same.”18  Historian Daniel Walker Howe 
commented that Whig Massachusetts Senator Rufus Choate “looked back nostalgically upon the 
“heroic” ages … when Alexander Hamilton and John Adams laid the foundations of the 
union.”19  Fellow historian Michael Holt noted that Whigs believed that “the public welfare or 
commonweal included far more than equal rights.  Government … had an obligation to promote 
economic recovery.”20  Harry Watson stated that Whigs expected “prosperity … from a 
commercialized economy … policies such as the tariff [were a] … means to these ends.”21  
Consistent with these goals, Whigs believed protective tariff legislation would “invite capital 
into the establishment of manufactures” and protect the nation against the predatory “dumping” 
practices of foreign countries, particularly Great Britain.
22
   
     Whig policies were supported by intellectual arguments.  Friedrich List, who had promoted 
economic nationalism since the 1820s, published National System of Political Economy in 1841, 
coinciding with the first Whig presidential administration.  This work synthesized his nationalist 
views regarding political economy.  List predicted that the United States would “perhaps in the 
time of our grandchildren exalt itself to the rank of the first naval and commercial power in the 
world.”  He explained that “The history of the trade and industry of North America is more 
instructive for our subject than any other can be, because here the course of development 
proceeds rapidly, the periods of free trade and protection follow closely on each other, their 
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consequences stand out clearly and sharply defined, and the whole machinery of national 
industry and State administration moves exposed before the eyes of the spectator.”23      
     List reviewed the recent American experience with trade policy.  He related that “After the 
peace of Ghent, Congress … decreed that for the first year the previous duties should be doubled, 
and during this period the country continued to prosper.  Coerced, however, by powerful private 
interests which were opposed to those of the manufacturers, and persuaded by the arguments of 
theorists, it resolved in the year 1816 to make a considerable reduction in the import duties, 
whereupon the same effects of external competition reappeared … viz. ruin of manufactories, 
unsaleability of produce, fall in the value of property and general calamity among landowners.”  
The Americans, List concluded, learned from this episode, and quickly established a more 
beneficial trade policy.  He commented that “It was only in 1824, after the effects of the English 
corn laws had been made manifest … thus compelling the agricultural interest … to make 
common cause with the manufacturing interest, that a somewhat higher tariff was passed in 
Congress.”  List added that the 1824 initiative “soon proved insufficient, and had to be 
supplemented by the tariff of 1828.”24 
     In the end, the Americans were to be lauded, because their “sound common sense, and the 
instinct of what was necessary for the nation, were more potent than a belief in theoretical 
propositions.  List concluded that “Americans came to realize the truth … that civilization and 
power … can only be secured and retained by the creation of a manufacturing power of its own.”  
He concluded that classical economists had reached faulty conclusions, as “Adam Smith and J. 
B. Say had laid it down that the United States were, ‘like Poland,’ destined for agriculture … the 
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arguments of the theorists were thoroughly investigated, and strong doubts entertained of a 
doctrine which its own disciples were not willing to put in practice.”25 
     List considered manufacturing an essential prerequisite for achieving national economic 
progress.  He noted that “in a country devoted to mere raw agriculture, dullness of mind, 
awkwardness of body, obstinate adherence to old notions, customs, methods, and processes, 
want of culture, of prosperity, and of liberty prevail.”26  In contrast, a modern political state 
should invoke good economic policy that included “favor [to] the importation of productive 
power … to protect the development of the productive power … [and] to import only raw 
materials and agricultural products, and to export nothing but manufactured goods.”27  The only 
practical way to accomplish this end was through use of protecting tariffs to shield these means 
of industrial production.  Thus, List’s theories varied from the elements of the American System 
that tolerated protection for raw materials.  List clearly articulated that “measures of production 
are justifiable only for the purpose of furthering and protecting the internal manufacturing power 
… protection can be afforded, either by the prohibition of certain manufactured articles, or by 
rates of duty which amount wholly, or at least partly, to prohibition.”28  He added that advancing 
manufacturing offered symbiotic benefits, and noted that “the Americans had long ago learnt 
from experience that agriculture cannot rise to a high state of prosperity unless the exchange of 
agricultural produce for manufactures is guaranteed for all future time.”29   
     Democrats, in contrast, maintained that low tariffs, without protectionist features, were 
integral to a virtuous American republic.  They feared that high tariffs, particularly protective 
ones, created dangerous concentrations of economic power, which in turn provided opportunities 
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for tyranny similar to what had sparked the Revolution.  A minimal federal role better promoted 
widespread economic opportunity for citizens and protected the republican principles of freedom 
that were essential to a virtuous society.  
     On the tariff question, Democrats were particularly wary of protectionism because it 
artificially created opportunities for privileged economic interest groups to unfairly profit off of 
others.  Historian Lawrence Kohl states that “the intricacies of the tariff were also seen as a 
conscious effort to defraud” by the Democrats.  The Whig economic stimulus programs “might 
temporarily produce the appearance of prosperity … but they could not permanently increase 
American productivity.”  Instead, Democrats concluded that “real [national] wealth was 
increased only gradually by traditional patterns of industry and frugality.”30   
     Democrats also produced intellectual support for their party’s political position.  Henry 
Carey, son of Mathew Carey, published Principles of Political Economy in 1837.  Carey 
considered a wide array of economic topics, including, but not limited to labor, production, 
capital, and value.  The treatise accepted Smith’s and Ricardo’s notions that geographical 
location and individual talents lent themselves to economic specialization, but moved beyond his 
predecessors by integrating the role of capital more fully into his economic model.  This 
represented a distinctly American contribution to classical liberal thought.  Carey concluded that 
“capital aids labour and increases the power of production … it also facilitates the division of 
employments, and the combination of labour.”31       
     Carey’s economic model represents a synthesis of certain free trade and nationalist ideas.  His 
primary conclusion was that free trade was desirable, but he also concluded that industrialization 
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importantly contributed to economic growth.  It largely paralleled Dallas Report principles: free 
trade was the desirable end, but protection could provide appropriate means in the short-term to 
get there.  Carey rationalized short-term protection where “the interests of the capitalist and the 
labourer are thus in perfect harmony with each other, as each derives advantage from every 
measure that tends to facilitate the growth of capital, and to render labour productive.”  In a 
mature economy, though, free trade became preferable, as “both capitalist and labourer are, 
therefore, enabled to obtain a constantly increasing measure of the conveniences, comforts, and 
luxuries of life, in exchange for their products.”32       
     Carey was joined by a more radical free trader, William Leggett, who rejected any sort of 
protective principle, whatsoever.  He was a news writer, and a leading spokesman for the 
Locofoco faction of New York’s Democratic Party, which supported pro-labor, hard money, 
anti-banking, and free trade positions.
33
  Tragically, Leggett died prematurely at age thirty-eight 
in 1839.
34
  He strenuously argued for lower tariffs, which “would certainly not place trade in a 
state of absolute freedom; but it would be such an enlargement of its bounds, such a relaxation of 
its fetters, as might well deserve to be spoken of as comparative freedom,”  but insisted that ideal 
trade policy involved “levying no duties at all.  It consists in leaving the parties to trade – the 
buyer and seller – perfectly unrestrained by the conditions of a third party.”35   
     Leggett, echoing a theme oft heard in Congress from tariff opponents, that free trade was an 
essential attribute for a virtuous republic.  He paralleled Paine’s political views on liberty with 
his own on economics when he proclaimed that “It is a happy thing for the destinies of this 
young and vigorous republic, that … they who are fighting the great battle in defence of the 
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political rights of man, are at the same time endeavouring to establish that noble science 
[political economy], the ignorance of whose truths and the violation of whose doctrines have 
been a prolific source of the burdens and oppressions under which the people of Europe groan.”36     
Leggett feared the dangers of concentrated political power, economic power, or a combination of 
both.  He contrasted the potential for liberal political economy in the United States with the 
illiberal nationalist policies of Europe.  Leggett asserted that “to the interference of Government 
with the private pursuits of individuals; to the granting of exclusive privileges to one body of 
citizens, and placing burdensome restrictions on others; to the giving a stimulating bounty here, 
and imposing a prohibitory duty there; to the withholding from whole communities the right to 
employ their capital or labour in a particular channel of industry, and conferring a monopoly of 
that privilege on some single one as a token of favour … to these, and a thousand other 
violations of the principles of political economy, is to be ascribed much, very much of the misery 
with which the groaning nation of king-governed Europe is filled.”37  
     Leggett’s forceful arguments tightly aligned with the egalitarian views that characterized the 
emerging Democratic Party during the 1830s.  Historian Lawrence Peskin noted that the 
antebellum free traders “linked laissez-faire to equal rights and equal protection.”38  By the dawn 
of the 1840s, the “Democracy” had created a coherent republican vision of political economy 
within an industrializing world, believing that essential characteristics of a virtuous republic 
included the protection of each citizen’s rights to life, liberty and property.  A concentration of 
power, whether political or economic, threatened these principles.  Government should be the 
protector, rather than the enemy, of such rights.     
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     In 1840 Democrats published the first Party platform in American history.  This short 
document addressed the nation’s choices regarding political economy, including the tariff.  
Democrats resolved that “justice and sound policy forbid the federal government to foster one 
branch of industry to the detriment of another, or to cherish the interests of one portion to the 
injury of another portion of our common country.”  They repeated this statement verbatim in 
their 1844 party platform.
39
 
     Whigs published their first platform in 1844.  Their document also addressed trade policy.  
They called for “a tariff for revenue to defray the necessary expenses of the government, and 
discriminating with special reference to the protection of the domestic labor of the country.”40 
     These clashing views corresponded with each party’s views about the proper role of 
government.  Democrats noted in their platform that “the Federal Government is one of limited 
powers … and that it is inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers.”  
Whigs presented an opposite view, and pledged “an administration of the affairs of the country 
as shall impart to every branch of the public service the greatest practicable efficiency, controlled 
by a well regulated and wise economy.”41   
     The mutually exclusive views between Democrats and Whigs on a host of issues, including 
economic ones, during the time of the Second Party System have been well documented.  The 
foremost studies have been conducted by Joel Silbey and Thomas Alexander, who both noted 
that this period was characterized by high degrees of party loyalty and orthodoxy.  Silbey’s The 
Shrine of Party closely examines congressional voting patterns during the period 1841 through 
1852.  His data demonstrates that voting unity correlated more strongly to political parties than 
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regions, leading him to conclude that “parties were united … sections were split.”42  Alexander’s 
Sectional Stress and Party Strength studied voting patterns in the House of Representatives from 
1836 to 1860, and he similarly concludes that “party antagonism dominated the divisions” on 
economic issues.
43
  Silbey and Alexander identified a key attribute of 1840s politics, that party 
loyalty held a greater sway in Congress than sectional loyalty.       
Southern Industrial “Takeoff” in the 1830s and 1840s  
     In discussing the development, and consequences of American industrialization in the 1830s 
and 1840s, two significant books, Walter Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth, and 
Alexander Gershenkron’s Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective merit 
consideration.  Both works explore the process of economic growth, and particularly in regards 
to industrialization, in twentieth century developing countries.  However, both works used 
nineteenth century examples to validate their respective theses, and their conclusions can be 
applied back to the nineteenth century American example. 
     Walter W. Rostow published The Stages of Economic Growth in 1960 and he used the 
American historical example as part of his analysis.  He defined five stages of economic growth 
in any given national economy: (a) traditional society, (b) precondition for take-off, (c) take-off, 
(d) drive to maturity, and (e) mass consumption.  The case of initial American industrialization 
during the first half of the nineteenth century involved the transition from “precondition” to 
“takeoff.”   
     Rostow defined the precondition stage as “societies in the process of transition … for it takes 
time to transform a traditional society in the ways necessary for it to exploit the fruits of modern 
science.”  He further explained that in the modern era “the stage of preconditions arise not 
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endogenously but from some external intrusion by more advanced societies.  These invasions … 
set in motion ideas and sentiments which initiated the process by which a modern alternative to 
the traditional society was constructed out of the old culture.”44  
     He defined take-off as the “great watershed in the life of modern societies.”  Rostow noted 
that historically “the proximate stimulus for take-off was mainly (but not wholly) technological 
… the take-off awaited not only the build-up of social overhead capital and a surge of 
technological development in industry and agriculture, but also the emergence to political power 
of a group prepared to regard the modernization of the economy as serious, high-order political 
business.”45  
     Rostow’s “take-off” society is one filled with strong symbiotic relationships between 
economic spheres.  His description paralleled the beliefs of many nineteenth century Americans.  
Rostow stated that “during the take-off new industries expand rapidly … these new industries, in 
turn, stimulate, through their rapidly expanding requirement for factory workers, the services to 
support them … .  New techniques spread into agriculture as well as industry, as agriculture is 
commercialized … revolutionary changes in agricultural productivity are an essential condition 
for successful take-off; for modernization of a society increases radically its bill for agricultural 
products.”46  Rostow’s observations strongly mirror Henry Clay’s vision of the American System 
from the 1820s through the 1840s. 
     Rostow estimated the approximate date of American take-off as the period from 1843 to 
1860, and that it was initially confined to the Northeastern portion of the country.  He also 
concluded that eventually, over a long period of time, the take-off applied to the entire nation.  
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Rostow suggested that the overall process was not fully completed until nearly a century later, in 
the 1930s, when the South finally achieved takeoff.
47
  
     Alexander Gerschenkron published Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective in 
1962.  The work’s primary theme was “that in a number of important historical instances 
industrialization processes, when launched at length in a backward country, showed considerable 
differences, as compared with more advanced countries, not only with regard to the speed of 
development (the rate of industrial growth) but also with regard to the productive and 
organizational structures of industry which emerged from those processes.”48  While its focus 
was on Europe, its foundational ideas are applicable to the nineteenth century American 
experience.  Importantly, Economic Backwardness offers a second perspective, as it often differs 
with The Stages of Economic Growth, rejecting Rostow’s premise that industrialization occurred 
as the final product of a series of identical steps in different societies.  Rather, Gerschenkron 
maintained that varying economic endowments in countries influenced the manner in which they 
could achieve industrialization. 
     The most important element of the Gerschekron thesis was that it was quite feasible for 
“backward” economies to “catch up” in the industrialization process.  Gerschenkron argued that 
before any industrialization in a nation or region occurs, there exists “tension between the actual 
state of economic activities … and the existing obstacles to industrial development, on the one 
hand, and the great promise inherent in such a development, on the other.”49  However, if 
political resources can be organized to actively support industrialization through direct or 
indirect means, non-industrialized countries can successfully industrialize relatively quickly.  
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The great obstacle to industrialization is access to the large sums of financial capital.  
Gerschenkron stated that backward nations can, through use of “borrowed technology” and 
through active support of the state and or financial institutions such as banks, can result in “A 
high speed of development in a backward country entering the stage of industrialization.”50   
     Gerschenkron’s thesis correlates strongly with the early nineteenth century American 
experience.  New England and the Atlantic states borrowed British technology and were 
supported by protectionist trade policy.  The region quickly “caught up” with Great Britain 
between 1810 and 1860. 
     An oft repeated theme during the tariff debates from 1816 through 1833 was the idea that the 
South was incapable of directly participating in American industrialization.  Some Southerners 
pointed out that Southern natural resources and slave labor were insurmountable obstacles.  
Though some Northerners such as Nathan Appleton invited their Southern counterparts to share 
in the process, most Northerners likewise considered Southern industrialization unlikely.  John 
Quincy Adams exemplified this impression of two distinct economic regions, pitting an 
industrialized, free labor North against an agrarian, slave dominated South over national 
economic policies.  In 1841, he confronted Southerners over the tariff, stating that ‘the subject 
was one involving the great question between free labor and slave labor.”51 
     The evidence shows that the antebellum Northern and Southern economies were not as 
disparate in 1840 as Adams suggested.  In the 1830s, meaningful industrialization started in the 
South.  The region expanded its industrial base throughout the following decade.     
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     In 1840, New England still dominated American manufacturing; the region domiciled 70% of 
the nation’s 2,284,631 spindles.52  The growth of manufacturing in the region was stunning.  In 
1807, only 4,000 cotton spindles existed in all of the United States.  By 1815, the average sized 
cotton mill in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts contained 723 spindles.
53
  By 1840, 
the average number of spindles per New England cotton mill had increased threefold to 2,370 
spindles.
54
   
     The South, in contrast, did not experience substantive manufacturing activity and the building 
of manufacturing capacity until the 1830s and 1840s.  By 1840, the average Southern factory 
housed 729 spindles, similar to New England’s scale twenty-five years before.55  However, the 
South also featured some very large facilities by 1840, including South Carolina’s Vaucluse 
factory, which contained over 1,500 spindles by the early 1830s and North Carolina factories in 
Rocky Mount and Fayetteville, which featured over 2,000 spindles each as early as the 1820s.
56
    
     Census data from 1840 and 1850 presents strong evidence that Southern manufacturing, 
particularly in its eastern states, was on the rise during the 1840s.  In assessing American 
industrialization, it is helpful to demarcate the North and South into east and west sub-
components, establishing quadrants that separate the states mainly located on or near the Atlantic 
seaboard from states located west of the Appalachian Mountains.  In this scenario, the Northeast 
consists of both the New England and Atlantic regions and the Southeast is the combination of 
the Chesapeake and South regions.  This treatment is helpful because many of the demographic 
                                                 
52
 John S. Hekman, “The Product Cycle and New England Textiles,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics Volume 
94, No. 4 (Jun, 1980): 705.   
53
 Batchelder, Early Progress of the Cotton Manufacture, 53, 59.   
54
 Hekman, “The Product Cycle and New England Textiles,” 705. 
55
 Ibid., 705.  
56
 Tom Downey, Planting a Capitalist South: Masters, Merchants, and Manufacturers in the Southern Interior, 
1790-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 123-126; Norris W. Preyer, “The Historian, the 
Slave, and the Ante-Bellum Textile Industry,” The Journal of Negro History Volume 46, No. 2 (Apr, 1961): 69-71. 
341 
 
 
 
dynamics of the period can be better understood as an East-West relationship rather than a 
North-South relationship.   
     It is important to realize that throughout the Antebellum Era, the United States remained a 
primarily agricultural nation.  Nonetheless, significant demographic and economic changes were 
occurring.  The most notable was westward migration.  In the late 1830s, Arkansas (1836) and 
Michigan (1837) were added to the Union.  During the following decade Florida (1845), Texas 
(1845), Iowa (1846), and Wisconsin (1848) were also added.  Between 1840 and 1850, Eastern 
states experienced an impressive 25% population growth, but Western population growth was an 
even more impressive 52% rate.
57
   
     At the same time, industrialization was spreading throughout the nation, though at an uneven 
rate.  The 1850 census was the first to measure the cash value of farms and the total amount of 
capital invested into manufacturing.  From this information, a rough estimate can be calculated 
of the percentage of assets deployed in manufactures versus assets as a whole in 1850 by region.  
The following information confirms that the country remained primarily agricultural, but also 
demonstrated that every region had achieved meaningful levels of industrialization:
58
 
Table 9.2. Percentage of Total Capital Invested in Manufactures by Region, 185054 
   Percentage  Manufactures  Total 
Region   of Capital  Capital (millions) Capital (millions) 
New England  29.8%   $158   $   530 
Atlantic  16.6%   $219   $1,321 
Chesapeake    9.8%   $  33   $   336 
Northwest    7.3%   $  54   $   743 
South     7.1%   $  19   $   272 
Southwest     6.8%   $  40   $   583 
Totals   13.8%   $523   $3,785 
Source: United States Census, 1850, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu. 
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Clearly, the New England and Atlantic regions were the dominant manufacturing regions.  
However, the remaining four regions were experiencing meaningful industrialization, as their 
total manufacturing capital annual growth rates ranged from 5.6% to 6.3% between 1840 and 
1850, shown on Table 8.3.  This demonstrates that the American “takeoff” was beginning to 
spread beyond the Northeast.     
     The census data for both 1840 and 1850 included measures of total capital invested in 
manufactures alone.  From this information we can ascertain the rates of industrial growth by 
region during the 1840s decade:
59
 
Table 9.3. Regional Manufacturing Growth, 1840 to 185055 
   Growth  Manufactures Capital Manufactures Capital 
Region   Rate   1840 (millions) 1850 (millions) 
Atlantic  119%   $100   $219 
Northwest    94%   $  28   $  54 
Chesapeake    85%   $  18   $  33 
New England    82%   $  87   $158 
South     82%   $  11   $  19 
Southwest     72%   $  23   $  40 
Totals     96%   $267   $523 
Source: United States Census, 1840 and 1850, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu 
The growth rates shown in Table 9.3 validate that all regions were industrializing.  Southern 
states grew their manufacturing infrastructure at rates very similar to their Northern counterparts.       
     However, the most telling economic and demographic trend of the 1840s can be determined 
through measuring growth on a per capita basis, to consider the impact of industrialization and 
population growth together.  While the nation’s population grew 35% during the decade, capital 
invested in manufactures correspondingly grew 96%.  The measures on a per capita basis are 
summarized in Table 9.4:
60
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Table 9.4. Regional Growth in Manufacturing Capital per Capita, 1840 to 185056 
   Growth  Manufactures Capital Manufactures Capital 
Region   Rate   1840    1850  
Atlantic  68.2%   $21.76   $36.60 
Chesapeake  57.4%   $10.42   $16.40 
South   50.4%   $  5.07   $  7.63 
New England  49.2%   $38.85   $57.95 
Northwest  21.9%   $  9.48   $11.55 
Southwest   17.8%   $  6.79   $  8.00 
Totals   45.6%   $15.67   $22.82 
Source: United States Census, 1840 and 1850, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu 
This data provides a clear picture of the east-west nature of the antebellum American 
industrialization process.  It shows that the takeoff of the 1820s, confined largely to the 
Northeast, was followed by takeoffs in the South and Northwest by the 1840s.  The Southwest 
was showing signs that it would soon be experiencing takeoff as well.
61
   
     A few important observations regarding Southern industrialization can be derived from the 
above information.  First, the Northeastern regions (Atlantic and New England) clearly remained 
the industrial bastions of the United States.  These two regions contained 70% and 72% of the 
total national capital invested in manufactures in 1840 and 1850, respectively.  Consequently, 
Southern manufacturing was not sufficiently developed to directly compete with its Northern 
brethren either in 1840 or 1850.  The information in Table 9.4, considered in tandem with the 
earlier observation regarding average spindles per factory, affirms that Southern industrialization 
was trailing the North by about a decade or two.  A second observation is that the pace of 
Southern industrial growth was similar to the North between 1840 and 1850, particularly when 
observing the eastern seaboard regions.  Rates of industrial expansion per capita in the 
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Chesapeake and South regions were strikingly similar to those of the New England and Atlantic 
regions.  Though the North, and in particular the Northeast, still dominated American 
manufacturing, the South, and particularly the Southeast, had clearly joined the American 
industrialization process.     
     By 1840, industrial growth in the South began to impact politics, as the region’s politicians 
increasingly supported higher tariffs to benefit local manufacturing interests.  The distribution of 
total manufacturing capital per the 1840 and 1850 censuses for the Chesapeake and Southern 
regions were: Virginia (37%), Maryland (26%), North Carolina (14%), South Carolina (12%), 
Georgia (10%), and Florida (1%).  This assertion can be validated by a review of the most 
industrialized congressional districts in the South, where levels of local industrialization and the 
political leanings of their House members during the tariff debates of 1841 and 1842 were highly 
correlated.  These relationships were particularly true for the most industrialized areas in 
Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina.      
     In Virginia, industrialization centered on iron forging, featuring the Tredegar Iron Works in 
Richmond, founded in 1833, and smaller operations in the Shenandoah Valley such as Buffalo 
Forge in Rockbridge County.  The corresponding representatives for the 11
th
 district (Richmond) 
and the 17
th
 district (the Valley) were Whigs John Botts and Alexander Stuart, respectively.
62
  
Both congressmen consistently voted for higher tariffs during the 1841 and 1842 debates. 
     Maryland’s manufacturing was concentrated in Baltimore, situated in the state’s 4th district.  
In the 27
th
 Congress the 4
th
 district elected two Whig representatives, John Kennedy and 
Alexander Randall.  Both of these gentlemen also voted pro-tariff throughout the debates.
63
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     Likewise, North Carolina’s manufacturing interests centered upon the cotton mills that were 
concentrated near Rocky Mount and Fayetteville.  These two areas comprised the 3
rd
 and 7
th
 
congressional districts, respectively.  Whigs Edward Stanly (a future Union general during the 
Civil War) and Edmund Debarry represented these districts and they consistently supported pro-
tariff initiatives.
64
 
     The strength of the correlation between manufacturing and pro-tariff positions weakened in 
the smaller manufacturing states.  South Carolina, which didn’t feature a functioning party 
system, represents an example.  Most of South Carolina’s cotton mills were located in the 4th and 
6
th
 districts, which incorporated the major factory at Vaucluse.  These districts were represented 
by Democrats Sampson Butler and Francis Pickens, who both consistently opposed the tariff 
proposals.
65
  This anomaly was also impacted by the influence of local state politics, which saw 
but a single Whig elected by South Carolinians to Congress throughout the 1840s, and then for 
only a single term.
66
    
     Likewise, the correlation weakens in the case of Georgia.  Most of Georgia’s manufacturing 
centered upon iron factories located near Macon and Augusta.  Georgia’s representatives were 
elected on an “at large” basis for the 27th Congress, and in October 1840 the Whigs won all nine 
congressional seats in the state elections.  However, while the Georgia delegation was amenable 
to distributions, the delegation unanimously opposed the tariff during 1841 and 1842.
67
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     Importantly, Southern industrialization proved compatible with the social institution of 
slavery.
68
  There are numerous examples in the antebellum South where factories utilized slave 
labor.  In 1814 South Carolina Governor David Williams established a cotton mill on his 
plantation that utilized slave labor, which eventually grew to between 300 and 400 spindles.  By 
1840, his son, John Williams, grew the plant to 700 spindles.  Slaves were used at the Rocky 
Mount Cotton Mills and in Fayetteville, North Carolina as early as 1817 and 1825, 
respectively.
69
  In the late 1820s, at the Maryland Chemical works in Baltimore, slaves 
comprised forty percent of the work force.
70
  Slaves were utilized in the tobacco manufacturing 
factories of Danville, Virginia by 1850.
71
   
     The quality of slave labor in manufacturing settings was satisfactory in the eyes of 
contemporaries.  James Hammond, of South Carolina, declared in 1841 that “our slaves can be 
made as expert as any other class in all, or nearly all, the operations of a cotton factory.”72  In 
1851, a visitor to the Saluda factory in South Carolina commented that “A weaver from Lowell 
has charge … and she reports that ... there is full as much work done by the blacks, [and] they are 
much more attentive to the condition of their looms.”73  By 1840, John Williams’ factory in 
South Carolina employed twenty-five slave workers as its entire work force, supervised by a 
single white superintendent.  The Vaucluse factory, in which George McDuffie was an investor, 
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used about 40% salve labor during the same general time period.
74
  In total, historian Robert 
Starobin estimates that five percent of all slaves in the 1840s were involved in manufacturing 
activities, primarily in textile works and iron forges.
75
  Fellow historian Richard Wade added that 
“industrial employment [of slaves], moreover, had proved feasible in a variety of enterprises.”76  
      The growth of manufactures in the South gave rise to an indigenous group of capitalists and 
theorists who championed further industrialization.  The biggest booster was William Gregg of 
South Carolina.  Interestingly, Gregg opposed protective tariffs, believing that industrialization 
without protection was possible and preferable.
77
  He noted that “There is no lack of capital in 
South Carolina; Charleston, herself, possesses all the requisites … let the manufacture of cotton 
be commenced among us … we shall see the hidden treasures that have been locked up, 
unproductive and rusting, coming forth to put machinery in motion, and to give employment to 
the present unproductive labor of our country.”78 
     Even Gregg’s state of South Carolina, the home of nullification, was touched by the Southern 
takeoff of the 1830s and 1840s.  In 1833, the South Carolina Canal and Railroad Company 
constructed a 136 mile track connecting Charleston to the Edgefield and Barnwell districts.
79
  
The rail link benefited manufacturing facilities that utilized water power from the state’s many 
inland rivers.  In 1833 a five story factory was completed at Vaucluse in the Edgefield District 
with more than 1,500 spindles and 25 looms where, by 1836, half of the factory’s employees 
were slaves.
80
  Gregg later established the nearby Graniteville factory in 1849, a massive 
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building 350 feet in length, equipped with 9,425 spindles and 300 looms.
81
  Graniteville’s size 
and scale were comparable to contemporary Northeastern mills.
82
   
     Virginia and Georgia also domiciled significant manufacturing establishments.  William 
Weaver began iron working operations the heart of Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley in the 1810s, 
continuously operated through the antebellum period, and his main operation in Rockbridge 
County at Buffalo Forge exclusively utilizing slave labor by 1840.
83
  Robert Findlay’s Georgia 
based Macon Brass & Iron Works and Machine Shop, founded in 1840, employed twenty 
individuals, including slaves, and produced $20,000 worth of machinery per annum.
84
  J. Shivers 
and Company established a textile factory in Columbus, Georgia in 1834.
85
  By 1840, Georgia 
was home to nineteen cotton mills containing over 42,000 spindles.
86
   
     These successful Southern forays into manufactures were well publicized and shaped the 
course of public opinion.  A representative example of the degree to which manufacturing had 
taken a solid foothold in the South occurred during a debate held in the Barnwell District of 
South Carolina, an area noted for its devotion to state rights and agrarianism.  The local 
Demosthenian Debating Society held a debate in 1843 that considered the question “Is 
agriculture or Manufactures of more benefit to Society?”-- which was only decided in favor of 
agriculture by the president’s tie breaking vote.87   
     The Southern industrialization process continued up to the time of the Civil War.  Richmond, 
Virginia became a major iron production center, built around the Tredegar Iron Works, which 
                                                 
81
 Ibid., 138-139.  
82
 Gregg, Essays on Domestic Industry, 57. 
83
 Charles B. Dew, Bond of Iron: Master and Slave at Buffalo Forge (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
1994), 20-21, 29, 106. 
84
 Robert S. Davis, Jr., Cotton, Fire, & Dreams: The Robert Findlay Iron Works and Heavy Industry in Macon, 
Georgia, 1839-1912 (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1998), 6, 43. 
85
 Mary A. DeCredico, Patriotism for Profit: Georgia’s Urban Entrepreneurs and the Confederate War Effort 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 2-4. 
86
 Preyer, “The Historian, the Slave, and the Ante-Bellum Textile Industry,” 73.   
87
 Downey, Planting a Capitalist South, 118. 
349 
 
 
 
was founded in 1837.
88
  During the 1850s capital invested in manufacturing in the South rose 
another 77%.
89
  By 1860, the South, if viewed as an independent nation, was second in the world 
in rail mileage and sixth in cotton manufacturing in the world.
90
  This well-developed industrial 
base sustained large Southern field armies throughout the Civil War.  The Southern industrial 
expansion during the two decades preceding the war is particularly impressive because it 
coincided with a boom period in agricultural export prices, fueled by cotton.  Export staples 
increased in value 1.5% more per annum than manufactured goods during that time.
91
  
     Many Southerners were optimistic about the future of industrialization in the South.  William 
Gregg wrote in the Charleston Courier in 1844 that “The United States is destined to be a great 
manufacturing country, and a few years, even without a protective tariff, will place her on a 
footing with, if not ahead of the most skilful nations, and all who have any knowledge of the 
subject admit that South Carolina and Georgia possess advantages, which only need to be 
fostered to lead to success in Cotton Manufacturing.”92  Even John Calhoun promoted Southern 
industrialization when he invested into a Georgia mining operation in the 1830s.  Calhoun’s 
brother-in-law, John Colhoun, founded a woolen factory in the late 1820s.
93
   
     Although Gregg and other prominent Southern industrialists were free trade advocates, the 
rise of industry in the South caused many other Southerners to embrace protectionist policies.  
Edwin Michael Holt, who owned a substantial textile factory in Alamance County, North 
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Carolina, ardently supported Henry Clay.
94
 Southern participants at the pro-tariff Home League 
convention in New York City in April 1842 included such notables as Robert Toombs, John 
Berrien, and T. Butler King.
95
     
     Manufacturing was a growing and substantial part of the Southern economy by 1840.  
Further, slavery, instead of precluding industrialization, provided potential labor to man the 
factories.  These facts caused historians Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss to conclude that 
“given the rapid growth of Southern industry during the 1850 to 1860 period, a cross-section 
glimpse at the late antebellum period, which typifies many characterizations of the South as an 
industrially-stagnant region before the Civil War, may actually capture a system working toward 
long-term equilibrium.”96   
The Tariff of 1841 
     Whig party devotees were optimistic on March 4, 1841, as William Henry Harrison was 
sworn in as president.  The first-ever Whig chief executive’s bland and lengthy two-hour 
inaugural address attacked the principle of executive veto power, stating that “to assist or control 
Congress, then, in its ordinary legislation could not, I conceive, have been the motive for 
conferring the veto power on the president.  This argument acquires additional force from the 
fact of its never having been used by our first six presidents.”97  Harrison had supported the tariff 
as a senator and representative from Ohio, and Henry Clay and Daniel Webster now stood ready 
to introduce new tariff legislation to address the federal government’s financial duress and to 
reintroduce the American System in spite of the 1833 compromise.  Whig majorities in the 
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legislature, combined with Harrison’s pro-tariff sentiments and pledge of non-interference, 
created the likelihood that a new protectionist tariff would be a centerpiece of the Whig 
economic agenda in the upcoming 27
th
 Congress.
98
    
     The Whig Party scored decisive political victories in 1840, in part due to voter reaction to the 
Panic of 1837.  Whigs gained control of both the executive and legislative branches for the first 
time in party history.  Whigs now occupied 29 of 51 (57%) Senate seats and 143 of 242 (59%) 
House seats in the 27
th
 Congress.
99
  Their victory was national in scope, and Whigs now 
possessed majorities in both the Northern and Southern delegations in House of Representatives 
as well as the Senate.  The party held 61% of the House seats and 58% of the Senate seats from 
the thirteen free Northern states, and 57% of the House seats and 56% of the Senate seats from 
the thirteen Southern slave states.
100
  The Southern gains were particularly impressive, as Whigs 
succeeded in winning 54% of the region’s popular vote and 62% of its electoral vote.101       
        Whigs were anxious to set to work immediately after the inauguration.  Henry Clay planned 
to introduce legislative initiatives for a new national bank, distributions of federal funds to the 
states, a repeal of the Van Buren sub treasury, bankruptcy reform, and a new tariff.  President 
Harrison ordered a special session of Congress to meet May 31, 1841 to consider the new 
economic agenda as quickly as possible.   
     Unfortunately for the Whigs, fate dealt them a cruel blow as President Harrison took ill and 
died on April 4.
102
  Vice-president John Tyler quickly returned to Washington from his home 
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near Williamsburg Virginia and was sworn into office on April 6, 1841.
103
  The selection of the 
Virginian as vice-president candidate had been intended to geographically balance the Party 
ticket, but Tyler was the political antithesis of Harrison.  Though Tyler was personal friends with 
Henry Clay, their political views were diametrically opposite.
104
 
     Tyler was an anomaly, a free trade Whig, and as a congressman he voted against the tariff 
bills in 1820 and 1828.  He was either strongly principled or stubborn, or both, depending upon 
one’s point of view, as exemplified by his casting the sole dissenting vote in the House against 
Andrew Jackson’s Force Bill in 1833.105  Tyler politically and socially affiliated himself with an 
unofficial group known as the “Virginia Cabal,” whose ranks included congressmen Henry Wise, 
Robert Hunter, Thomas Gilmer and Francis Mallory.  The Cabal’s loyalty to the Whig Party 
derived more from their opposition to Jacksonian Democracy than from enthusiasm for the 
American System.
106
  They never embraced Whiggery’s core nationalist ideologies, preferring 
“Old Republican” views.  The Cabal’s marriage to the Whig Party was nominal, held together 
only by a mutual disdain for Andrew Jackson.    
     The federal treasury balance was rapidly dwindling as Tyler assumed office.  During the 
preceding Van Buren Administration tariffs and land sales had accounted for 63% and 20%, 
respectively, of all federal revenues.
107
  Both sources were adversely impacted by the Panic.  
Total governmental receipts, which averaged $35.5 million annually during Andrew Jackson’s 
second term and $25.6 million annually during Martin Van Buren’s term, dropped precipitously 
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to only $16.9 million in 1841.
108
  These low revenues, combined with increased federal 
spending, forced Congress to approve issuing $12 million of bonds in 1841.  However, only $5.5 
million were actually sold.
109
  The economic situation caused Whigs to conclude that increased 
tariff constituted the best alternative option. 
     Henry Clay assumed the tactical helm of the Whig legislative effort, which lasted the duration 
of the special session from May 31, 1841, through the hot summer months, to September 13.
110
  
Despite of the Treasury’s dire condition, Clay prioritized a national bank and distribution first, 
foregoing the tariff issue until late summer.  Clay’s Distribution Act, like its 1836 predecessor, 
intended to divert all proceeds from sales of federal lands to the states, with the first ten percent 
going to the state in which the land was sold and the remainder to be distributed to all states in 
proportion to their congressional representation.  Strictly speaking, the Distribution Act was not 
tied to tariffs.  As a practical matter, it was integrally entwined with the tariff issue.  The Act’s 
passage would exacerbate the treasury shortfall by cutting a primary revenue source, virtually 
necessitating that tariffs be increased in order to fund all of the federal government’s operating 
expenses.
111
  Consequently, voting patterns on the distribution bill strongly correlated to 
congressional views on the tariff.  The Distribution Act passed the House on July 6, 1841, by a 
vote of 116 to 107 and the Senate on August 26 by a vote of 28 to 23.
112
   
     The House and Senate proceeded to consider the tariff on July 24 and August 27, 
respectively.  The 1841 bill proposed to augment the Treasury’s revenues by charging a 20% 
duty on goods that had previously been admitted either free or at rates less than 20%.  If passed, 
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the bill would uphold the existing terms of the Compromise Tariff because the newly established 
duties would remain at, or below, the required 20% cap.     
     The brief debate that followed featured many of the traditional nationalist and free trade 
arguments that had been hallmarks of previous tariff initiatives.  Participants characterized the 
tariff as a struggle between competing, and mutually exclusive, economic systems.  For example, 
in the House, former president John Quincy Adams, an ardent protectionist, remarked that the 
tariff pitted the competing interests of free and slave labor against one another.
113
   
     Some agricultural special interests tried to take advantage of the reopened tariff dialogue to 
push for new protection for some of their products.  Democrat Senator Levi Woodbury of New 
Hampshire proposed placing sumac on the list of approved tariffs in order to encourage its 
domestic cultivation.  Sumac, a plant whose species includes poison ivy, produces a gum extract 
that was used in tanning processes by American manufacturers.  Woodbury declared that “the 
farming interest [is] as much entitled to protection as other interests.”  Henry Clay declared 
against protection for this item, since “Imported sumach came from countries where labor was 
much cheaper … it was in the interests of our manufacturers to obtain it upon the cheapest terms 
they can … our agricultural labor can be better employed in other channels of industry.”  Clay’s 
explanation represented a shift from his position during earlier tariff debates.  Throughout the 
1820s and early 1830s, he had ardently sought protection for hemp, another agricultural product 
that was widely produced in Clay’s native state of Kentucky.114    
     Manufacturing interests also requested increased protection.  Pennsylvania Democrat Senator 
James Buchanan spoke for Pennsylvania’s iron producers, since “it was well known that there 
was iron in Pennsylvania equal to the best English iron for railroads, enough indeed to support 
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the whole world.”  Calhoun, whose own state was busy building railroads, commented that such 
a proposal pitted domestic special interest groups against one another, retorting that “the Senator 
says that manufacture of iron is important; so is the manufacture of railroads important … we are 
here fighting in the dark, railroads against iron; iron wanting the supremacy over railroads, and 
railroads not wishing to yield this supremacy.”115   
     Iron, along with cotton and wool, had previously received substantial protection in previous 
tariff bills.  Beginning with the railroad construction boom in the 1830s, however, Congress 
began removing iron protection.  Senator Alfred Cuthbert of Georgia reminded his colleagues of 
this fact, noting that “the purpose of the law of 1832, exempting iron from duty, was to 
encourage enterprise for general public benefit, for the establishment of railroads.”  Clay 
countered that iron protection would demonstrate “the wisdom of the principle of protection … 
in less than five years, were this amendment adopted, the foreign iron would be brought to a 
much less rate than at present, as there would be an American rival in the trade.”116   
     Clay, ignoring the 1833 compromise, sought to resurrect the American System.  He noted that 
“he and his friends were in favor of the universal practice of nations, and the wholesome and 
necessary protection of manufactures,” and described anti-tariff forces as favoring “book theory 
and abstractions.”117  John Calhoun reminded his fellow senators that the American System 
shouldn’t even be considered in the discussion, as “the object of the compromise bill was in the 
first place to sweep away the protective system.”118 
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     After brief debate the Tariff Bill of 1841, sans added protection for either sumac or iron, 
passed.  The House approved the legislation on July 30 by a vote of 116 to 101.
119
  It became 
quickly evident that the bill would fail to offset the Federal operating deficit, and it was amended 
during the Senate debates with a proviso that negated the Distribution Act if the reductions 
pursuant to the Compromise Tariff of 1833 were not enacted on their scheduled dates in 1842.  
On September 7, the Senate overwhelmingly approved this modified version of the bill by a vote 
of 33 to 11.
120
  President Tyler quickly signed the tariff bill into law.
121
  
     The Whig special session legislation in the 1841 addressed the nation’s short-term economic 
crisis.  President Tyler left the legislative branch alone to craft and approve a solution and Whigs 
anticipated he would do the same in 1842 when they planned to enact more sweeping changes to 
trade policy.  Henry Clay returned home to Ashland, resigning his Senate seat on March 31, 
1842 in order to prepare for a presidential bid in 1844, and his capable Kentucky protégé, John 
Crittenden, assumed congressional management of the Whig agenda.
122
   
The Tariff Debates of 1842 
      Whigs sought to reintroduce the essential trade policy elements of the American System in 
1842.  The two final incremental tariff reductions of 9% each, agreed to as part of the 
Compromise Tariff, were scheduled to occur on January 1 and July 1, 1842, to finally arrive at a 
permanent ad valorem rate of 20%.
123
  While the Tariff of 1841 had left the terms of the 1833 
compromise intact, the 1842 Whig legislative agenda actively sought to overturn it.  
     Whigs recognized an opportunity, in light of the nation’s financial woes originating with the 
Panic of 1837, to resurrect a new tariff along nationalist lines.  The House opened the new round 
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of tariff discussions on June 9, 1842, when Representative Millard Fillmore of New York 
introduced the “Little Tariff” bill, which proposed to extend the schedule of duties in place June 
1 pursuant to the Compromise Tariff forward to August 1.  Whigs argued that a delay of the last 
scheduled tariff reduction would provide Congress with sufficient time to establish a long-term 
solution to the federal financial crisis.
124
  The bill also provided that land sales distributions 
would continue despite the delayed reduction, contradicting the proviso attached to the 1841 
Tariff Act.  After a brief debate lasting less than a week, the bill passed by a vote of 116 to 
103.
125
  John Crittenden proceeded to introduce the bill to the Senate on June 23.  One day later, 
with the final scheduled reduction on June 30 looming, the Senate passed the bill 24 to 19.
126
   
     At this juncture, the process experienced an unanticipated obstacle.  President John Tyler 
vetoed the Little Tariff five days after the Senate’s passage, citing its conflict with the 1841 
Tariff Act’s distribution provision.  The new president signaled his intent to uphold “Old 
Republican” principles in the face of Whig nationalism.127     
     The House began considering a permanent tariff bill on June 18, even before the Little Tariff 
made its way to the Senate.  The “Permanent Tariff” proposed significant increases in tariff 
duties back to the levels of 1832.  It also proposed to retain the 1841 Distribution Act.  The bill 
narrowly passed the House on July 16 by a vote of 116 to 112.
128
  The Senate debate concluded 
on August 5 and the bill passed by a vote of 25 to 23.
129
  On August 9 Tyler again vetoed the bill, 
explaining that the combination of increased duties and distribution violated the letter, as well as 
the spirit, of the 1841 Tariff Act.
130
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     Ultimately, the Whigs conceded to President Tyler and eliminated the distribution provisions 
from the tariff bill.  On August 22, the House finally passed a modified measure by a vote of 105 
to 103 and the Senate did the same five days later by a vote of 24 to 23.
131
  The new tariff 
restored ad valorem rates to their 1832 levels, and included high specific duties on iron ore, 
manufactured iron products such as rails, and clothing.  Overall, the new tariff established an 
average tariff rate of 33%.
132
  President Tyler, facing a drained treasury, signed the bill into law 
on August 30.
133
  However, Tyler had successfully separated the tariff and distribution issues.  
Calhoun gleefully noted that “The Whigs are now divided into two parties … one preferring the 
Distribution to the Tariff, and the other the Tariff to the Distribution; and neither willing to join 
in a bill simply for revenue with us.”134  The Whigs quickly passed a separate distribution bill, 
but Tyler pocket vetoed it, ending all hopes for the distribution initiative.
135
 
     The debates surrounding the Little Tariff, the Permanent Tariff, and the Revised Permanent 
Tariff all featured common themes.  The demarcation occurred along traditional lines, but now 
the respective positions also corresponded with the two major political parties.  Whigs advocated 
economic nationalism while Democrats argued for free trade principles.  
     Whigs used three primary themes in arguing for higher tariffs.  The first was familiar, a call 
for increased national economic and military strength.  They believed that maintaining 
protectionism was a prerequisite for American manufacturing prosperity, which would 
eventually create national economic strength sufficient to compete with European powers.  A 
second theme was new, and represented an adaptation to ongoing democratization and the 
rapidly increasing number of immigrants in American society.  Whigs argued that protectionism 
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benefitted American workers by driving up wages.  The final theme was a familiar refrain; 
Whigs maintained that free trade was an impractical idea grounded in theory, lacking empirical 
evidence that it could ever be put into practice. 
     The 1842 tariff debates commenced with disagreement over the bill’s purpose.  Millard 
Fillmore introduced the Little Tariff simply stating that “this was a revenue bill, intended to 
supply the wants of the treasury.”136  Virginia Democrat representative Thomas Gilmer contested 
Fillmore’s characterization, declaring that “These bills were founded upon different principles – 
upon protection and revenue, and upon both blended, according to the views of their advocates.”  
Gilmer explained that “there were three parties in the House at this time; the first was in favor of 
… protection; the second … the attainment of distribution; the third for revenue only … The 
object sought after by many gentlemen was to unite the first two, and get protection and 
distribution.”137   
     The primary Whig argument was the familiar refrain that protective tariffs would foster 
American industrialization and make the United States self-reliant both economically and 
militarily.  Representative John Kennedy of Maryland demanded “protection for the country, and 
for every portion of the country,” because protection was “one of the highest duties of this 
government … revenue … was a necessary evil; but [we] must have protection to secure to our 
own people our own markets against all the world.”138  Pennsylvania Democratic Senator James 
Buchanan joined the Whigs on this point for the benefit of his iron industry constituents, stating 
that he would “discriminate – and especially would be discriminate in favor of such 
manufactures as were essentially necessary … in time of war.”139   
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     Whigs reiterated that that all economic spheres and geographic regions should expect to 
prosper under the American System.  Massachusetts congressman Leverett Saltonstall noted that 
the “commercial and manufacturing interests were not alone in calling for action on the subject; 
the agricultural interests were alike involved in it; [Congress] had received memorials from the 
South and West.”140  Thomas Marshall of Kentucky pointed out that protection was a national, 
rather than regional, doctrine.  He stated that “This bill is not inattentive to Southern interests 
whenever they can come within the protective principle.  Take sugar … sugar is protected by a 
duty of 50 per cent …. Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri and more extensive regions still, are 
fitted to the production of hemp, sufficient for the whole national supply.”141  
     Another aspect of the “nationalist” argument, previously cited in 1828 and 1832, was that 
previous protectionist policies created an implied pledge by the federal government to 
manufacturers.  Connecticut representative John Brockway described the tariff as a quasi-
covenant between government and the private sector, declaring that “the protective policy did not 
originate in New England.  It was forced on her by the acts of this Government … which had 
induced so many in the North and East to invest capital in manufactures, and which … gave 
them certain vested rights (emphasis added) by pledging the faith of the Government for their 
protection.”142 
     Tariff advocates also argued, as a second major theme, that protection benefitted American 
workers.  New York Whig congressman Hiram Hunt stated that “Not only did he believe that 
Congress had the constitutional power, but he held it to be their duty, to protect American labor 
from hostile enactments of foreign Governments.”143  Whig Pennsylvania Representative 
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William Irwin referred to “the state of feeling on the subject of the tariff in his own district and 
stated the contents of a memorial … adopted by a meeting [including] prominent personages of 
the Democratic party … it took strong ground in favor of protecting American industry against 
the labor of the half-starved paupers of Europe.”144  Maine Senator George Evans defined 
national prosperity as “the high price of wages.  What is to keep up the price of wages but high 
prices?”145   
     Protectionists also attacked the practicality of free trade, constituting their third major theme.  
Virginia Whig congressman Alexander Stuart explained that “free trade never had been the 
policy of any country, and never would be; and therefore it was unprofitable to contend with an 
abstraction.”146  New York’s Hunt added that “England … had derived the greatest advantage 
from the protective system … [no] single British statesman, Whig or Tory … practically 
advocated free trade.”147    
     Free-traders objected to the tariff with three themes of their own.  Their first objection related 
to distribution, which necessitated tariff increases to offset the loss of land sale revenues to the 
federal government.  The second objection was that the Compromise Act of 1833 had settled the 
tariff issue once and for all, and that Whigs were reneging on a bargain already struck.  Their 
final argument was the most important one, that free-trade policy was essential to the 
safeguarding American republicanism.  They equated protection with economic favoritism and 
privilege, a situation incompatible with republicanism because it built up vast economic power in 
the hands of a few, which inevitably led to political corruption.    
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     Democrats argued that the Distribution Act placed excessive economic power in hands of 
both the federal and state governments.  Representative John Jones praised his native Virginia’s 
refusal “to receive the proceeds of the land money … her principles could not be bought.”148  
John Van Buren of New York believed that land sale revenues should stay with the federal 
government, and “he could vouch for the Democracy on that floor, that if the land revenues were 
restored to the Government, to which they belonged, they would be willing to vote for such a 
tariff as would be necessary for the economical purposes of the Government.”149   
     A second Democrat objection was that the Whigs were reneging on pledges made in the 
Compromise Tariff.  Roger Gamble of Georgia noted that the Whigs had not run on a 
protectionist platform in the South in the recent election and “protested against having a 
protective tariff fastened upon them as a consequence of the victory of the Whigs in 1840.”150  
William “Extra Billy” Smith of Virginia denied that any promises or concessions had been made 
to manufacturers in the Compromise Act: 
Mr. Clay declared that the tariff was at the last gasp … the gentlemen of the 
South, with unequaled generosity yielded to … the manufacturers the benefits of 
protection for nine years longer … now that the South was to receive its share of 
the advantages held out by it, gentlemen were anxious to violate it … I’ve got the 
gentleman’s principles; and what are they?  The five loaves and the seven fishes – 
protection and distribution – plunder and division.151   
 
Massachusetts’ Nathan Appleton contested Smith’s argument, suggesting that the Compromise 
Act amounted to a corrupt bargain, and that it was a deal “to which the Jackson party and the 
State of South Carolina were the parties … manufacturers were … victims … The compromise 
act [was] an arrant imposture, and … not obligatory on manufacturing interests.”152     
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     Finally, the most powerful objections to the proposed tariff attacked its protective principles.  
Liberals maintained that free trade promoted liberty and equal opportunity for all citizens.  In 
contrast, protection amounted to economic favoritism, and the resulting concentrations of 
economic power would eventually corrupt and destroy the republic.   
     Many free trade advocates insisted that the proposed tariff placed economic burdens on 
American citizens.  John Van Buren complained of the “injustices of a high tariff to the other 
diversified interests of the country, and to its commerce generally.”153 Indiana’s Andrew 
Kennedy had “no patience with the doctrines of protection; he could just as calmly sit down and 
reason about the modus operandi of stealing from his pocket the produce of a day’s labor, as 
about this doctrine of protection … if such [economic prosperity] were to be the effect … the 
consumer would ask for it … not the manufacturer.”154  Arthur Bagby of Alabama declared that 
he was “opposed to protection in all its forms … the country had not yet reached that climax in 
stupidity, in which it could believe that to tax the people heavily is to promote their 
prosperity.”155   
     Other critics viewed the tariff as favoritism to economic special interest groups.  Pennsylvania 
Representative Joseph Fornance commented that “if it [the tariff] meant a bounty given to a 
particular occupation – a tax to aid one man or set of men who could not live without it, and who 
required the protection of Government to enable their business to succeed – he was opposed to it, 
and would deem such a system oppressive and unjust.”156  William Smith described protection 
“as a system of plunder … What was the reason the manufacturers could not thrive without this 
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insidious distinction in their favor?  Plainly because labor and capital employed in other 
avocations were more profitable and attended with richer rewards.”157   
     Economic liberals argued the superiority of their theories over the American System.  
Virginian Robert Hunter “expressed astonishment that, in this enlightened age … when other 
nations were advancing with the progressive spirit of the times, and laying down their restrictive 
armor, this country was asked to revive a policy that would better become the empire of 
Mehemet Ali, than such a nation as ours.”158  Aaron Brown of Tennessee proclaimed that 
“protection had now become odious, and many who had once advocated it, now merely 
expressed themselves for a tariff for revenue, though in disguise for protection.”159       
     It is important to note that free traders were not necessarily anti-manufacturing.  Their 
foremost concern was to establish a fair economic playing field, consistent with republican 
principles.  Aaron Brown stated that “he was not an enemy to useful manufactures, but thought 
that, in a country like the United States, where raw materials were so cheap, water-power so 
abundant, and taxes on real property so low, it was exceedingly singular if the manufacturers 
could not sustain themselves by the aid of a duty of twenty or twenty-five percent.”160  
Mississippian William Gwin pointed out that trade policy should be based on principle rather 
than economic self-interest when he pointed out that “years ago, the South was extensively 
engaged in the culture of indigo. … how did this section act when it was found that other 
countries could compete with it in the production of this article?  Did it come to Congress and 
ask protection …?  It did not look to its own selfish interest, but abandoned the production of the 
article.”  He concluded that “what the South wanted was free trade, and the world at large for a 
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market.”161  Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire explained that “though he was deliberately and 
decidedly opposed to the tariff system, it was not because he was hostile to the manufacturing 
interests.  All he desired was equal privileges.”162   
     In the end, free traders simply could not reconcile artificial economic privileges with 
republican virtue.  Alabama’s Dixon Lewis best summed this viewpoint when he explained that 
“According to all … conceptions of free governments, they were instituted solely for the 
protection of life, liberty, and property … he looked upon the system of protective tariffs and 
distribution as the grossest and most unjust species of favoritism.”  Lewis chastised 
protectionists, suggesting that “They began at the wrong end.  Instead of asking for protection to 
increase the prices of their products, they should produce cheaper, and this was the only way to 
become prosperous.  They could not, by legislation, change the laws of trade, which were of 
Divine origin. … the life of business was competition.”163 
     Venerable John Calhoun, co-author of the Compromise Tariff, remained silent through most 
of the 1842 debates, but offered a last word.  He concluded that “the tariff bill of 1828 was justly 
called a tariff of abominations. But, bad as it was, this is infinitely worse.  The average of duties 
by this bill on the necessaries of life will be 10 percent greater than was the average of the tariff 
bill of 1828.”164  In Calhoun’s view, economic favoritism had won the day, and the citizens of 
the American republic were the victims.  The seeds for economic tyranny, and an attack upon 
true republican ideals, had been sown.  
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The Tariffs of 1841 and 1842: A Voting Analysis 
     The Second Party System, featuring a sharp demarcation between Whigs and Democrats on 
the tariff issue, shifted the pattern from one dominated by region to one of party, where voting 
discipline could be enforced in most cases.  While tariff rhetoric in 1841 and 1842 resembled 
past episodes, the roll calls sharply contrasted with previous votes.  The regional pattern of 
voting that dominated the tariff issue from 1824 through 1833 was decisively broken.  These 
dynamics had been absent from the American political landscape since the Madison presidency.  
A review of each of the five major legislative bills that either directly or indirectly impacted the 
trade policy discourse in 1841 and 1842 (Distribution, Tariff of 1841, Little Tariff, Permanent 
Tariff, and Revised Permanent Tariff) illustrate that dynamic political shifts had occurred since 
1833 regarding trade policy.   
     An analysis of the 1841 Distribution bill by region shows the breakdown of regional 
solidarity in comparison to tariff votes in 1824, 1828, and 1832.  Table 9.5 shows that the New 
England and Atlantic states, who by 1832 had become ardent supporters of economic 
nationalism, were significantly divided on the distribution issue in both the House and Senate.  
The South and the Chesapeake, reliably anti-nationalist, featured a sizable minority of “aye” 
votes in the House and a majority their senators favored the bill.  The two Western regions, 
which stood to greatly benefit from internal improvements, were surprisingly divided. 
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Table 9.5. Ratification Vote of the 1841 Distribution Bill by Region57 
             House      House   Senate Senate 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)      28                 10                 8                    4 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                   37                 32                 5                    3 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                               12                 16                 4                    0 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           5                 25                 3                    3 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                      18                   8                 4                    4 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)    16                 16                 4                    9 
Totals              116               107               28                  23 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 156, 388 (1841).  
 
     The voting patterns for the Distribution Bill in the House, illustrated in Table 9.6, are more 
correlated when votes are tabulated by party affiliation.  Democrats, ideologically opposed to the 
American System, unanimously voted against the measure by a vote of 90 to 0.  Whigs favored 
the measure by a margin of 116 in favor to only 17 against.  Of the 17 dissenters, 16 came from 
the Chesapeake and South regions, areas least likely to benefit from the Distribution bill.  
Table 9.6. House Ratification Vote – The 1841 Distribution Bill by Region & Party58 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        0                 10                 28                    0 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     0                 32                 37                    0 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                 12                 12                    4 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                 13                   5                  12 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        0                   8                 18                    0 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                 15                 16                    1 
Totals                  0                 90               116                  17 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1841). 
 
     The demarcation along party lines was even more striking in the Senate.  Table 9.7 shows that 
all 28 Whig senators voted for the bill, while all 23 Democrats voted against the measure.  
Clearly, loyalty was a much stronger influence on the Distribution Bill vote than geography.  
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Table 9.7. Senate Ratification Vote – The 1841 Distribution Bill by Region & Party59 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        0                   4                   8                    0 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     0                   3                   5                    0 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                   0                   4                    0 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                   3                   3                    0 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        0                   4                   4                    0 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                   9                   4                    0 
Totals                  0                 23                 28                    0 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 388 (1841).  
. 
     A similar pattern emerges in analyzing the votes associated with the Tariff of 1841.  The bill 
garnered appreciable support from all geographical regions, as summarized in Table 9.8.  If the 
six regions that have characterized this study are aggregated into larger scale “super-regions,” 
delineated as the North (New England and Atlantic), South (Chesapeake and South), and West 
(Northwest and Southwest), it is informative to note that the Tariff Bill received a majority vote 
in all three super-regions in both the House and Senate.       
Table 9.8. Ratification Vote of the Tariff of 1841 by Region60 
             House      House   Senate Senate 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)      22                 14                 7                    1 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                   32                 37                 7                    1 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                               11                 13                 3                    0 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                         15                 12                 4                    2 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                      18                   8                 4                    2 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)    18                 17                 8                    5 
Totals              116               101               33                  11 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 274, 438 (1841).  
 
     A review of the Tariff of 1841 along party lines again shows that the line of demarcation was 
based upon ideology rather than geography.  Table 9.9 tabulates the House roll call by political 
party.  In this instance, Democrat representatives unanimously voted against the measure, while 
116 of 132 Whigs voted for it.  The Whig defectors were spread throughout varying regions, 
again demonstrating the weakness of geography as a factor in influencing voting patterns.  
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Table 9.9. House Ratification Vote – The Tariff of 1841 by Region & Party61 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        0                   9                 22                    5 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     0                 33                 32                    4 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                   9                 11                    4 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                 11                 15                    1 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        0                   7                 18                    1 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                 16                 18                    1 
Totals                  0                 85               116                  16 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1841). 
 
      The Senate voting pattern on the Tariff of 1841 was more ambiguous than the House.  In this 
instance, all 25 Whig senators voted in favor of the measure.  Democrats demonstrated less 
solidarity, voting against the bill by only an 11 to 8 margin.  The logical explanation for this 
pattern is that the Senate version added the proviso negating the Distribution Bill if the scheduled 
rate reductions per the Compromise Tariff of 1833 were not enacted.  Many Senate Democrats 
were willing to accept the short-term consequences of the Tariff bill in exchange for what was 
perceived to be a guaranty that the terms of the Compromise Tariff would be respected.    
Table 9.10. Senate Ratification Vote – The Tariff of 1841 by Region & Party62 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        0                   1                   7                    0 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     2                   1                   5                    0 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                   0                   3                    0 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           1                   2                   3                    0 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        1                   2                   3                    0 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      4                   5                   4                    0 
Totals                  8                 11                 25                    0 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 438 (1841). 
 
     In 1842, when the Whig legislative agenda sought to reintroduce the key elements of the 
American System, the political scenario was similar to 1824 and 1828, when nationalists had 
previously pressed a similar agenda.  The prior initiatives in 1824 and 1828 featured sharp voting 
demarcations based on region.  The voting patterns in 1842, shown in Table 9.11, distinctly 
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differed from those prior experiences.  While the Little Tariff received significant support in 
New England and was heavily opposed in the South, all regions featured significant minority 
voting blocs in both the House and Senate. 
Table 9.11. Ratification Vote of the “Little Tariff” of 1842 by Region63 
             House      House   Senate Senate 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)      27                   9                 7                    3 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                   35                 32                 4                    3 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                               11                 12                 2                    1 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           6                 21                 2                    3 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                      20                   9                 4                    4 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)    16                 18                 5                    5 
Totals              115               101               24                  19 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 637, 679 (1842); note that although the Globe 
reported the House roll call vote as 116 to 103, only 115 aye and 101 nay votes are recorded.   
 
     In contrast, the influence of political party affiliation on the Little Tariff votes was far more 
correlated.  As illustrated in Table 9.12, House Whigs favored the measure by a margin of 113 to 
12, while Democrats opposed the measure 89 to 2.  The few Whig defectors largely came from 
the Chesapeake and South regions. 
Table 9.12. House Ratification Vote – The “Little Tariff” of 1842 by Region & Party64 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        1                   9                 26                    0 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     0                 31                 35                    1 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                   9                 11                    3 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                 14                   6                    7 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        1                   8                 19                    1 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                 18                 16                    0 
Totals                  2                 89               113                  12 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 637 (1842); note that although the Globe reported 
the House roll call vote as 116 to 103, only 115 aye and 101 nay votes are recorded.   
 
     A similar pattern emerges when analyzing the Senate votes.  Table 9.13 shows that Whigs 
approved of the Little Tariff by casting 24 ayes versus only 2 nays.  Democrats voted against the 
measure by a 17 to 0 vote.  
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Table 9.13. Senate Ratification Vote – The “Little Tariff” of 1842 by Region & Party65 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        0                   3                   7                    0 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     0                   3                   4                    0 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                   0                   2                    1 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                   2                   2                    1 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        0                   4                   4                    0 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                   5                   5                    0 
Totals                  0                 17                 24                    2 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 679 (1842). 
 
     The patterns established with the Little Tariff were largely duplicated a few weeks later when 
the Permanent Tariff bill was considered.  Overall voting results were slightly closer, as some 
anti-tariff legislators who did not participate in the Little Tariff vote turned out for the Permanent 
Tariff roll call.  Table 9.14 presents a similar voting pattern to the earlier bill.  There was 
appreciable voting support and resistance in virtually every region in both Senate and House.   
Table 9.14. Ratification Vote of the Permanent Tariff of 1842 by Region66 
             House      House   Senate Senate 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)      27                   9                 8                    4 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                   37                 33                 5                    3 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                               13                 15                 3                    1 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           4                 24                 1                    4 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                      19                   9                 4                    4 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)    16                 22                 4                    7 
Totals              116               112               25                  23 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 762, 852 (1842). 
 
     The House voting patterns for the Permanent Tariff by political party again show a higher 
correlation by party than by geographical region.  Table 9.15 shows that 94 of 95 Democrats 
voted against the bill, while 115 of 133 Whigs voted for it.  Again, the few Whig defectors were 
largely confined to the Chesapeake and South regions.  
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Table 9.15. House Ratification Vote – The Permanent Tariff of 1842 by Region & Party67 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        1                   8                 26                    1 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     0                 32                 37                    1 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                 12                 13                    3 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                 15                   4                    9 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        0                   9                 19                    0 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                 18                 16                    4 
Totals                  1                 94               115                  18 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 762 (1842). 
 
     The Senate voting patterns on the Permanent Tariff also followed similar patterns to the Little 
Tariff.  Table 9.16 illustrates that 25 of 27 Whigs voted in favor of the bill and all 21 Democrats 
voted against it.  The only two Whig defections were confined to the Chesapeake and South. 
Table 9.16. Senate Ratification Vote – The Permanent Tariff of 1842 by Region & Party68 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        0                   4                   8                    0 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     0                   3                   5                    0 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                   0                   3                    1 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                   3                   1                    1 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        0                   4                   4                    0 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                   7                   4                    0 
Totals                  0                 21                 25                    2 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 852 (1842). 
 
     The fairly consistent voting patterns established during the Distribution, Tariff of 1841, Little 
Tariff, and Permanent Tariff broke down during the roll call vote on the Revised Permanent 
Tariff.  The votes on the final legislative tariff act in 1842 coalesced along geographic lines, 
similar to most tariff votes during the 1820s and early 1830s.  Table 9.17 shows that New 
England and the Atlantic region heavily supported the measure, while the Chesapeake and South 
strongly opposed it.  The Western regions produced mixed results, with the Northwest almost 
evenly split and the Southwest against, but with an appreciable minority in favor of the bill. 
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Table 9.17. Ratification Vote of the Revised Permanent Tariff of 1842 by Region69 
             House      House   Senate Senate 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)      26                   7                 9                    2 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                   53                 10                 7                    1 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 6                 20                 0                    3 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                 24                 0                    6 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                      14                 12                 4                    3 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      6                 30                 4                    8 
Totals              105               103               24                  23 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 926, 960 (1842). 
 
     As geography became a more important variable in the Revised Permanent Tariff vote, party 
affiliation became less important.  Table 9.18 shows that most Whigs favored the bill and most 
Democrats opposed it.  However, substantial minority voting blocs in both parties strayed from 
the standard party position.  Geography played an important role in the defections, as many 
Northern Democrats voted for the final bill and many Southern Whigs voted against it.  
Table 9.18. House Ratification Vote – The Revised Permanent Tariff of 1842 by Region & 
Party70 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        1                   6                 25                    1 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                   19                   7                 34                    3 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                 12                   6                    8 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                 13                   0                  11 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        0                   9                 14                    3 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                 17                   6                  13 
Totals                20                 64                 85                  39 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 926 (1842). 
 
     A similar pattern emerged in the Senate.  Table 9.19 shows that some Northern Democrat and 
Southern Whig senators voted against party doctrine.  The pattern correlated to geography, with 
most Whig defectors from the South and Democrat defectors from the North.  
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Table 9.19. Senate Ratification Vote – The Revised Permanent Tariff of 1842 by Region & 
Party71 
             Democrat     Democrat   Whig  Whig 
Region              States           Ayes      Nays   Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT,MA,ME,NH,RI,VT)        1                   2                   8                    0 
Atlantic           (DE,NJ, NY,PA)                     3                   0                   4                    1 
Chesapeake     (MD,VA)                                 0                   0                   0                    3 
South               (GA,NC,SC)                           0                   3                   0                    3 
Northwest       (IL,IN,MI,OH)                        0                   3                   4                    0 
Southwest (AL,AR,KY,LA,MO,MS,TN)      0                   7                   4                    1 
Totals                  4                 15                 20                    8 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 960 (1842). 
 
     The votes on the final version of the 1842 tariff bill represent an anomaly in comparison to 
the other roll calls during the 1841 and 1842 debates.  Although the majority of Whigs and 
Democrats remained loyal to their parties’ positions, 39 Whigs and 20 Democrats switched sides.   
     The significant shift in voting patterns on the final tariff bill vote begs explanation.  Many 
congressmen appear to have used it as a referendum on the separate issues of distribution and 
President Tyler’s use of the veto, creating a distortion.  Several specific examples clearly 
demonstrate that this particular vote was an anomaly.  For example, Martin Van Buren protégé 
Senator Silas Wright, a solid free trader on all previous roll calls, voted for the bill because of the 
Treasury’s immediate needs.165  John Quincy Adams, an ardent protectionist, voted against it as 
a protest against Tyler.  Senators Willie Magnum of North Carolina and William Merrick of 
Maryland informed Clay that they supported protection, but switched their votes to “nay” in 
August because distribution had been dropped.
166
    
     As a result, party loyalty patterns broke down on the final tariff vote.  A contributing factor 
was certainly the spiteful relationship developed by late 1842 between President Tyler and the 
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Whig congressional caucus, leading to Tyler’s eviction from the party.167  These circumstances 
created a variety of grounds for both Whigs and Democrats to potentially change from their 
traditional postures in the interest of political expediency.  The most significant changes in 
position occurred in the industrialized states of New York and Pennsylvania, where many 
Democrats took an opportunity to appear pro-tariff, and somewhat less so in the states of North 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Kentucky, where many Whigs took the opportunity to appear 
anti-tariff and/or anti-administration.      
     The Distribution, Tariff of 1841, Little Tariff and Permanent Tariff votes demonstrate that an 
important shift in the nature of American political economy occurred between 1832 and 1841.  
The entire United States were now embracing industrialization.  Granted, different regions were 
industrializing at different growth rates, but each section had reached a point where significant 
portions of their citizenry considered themselves vested in the industrialization process.  This is 
emphatically demonstrated by the presence of strong economic nationalist voting blocs in all 
regions.  The final vote on the Revised Permanent Tariff, whose pattern is distinctly different 
than the other four bills, represents an isolated exception, and does not appropriately convey the 
political and economic reality that existed in 1842. 
     The creation of the Second Party System, and the respective Whig and Democrat Parties, 
provided Americans with clear choices regarding national economic policy.  The fact that both 
Whigs and Democrats featured large constituencies throughout all of the nation’s regions 
demonstrates the degree to which the ideological platforms of economic nationalism and free 
trade had permeated the United States.  This came about because each region was experiencing 
meaningful growth in their respective manufacturing sectors.   
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     Historians have long misinterpreted the important events that occurred during the tariff 
debates in 1841 and 1842, usually as a consequence of only examining the roll call for the 
Revised Permanent Tariff.  Charles Sydnor, author of The Development of Southern 
Sectionalism, grants only a single reference to the Tariff of 1842.  He interpreted the bill’s 
passage as proof of the “declining influence of Southern Whigs.”168  Edward Stanwood described 
the country’s economic woes in 1842 as affecting “the industrial North, the agricultural West, 
and the planting South.”169  Douglas Irwin states that the Tariff of 1842 represents an instance 
where “The House passed the measure by a single vote, with overwhelming support from the 
North, complete opposition from the South, and a majority against in the West.”170  All of these 
authors suggest that sectionalism is the key variable to understanding the events of 1841 and 
1842.   
     A detailed examination of the trade policy related bills during those two years reveals a far 
different story.  The first three tariff bills considered during 1841 and 1842 demonstrate that, in 
contrast to increased sectionalism, the tariff issue had actually become nationalized, based on the 
competing ideologies of economic nationalism and free trade.  The opposing ideological camps 
were, at this point in time, closely matched.  The Little Tariff and Permanent Tariff bills, which 
constitute the best examples of diametric nationalist and free trade positions at play in the roll 
call vote, passed Congress by thin margins, each with a bare majority of 50.9% of the votes cast.  
Senate results were slightly better, as the Little Tariff passed with 55.8% of the total votes and 
the Permanent Tariff with 52.1% of the votes.   
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     The voting patterns in 1842 clearly demonstrate an important shift occurring in the American 
political and economic landscape.  It is true that a majority of Northerners favored, and a 
majority of Southerners opposed, the tariff bills in 1842, as had been the case in the 1820s and 
1830s.  However, Northern free trade sentiment and Southern protectionist sentiment both 
markedly increased in 1842 compared with earlier roll calls.  Table 9.20 shows the voting pattern 
on a North/South axis for the tariff votes in 1824, 1828, and two 1842 votes (the Little Tariff and 
the Permanent Tariff).  These four votes present the best basis for comparison because all four 
involved efforts to raise tariff rates, creating scenarios where economic nationalists were most 
inclined to vote in favor of the pending legislation and where free traders would vote against.   
Table 9.20. Tariff Voting Patterns: North and South, 1824 to 184272 
            Northern Northern Southern Southern  
Bill                Ayes       Nays    Ayes  Nays 
House: 
Tariff of 1824   89 (73.6%) 32 (26.4%) 18 (20.5%) 70 (79.5%) 
Tariff of 1828   89 (75.4%) 29 (24.6%) 16 (20.0%) 64 (80.0%) 
Little Tariff of 1842  82 (62.1%) 50 (37.9%) 33 (39.3%) 51 (60.7%) 
Permanent Tariff of 1842   83 (61.9%) 51 (38.1%) 33 (35.1%) 61 (64.9%) 
 
Senate: 
Tariff of 1824   19 (76.0%)   6 (24.0%)   6 (28.6%) 15 (71.4%) 
Tariff of 1828   20 (80.0%)   5 (20.0%)   6 (27.3%) 16 (72.7%) 
Little Tariff of 1842  15 (60.0%) 10 (40.0%)   9 (50.0%)   9 (50.0%) 
Permanent Tariff of 1842   17 (60.7%) 11 (39.3%)   8 (40.0%) 12 (60.0%) 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 637, 679, 762, 852 (1842). 
 
     In 1842, many House Northerners exhibited free trade sentiments while many Southerners 
exhibited protectionist sentiments.  These minority blocs approached 40% of the votes from each 
region, significantly greater than had been the case in 1824 and 1828.  The same pattern emerged 
in the Senate to a greater degree.  Northern free trade sentiment virtually doubled compared to 
1824 and 1828, approximating 40% of Northern senators, while 50% of Southern senators voted 
for the Little Tariff in 1842.        
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     An in-depth review of the three primary tariff bills in 1841 and 1842 (Tariff of 1841, The 
Little Tariff, and the Permanent Tariff) provides strong evidence that party loyalty held a much 
stronger sway than region.  Fully 90% of House members voted strictly alongside with their 
party position on all of the votes that they participated in.  A small group of 4% exhibited 
“mixed” voting patterns, leaving only 6% of members willing to defy their party’s position.  In 
raw numbers, these dissenters comprised a mere fifteen House members.  Eight of them were 
Georgia Whigs, who defected en masse to oppose the tariff.   
     The party loyalty pattern on the three primary tariff bills was even stronger in the Senate.  Not 
a single Senator consistently opposed their respective party positions.  Only three exhibited a 
“mixed” voting pattern.  By the end of the voting on the three primary tariff bills, 95% of 
senators had voted consistently with the party position on every one of the votes.     
     The degree of party loyalty on the related distribution issue was also strong.  In the House, 
93% of the votes cast conformed to party ideology.  In the Senate, 82% of Senators supported 
their party’s position.  The strong correlation between the tariff and distribution voting patterns is 
not surprising, as Henry Clay tried to marry the two issues together in 1841 and 1842.  It also 
confirms the power of party during the Second Party System period, as nationalist Whigs 
supported both elements of the American System while egalitarian Democrats opposed them.  
     Joel Silbey’s The Shrine of Party closely examines congressional voting patterns during the 
period 1841 through 1852.  His study includes the voting patterns of the 27
th
 Congress by party 
and of the 27
th
 and 28
th
 Congresses by region and it validates that tariffs were primarily a matter 
of party economic principles rather than sectional self-interest. He devised quantitative measures 
to measure loyalty patterns by both party and sectional behavior as follows: 
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Table 9.21. The Tariff/Distribution Issue – Party & Sectional Voting Patterns73 
              
Party/Region and Voting Disposition   Tariff  Distribution 
By Party:  
Senate Whigs highly pro    80%  96% 
House Whigs highly pro    70%  88% 
Senate Democrats highly anti    90%  86% 
House Democrats highly anti    95%  98% 
 
By Section: 
Northern senators highly pro    72%  65% 
Northern representatives highly pro   51%  59% 
Northwestern senators highly pro   50%  57% 
Northwestern representatives highly pro  57%  62% 
Southern senators highly anti    46%  52% 
Southern representatives highly anti   60%  59% 
Source: Silbey, Shrine of Party, 54-55, 62--66. 
 
Silbey concluded that “parties were united … sections were split.”171  Thomas Alexander, in 
another statistical analysis of the 27
th
 Congress, corroborates Silbey’s conclusions, stating “party 
antagonism dominated the divisions” on economic issues.172  Henry Clay contemporaneously 
noted these patterns, observing in 1843 the presence of strong Southern Whig support for 
protection.
173
 
     In addition to party, a statistical analysis of the voting patterns clearly demonstrates that 
industrialization influenced the voting patterns as well.  Appendix QQ summarizes findings of a 
logistic regression analysis of the 1841 and 1842 votes against a series of economic compiled 
from the 1840 census.  Its findings include the following: 
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Table 9.22. Logistic Regression Analysis Findings74 
      Statistical          
Variable     Significance 
Slave/free state          No 
Slave population          No  
Agricultural population         No 
Capital per capita         Yes 
Source: Appendix QQ. 
 
Not only did this analysis show that invested manufacturing capital per capita was a significant 
variable factor in the congressional voting, it also demonstrated that the variables of slave versus 
free state, slave population, and agricultural labor force were not significant.  Those states or 
congressional districts where industrial investment was occurring were more likely to vote in 
favor of the protectionist legislation that the Whigs offered in 1841 and 1842.
174
   
     Several state delegations exhibited strong voting patterns either for, or against, the tariff in 
1841 and 1842.  The New England states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and 
Vermont overwhelmingly favored economic nationalism.  They were joined by New Jersey, 
Delaware, Indiana and Michigan.  In contrast, the states of Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, 
Alabama and South Carolina were overwhelmingly anti-protectionist.  They were joined by 
Democrats in the New Hampshire delegation.  
     However, many states in both the North and South exhibited mixed tendencies on the tariff 
issue.  In the North, the list included the evenly split states of New York, Pennsylvania, Maine, 
and Illinois, as well as a slight protectionist majority in Ohio.  In the South, the Tennessee and 
North Carolina delegations were split, while protectionists possessed majorities in the Kentucky, 
Louisiana and Maryland delegations and sizable minorities in both Virginia and Georgia. 
     The fourteen states that can be categorized as strongly in either the nationalist or liberal 
camps possessed 64 House seats.  In comparison, the twelve remaining “battleground” states 
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possessed 178 House seats.  This suggests that by the 1840s the tariff issue was sharply contested 
in many states as well as at the federal level, again contradicting impressions that the tariff was 
strictly a sectional issue. 
     Even states that appeared to be solidly “pro” or “anti” tariff at the national level were prone to 
significant internal quarreling over trade policy.  An example was the case of Mississippi in 
1842, where the Whig party was both active and successful.  That year, the state legislature 
narrowly rejected a motion to revoke instructions to the state’s two senators to vote against the 
tariff by a vote of 45 to 39, a demonstration of strong state-level protectionist sentiment.
175
 
     The Tariff of 1842 represented the final instance during the antebellum period where tariff 
rates increased.  The scheduled Compromise Tariff reduction to a 20% rate was superseded, and 
an average rate of 32% was established in its place.
176
  Actual tariff rates between 1843 and 1846 
averaged 27%, an increase from rates charged between 1834 and 1842, which had averaged just 
19% of the total value of imports.
177
  Although their victory was less complete than they had 
hoped, Whigs substantially raised tariff rates and retained the discriminatory principle.     
     Democrats considered the Tariff of 1842 a significant political setback.  In the 1844 election, 
their presidential candidate, James K. Polk, incorporated the tariff as a major campaign issue.  
His successful election set the stage for another major trade policy initiative, attempting to 
reintroduce the principles embodied in the Compromise Tariff of 1833.  That confrontation 
would occur in 1846.  
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Reconciling John Calhoun 
     The traditional interpretation of the tariff as a sectional issue has been largely influenced by 
John Calhoun’s intellectual marriage of the economic issue of the Tariff of Abominations with 
the political issue of state rights doctrine.  Calhoun’s pen and intellect were powerful weapons.  
Historian Lacy Ford pointed out that Calhoun opposed Whig economic development programs 
“on both `Country‘ republican and Smithian liberal grounds, sometimes combining these 
potentially contradictory sets of ideas with stunning effect.”178   
     Many historians have claimed that the tariff was Calhoun’s major concern during the 
Nullification Crisis, creating a source for regional antagonisms that eventually led to the Civil 
War.  Charles and Mary Beard asserted, in The Rise of American Civilization, that economic 
tensions, primarily due to the tariff, represented a primary cause of the Civil War.  They agreed 
with Jefferson Davis’ insistence that the North sought “by an unjust system of legislation, to 
promote the industry of the New England states, at the expense of the people of the South.”  The 
Beards believed that Southerners foresaw “an economic policy that meant the exploitation of the 
South for the benefit of northern capitalism.”179 
     During the crisis of 1832-33, Calhoun assumed a prominent leadership role amongst the 
Nullifiers.  Many historians have unconditionally accepted his argument that the twin issues of 
the tariff and nullification were inseparable. Southern fire-eaters perpetuated this view during the 
1850s.  They argued that northern industrialization and free labor represented a political threat to 
the South.  However, a close review of Calhoun’s actions and views demonstrate that he used the 
tariff as a pretext to wage political war using nullification and state rights doctrine to further his 
true strategic goal, which was the defense of slavery.   
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     On the surface, Calhoun seemed to be firmly aligned with the free trade movement.  For 
example, he warned a Democratic-Republican Club in New York shortly after the 1840 election, 
inquiring “which shall prevail, the school of Jefferson or Hamilton? … turn back to the Hamilton 
policy … [and] restore the misnamed American System, with all its corrupting and dangerous 
consequences?”180  The 1840 Whig victory motivated a fearful South Carolina legislature to pass 
a resolution immediately after the election declaring that any protective features in tariffs were 
unconstitutional.
181
  These historical fragments give the misimpression that the tariff and 
nullification were solely matters over political economy.  
     Calhoun had an opportunity to become a standard bearer for free trade during the 
Nullification Crisis in 1832.  Instead, he set forth on a separate political agenda focusing upon 
state rights issues to the exclusion of political economy.  As the Nullification Crisis escalated in 
1831, Calhoun issued his “Fort Hill Address,” where he transformed the tariff issue from one 
regarding the merits of trade policy to one of protecting minority political rights.  Although he 
initially addressed the tariff, stating that “every duty imposed for the purpose of protection is not 
only unequal, but also unconstitutional,” Calhoun immediately shifted his emphasis from the 
tariff to his real goal of endorsing the political doctrine of nullification.
182
  He continued: “The 
Tariff itself is a strong case in point … where Congress perverts a power from an object 
intended, to one not intended, the most insidious and dangerous of all infractions.”  He declared 
the remedy to be “the reserved sovereignty of the States as the only refuge.”183   
     The South Carolinian’s fervent endorsement of nullification overshadowed his economic 
views from 1833 onward, and he contributed little to the tariff question over his remaining 
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career.  Rather disingenuously, Calhoun mustered an effort to gain the presidency in the 1832 
election, and in the process sought political favor from other regions by advocating western 
internal improvements through federal land sales and selective tariff protection for northeastern 
interests to pursue personal political gain.
184
  By the end of his career he characterized the tariff 
solely in sectional terms, stating in his famous speech during the 1850 compromise debates that 
“a far greater portion of the [tariff] revenue has been disbursed at the North … intended to put 
money … into the pocket of the manufacturers.”185 
     Calhoun’s commitment to the nullification camp and its radical state rights position joined 
him to fellow South Carolinians George McDuffie, James Hamilton, Jr., and Robert Barnwell 
Rhett.  However, many of the state’s equally prominent Unionists such as William Smith, Daniel 
Huger, James Petigru, and Henry DeSaussure also opposed the tariff, but solely on classical 
liberal grounds.
186
  Historian Joseph Persky aptly describes the motivations behind Calhoun’s 
rising Southern sectionalism, which realized that “manufacturing and urban areas could provide 
additional markets to agriculture, but feared “that such a policy … could not be kept under 
agrarian control.”187  Calhoun’s pro-agrarian, anti-industrial stance ultimately proved to be 
incompatible with orthodox classical liberalism, and his remaining political career had 
everything to do with state rights and little to do with political economy.  Political scientist 
James H. Read provides some insight to Calhoun’s motives by noting that he “was worried 
above all that tariff revenues would be spent for anti-slavery purposes.”188 
     Other prominent Southern intellectuals furthered Calhoun’s arguments, using the economic 
issue as a proxy for arguing about the true substantive issue, which was slavery.  A decade after 
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the Tariff of 1842, prominent Southern intellectual George Fitzhugh lambasted free trade 
ideology, remarking that “for writing a one-sided philosophy, no man was better fitted than 
Adam Smith.  He possessed extraordinary powers of abstraction, analysis and generalization … 
every man for himself and the Devil take the hindmost.”189  Fitzhugh criticized laissez-faire, not 
because of its relationship to ideal republican economic policy, but rather due to the threat it 
posed to the standing Southern social and cultural order.  He feared that under a system of free 
trade “the disparities of shrewdness, of skill and business capacity, between nations and 
individuals, would, in the commercial and trading war of the wits, rob the weak and simple, and 
enrich the strong and cunning … political economy and all other systems of moral science which 
we derive from Europe are tainted with abolition, and at war with our institutions.”190  Historian 
C. Vann Woodward comments that Fitzhugh “preferred inequality to equality, aristocracy to 
democracy, and almost anything – including slavery and socialism – to laissez faire 
capitalism.”191  
     Calhoun, Fitzhugh, and the fire-eaters were obsessed with any economic threat to slavery.  As 
historian Louis Hartz notes, “When we penetrate beneath the feudal and reactionary surface of 
Southern thought, we do not find feudalism: we find slavery.”192  Eugene Genovese summarized 
the common thread of these theorists, noting that “so long as the South functioned as part of the 
world capitalist system, it could never wholly establish its moral and intellectual independence 
… the struggle was irreconcilable … the world-wide system of economic interdependence must 
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be crushed; capitalism, in short, must everywhere be uprooted.”193  He also notes that “Fitzhugh 
cannot be understood unless the words “free trade” are read as they were meant to be read: as 
“capitalism,” defined to mean the private ownership of the means of production and the freedom 
of the laborer to sell his labor power.”194   Although southern ideologues such as Calhoun and 
Fitzhugh tried to cast sectional differences in terms of economic theory, this approach 
intentionally veiled the true issue, which was a defense of slavery.    
       Southern “fire-eaters” perpetuated Calhoun’s rhetoric during the years leading up to the 
Civil War.   By 1844 Louis Wigfall openly extolled secession, and cited the tariff as a major 
reason for doing so.
195
  Robert Barnwell Rhett persuaded fellow delegates at the 1861 
Montgomery Convention to include a ban on protective tariffs as one of the few alterations to the 
original Constitution of 1787.
196
   
     The historical attention granted to the views of Calhoun, Fitzhugh and the fire-eater 
secessionists from the early 1830s through the 1850s is unfortunate, because their rhetoric is 
disconnected from the seismic event taking place during their watch, which was the nationalizing 
of American industrialization from the latter 1830s onward.  The tariff bills and votes during 
1841 and 1842 demonstrate a South in the midst of significant economic change.  While most 
Southerners retained solidarity on the slavery issue, increasingly, Calhoun, Fitzhugh, and their 
sympathizers were being marginalized in the South in regards to their economic views.  Calhoun 
was a decided sectionalist by 1842.  His views and actions from 1832 to his death did not 
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represent those of the South as a whole, and any interpretation that his views as a regional proxy 
falsely create the impression that the tariff issue was sectional in nature.   
     Calhoun’s own words best sum up the true source of regional tensions during the antebellum 
era.  In 1830, on the eve of the Nullification Crisis, he wrote a letter to a friend stating that “I 
consider the Tariff act as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of 
things.  The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar domestick institution of the 
Southern States … has placed them … in opposite relation to the majority of the Union, against 
the danger of which … they must in the end be forced to rebel, or submit to have their permanent 
interests sacrificed.”197  These thoughts eventually inspired the Camp Hill Address and the South 
Carolina Exposition. 
Conclusions 
     The tariff episodes in 1841 and 1842 are a crucial episode in the evolution of antebellum trade 
policy. American industrialization spread beyond the Northeast, including the South, creating 
economic special interest groups throughout the country who promoted protection at the national 
level.  At the same time, the Whig and Democratic parties developed mutually exclusive 
economic platforms regarding trade policy.  The new round of trade policy battles between the 
protectionists and liberals were national in character, correlating to political party affiliation 
instead of geographic region.  
     Economic interests greatly influenced trade policy.  By the early 1840s, Whigs and 
Democrats were well represented in both the North and South because the country’s regions had 
developed many common economic attributes.  Each was predominantly agricultural, but all of 
them also possessed now possessed discernible manufacturing components.   
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     The South actively participated in the industrialization process.  Historian Joseph Persky 
perceptibly notes that “At the close of the War of 1812, the post-revolutionary generation of 
Southern leaders hardly seemed ready to retreat into idiosyncratic regional agrarianism.”198  In 
fact, by 1842, many Southerners were committed to growing manufacturing within the region.  
They did so, however, with divided beliefs on proper policy.  Some suggested political economy 
based on classical liberalism, where manufacturing and agriculture could flourish free of 
favoritism and interest.  Others took a nationalist view, believing that protection was a necessary 
prerequisite for any attempt to successfully grow the nation’s manufacturing sector.    
     The fact that Southern industry grew significantly in the 1840s and the 1850s suggests that 
certain stereotypical notions about Southern antebellum society should be reconsidered.  
Historian Eugene Genovese frequently cited antebellum sectionalists such as Calhoun, Fitzhugh 
and other fire-eaters, who maintained that a slave owning society was incompatible with 
industrialization.  Genovese stated that the South, “with its masters and slaves … stood for 
progress and modernity without the terrible evils that plagued bourgeois societies.”199  He 
suggested that “However much the slaveholders might have wished to transform their slaves into 
clock-punchers, they could not, for in a variety of senses both literal and metaphoric … planters 
of the United States … hardly lived in a factory world themselves and at best could only preach 
what the most docile or stupid slave knew very well they did not and could not practice.”200  The 
reality of Southern industrialization, and its use of slave labor, suggests that, contrary to 
Genovese’s conclusions, that slaves were an integral factor of production within a capitalist 
economic framework.   
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     The 1841 and 1842 tariff debates featured competing ideological views and competing 
economic interest groups, both tightly demarcated by party.  Thus, the 1841 to 1842 episode 
sharply differs from preceding debates between 1824 and 1833.  The key variable that explains 
this changed nature of the trade policy debate was American industrialization.   
     The beginnings of American mass manufacturing only began in earnest in the late 1810s and 
early 1820s with establishments in Waltham and Lowell.  Soon, manufacturing establishments 
sprouted up throughout most of the New England states.  The earliest concentrations of 
American industrialization were confined to the New England and Atlantic states, but these 
regions did not possess monopolistic characteristics regarding industrialization.  Other regions 
possessed the water, labor, and financial resources necessary for successful manufacturing.  
These variables coalesced first in New England and along the northern Atlantic seaboard, but the 
South began to do so as well in the 1830s and 1840s.    
     The above developments, when assessed against the framework of Rostow’s and 
Gerschenkron’s works, create grounds for proposing that American trade policy between the 
Founding and the Civil War was, with the exception of the 1824 to 1833 episode, more 
influenced by the First Industrial Revolution, rather than by slavery or culture.  By the 1840s the 
South possessed an active and thriving Whig Party, a rapidly growing manufactures sector, and 
possessed satisfactory evidence that slave labor could be adapted to industrialized activities.  
These facts combine to suggest that the South was actively in the midst of transitioning from a 
“precondition” to a “take-off” stage by the time of the 1841 and 1842 tariffs.201    
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     The American South was capable of achieving Gerschenkron’s “catch up” process and, by 
1840, was showing signs of doing so.  New England technologies were being introduced to the 
region and local political interests were agitating for pro-industrialization policies.  The 
necessary financial capital, provided in the earlier New England case by merchants and a 
national bank, was available through Southern planters and a maturing national banking sector. 
     When the South embraced the early stages of industrialization in the late 1830s and the 1840s, 
the core issues of political economy regained ascendency in the trade policy debate, while the 
impact of the slavery issue waned.  The newly developed Southern manufacturing interests, 
however, did not create brand new arguments for governmental assistance to their economic 
sector.  Instead, they adopted ideological positions that had already been in place for decades.  
     In the end, the period from 1824 to 1833 was aberration in the American trade policy saga.  
The introduction of industrialization in the American Northeast in the 1820s created sectionalist 
division on trade policy.  The spread of industrialization to the rest of the nation in the 1830s and 
1840s closed the division.  The Tariff of 1842 marked where the trade policy debate resumed its 
national character.  
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CHAPTER 10 – FREE TRADE TRIUMPHANT: THE TARIFFS OF 1846 AND 1857 
“by levying a tariff of duties for the support of government, the raising of revenue should be the 
object, and protection the incident.  To reverse this principle and make protection the object, and 
revenue the incident, would be to inflict manifest injustice upon all other than the protected 
interests.”1  
- President James Polk (March 4, 1845 Inaugural Address) 
 
“The moment the American rises to his feet, in this struggle with foreigners for the American 
market, he is to be knocked down by the executive poker, and walked over by his Secretary 
Walker. [a laugh] … and would the House endorse  a system like this? … take off the duty, and 
the British workshops would be brought to our door.”2   
- Representative Andrew Stewart of Pennsylvania (December 9, 1845 remarks to the House) 
 
“This policy of imposing taxes, not with a single eye to revenue, but with the express design to 
shut out competition and raise prices … You speak of it as patriotic; you still call it American; 
do you hope to continue, to perpetuate, to ingraft it on our republican system? … privilege 
always dies hard.”3   
- Representative Robert Owen of Indiana (June 19, 1846 remarks to the House) 
 
     Henry Clay and fellow economic nationalists concluded that the Tariff of 1842 marked a 
reaffirmation of the American System.  Although distribution was rejected, the Compromise 
Tariff of 1833 had been effectively abrogated.  Tariff rates were not rolled back to the levels 
promised by the compromise and the discriminatory principle remained in place rather than an 
ad valorem structure.  The only Whig disappointment was the cruel twist of fate resulting from 
the death of William Henry Harrison.  The final bill achieved many important Whig goals, but 
the legislative victory was incomplete due to vetoes by John Tyler. 
     Clay and the Whigs were encouraged that the tariff discourse, and roll call voting in 1841 and 
1842, suggested that the American System enjoyed broad national support.  President Tyler had 
been kicked out of the Whig Party, and was now politically isolated.  Whigs optimistically 
looked forward to the 1844 election, when they could regain the executive branch and complete 
the full re-establishment of the American System, including high, discriminatory tariffs. 
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     Unfortunately for Clay and economic nationalists, two significant events would change their 
political fortunes.  The first was the election of 1844, where dark horse Democratic candidate 
James Polk, a former Speaker of the House, won the presidency in a race against Whig candidate 
Clay.  The second occurred in 1846, when Great Britain repealed its Corn Laws, an act that 
transformed the world’s leading economic power from a protectionist trade policy to one that 
endorsing free trade principles.   
     The Polk presidency, rather than the witnessing the triumph of the American System and 
protectionism, marked just the opposite, the beginning of an American commitment to free trade 
principles and a low tariff that would last until the Civil War.  The first step was the passage of 
the Walker Tariff in 1846, named after Polk’s Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker.  This 
tariff would become national trade policy for the next eleven years, marking the longest time 
frame that a single tariff remained in place since the time of the Jefferson presidency.  The 
Walker Tariff was eventually replaced by the Tariff of 1857, which lowered rates even further.      
     The 1844 election was Henry Clay’s closest, and last, of his three tries to gain the presidency.  
Clay narrowly lost the popular vote by a tally of 1.34 million to 1.30 million.  The electoral vote 
was more decisive, as Polk gathered 170 votes to Clay’s 105.  Another telling development 
against the fortunes of the American System was the fact that the Democrats also gained control 
of both houses of Congress.
4
 
     Polk’s campaign pledges were few: to annex Texas, serve a single term only, and lower the 
tariff.  To his credit, he is one of the few American presidents who could rightly claim that he 
achieved all of his key campaign promises.  The 1844 Democrat Party platform criticized all 
aspects of the American System, and it vigorously attacked Whig trade policy.  Democrats 
declared “That justice and sound policy forbid the Federal Government to foster one branch of 
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industry to the detriment of another, or to cherish the interests of one portion to the injury of 
another portion of our common country.”5  This stance represented the consistent application of 
classical liberal ideals, where the American tariff should be set as low as possible and applied on 
an ad valorem basis. 
     The new president affirmed his party’s position in his inaugural address of March 4, 1845.  
Polk asserted that “by levying a tariff of duties for the support of government, the raising of 
revenue should be the object, and protection the incident.  To reverse this principle and make 
protection the object, and revenue the incident, would be to inflict manifest injustice upon all 
other than the protected interests.”6  There could be little doubt that one of the principal goals of 
the Polk administration would be to replace the Tariff of 1842, and replace it with a bill featuring 
lower tariffs rates and with less emphasis on protection.  
     The United States experienced significant economic growth from the beginning of Polk’s 
presidency in 1845 up to the Civil War.
7
  The tariff issue receded in prominence, in part due to 
the favorable state of the economy, but more importantly because the issue of slavery dominated 
American politics after the Mexican-American War.  Although trade policy captured fewer front 
page headlines during this period, the 1846 and 1857 tariff debates still featured vigorous 
arguments on behalf of both the economic nationalist and free trade positions.  These arguments 
were well aligned with the ones that had characterized many previous trade policy 
confrontations.  Even as the Compromise of 1850, Kansas-Nebraska and Dred Scott pulled the 
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nation towards Civil War, trade policy remained a very prominent and important issue, a 
consequence of ongoing clashes of ideas and economic interests. 
     The second blow to Whig hopes occurred two years later, when Great Britain struck down its 
Corn Laws.  The British repeal directly impacted the tenor of the 1846 American tariff debate.  
One of the arguments most forcefully made by nationalists since the War of 1812 had been that 
Great Britain represented the benchmark in trade policy that the United States should ensure 
itself by. The sudden and surprising shift in British trade policy provided free traders with a new 
and very effective weapon to use that undermined the protectionist position. 
British Corn Laws and the Walker Tariff of 1846     
     On May 15, 1846, after almost four months of debate, the British Parliament repealed the 
Corn Laws that had been in place since the Napoleonic Wars, marking a dramatic shift in British 
trade policy from a protectionist stance to free trade.  The most startling aspect of this 
development was that its champion was Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel.  Peel led the 
Conservative Party, who had staunchly supported protectionism throughout its history, and his 
surprising advocacy for repeal of the Corn Laws came with a political price, as he was forced to 
resign his post only one month later.
8
  Peel may have been personally motivated by a general 
shift towards free trade ideology within British society.
9
  Great Britain’s protectionist policies 
had been constructed to protect agriculture more so than manufactures, where she possessed 
economic comparative advantage, an opposite situation from what the United States faced.  The 
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effect of the Corn Laws was to benefit British landowners to the detriment of consumers, who 
were forced to pay higher food prices.
10
  
     From the founding of the American republic in 1789, the American discourse on trade policy 
had always been heavily influenced by Great Britain’s policies.  American lawmakers looked at 
British policy as an example for the United States to either embrace or reject certain trade policy 
options.  The tariff debates from 1789 through 1842 are full of examples where American 
legislators, particularly nationalists, referred to the British example of protection as a model for 
the United States to follow.  The sudden change in British trade policy in 1846 was carefully 
noted in the United States, and American free traders saw the opportunity to use it as a powerful 
political weapon to bolster their argument for the United States to adopt a free trade policy as 
well. 
     In late 1845, Secretary of Treasury Robert Walker drafted a report calling for a lower tariff 
based solely on ad valorem duties, and congressional Democrats reported a bill that, consistent 
with Walker’s recommendations, fulfilled the campaign pledges made by President Polk and the 
party platform.  The proposal represented a radical change in American trade policy, as specific 
duties had always been a mainstay element of the tariff schedule since 1789.  The resulting bill, 
however, did not propose a single ad valorem rate on imports.  Rather, it divided imports into a 
series of classes, each with its own tariff rate.  These ad valorem tranches were set at 75% (on 
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certain spirits), 30%, 25%, 20%, 15% and 10%.
11
  In addition, a great number of goods were 
allowed to be imported free of duty.  This proposal amounted as close to an absolute free trade 
structure as was possible in the world of nineteenth century international trade.   
     Walker’s report was clearly built upon notions that the costs of the federal government should 
be funded by a tariff policy premised on free trade principles, with projected tariff revenues only 
set to a level adequate to meet expenses.  Further, he endorsed the idea that trade policy should 
not favor any economic sector in favor of another.  The report stated that “A tariff is a bill to ‘lay 
and collect taxes.’  It is a bill for raising revenue; and whenever it departs from that object, in 
whole or in part, either by total or partial prohibition, it violates the purpose of the granted 
power.”12  This posture presented ideas that hearkened back to the same “old republican” 
principles that had guided Thomas Paine, John Randolph, and Nathaniel Macon a generation 
before when they had advocated free trade.   
     The House began consideration of the proposed new tariff in December 1845, and aghast 
economic nationalists immediately argued that the policy would spell certain ruin for the 
American economy.  Representative Andrew Stewart of Pennsylvania, who had been quite vocal 
on behalf of protectionism during the 1832-33 debates, was adamant in warning his colleagues 
that the Walker Bill was, in his opinion, sheer folly.  Stewart maintained that protection had 
allowed the United States to become economically competitive with other nations, and that 
abandonment of the policy would undo all that had been accomplished.  He wittily commented 
that “The moment the American rises to his feet, in this struggle with foreigners for the 
American market, he is to be knocked down by the executive poker, and walked over by his 
Secretary Walker. [a laugh] … and would the House endorse  a system like this? … take off the 
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duty, and the British workshops would be brought to our door.”13  Bryan Young of Kentucky 
added that, should the Tariff of 1842 be repealed, “we should then be virtual colonies to Great 
Britain.”14   
     Protectionists reminded their colleagues that previous nationalist-oriented tariffs carried an 
implied promise of continued economic governmental assistance, and that abandonment of 
protection represented a promise broken.  James Thompson of Pennsylvania concluded that a 
shift to a free trade tariff posture would “change the industry of the people, driving them from 
employments undertaken upon the faith of your legislation, by admitting a free and almost 
unrestricted competition from abroad.”  Thompson predicted a dire future, because the new trade 
policy “will retard that great national prosperity now everywhere so conspicuous, by not only 
greatly impairing the success of enterprises already undertaken, but by preventing the discovery 
of new fields in which to employ the ingenuity and skill of our people.”15 
     Nationalists also attempted to establish a causal relationship between the Tariff of 1842 and 
the nation’s recovery from the Panic of 1837.  Abraham McIlvaine of Pennsylvania argued that 
protectionism had recently saved the country from dire circumstances.  He asked “Who could 
forget the scenes of 1840, 1841, and 1842; when the cry for employment was heard throughout 
the country, when all business was at a stand, and all classes of the community felt a general 
paralysis?  The effect of the Tariff of 1842 restored universal prosperity, as if by a stroke of a 
magician’s wand.  That prosperity still continued.  Why, then, repeal the law which has wrought 
such happy effects.”16  
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     Despite their vigorous arguments, Whigs realized that Democrats, with majorities in both 
chambers, could force the bill through just as the Whigs had in 1842.  Representative Jacob 
Collamer of Vermont held out hope that the Democracy’s policies would be proven wrong.  
Collamer declared that “after their scheme had had a fair trial, if it did not succeed, let them have 
the candor to say so, and give it up.”17   
     House free traders were equally adamant in asserting that the time had come for the United 
States to embrace a laissez-faire trade policy.  Seaborn Jones of Georgia intimated that the 1844 
election had provided the Democrats with a mandate to adjust American trade policy.  He called 
for the House to “redeem the pledges of reducing the tariff of 1842 to a revenue standard, so that 
more revenue – the greatest amount of revenue – may be raised from it.  The tariff that we 
propose to establish should not be a tariff for protection.”18  Representative Andrew Johnson of 
Tennessee asked “Did not our “home industry” include the labor of the farmer; or was it 
exclusively the labor of the manufacturer?  Ought not Government to look to the happiness of 
those who were the bone and sinew of the country?  Protection has been exclusive quite long 
enough.”19  
     The American debate was clearly influenced by the concurrent British initiative to repeal the 
Corn Laws.  By June 1846, the events in Parliament were already well known in the United 
States, and Seaborn Jones commented that “the example of Sir Robert Peel in the modification of 
the corn-laws ought to speak in language stronger than any argument I can use.  We copied this 
system of protection from England; England has found it ruinous to her people of every class; 
she in her wisdom has abandoned it; and are we in our folly still to cling to it?”  Jones noted that 
“Sir Robert Peel was formerly a tory; he was brought to power by the tory interest – by the 
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landholders, to protect their interests.  With a noble magnanimity he preferred the interests of the 
country to those of a class.”20   
     Free traders also framed the debate as one to restore what they believed were the optimal 
economic attributes of a republic, a vision that stressed Jacksonian egalitarianism.  
Representative Robert Owen of Indiana, son of the utopian founder of the New Harmony 
community two decades before, characterized the debate as one about the appropriate nature of 
trade policy in relation to the American Republic.  He inquired of protectionists, “This policy of 
imposing taxes, not with a single eye to revenue, but with the express design to shut out 
competition and raise prices … You speak of it as patriotic; you still call it American; do you 
hope to continue, to perpetuate, to ingraft it on our republican system?”  Owen remarked 
“Privilege always dies hard … The history of reform throughout the world teaches us this lesson: 
that privilege has often lost all because she knew not when to yield a part.  There was a time, in 
the early days of the French Revolution, before the oath of the Tennis court or the fall of the 
Bastille, when, by well timed concession, the unfortunate Louis might have saved his kingdom 
and life.”21    
     On July 3, 1846, the House of Representatives passed the Walker Tariff by a vote of 114 to 
95.
22
  Like the voting patterns in 1842, the overall voting pattern correlated strongly with 
political party affiliation.  Democrats generally voted for the bill, while Whigs and American 
Party members voted against it.  The bill was quickly passed on to the Senate for consideration.
23
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     Whigs continued to resist the Walker Bill in the Senate.  Senator George Evans of Maine was 
particularly indignant over the impending repeal of the 1842 Tariff.  He exclaimed, “The fierce 
and bitter denunciations – the outpouring of all sorts of opprobrious epithets directed against the 
existing law.”  Evans then asked, “Has the Tariff of 1842 accomplished that which its friends and 
advocates and supporters promised it would accomplish?  … We hear it said that this law was 
designed for protection alone.  No Sir.  We know it would yield good protection, but we passed 
this at a time when your treasury was empty and your credit gone.”24  
     With the political tables now turned, Whigs predicted calamitous results from a transition to 
free trade.  Senator John Davis of Massachusetts expressed concerns that a free trade bill would 
ruin the American republican fabric, an argument previously used by free traders.  Davis 
described the Walker bill “as favoring foreigners at the expense of our own interests; because it 
was anti-American in all its details; because it overloaded particular interests, and would render 
it necessary to divert labor into new channels; because it protected one interest at the expense of 
all others; and because it was a war on free labor, pregnant with moral degradation.”25   
     Whigs also expressed fears over the tyranny of the majority in an increasingly democratic 
United States.  Daniel Webster launched an entirely new argument on behalf of economic 
nationalism, criticizing the Democrat free traders of crass populism.  He noted that “We are here, 
sir, calling ourselves every day a Democratic Congress, and the majority of the body is said to be 
about to pass a great Democratic measure … a measure favorable to the masses – favorable to 
the people – preferring the interests of the masses to the interests of a few – preferring the 
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interests of the great body of the people to those who may be called the possessors of a high 
measure of wealth.”26  
     Democrats denied the legitimacy of Webster’s arguments, and argued that it was the 
preferential economic treatment of capitalists that was the problem.  The new tariff would, 
similar to the Corn Laws repeal, create economic relief for American citizens. South Carolina’s 
George McDuffie asserted that “the Senator from Massachusetts, in characterizing this bill as an 
aristocratic measure, imposes on me the duty of saying a very few words … I sincerely believe 
that in this bill, on all that class of manufactures consumed by the poor and middle ranks, there is 
a reduction of duties greater than on any other class of articles in the bill … [it] will enable the 
people of the United States to consume an increased importation, approaching to ten millions of 
dollars, at prices little more than two-thirds of that which they have now to pay.”27   
     On July 28, 1846, the Senate ratified the Walker Tariff by the narrow vote of 28 to 27.
28
  Like 
House vote, the roll call in the Senate correlated more strongly to party affiliation, rather than 
geography.  The Walker Tariff passed, significantly reducing American tariff schedules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 1152. 
27
 Ibid., 1153. 
28
 Ibid., 1158. 
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     Table 10.1 summarizes the Walker Tariff roll call vote by region: 
Table 10.1. Ratification Vote of the 1846 Tariff Bill by Region75 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)       9    19    2  10   
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      18        44      2    6 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)        15          3      1    3 
South   (FA, GA, NC, SC)       18        6      5    2 
Northwest (IL, IN, MI,OH)    26      10      6    2 
Southwest (AL, KY, MS, TN)    20    12      6    2 
Trans South (AR, LA, MO, TX)        9      1    6    2 
Totals                 115    95  28  27 
Source: Cong. Globe, 29
th
 Cong., 1st Sess., 1053, 1158 (1846); note that although the Globe 
reported the House roll call vote as 114 to 95, only 115 aye votes are recorded.   
 
The table shows that there was regional bias on the tariff issue in the roll call votes.  The more 
industrialized Northeast generally objected to the measure, while the Southern and Western 
regions generally favored it.  However, the near unanimity that characterized regional voting in 
the 1824 through 1832 period was no longer present in 1846.  In almost all regions there existed 
meaningful minority positions, as had been the case in 1841 and 1842.  Many Southerners were 
willing to embrace protectionism, while many Northerners willingly adhered to a free trade 
stance.   
     Table 10.2 summarizes the 1846 tariff vote in both the House and Senate by party affiliation, 
and it shows that party remained a more significant variable in determining the final roll call 
votes:    
Table 10.2. Ratification Vote of the 1846 Tariff Bill by Party Affiliation76 
Political    House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party     Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Democrat     113        18    27    4 
Whig         2        71    1  23 
American        0      6    0    0  
Totals     115    95  28  27 
Source: Cong. Globe, 29
th
 Cong., 1st Sess., 1053, 1158 (1846); note that although the Globe 
reported the House roll call vote as 114 to 95, only 115 aye votes are recorded.   
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The table illustrates that once again, the tariff issue in 1846 was more a matter of party rather 
than one of geography.  Whig and American Party opposition was near unanimous, as 97% of 
their House members and 96% of their senators voted against the measure.  Democrats 
overwhelmingly voted in favor of the measure, though with less solidarity in their voting bloc.  
The resisting party members were largely confined to the Atlantic states, and in particular, 
Pennsylvania.  Sixteen of the eighteen Democrats voting against the measure hailed from the 
Atlantic region and ten of those were Pennsylvanians.  Two of the four Democrat senators voting 
“nay” represented Pennsylvania.29    
     A significant variable explaining most of the votes that conflicted with party affiliation was 
the still-common practice of state legislatures to instruct their congressional delegations on 
important issues of the day.  Moses McClean of Pennsylvania related that “I am a Democrat.  I 
hold to the right of instruction from my people.”  McClean presented resolutions from the 
Pennsylvania State legislature requesting that its senators and representatives oppose any 
modifications to the Tariff of 1842.  Consequently, he conceded that “these resolutions and 
requests, coming from the Legislature of my native State – from the Democratic Legislature of 
both Houses, signed and approved by a Democratic Governor – and being, as I believe these 
resolutions are, in strict accordance with the wishes of the people whom I have the honor more 
immediately to represent, I feel bound in my action here to pay the strictest regard to them.”30    
                                                 
29
 Polk had indications that Pennsylvania could be kept in the party fold regarding the tariff.  Senator Simon 
Cameron initially suggested that Pennsylvania Democrats would overlook the tariff despite the state’s historical pro-
tariff tendencies.  Ultimately, Cameron voted against the tariff along the vast majority of the Pennsylvania 
congressional delegation; Iron was an extremely important local issue in Pennsylvania.  The number of furnaces and 
tons of output had increased from 45/31,000 in 1830 to 213/152,000 by 1840, see Paskoff, Industrial Evolution, 75; 
Eugene Irving McCormac, James K. Polk, a Political Biography (Newtown, Connecticut: American Political 
Biography Press, 1995), 668;  In a situation where every vote counted, particularly due to the defection of 
Pennsylvania Democrats, the administration was fortunate to gain support from Democrat votes from the new State 
of Texas, see Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 765.   
30
 Cong. Globe, 29
th
 Cong., 1st Sess., 991 (1846). 
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     The Pennsylvania situation, where a Democratic controlled state government favored 
discriminatory protection, was influenced by the State’s economic interests, and particularly the 
iron industry.  Democrat Senator Simon Cameron explained the situation back in his native state.  
He described his constituents, noting that “Their Democracy is undoubted and beyond reproach.  
It is known throughout the Union; and thrice has it saved the Democratic party of the Union.  
Her sons come here not to create a panic, but to speak with Democrats in the Senate, and in other 
high places, as Democrats may speak to those whom by their votes they have elevated.”31   
     Cameron maintained that in the past election, Pennsylvania voters were led to believe in a 
campaign slogan of “Polk, Dallas … and the Tariff of 1842.”  He insisted that “neither of the 
three, sir, would have got the vote of Pennsylvania without the last – the Tariff of 1842.  Much as 
we disliked Mr. Clay, and sincerely attached as we were to the Democratic Party, all would have 
gone before we would have relinquished the Tariff of 1842.”32  Consequently, Cameron and his 
fellow Democrat Pennsylvania senator, Daniel Sturgeon, both voted against the bill.   
     In the remaining cases where legislators broke rank with their party, it was usually due to 
intense pressure from either home legislatures or constituent interests.  Senator John Niles of 
Connecticut, a Democrat who voted against the bill, noted that “The act of 1842 has never been 
an object of assault on the part of the Democracy of the North” and he considered “this bill 
hostile to the Democracy of his State.”33  In similar fashion, Senator Spencer Jarnagin, a Whig 
from Tennessee, declared that “I will not allow it to be said that this was forced upon the people 
                                                 
31
 Ibid., 1112. 
32
 Ibid., 1112. 
33
 Ibid., 1117. 
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of the United States by a Whig vote.  I shall, when the time comes, obey my instructions; but I 
wish it to stand rectus in curia.”34  
     Kentucky’s John Crittenden was distraught over the situation involving state legislature 
instructions.  He lamented that “It is to pass by the vote of the Senator from Tennessee, acting 
under instructions … That Senator is himself a Whig, and his personal views and feelings are 
entirely opposed to this measure … if this bill pass – if the Senator votes against his personal 
convictions, and in favor of a bill which he thinks destructive to the best interests of the country 
– it will pass by a single vote.”35  Crittenden was technically correct in asserting that each Senate 
vote mattered since the bill passed by a single vote, but he selectively complained about 
Jarnagin’s situation, while ignoring the fact that more than one Democrat senator voted against 
the bill as a result of the exact same set of circumstances.
36
 
     Whigs continued the fight to reinstate the American System after the Walker Tariff passed.  
Some Whigs even welcomed its passage, as they were certain that economic disaster would soon 
follow, ensuring that the Whigs would regain the control of the executive and legislative 
branches that they had fleetingly controlled in 1841.
37
  Henry Clay wrote as late as 1850 that 
“Some of us are considering the propriety of attempting at this session some modification of the 
                                                 
34
 Ibid., 1151; Jarnagin’s vote attracted considerable attention.  Daniel Webster and other Whigs tried to convince 
him to ignore his instructions.  He, at one point, was rumored to be considering resignation.  President Polk 
personally applied pressure to assure that Jarnagin voted in favor of the bill, see Bergeron, Presidency of James K. 
Polk, 190-191.  Jarnagin’s vote became crucial when North Carolina Senator William Haywood, a Democrat, 
resigned only days before the roll call rather than vote in favor of the bill, see Robert W. Merry, A Country of Vast 
Designs: James K. Polk the Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2009), 274-275.  
35 Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1155 (1846). 
36
 Crittenden, the Clay protégé, gambled in attempting to outright defeat the Walker bill.  Daniel Webster had tried 
to negotiate a compromise bill, and gained soft support from his Boston-based supporters and Secretary Walker.  
However, he needed full Whig support in order to assure that he could fashion the compromise, and Crittenden 
withheld support, thus dooming the compromise effort, see Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., Daniel Webster and the Trial of 
American Nationalism, 1843-1852 (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 110-111.    
37
 Holt, Political Parties, 215-216.  The anticipated economic depression never materialized.  Whigs, running 
Zachary Taylor, won the presidential election of 1848, but failed to gain a majority in either the Senate or the House 
in the Thirty-First Congress; Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1978), 
47. 
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existing tariff, but nothing has been yet absolutely determined on.”38  Clay’s desire to offer 
another protectionist tariff bill would go unfulfilled at the time of his death in 1852.  Soon 
thereafter, his Whig Party collapsed.  However, the cause for economic nationalism survived, as 
a loose coalition that included the new Republican Party, the American Party, and other 
“opponents” of the Democracy remained active in advancing protectionist economic interests 
during the 1850s.    
American Trade and the National Economy: 1833 to 1860 
     Economic nationalists predicted in 1846 that the radical change in trade policy would surely 
damage prospects for the American economy.  Their prophecy failed.  Instead, the American 
economy grew significantly between 1846 and 1857.   
     Figure 10.1 charts the growth of American GDP per capita from the time of the Compromise 
Tariff up to the Civil War.  While the latter 1830s had been a period of stagnant national 
productivity, mainly the result of the Panic of 1837, the 1840s and early 1850s were periods of 
significant growth.  American real GDP growth per capita (shrank)/grew at annualized rates of 
(0.6%), 0.9%, and 1.9% during the time periods of 1833-1840, 1840-1850, and 1850-1860, 
respectively.  The real GDP per capita commenced a sharply upward trend after the protectionist 
Tariff of 1842 passed.  However, in the aftermath of the laissez-faire Walker Tariff, the upward 
trend actually improved.  Naturally, each side of the trade policy debate viewed these two most 
recent legislative initiatives, and subsequent economic growth, as proof that their respective 
policy produced national economic prosperity.   
                                                 
38
 Henry Clay to F. R. Backus, 13 September 1850, Filson Historical Society special collections, Louisville, 
Kentucky. 
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Figure 10.1. American GDP per Capita, 1833 to 1860 (in real dollars = 1996) (3 year rolling 
average)14    
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498, 510; “Measuring Worth,” http://www.me 
asuringworth.org/usgdp/. 
 
     A significant portion the American economic expansion from 1840 onward can be credited to 
continued industrialization.  Figure 10.2 shows the trend of American industrial growth on a 
nominal basis from the time of the Compromise Tariff of 1833 until 1860.  During the 1830s, 
nascent American industry continued its slow and steady rate of growth.  However, in the 1840s 
and 1850s, the American industrialization process rapidly accelerated.   
     The annual compounded industrial growth rate during this twenty-seven year period was an 
impressive 6.1% per annum.  A breakdown by decade, though, shows that the growth in the 
1840s and 1850s was particularly strong.  The industrial growth from 1833 to 1840 was 3.2% per 
annum, a satisfactory rate under circumstances that included the Panic of 1837.  However, the 
rates of growth in the 1840s and 1850s were much higher, at 8.8% and 5.4%, respectively.  The 
manufacturing sphere, which had been a smaller economic sector than agriculture and commerce 
during the early part of the nineteenth century, was now ascendant, and had come of age. 
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Figure 10.2. American Industrial Production, 1833-186015 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 3:23-24.  The above information was compiled 
by Joseph H. Davis and represents the best estimates to date from somewhat imperfect data of 
what the United States manufacturing output was during the nineteenth century.  Note that the 
Davis Index uses base year 1849-1850 as 100,000. 
 
     A number of potential factors might explain this surge in American industrialization.  One 
possibility was the acceleration of American immigration, fueled in the latter 1840s by the Irish 
Famine and the European revolutions in 1848.  Another could be the growth of capital and 
productivity among American workers.  A third explanation could be the expansion of American 
industrialization beyond the Northeast of the United States to other parts of the country.   
     In order to address the issue of immigration, the above nominal industrial production data can 
be viewed in the context of American population growth during the corresponding period.  Table 
10.3 illustrates that the growth of American industrialization, when viewed on a per capita basis, 
was every bit as impressive as it was on a nominal basis.  By any measure, American 
industrialization, which had commenced in earnest after the War of 1812, experienced a major 
“take off” expansion beginning in the 1840s.  
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Figure 10.3. American Industrial Production on a per capita Basis, 1833-186016 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 3:23-24.  The above information was compiled 
by Joseph H. Davis and represents the best estimates to date from somewhat imperfect data of 
what the United States manufacturing output was during the nineteenth century.  Note that the 
Davis Index uses base year 1849-1850 as 100,000. 
 
     The American “takeoff” in manufactures between 1840 and 1860 was not confined to New 
England and the Atlantic States, where significant industrialization had begun in the 1820s with 
the founding of Lowell.  The industrialization process was underway in all parts of the nation.  
Data from the 1840, 1850, and 1860 United States censuses provide basic manufacturing 
statistics.  As is the case with all early American census data, the information provided should 
not be construed as precise, but is still useful in identifying large scale trends and changes.
39
  
     The census data provides compelling evidence to support an assertion that a Rostovian 
“takeoff” process was underway in the United States from 1840 onward, as industrialization 
expanded from the northeastern regions of the country and spread to other regions.  This process 
included both the Western and Southern regions.  Table 10.3 summarizes the total amount of 
capital invested in manufactures by region as measured in each of the three aforementioned 
census reports: 
                                                 
39
 Rostow’s concepts regarding “takeoff” were previously introduced in Chapter 9.  
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Table 10.3. Total Capital Investment in Manufactures by Region, 1840 – 1860 (in millions)77 
        
Region  States         1840    1850    1860 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)   $100.2  $219.2  $   416.4 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)      $  88.8  $158.1  $   293.8 
Northwest (IL, IN, MI, OH)   $  28.1  $  54.5  $   152.0 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)         $  17.8  $  32.9  $     50.2 
Southwest (AL, KY, MS, TN)   $  13.6  $  24.6  $     48.1 
Trans South (AR, LA, MO, TX)     $    9.6  $  15.3     $     31.8 
South   (FA, GA, NC, SC)        $  10.6  $  19.3  $     30.0 
Pacific  (CA, OR)          n/a  $    1.0  $     23.3 
Totals                  $266.7  $524.9  $1,045.6  
Source: United States Census, 1840, 1850, and 1860, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu. 
 
The 1850 and 1860 censuses also provided information on total manufactures output and the 
1860 census identified the number of factories in the United States.  This information is 
summarized in Table 10.4: 
Table 10.4. Total Manufactures Output by Region, 1850 – 1860 (in millions)78 
       Output  Output  Factories 
Region  States         1850    1860    1860 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)   $   430.2 $   750.7   49,775 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)      $   276.3 $   432.2   20,671  
Northwest (IL, IN, MI, OH)   $   127.7 $   299.0   29,514  
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)         $     70.5 $     92.4     8,468  
Southwest (AL, KY, MS, TN)   $     50.5 $     73.1     8,457  
Pacific  (CA, OR)    $     12.9 $     71.2     8,777 
Trans South (AR, LA, MO, TX)     $     35.6 $     66.8     6,402     
South   (FA, GA, NC, SC)        $     28.8 $     44.1     6,994  
Totals                  $1,032.5 $1,829.5 139,058  
Source: United States Census, 1850 and 1860, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu. 
 
Both Tables 10.3 and 10.4 validate that the Atlantic States and New England were clearly the 
center of American manufacturing.  The two regions were home to 71%, 72%, and 68% of the 
total manufacturing capital in the United States in 1840, 1850, and 1860, respectively.  Further, 
these two regions also accounted for 68% of total American manufacturing output in 1850 and 
65% of output in 1860.  In addition to the northeastern regions, all other regions in the country 
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experienced significant increases in manufacturing capital invested and manufacturing output 
between 1840 and 1860.    
     Although the northeastern United States possessed the majority of American manufactures, a 
truer test of a takeoff would be the rates of manufacturing growth within each region.  Table 10.5 
illustrates total manufacturing capital invested in each region on a per capita basis between 1840 
and 1860, which neutralizes any biases created by population changes: 
Table 10.5. Total Manufactures Capital Investment per capita by Region, 1840 – 186079 
       Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita 
Region  States       1840  1850  1860 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)      $  38.85 $  57.95 $  93.71  
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)   $  21.76 $  36.60   $  54.99   
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)         $  10.42 $  16.40 $  21.97 
Northwest (IL, IN, MI, OH)   $    9.48  $  11.55 $  19.55  
Southwest (AL, KY, MS, TN)   $    5.28 $    7.32   $  11.98 
Trans South (AR, LA, MO, TX)     $  11.47 $    9.42 $  10.85 
South   (FA, GA, NC, SC)        $    5.07 $    7.63 $  10.35 
Source:  United States Census, 1840, 1850, and 1860, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu. 
       
New England and the Atlantic regions achieved the highest measurement of manufacturing 
“density.”  However, all other regions of the country also experienced increasing levels of 
manufacturing as well. 
     Table 10.6 shows the rates of growth in each region on a per capita basis, providing the best 
measure of the adaptation of manufacturing in the various parts of the country: 
Table 10.6. Growth in Manufactures Capital Investment per capita by Region, 1840 – 186080 
       Growth Growth Growth 
Region  States       1840-1850 1850-1860 1840-1860 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)   68.2%  50.3%  152.8%   
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)      49.2%  61.7%  141.2%  
Southwest (AL, KY, MS, TN)   38.5%  63.7%  126.8% 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)    57.4%  34.0%  110.9%     
Northwest (IL, IN, MI, OH)   21.9%  69.3%  106.4%  
South   (FA, GA, NC, SC)   50.4%  35.7%  104.0%  
Trans South (AR, LA, MO, TX)                 (17.8%) 15.1%            (   5.4%)  
Source: United States Census, 1840, 1850, and 1860, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu. 
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Once again, the rates of growth were strongest in the Atlantic states and New England.  
However, while measures of absolute capital investment and manufacturing output show a great 
disparity between those two regions and the remainder of the country, when a per capita measure 
is applied based upon invested capital over a twenty year period, the regional disparities are far 
less significant.  What becomes obvious is that all regions except the Trans South experienced 
significant levels of growth between 1840 and 1860.  The entire nation was embracing 
industrialization.  The anomaly of the Trans South data is principally due to the addition of 
Texas, which possessed virtually no industry, to the United States in 1845.  The strong rates of 
growth in Southern States provide evidence as to why numerous Southerners became more open 
to protectionist ideology commencing in the 1840s.  
     Southern openness to economic nationalism becomes even more apparent when the above per 
capita growth rates are applied to individual states.  Table 10.7 lists the top ten States in terms of 
growth in manufacturing capital invested per capita between 1840 and 1860: 
Table 10.7. Top Ten States in Growth Rate, Manufactures Capital Investment on a per capita 
basis, 1840 – 186081 
       Growth  
State   Region    1840-1860 
Delaware  Atlantic   333.2% 
Connecticut  New England   303.8% 
Pennsylvania  Atlantic   254.4% 
Tennessee  Southwest   188.9%  
Alabama  Southwest                161.7% 
Maine   New England   147.8% 
Maryland  Chesapeake   146.4% 
Georgia  South    145.6% 
Illinois   Northwest   144.3% 
Missouri  Trans South   140.5%  
Source: United States Census, 1840 and 1860, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu. 
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The above table includes states from every region of the country, again illustrating that 
industrialization was a national phenomenon.  Further, half of the above states were slave states, 
demonstrated that the Peculiar Institution did not inhibit the growth of manufacturing.    
     Many historians have studied the manufacturing output gap between the North and the South 
that existed in 1850 and 1860, a fact consistent with the data found in tables 10.4 and 10.5.  The 
most noteworthy effort is A Deplorable Scarcity, authored by Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss.  
Their work presented a number of points that are actually compatible with the findings of this 
study.  Bateman and Weiss maintained that Southern industrial undertakings were highly 
profitable, and that the financial return per annum “was 28 percent in 1860, and 25 percent in 
1850 … on a state and regional basis, the returns appear equally lofty.”40  As demonstrated by 
the data in this chapter, the Southern manufacturing was growing at a relatively rapid pace prior 
to the Civil War.  In the end, Deplorable Scarcity did not provide a compelling case that 
Southern manufacturing was doomed to perpetually lag the North.  Rather, the book better 
explains why a significant Southern Gerschenkronian “catch up” failed to materialize in the 
1850s.  To this issue, their study contributed some helpful insights.  Raw cotton prices, which 
had averaged about eight cents per pound in the 1840s, jumped to eleven cents per pound in the 
1850s, causing many Southern planters to focus their economic resources to cultivating cotton, 
where they possessed comparative economic advantage.  Further, technological advances in 
cultivation caused the annual output of bales of cotton per slave to markedly increase in much of 
the South during the 1850s.  Cotton production, predominantly comprised of variable costs, 
posed a less risky alternative to manufacturing projects, which involved significant fixed cost 
investments.  Simply put, Southern industrialization proceeded during the 1850s, but could have 
                                                 
40
 Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss, A Deplorable Scarcity: The Failure of Industrialization in the Slave Economy 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 106.  
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been much greater if Southern investors had chosen the higher risk and reward associated with 
manufacturing.  Instead, they chose to accept lower profits, and lower financial risk, by 
allocating significant resources to cotton production.
41
 
     The impact of tariff barriers on American trade was not as strong as many contemporary 
politicians may have believed after 1840.  Figure 10.4 shows the average tariff rate on American 
imports between 1833 and 1860. 
 
Figure 10.4. American Foreign Trade, 1833 to 1860 (3 year rolling average)17  
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 1:30, 3:24. 
 
The impact of the Tariff of 1842 was to increase the effective tariff rate.  However, the levels of 
overall American trade were not significantly impacted, decreasing only slightly.   
                                                 
41
 Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 3:209; Bateman and Weiss, A Deplorable Scarcity, 27-28, 128-142; James 
D. Foust and Dale E. Swan, “Productivity and Profitability of Antebellum Slave Labor: A Micro-Approach,” in The 
Structure of the Cotton Economy of the Antebellum South, edited by William N. Parker (Washington, D.C.: The 
Agricultural History Society, 1970), 46-47; Southern planters, in selectively accepting industrialization, as well as 
dedicating resources to cotton agriculture, were simply making rational economic judgments for their own self-
interest.  Brian Schoen notes that “close examination of planters’ exhaustive accounting logs and letters reveal their 
obsession with gains and losses … reminding us that their homes were also modern businesses, often on a grand and 
very brutal scale … [and] almost certainly approximated Northern factories or merchant houses more closely than 
urban artisan shops or family farms,” Schoen, “The Burdens and Opportunities of Interdependence: The Political 
Economies of the Planter Class,” in The Old South’s Modern Worlds: Slavery Region and Nation in the Age of 
Progress, edited by Diane L. Barnes, Brian Schoen, and Frank Towers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
67. 
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     The Tariffs of 1846 and 1857, in contrast, significantly decreased the effective tariff rate, but 
their implementation did not lead to a flood of imports, as had been the case after the War of 
1812.  The key difference between the two episodes is that the American “infant industries” of 
the 1810s and 1820s had, by the 1840s and 1850s, with some help from protection, grown to the 
point where they could produce large quantities of goods on a cost effective basis.  The very 
modest consequences of lowered tariffs from the 1840s onward to American international trade 
strongly suggest that the American manufacturing sphere had reached a stage of maturity and 
that the national economy had evolved to a greater state of economic self-sufficiency.
42
       
The Tariff of 1857 
     An important political development between the time of the Tariff of 1846 and the Tariff of 
1857 was the breakdown of the Second Party System.  In the interim, there had been rumblings 
to further reduce the tariff during Fillmore’s administration as well as the early years of the 
Pierce administration, but nothing came of the efforts.
43
  The Whigs fielded a presidential 
candidate for the last time in 1852 and the party was in rapid decline as the slavery issue tore it 
apart.  The Republican Party ran its first presidential candidate in 1856, but was still in its 
formation process.  As a result, Congress possessed a menagerie of political interests.  The 
Democracy remained the sole major national party, but only held a majority in the Senate.  Very 
few non-Democrats clung to the Whig moniker, and a growing number of Northerners identified 
                                                 
42
 In the important area of cotton textiles, Douglas A. Irwin and Peter Temin note that “after 1830 … American and 
British cotton-textile producers specialized in quite different varieties of cotton goods, and domestic producers were 
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themselves as Republicans, but the great majority of non-Democrats identified themselves either 
as the “American Party” or simply as “Opposition” members.44 
     The American economy performed well between 1846 and 1857.  The discovery of gold in 
California in 1848 grew the nation’s money supply, spurring economic growth.  Foreign 
investment facilitated a rapid expansion of American infrastructure, particularly railroads.  The 
Walker Tariff produced none of the calamities that the Whigs predicted back in 1846.
45
   
     As Congress considered the Tariff of 1857, many familiar faces from previous tariff debates 
were absent.  Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and Daniel Webster had all died since passage of the 
Walker Tariff.  When the 1857 tariff bill was introduced, the great oratory and principled 
positions over trade policy were notably absent as well, overshadowed by a national obsession 
with the slavery issue. 
     The Tariff of 1857 was constructed as a sort of “middle ground” piece of legislation, in a 
fashion quite distinct from earlier trade policy measures.  The bill proposed to lower overall tariff 
levels by about twenty percent.  Importantly, it proposed dramatic reductions on raw wool 
imports, a very appealing prospect to American wool manufacturers, who were struggling 
economically at the time.
46
  
     The 1857 bill was passed through the efforts of an odd coalition between free trade 
Democrats and New England and Atlantic legislators, who were serving the economic interests 
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of their wool manufacturing constituents.  The passage could not have succeeded without this 
political marriage because Democrats were now a minority in the House.  In an ironic twist, free 
trade ideas mixed with Northeastern manufacturing interests to make the bill a reality.  
Additionally, it was debated and passed during the lame duck session of the Thirty Fourth 
Congress in early 1857, after the election of James Buchanan, but before his inauguration.  In 
fact, it was the final legislative act signed by President Franklin Pierce on his last day in office.
47
 
     Even after eleven years of a free trade policy, protectionists desired to return the country to a 
nationalist-based trade policy.  Representative Nathaniel Durfee of Rhode Island stated “The 
prominent interest of that State [Rhode Island] is her manufactures.  Being among the first to 
embark in the business, she has always pursued it with characteristic perseverance, and with a 
success which has fluctuated only in consequence of the fluctuations of national legislation. … a 
large majority of the intelligent and well-informed of all political parties in that State are 
decidedly favorable to a tariff which, whether denominated revenue or protective, shall be based 
upon some principle of discrimination in favor of domestic industry.”48   
     Nationalists, as they had done in 1846, warned that free trade would weaken the United States 
and leave it exposed to economic panics.  Representative Amos Granger of New York expressed 
alarm at the prospect of further lowering tariffs, as they would cause the nation to become 
dependent upon foreign powers for essential goods.  He stated, “Suppose the case of a foreign 
war, of which you are never out of danger.  Relying on a foreign supply of an article that enters 
into the daily indispensible use of every family, rich or poor, you might as well depend on 
foreigners for powder as for salt.”  Granger warned that “unless we have a radical change in our 
tariff laws, we shall surely have another crash.  Come it will, and it is only a question of time.  
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We must manufacture more and import less, and keep our specie at home.  We must raise our 
own wool, and make our cloth and iron as we do our glass, nails, and cottons.”49 
     Free traders restated their long-standing arguments to support lowering the tariff further, 
emphasizing that a virtuous republic required equal economic opportunity for its citizens.  Lewis 
Campbell of Pennsylvania expressed the long-time free trade position that no portion of the 
national economy should receive any sort of preferential treatment.  He explained that “we have 
been told by the gentlemen upon the other side of the House that it is the duty of this 
Government to protect American labor.  What proportion of the American population is are 
engaged in manufacture?  Not more than one-sixth or one-seventh of the whole population.  And 
should the agricultural portion of our people, should all the persons engaged in commerce and 
trade, indeed should all the other classes of our people be taxed in order that the manufacturing 
interest should be built up?”50  
     As Table 10.8 shows, the 1857 Tariff roll call votes in the House and Senate followed a very 
unique pattern.  In the House, the bill to reduce tariff levels, actually received significant support 
from Northeastern states and significant opposition from the Southern seaboard states.  The 
western states (both in the North and the South) generally voted against the bill, but the vote was 
more divided (59% to 41%) than in the other parts of the nation.    
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Table 10.8. Ratification Vote of the 1857 Tariff Bill by Region82 
      House  House  Senate  Senate  
Region  States      Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
New England  (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)     27      0    4    4 
Atlantic  (DE, NJ, NY, PA)      41           7      3    2 
Chesapeake  (MD, VA)          5        13      2    0 
South   (FA, GA, NC, SC)         3      13      7    0 
Northwest (IA, IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)   20      26      5    1 
Southwest (AL, KY, MS, TN)      7    22       4    0 
Trans South (AR, LA, MO, TX)        8      3    6    1 
Far West (CA)        0      0    2    0  
Totals                 111    84  33    8 
Source: Cong. Globe, 34
th
 Cong., 3rd Sess., 791, 1062 (1857). 
 
     The changed voting pattern in the Northeast signaled a significant turning point in the 
progress of American industrialization.  Historian Marc Egnal points out that “by midcentury 
New England factories could hold their own in world markets, and producers were concerned 
instead about securing cheap raw materials, particularly wool and cotton.”51  American 
industrialization had reached a level of maturity by 1857.  
     The House voting patterns by party, shown in Table 10.9, show an equally curious pattern.  
Free trade Democrats generally voted against the measure, while the opposing coalition of 
Republicans, Americans, Whigs and others generally voted in favor of the bill.  The lack of a  
Democrat majority in the House limited the extent to which the party could impose its will on 
trade policy issues, and the tendency by House Democrats to oppose the bill suggests that they 
may have wished to lower rates further and not provide what they perceived as favorable 
economic treatment to wool manufacturers. 
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Table 10.9. Ratification Vote of the 1857 Tariff Bill by Party Affiliation83 
Political    House  House  Senate  Senate  
Party     Ayes  Nays  Ayes  Nays 
Democrat         8        53    25    4 
Republican        8      5    4    3 
Opposition       52     18    0    0 
Whig         4      0    3    1 
American      39      8    1    0  
Totals     111    84  33    8 
Source: Cong. Globe, 34
th
 Cong., 3rd Sess., 91, 1062 (1857). 
 
     As had been the case in 1846, some legislators felt bound to recognize instructions from their 
respective States.  House Democrat Thomas Davidson of Louisiana acknowledged that “I desire 
to state that, while I am opposed to any discrimination, yet I am constrained, in carrying out in 
good faith the joint resolution of the Legislature of Louisiana, instructing the Senators and 
requesting the Representatives of that State in Congress in reference to duty on sugar, to vote 
against placing sugar on the free list, and in favor of retaining it in its present position.”52  
    Economic nationalists were less organized in the 1850s politically.  Whigs had been 
consistently pro-tariff, but the party was virtually extinct by 1857.  Republicans would 
eventually become fiercely pro-tariff in the future, but they were still in their political infancy in 
1857.  The fact that so many legislators were categorized as “Opposition” illustrates the transient 
nature of politics at this juncture.  Historian John Ashworth commented that, in 1857, “when 
economic conditions were at last more favorable to a renewed debate over the tariff, the political 
will was missing.”53    
     The Tariff of 1857 was the final significant tariff bill of the antebellum period, and its passage 
confirmed free trade as the dominant American policy during the 1850s.  Although the Panic of 
1857 interrupted the long period of American prosperity dating back to the mid-1840s, there 
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were no serious efforts to reverse the trend towards free trade.  Only the secession of Southern 
States in late 1860 and early 1861, and the outbreak of Civil War in April 1861, created 
circumstances where Republicans possessed the means in the executive and legislative branches 
to again alter the direction of American trade policy.   
     In March 1861, shortly after the majority of southern congressmen had abandoned 
Washington, a Republican dominated legislature passed the Morrill Tariff.  The new tariff 
reestablished all of the trade principles of the American System, including specific duties and 
targeted protection for particular industries.  Congress raised tariff rates again over the next four 
years to help fund the war, but with the end of hostilities in 1865 these tariffs were largely left in 
place.  The United States would retain a protectionist trade policy for the next half-century.
54
 
Conclusions 
     The transition from the American System, which dominated the period between 1824 and 
1846, to a laissez-faire trade policy between 1846 through 1857, did not slow down the 
accelerating pace of American economic growth.  Industrialization expanded throughout all 
regions of the nation.  By 1857, the United States had become one of the leading economic 
powers in the world, only trailing Great Britain and France in overall economic productivity. 
     The experiment with free trade witnessed substantial economic growth, but economic 
nationalists and free traders still fundamentally disagreed on the reasons behind this positive 
trend.  Free traders naturally attributed prosperity with the passage of the Walker Tariff and 
ending discriminatory tariffs.  Economic nationalists contended that earlier policies of protection 
had been critical to placing American manufacturers on a competitive footing with international 
competition.  The Panic of 1857, which came about shortly after that year’s tariff bill passed, 
                                                 
54
 Taussig, Tariff History, 97-108. 
422 
 
 
 
provided a convenient episode for nationalists to contend that the nation required a new wave of 
protection in order to restore American economic growth and progress. 
     Although free traders clearly possessed the political upper hand from 1846 until the Civil 
War, they were unable to bring the trade policy debate to a conclusion.  Economic nationalism 
remained alive and well, and an emerging Republican Party picked up the old Whig banner in 
promoting protectionism for American manufacturers.  As the American Civil War approached, 
the trade policy issue remained unsettled. 
     Indiana’s Robert Owen summed up the fierce nature of the debate in 1846 when he shared his 
belief that economic nationalists would continue the fight after passage of a free trade bill.  He 
asked “Will its [The Tariff of 1842] defeat be silently acquiesced in?  You know it will not.  
Session after session the struggles will be renewed, and renewed with increased forces and 
growing strength.”  He was not dismayed, though, and he warned the nationalists that “Reject it, 
and see if the next proposal be not one of yet lower rates.”55 
     The most important feature of the trade policy issue during the 1840s and 1850s was the 
impact of American industrialization on the tariff debate.  A national expansion clearly took 
place, and although the South and West lagged the Northeast in absolute manufacturing 
production, all regions of the nation experienced substantial manufacturing growth, and all 
regions clearly had economic stakes in the industrialization process.  This evolution manifested 
itself in the fact that congressional voting patterns on the tariff issue were now more diversified 
within regions, and party ideologies reflected clear demarcations over economic policy that 
voters considered when electing their representatives.  Trade policy, unlike the case in the 1820s 
and 1830s, was no longer a significant contributing factor to the sectional tensions developing in 
the United States.    
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     It was the Mexican American War that marked the beginning of escalating sectional tensions 
over a series of events such as the 1850 Compromise, Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Dred Scott 
decision, with slavery as a related caiue behind them all.  However, the corresponding Tariffs of 
1846 and 1857 did not feature similar sectional hostilities.  The corresponding rhetoric 
surrounding the tariff bills instead focused on familiar issues of protectionism and free trade, as 
had been the case in almost all previous debates.  In fact, the Tariff debates from 1828 through 
1833 contained far more references to sectional tensions than was the case in 1846 and 1857, 
even as the United States approached the outbreak of civil war.   
     This evidence suggests that trade policy, though a source of sectional friction during the 
Nullification Crisis, did not significantly contribute to the “Impending Crisis” in the 1840s and 
1850s.  The Civil War was caused by many factors, most prominently the slavery issue.  Trade 
policy had little, if any, causal impact on the national tragedy that soon followed the Tariff of 
1857. 
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CHAPTER 11 – INTERESTS, IDEAS, AND TRADE POLICY, 1789 TO 1860 
Special Interest: a person or group seeking to influence legislative or government policy 
to further often narrowly defined interests
1
 
 
Ideas: a formulated thought or opinion
2
 
 
     Interests and ideas.  American trade policy from its founding in 1789 to the Civil War 
was profoundly impacted both by the special economic interest groups created as a result 
of the First Industrial Revolution and the by the intellectual ideas that Americans 
developed about the role of political economy in a republican setting.  There was much at 
stake, clearly demonstrated by the nineteen major trade policy initiatives considered by 
Congress over a sixty-eight year period.          
     Ideas influenced antebellum trade policy.  The dual ideas of free trade and economic 
nationalism were present at the First Congress in 1789 and these competing ideologies, 
which slowly matured between 1789 and 1860, remained important features of American 
political landscape throughout the period.  Foundational perspectives were augmented by 
important state reports such as Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures and the Dallas Report 
of 1816, political programs such as the Jeffersonian Experiment and the American 
System, and the popular writings of authors that included Thomas Paine, John Taylor, 
Friedrich List, Mathew Carey, Hezekiah Niles, William Leggett and others.
3
     
     The first generations of Americans placed significant importance certain concepts, 
such as republicanism, virtue and liberty.  In particular, they wished to avoid the 
perceived evils of Europe, particularly monarchical forms of government and the 
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accompanying corruption that often accompanied them.  The trade policy debate in many 
ways reflected competing interpretations of what the experimental American republic 
should be.  Economic nationalism appealed to those concerned that a weak economic 
United States was endangered in a hostile world dominated by monarchy, where the goals 
and needs of the American community at large should take precedence over those of the 
individual.  In contrast, free traders concluded that aggregations of political and/or 
economic power represented a great threat to the United States, where economic 
privileges could create a tyranny every bit as oppressive as hereditary privileges in 
Europe.  They insisted that egalitarian individualism, including the sphere of political 
economy, was a necessary attribute for a republic.
4
 
The Chronological Context of the Trade Policy Debate 
     The impact of special economic interests, in sharp contrast to the slowly evolving but 
continuous articulation of trade policy ideas, was the consequence of a dynamic and ever-
changing economic environment.  The First Industrial Revolution significantly altered the 
economic character of the United States.  At the founding in 1789, the nation was almost 
exclusively engaged in agriculture and commerce.  By 1860, manufacturing was an 
integral feature of the economy throughout the nation.  As industrialization spread and 
developed, the motivations of politicians and their constituents shifted, correlating to the 
changing economic circumstances that confronted them.   
     At the Founding, the United States was a fragile political experiment situated in a 
hostile world.  The new nation was economically and militarily weak.  It was over-reliant 
                                                 
4
 These positions trace to the Founding.  See 1789 nationalist comments by Thomas Fitzsimons (PA), 1 
Annals of Cong. 110 (1789).  See 1788 free trade comments by Robert Yates (NY), Bruce Frohnen, ed., 
The Anti-Federalists, 372; and John Nicholson (PA), Cornell, The Other Founders, 83, 94.   
426 
 
 
 
on Great Britain for most of its imports and exports, and as Jay’s Treaty illustrated, the 
British were comfortable dictating policy to the upstart Americans.   
     In this environment, American trade policy was perpetually reactionary, as much 
stronger European nations oftentimes sought to intimidate the United States.  
Circumstances caused Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to engage in economic 
warfare with Great Britain and France.  Both presidents, staunch economic liberals, oddly 
used the means of trade restrictions in pursuit of the ends of free trade.  They incorrectly 
concluded that trade was a potent weapon that the United States could use to achieve 
diplomatic goals.
5
     
     The Jeffersonian Experiment was an unmitigated disaster.  It drew the United States 
into a war where American military forces were humiliated.  In the wake of the War of 
1812, Jefferson, Madison, and a great majority of Americans concluded that economic 
nationalism was essential for national survival.  Not only did Jefferson and Madison 
convert, but prominent members of the next generation, including John Calhoun, rabidly 
supported a nationalist policy.  As the Federalist Party died out, only John Randolph, 
Nathaniel Macon, and their small band of Quid republican maintained a free trade 
position. 
     The nationalist consensus in the immediate post-war period was built upon an 
intellectual foundation embodied in the Dallas Report of 1816.  The Dallas Report clearly 
laid out the principle that temporary protection was valid in the case of infant American 
industries, and that protection should be lifted at such point in time that American 
manufacturers became competitive in the international marketplace.  Like Hamilton’s 
earlier Report on Manufactures, Dallas doctrine focused on manufacturing and did not 
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propose protection for raw materials or non-manufacturing activities.  The Tariffs of 
1816 and 1818 were supported by a broad national coalition who subscribed to the tenets 
laid out in the Dallas Report.
6
   
     American industrialization began in earnest during the 1810s, in part influenced by the 
virtual halt in trade during the war years.  Factory production on a large scale basis began 
as the United States imported intellectual capital in the form of technology from abroad 
and, combined with an abundant inventory of natural resources, began a “catch up” 
process with Great Britain and Europe.  This initial industrial “takeoff” was centered in 
New England and the Atlantic states.  The founding of Waltham and Lowell are 
prominent examples of early American application of financial, physical, and intellectual 
capital necessary for American industrialization.
7
  
     By 1820, however, Dallas doctrine was already under attack by the introduction of 
what eventually became Henry Clay’s American System, a far more ambitious and 
comprehensive blueprint for the American catch up process.  The American System went 
far beyond the Dallas Report and embraced long-term, or even permanent, tariff 
protection.  Although the Tariff of 1820 was rejected, Clay succeeded in achieving his 
trade policy vision with the passage of the Tariff of 1824, which featured high tariff 
duties and targeted protection for certain key industries.   
     The passage of the Tariff of 1824 shattered the Dallas consensus.  American 
industrialization was commencing in earnest in the northeastern portion of the nation at 
this time and manufacturing interests from the region enthusiastically supported the 
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American System.  However, a number of Americans, and particularly Southerners, 
concluded that the system posed a threat to the Republic, and that Clay’s policies 
bestowed economic privileges, wealth, and political power in the hands of a few at the 
expense of the many.  Liberal notions of trade policy formed the intellectual foundation 
for resistance to the American System.
8
 
     The Tariff of Abominations in 1828, and its much higher tariff rates, intensified 
sectional tensions.  Although Clay attempted to characterize the bill as a national benefit, 
at this stage of American industrial development the tariff generated winning and losing 
economic interests that closely aligned with geographical regions.  Northeastern 
manufacturers, where industrial takeoff was underway, clearly benefitted, while 
Westerners and Southerners, who had not yet engaged in takeoff, realized few, if any, 
benefits.   
     The Nullification Crisis, prompted by passage of the Tariff of 1832, threatened to tear 
the nation apart.  The crisis was instigated by South Carolina radicals who used the tariff 
as a proxy for arguing minority rights.  The latent issue during the crisis, however, was 
slavery.  Tensions were fortunately alleviated when Clay and Calhoun brokered the 
Compromise Tariff of 1833. 
     The tariff could only have been successfully used as a proxy test case for Southern 
minority rights, and a defense of slavery, between 1824 and 1833.  It was during this time 
frame that American industrialization was largely confined to the Northeast.  Trade 
policy, which had been a national issue in 1816, degenerated into a sectional squabble 
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between regions where large scale industrialization had taken root and those where it had 
not.   
     American industrialization “took off” in the other regions of the country in the 1830s 
and continued through the remaining antebellum years.  Suddenly, special economic 
interests arose in the South and West because of constituents who now had a stake in the 
industrialization process or had reason to believe they might possess an interest in the 
near future.  Consequently, the tariff became less defined by a sectional paradigm and 
reverted back to being a national-based issue.
9
 
     The spread of industrialization throughout most of the United States changed the 
nature of the trade policy debate by the 1840s.  The protectionist-oriented tariff acts in 
1841 and 1842 featured a debate that was, again, national in scope.  There were 
significant numbers of pro and anti-tariff votes scattered throughout the nation’s 
geographic regions.  In 1846 and 1857, as American trade policy shifted towards a more 
liberal program, voting patterns remained largely national in nature.  British repeal of the 
Corn Laws inspired free trade sentiments throughout all parts of the United States.
10
    
     It is apparent, in looking at the aforementioned periods, that the trade policy question 
was both complex and dynamic.  Economic interests changed with the spread of 
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industrialization. Dueling ideas promoting either nationalism or free trade remained a 
constant element throughout the many tariff debates.                  
American Trade Policy as a Unique Issue 
     This study illustrates that American trade policy was a unique political and economic 
issue between 1789 and 1860.  While many variables influenced the discourse, 
industrialization in the long-term proved to be the most influential.  The timing and 
location of American industrialization process dramatically changed the nature of the 
American economy between 1789 and 1860.  
     At the founding of the American Republic, there existed only two significant 
economic spheres, agriculture and commerce.  Manufactures, stifled by British policy 
during the Colonial Era, represented a miniscule portion of the small national economy.  
American policy makers, surrounded by a world hostile to republicanism, were faced 
with a need to craft economic policy that balanced the ideals of the recent Revolution 
with the pragmatic goal of maintaining national sovereignty.  This tension remained a 
consistent feature of all American trade policy debates from the Constitution to the Civil 
War.  
     American policy makers realized that in order for the United States to survive and 
thrive, the nation needed to become economically strong.  This goal was likely to remain 
elusive if the United States failed to embrace the Industrial Revolution.  Between 1789 
and 1820, an economically and militarily weaker United States was constantly concerned 
with developments in Europe and their impact.  British and French intimidation of 
American commerce, and the War of 1812, reminded Americans of their vulnerability.  
Consequently, foreign relations took on overriding importance during this period.  Given 
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the circumstances, it is understandable that Southerners such as John Calhoun prioritized 
a nationalist view in 1816; it was a matter of national survival.
11
   
     Economic nationalists, believing that time was of the essence, argued that American 
industrialization must be accelerated through the use of governmental encouragement.  
This was at the heart of the tariff issue.  They believed that high tariffs and protection 
would be the one sure policy to raise American manufactures to competitiveness with 
Europe.  Alexander Hamilton stressed this point in his Report on Manufactures.  Henry 
Clay continued this vision from the 1820s onward with his American System.  Both 
Hamilton and Clay viewed trade policy from an international perspective, believing that 
the United States must, using the arm of government, embrace policies that would make 
the nation economically competitive with Europe as quickly as possible.
12
 
     Other Americans, however, viewed trade policy differently, concluding that a 
domestic perspective ought to take precedence over an international one.  Their concern 
was that government-sponsored trade policy could not be successfully accomplished 
without creating economic favoritism, a result wholly incompatible with virtuous 
republicanism.  Further, these policies would also inevitably lead to concentrations of 
economic wealth.  Liberals such as John Taylor, John Randolph, and Nathaniel Macon 
warned their fellow citizens that if the nation allowed the creation of an economic 
aristocracy, the United States would be exposed to the same threats to liberty that 
hereditary aristocracy posed in Europe.  They pointed to Great Britain’s own experience 
during the Industrial Revolution, where capitalists exerted undue influence on Parliament 
and British trade policy.  They also noted the social costs created by overcrowded cities 
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swarming with unskilled laborers.  In their view, nationalist trade policy exposed the 
American experiment to failure from within, as industrialization and its negative effects 
would gradually corrupt core national values.
13
  
     The competing paradigms created by the nationalists and liberals centered around 
differing views of trade policy and equally differing intellectual solutions to what each 
side perceived to be the national challenge.  Nationalists concluded that the danger was 
external and that the grant of economic favoritism to a few through protectionist policies 
created benefits that inured to all Americans.  In contrast, liberals concluded that the 
primary danger was internal and insisted that any forms of economic favoritism 
represented a serious danger to the American republic.
14
 
     If the tariff is properly viewed as an intellectual offspring of the Enlightenment and a 
technological offspring of the Industrial Revolution, it becomes clear that trade policy 
was a unique issue between 1789 and 1860.  The competing views of the nationalists and 
liberals were played out during this period through the development of ever more 
sophisticated ideas as well as through the political influence generated by changing 
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the Tariff Debates of the 1820s,” Journal of the Early Republic Volume 14, No. 4 (Winter, 1994): 527, 
533-534; See also Marc W. Kruman’s comments that exemplify the period of the Second Party System 
when he states that “Whigs relinquished Republican fears of commerce; Democrats denounced commerce 
separated from productive labor,” Kruman, “The Second American Party System and the Transformation of 
Revolutionary Republicanism,” Journal of the Early Republic Volume 12 (Winter 1992): 528.    
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special interest economic groups.  Both ideas and interests evolved and changed during 
these years, explaining the constantly shifting fortunes of nationalists and free traders.    
     Ultimately, the tariff deserves unique consideration on its own merit because trade 
policy did not run parallel with the other two great American antebellum issues of slavery 
and state rights.  Admittedly, the tariff issue intersected with slavery and minority rights 
(argued at the time as state rights) during the period from 1824 to 1833.  However, this 
brief period of time was an anomaly.  Once the industrialization process proceeded in 
earnest beyond the northeastern part of the country, trade policy quickly resumed its 
unique character.     
Great Britain’s Influence 
     Great Britain’s impact on American trade policy throughout the period cannot be 
overstated.  Its influence followed the twin themes of interests and ideas.  From 1789 
through the late 1820s, Britain’s actions to bolster her own national economic interests 
constantly influenced American trade policy, which most often consisted of reactive 
American measures.  By the late 1820s and early 1830s, as American political and 
economic stability became more entrenched, it was British ideas that more forcefully 
influenced the American trade policy discourse.   
     The fact that the American nation traced its political and cultural heritage back to 
Great Britain made it highly likely that British ideas and practices would influence 
American policy makers.  Americans avidly read the works of British political 
economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and John Stuart Mill.  
American classical liberal arguments for free trade often quoted British intellectuals.  
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     From the time of the Revolution through 1846, British trade policy in practice was far 
different from what her most famous political economists preached.  Great Britain had 
become the most powerful nation in the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
and many British and foreign political leaders attributed the rise in part to Britain’s closed 
economic system that featured high tariff barriers.  As a result, while American free 
traders pointed to British intellectuals, American nationalists looked instead to British 
politicians.
15
 
     The British inconsistency between rhetoric and practice contributed to complicate the 
American search for an appropriate policy.  Although American politicians were reluctant 
to praise Great Britain in the post-Revolutionary era, it is clear from numerous examples 
in the tariff debates that Americans had deep respect for Britain’s intellectual 
contributions and economic success.  The fact that both nationalists and free traders could 
point to British sources for their ideas legitimized their respective positions.       
     The British conundrum was resolved in 1846, when the British Parliament repealed 
the Corn Laws.  Suddenly, British economic teaching and practice were aligned.  It was 
clear that American legislators were swayed by Britain’s actions, and the repeal 
positively influenced passage of the Walker Tariff.
16
 
     Great Britain’s influence on American trade policy was significant throughout the 
period between independence and civil war.  It is no coincidence that the high points of 
American economic nationalism came to pass when the perceived economic and military 
threat from Great Britain was at its highest.  Further, the onset of a free trade American 
                                                 
15
 Examples of nationalist interpretations are found in 1828 with comments by Alexander Stewart (PA), 6 
Reg. Deb. 2230 (1828), and James Strong (NY), 2271,2273; in the same congressional session, Churchill 
Cambreleng summarized the free trade position, 2370. 
16
 See comments by representative Seaborn Jones (GA) in 1846, Cong. Globe, 29th
 
Cong., 1st Sess. 990 
(1846). 
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policy from 1846 on occurred at a time when American industrialization had matured to 
the point of being internationally competitive and when Britain’s own trade policy 
changed.      
Rostow, Gerschenkron, and Industrialization      
     The two foremost twentieth-century American authors to consider the impact of 
industrialization on developing countries were Walt Whitman Rostow and Alexander 
Gerschenkron.  Rostow authored The Stages of Economic Growth in 1960 and 
Gerschenkron Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective in 1962.  Both authors 
attempted to explain the industrialization process in twentieth century third world nations, 
but many of their key concepts are useful in explaining the impact of the First Industrial 
Revolution on the United States.     
     The takeoff concept is helpful in explaining what occurred within the United States as 
industrialization began in the Northeast before spreading to other parts of the nation.  
Rostow alluded to the sectional nature of the American industrialization experience when 
he noted in The Stages of Economic Growth that the American South did not experience 
takeoff until the twentieth century.  This study concludes that Rostow’s assessment of the 
timing of the Southern takeoff should be reconsidered in light of the evidence.  The South 
experienced takeoff during the 1840s and 1850s.  Unfortunately, the Civil War virtually 
destroyed all of the South’s industrial capacity and infrastructure, and the South was 
economically thrown back into a pre-takeoff position.  It would not achieve takeoff again 
for nearly a century.
17
 
     Gerschenkron’s intellectual contributions likewise help in explaining why, once 
takeoff was achieved in the United States outside of the Northeast, political support for 
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 Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, 38, 67. 
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economic nationalism was now possible in all parts of the nation.  His most important 
concept from Economic Backwardness is that of “catch up,” where he maintained that, 
with appropriate governmental assistance, backward countries could close the industrial 
development gap with more developed nations.  By the 1840s and 1850s, the American 
South had access to the technological intellectual capital that was already present in the 
Northeast.  It would be logical for Southern industrial special interests to support 
governmental assistance in the form of higher tariffs and improved infrastructure to 
accelerate the catch up process.
18
 
     By the 1840s the American South and West possessed the technical knowledge, 
financial capital, labor pool, and natural resources necessary to industrialize.  Both 
Rostow and Gerschenkron supply economic theories that help explain that it was a 
natural evolution that industrialization would eventually spread throughout the United 
States.  Once “takeoff” occurred, it was also logical that localized special economic 
interests would use the political process to “catch up” their own industrialization process 
with more mature regions, such as New England and the Atlantic States.
19
    
Sectionalism, Slavery, and States Rights 
     The United States, from the moment of its founding, confronted significant issues that 
created political tensions between different regions.  Slavery was always the foremost 
among them.  The Constitutional Convention delicately handled the fractious slavery 
issue by means of the three-fifths compromise.  Slavery remained politically dormant for 
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 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, 31-38, 52-71. 
19
 Many historians have focused on a side by side comparison between the industrial output of the North 
and the South in order to argue that the South was not receptive to industrialization.  They fail to note or 
measure the growth rate of Southern industrialization form the 1830s on.  Also, the Southern seaboard 
states industrialized before their western counterparts.  By way of example, in 1860, six of the seven largest 
textile producing counties in the South were located in the Carolinas and Georgia, see Stephen J. Goldfarb, 
“A Note on Limits to the Growth of the Cotton-Textile Industry in the Old South,” The Journal of Southern 
History Volume 48, No. 4 (Nov, 1982): 556. 
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more than two decades, as foreign policy issues dominated the American national 
priorities from the 1790s through the end of the War of 1812.  However, it returned to 
prominence in 1820 at the time of Missouri’s admission to the Union.   
     Slavery dominated national politics from the time of the Missouri Compromise to the 
beginning of the Civil War.  The demarcation lines were clear, pitting a free labor North 
against a slave-based South.  This pattern had been in place at Philadelphia in 1787, and 
it remained consistently so through 1860. 
     The tariff issue, in contrast, never locked into a permanent geographical paradigm, 
though it briefly became so between 1824 and 1833.
20
  Rather, it was a dynamic issue 
where regional preferences on the trade policy issue shifted over time, in large part 
shaped by the advance of the Industrial Revolution across the United States.  When the 
Tariffs of 1824 and 1828 were passed, Southerners began to aggressively resist an 
economic policy that benefited Northern manufacturers to the economic detriment of 
Southerners.  The Southern reaction took time to develop and wasn’t a homogenous 
regional response.  Finally, after passage of the Tariff of 1832, South Carolina 
independently challenged the tariff during the Nullification Crisis of 1832 and 1833.
21
 
     South Carolina invoked a state rights argument to legitimize nullification of the Tariff 
of 1832.  The State’s actions were based on precedence; the Virginia and Kentucky 
resolutions of 1798 and 1799 also claimed that nullification was a legitimate form of 
redress by a State.  In similar fashion, the Hartford Convention of 1814 and 1815, while 
not directly addressing nullification doctrine, placed a list of grievances before Congress 
                                                 
20
 Brian Schoen points out that the South was fractured on the tariff throughout the antebellum period to 
some degree.  Some Southern economic interests were consistently pro-tariff throughout the antebellum 
period.  Examples, which have been highlighted in previous chapters, include sugar, hemp, and rice, see 
Schoen, “The Burdens and Opportunities of Interdependence,” in The Old South’s Modern Worlds, 70, 78. 
21
 See Robert Hayne’s (SC) comments in 1832, 14 Reg. Deb. 81 (1832).  
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with a hint of secession as its foundation.  South Carolina’s joining of the tariff with state 
rights was, in reality, a political mask for the real issues of slavery and minority rights.
22
   
     Most contemporary scholars agree that slavery was a major contributing factor leading 
to the American Civil War.  State rights and the tariff are also frequently cited.  However, 
trade policy was not dominated by static, geography-based, relationships.  The trade 
policy story, rather, was a slowly evolving process that paralleled industrial development 
in the United States.   
     The historical misinterpretation of the cause-effect relationship between the tariff and 
the Civil War is due to confusion about the dynamics at play in American politics 
between 1824 and 1833.  This brief nine-year period has unfortunately been 
superimposed upon the much longer seventy-one years between Washington’s 
inauguration and Lincoln’s election.  Properly understood, the period from 1824 to 1833 
should instead be viewed as an anomaly.
23
 
     Between 1824 and 1833, the three issues of slavery, states rights, and the tariff became 
tightly intertwined in American politics.  It is important, however, to consider the context 
in which these three issues intertwined with one another.  The primary trigger was the 
Missouri Crisis in 1819 and 1820, which resurrected slavery tensions that had been 
relatively dormant since the Constitutional Convention.  Slavery, after 1820, became, and 
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 Calhoun, in the Exposition, makes his arguments on the grounds of minority rights.  For an example, see 
Calhoun, Selected Writings, 270, 274.  Historian William Freehling takes a similar position, stating that 
“Even in 1832-33, a Nullification Controversy ostensibly about only protective tariffs actually also 
involved slavery’s future,” see Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Secessionists Triumphant: 1854-1861 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 531.   
23
 The emerging pattern at play that the tariff was a national issue before 1820 and would become so again 
later wasn’t necessarily clear to contemporary observers.  As keen an observer as Alexis de Tocqueville 
concluded that after the War of 1812, “Americans thought fit to establish a system of import duties, for the 
… purpose of protecting their incipient manufactures … The Southern States, which have no manufactures 
to encourage … soon complained of the measure,” see Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Bruce 
Frohnen (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2002), 323. 
439 
 
 
 
remained, the primary cause of sectional tensions.  What were the conditions causing this 
alignment of these three great issues?  An important contributing factor was American 
industrialization.  The American experience, consistent with Rostow’s views of a 
“takeoff” pattern, initially concentrated in New England and the Atlantic states.  This, in 
turn, caused a regional alignment regarding trade policy debates that temporarily 
coincided with the slavery issue between 1824 and 1833.  During this time frame, 
Southerners viewed the nationalist approach to trade policy as a one-sided affair, 
beneficial to the North and punitive to the South.  However, by the late 1830s the trade 
policy map changed because the Industrial Revolution expanded into western and 
southern areas.
24
 
     The unique circumstances during that particular moment in time made it possible for 
the tariff issue to briefly proxy for the Slavery issue.  Slavery, after the Missouri Crisis, 
was a source of constant regional tension throughout the 1820s and 1830s.  The tariff 
issue, because of the timing of regional takeoffs, momentarily aligned geographically 
with the slavery issue, providing the “means” for South Carolina’s political battle during 
the Nullification Crisis of 1833.  The “ends” of the crisis centered upon protecting 
minority rights and the future of the institution of Slavery.   
     John Calhoun was the mastermind who succeeded in tying slavery, states rights, and 
the tariff together.  As William Freehling noted, Calhoun responded to the immediate 
issue of the tariff by calling a “minority veto necessary because the permanent majority 
                                                 
24
 Refer to Tables 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4. Marc Egnal points out that the rise of Southern industrialization created 
tensions in Southern views on the tariff.  He notes that “Joseph Anderson [replaced] white workers with 
slaves after a strike in 1847 closed his foundry.  In the 1850s, strikes in Baltimore, St. Louis, Louisville, 
and New Orleans exacerbated planter concerns about white laborers.”  However, as James H. Hammond 
stated, “whenever a slave is made is made a mechanic, he is more than half freed.”  These two facts caused 
planters to fear “that Southern manufacturers might join the crusade for higher tariffs and challenge one of 
slave society’s fundamental tenets: free trade,” Egnal, “What if Genovese is Right?” The Old South’s 
Modern Worlds, 275. 
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would never lower the tariff.”  But the real issue was deeper; Freehling further noted that 
Calhoun “sought to stop some future northern majority from abolishing slavery by giving 
the Southern minority power to veto Yankee fanaticism.”25   
     Calhoun’s successful linkage of the three issues was exceptionally brief.  This is 
clearly proven by the fact that the tariff would never again be linked in any appreciable 
manner to either states rights or slavery during the next quarter-century.  The three major 
succeeding trade policy initiatives, in 1841-42, 1846, and 1857, failed to produce the 
same geographical roll call patterns that had characterized the 1824 to 1832 period. 
     Up to 1824, trade policy was still a national issue, and distinct from the domestic 
issues of slavery and state rights.  It was tightly associated with foreign policy, and 
American trade policy was more often guided by reactions to British and French 
diplomacy than domestic influences.  After 1833, the association of the tariff to slavery 
and state rights swiftly waned.  This was due to the fact that the Industrial Revolution in 
the United States expanded beyond its New England origins to other parts of the country.  
By 1842, economic special interests were present in all parts of the United States in favor 
of economic nationalism, and the roll call votes in 1841 and 1842 demonstrate this fact.  
The later tariffs of 1846 and 1857, impacted by the repeal of the British Corn laws, 
demonstrate that free traders were also well represented in all sections of the country 
during the post-1833 period.    
The Dynamic Nature of the Trade Policy Debate 
     A significant piece of circumstantial evidence that affirms the unique nature of the 
trade policy debates is the sheer number of influential and intellectual politicians who 
changed their views on trade policy over the course of their careers.  There are no parallel 
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 Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 259, 278.  
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examples in the case of either slavery or state rights, where individual changes of 
political position were virtually non-existent.  Although numerous men consistently 
maintained their trade policy position over an entire career, including economic 
nationalists such as Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay, and classical liberals such as 
John Randolph and Nathaniel Macon, there were many significant individuals who 
migrated from one point of view to the other.  In many instances, these men were at the 
forefront of the debate. 
     The most notable examples of this are the two-thirds of the “Great Triumvirate” who 
shifted their views on trade policy over time.  John Calhoun was a leading advocate for 
the Tariff of 1816, yet his later career was spent being a major critic of nationalist trade 
policy.  Daniel Webster’s experience was opposite.  He began his political career 
advocating free trade on behalf of Massachusetts based merchant interests.  As the 
Industrial Revolution progresses throughout New England, Webster changed his position 
to coincide with the changing interests of his constituents.
26
 
     The responsibilities of the American presidency also impacted the manner in which 
chief executives viewed trade policy.  Thomas Jefferson and James Madison offer two 
examples of the challenges that the United States faced during its first tenuous decades of 
existence.  Both men were early supporters of laissez-faire trade policy.  Madison was the 
most vocal advocate for free trade during the initial tariff debates of 1789.  Yet, burdened 
by the responsibilities of subordinating their parochial views on the issue to national 
interests, both men initiated policies that were more consistent with economic 
nationalism.  Jefferson, reacting to the precarious American economic position resulting 
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 Note Webster’s comments in 1824 against the tariff, 18 Annals of Cong. 2035 (1824), as compared to his 
1828 comments in support, 5 Reg. Deb. 751-752, 759 (1828). 
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from the Napoleonic wars, implemented policies that were the antithesis of free trade 
when he restricted, and then cut off, American trade with the British and the French.  
Jefferson openly acknowledged later in life that his personal views on trade gradually 
shifted, undoubtedly influenced by his own experiences as president.  James Madison 
reached his epiphany moment in the wake of American economic and military weakness 
during the War of 1812.  He became a strong proponent of both the Tariffs of 1816 and 
1818, a sharp departure from his earlier views.
27
   
     Several other prominent politicians also shifted their stance on trade policy over time.  
The most notable of these was Silas Wright of New York.  Wright was a primary 
architect of the infamous Tariff of Abominations in 1828, yet was also one of the leading 
critics of the Tariffs of 1841 and 1842.  Richard Mentor Johnson, when running for Vice-
President in 1836, felt a need to explain his conversion from economic nationalism to 
free trade.  He admitted in a letter that: 
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 Consider Madison’s comments in 1789, 1 Annals of Cong. 116 (1789), and compare to later thoughts 
after the War, Madison, Writings, 715-716;  Likewise, see Jefferson’s early thoughts, Jefferson, Notes on 
the State of Virginia, 165, and compare to later thoughts, Jefferson, Writings, 1370-1371. 
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In relation to the Tariff my views appear also not to be understood.  At the  
close of the last war, a general sentiment seemed to prevail among our 
eminent Statesmen, especially those who supported the Government in 
that conflict, that it was the true policy of the Republic so to regulate the 
Tariff, as to promote the establishment of manufactories within our 
borders.  In this opinion, many of the Statesmen of the South, united with 
those of the middle States & western States.  Without being distinguished 
as a peculiar advocate of the cause of legislation, which grew up under 
these circumstances, I gave it my support in pursuance of public opinion.  
As soon, however, as I perceived the dangers which were likely to grow 
out of this species of legislation pushed to excess, I became an advocate 
for a reduction of the Tariff and voted for every proposition having that 
end in view down to & including the compromise, which was made at the 
session of 1832.3.  That compromise ought to be considered by all good 
citizens as putting an end to the question.  No prudent & patriotic man 
will, I am sure, ever attempt a renewal of that species of legislation … it is 
no longer necessary as a measure of policy to support infant manufactories 
brought into existence by a state of war … The preservation of the union 
& the harmony of its members is incomparably more important than any 
system of legislation which regards only the pecuniary interests of a 
portion of the people.
28
 
 
Other examples of notable American statesmen who shifted on the tariff issue at one time 
or another include William Lowndes of South Carolina, Thomas Hart Benton of 
Missouri, and Willie Mangum of North Carolina.
29
 
     The fact that so many American politicians, from all parts of the country, shifted their 
stance on the tariff issue demonstrates the dynamic nature of the trade policy issue.  Even 
economists struggled with the issue.  Henry Carey, who established himself as a free 
trader in the 1830s, shifted his own stance in the 1850s, aligning himself with the 
nationalist movement that his father had been so instrumental in supporting.
30
  These 
various shifts were not random events.  Rather, they were responses to a world of ideas 
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 Richard M. Johnson to Franklin Blair, 25 June 1835, Filson Historical Society special collections, 
Louisville, Kentucky. 
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 For Lowndes, see Belz, ed., Webster-Hayne Debate, 159.  Benton and Wright both voted for the Tariff of 
1828, but opposed the Tariffs of 1841 and 1842.  Mangum voted against the Tariff of 1828, but supported 
the Whig tariffs initiative in 1841 and 1842.  
30
 Carey’s transition to protection was complete by 1852 with the publication of The Harmony of Interests, 
which firmly endorsed economic nationalism.   
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and economic interests that was in a constant state of change.  It should be noted, 
however, that these shifts became less frequent from the 1830s onward.  The introduction 
of the American System in the 1820s established a clear demarcation of the tariff issue 
between protectionists and free traders, and ultimately contributed to creating the Second 
Party System.  By the 1830s, Whigs and Democrats crafted clear ideological and policy 
stances on trade policy.         
Final Thoughts        
     Ultimately, the tariff debates served as a proxy for a larger debate regarding the 
structure of national political economy within a republican setting.  Early American 
political leaders grappled with establishing wise policy in the face of conflicting theories 
and a confusing variety of experiences during the nation’s first seventy years.  The 
consequences of the European embargoes and the Panics of 1819 and 1837 all served to 
render conclusive answers elusive.  If the antebellum tariff debates really amounted to a 
competition over republican ideals, the popular interpretation that economic issues were a 
major cause of the Civil War can be opened to question.   
     Slavery and state rights contributed towards sectional tensions, but tariffs did not.  It 
can be said that the tariff issue pitted brother against brother, exemplified in the 1842 
debates in Congress by brothers Joseph and Charles Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, who 
represented separate Philadelphia House districts in the 27
th
 Congress.  Joseph, a Whig, 
consistently voted in favor of the tariff.  Charles, who had befriended Friedrich List and 
spoke on the House floor on behalf of protectionism in 1842, nonetheless voted against 
each of the proposed tariff bills.  Charles was a Democrat, and in the end his party 
affiliation trumped his economic sympathies.  The Ingersoll brothers disagreed, but not 
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because of sectionalism, state rights, or slavery.  Their respective party’s competing ideas 
over economic policy determined their votes.    
     The Civil War began the process of resolving the thorny antebellum issues of slavery 
and state rights.  Slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment.  States rights 
ceased to be an important element of the American political landscape after 1865 and 
through the twentieth century.  Trade policy, however, remains an important and vibrant 
political issue to the present time.      
     If the Ingersoll brothers could be brought back to observe their nation in the twenty-
first century, they would likely agree that the trade policy issue remains unresolved in our 
own time.  Competing republican views of political economy, of protectionist-centered 
nationalism versus free trade liberalism, remain vibrant.  Contemporary Americans 
grapple with the impact of regional trade agreements and globalization upon the national 
economy.  They are faced with fundamental shifts in economic spheres, as less 
Americans engage in manufactures and agriculture because of fundamental shifts towards 
a service based economy premised on intellectual capital.     
     In the face of these complex and ever-changing developments, Americans wrestle 
with the same issues of reconciling the ideals of free trade to the pragmatic use of 
economic nationalism, of prioritizing the collective needs of the entire nation versus 
prioritizing individualism, in modern times.  The debates that occurred between 1789 and 
1860 serve as a reminder that American trade policy is inexorably linked to how our 
nation attempts to define republicanism even as our economy evolves.  We would be 
wise to look back and observe how previous generations considered this important 
question in order to establish a well-considered response to the issue in our own day.            
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APPENDIX A: TARIFF OF 1789 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
State/Region   Pro-Administration  Anti-Administration  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut    4-1   0-0    4-1 
   Massachusetts   3-2   2-0    5-2 
   New Hampshire   1-0   1-0    2-0 
   Rhode Island   0-0   0-0    0-0 
Totals     8-3   3-0   11-3 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    1-0   0-0     1-0 
   New Jersey    0-3   0-0    0-3 
   New York    3-1   2-0    5-1 
   Pennsylvania   2-1   3-0    5-1 
Totals     6-5   5-0   11-5 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    5-0   0-0    5-0 
   Virginia    2-0   7-0    9-0 
Totals     7-0   7-0   14-0 
 
South: 
   Georgia    0-0   2-0    2-0 
   North Carolina   0-0   0-0     0-0 
   South Carolina   1-0   2-0    3-0 
Totals      1-0   4-0    5-0 
 
Grand Totals    22-8   19-0   41-8 
 
Source: 1 Annals of Cong. 380 (1789); There were no formal political parties during the 
Washington Administration.  The source for Pro-administration and Anti-administration 
affiliations is Rudolph Bell, Party and Faction in American Politics: The House of 
Representatives, 1789-1801, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 252-253. 
 
Note: North Carolina and Rhode Island had not ratified the Constitution at the time of the 
vote on the Tariff of 1789. 
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APPENDIX B: TARIFF OF 1790 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
State/Region   Pro-Administration  Anti-Administration  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut    3-2   0-0    3-2 
   Massachusetts   0-4   0-2    0-6 
   New Hampshire   1-1   1-0    2-1 
   Rhode Island   0-0   0-0    0-0 
Totals     4-7   1-2   5-9 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    1-0   0-0     1-0 
   New Jersey    2-0   0-0    2-0 
   New York    2-1   2-0    4-1 
   Pennsylvania   4-0   3-0    7-0 
Totals     9-1   5-0   14-1 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    3-2   0-0    3-2 
   Virginia    1-0   6-0    7-0 
Totals     4-2   6-0   10-2 
 
South: 
   Georgia    0-0   3-0    3-0 
   North Carolina   2-0   3-0     5-0 
   South Carolina   0-1   2-0    2-1 
Totals      2-1   8-0   10-1 
 
Grand Totals    19-11   20-2   39-13 
 
Source: 2 Annals of Cong. 1741 (1790).  There were no formal political parties during 
the Washington Administration.  The source for Pro-administration and Anti-
administration affiliations is Bell, Party and Faction, 252-253. 
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APPENDIX C: TARIFF OF 1792 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
State/Region   Pro-Administration  Anti-Administration  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut    4-0   0-0    4-0 
   Massachusetts   5-0   1-0    6-0 
   New Hampshire   1-1   1-0    2-1 
   Rhode Island   1-0   0-0    1-0 
   Vermont    0-0   1-1    1-1 
Totals     11-1   3-1   14-2 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    1-0   0-0     1-0 
   New Jersey    2-0   1-0    3-0 
   New York    4-0   0-2    4-2 
   Pennsylvania   3-0   2-0    5-0 
Totals     10-0   3-2   13-2 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    2-1   1-2    3-3 
   Virginia    1-1   2-4    3-5 
Totals     3-2   3-6    6-8 
 
South: 
   Georgia    0-0   0-2    0-2 
   North Carolina   1-2   0-2     1-4 
   South Carolina   2-0   1-2    3-2 
Totals      3-2   1-6    4-8 
 
Grand Totals    27-5   10-15   37-20 
 
Source: 3 Annals of Cong. 572 (1792).  There were no formal political parties during the 
Washington Administration.  The source for Pro-administration and Anti-administration 
affiliations is Rudolph Bell, Party and Faction, 253-254. 
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APPENDIX D: NON-IMPORTATION ACT OF 1806 ROLL CALL BY 
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Massachusetts       0-0       1-1     1-1 
   New Hampshire       1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Rhode Island       1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Vermont        1-0       0-0     1-0 
Totals         3-0       1-4     4-4 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       0-1      0-1 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Pennsylvania       1-1       0-0     1-1 
Totals         5-1       0-1     5-2 
 
West: 
   Kentucky        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   Ohio         2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Tennessee           2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         5-1       0-0     5-1 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Virginia        1-0       0-0     1-0 
Totals         3-0       0-0     3-0 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   North Carolina       0-1       0-0      0-1 
   South Carolina       1-1       0-0     1-1 
Totals          2-2       0-0     2-2 
 
Grand Totals      18-4       1-5   19-9 
 
Source: 15 Annals of Cong. 240 (1806). 
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APPENDIX E: NON-IMPORTATION ACT OF 1806 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       0-7     0-7 
   Massachusetts       9-0       0-7     9-7 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-5     0-5 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        2-0       1-1     3-1 
Totals       13-0     1-20             14-20 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       0-1      0-1 
   New Jersey        5-0       0-0     5-0 
   New York      13-1       0-1   13-2 
   Pennsylvania     15-0       0-0   15-0 
Totals       33-1       0-2   33-3 
 
West: 
   Kentucky        4-1       0-0     4-1 
   Ohio         1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Tennessee        3-0       0-0     3-0 
Totals         8-1       0-0     8-1 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        6-0       0-1     6-1 
   Virginia      17-4       0-1   17-5 
Totals       23-4       0-2   23-6 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   North Carolina       8-1       0-0      8-1 
   South Carolina       6-0       0-0     6-0 
Totals        15-2       0-0   15-2 
 
Grand Totals      92-8     1-24             93-32 
 
Source: 15 Annals of Cong. 877-878 (1806).  
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APPENDIX F: EMBARGO ACT OF 1807 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Massachusetts       0-0       1-1     1-1 
   New Hampshire       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         6-0       1-3     7-3 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       0-1      0-1 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Pennsylvania       1-1       0-0     1-1 
Totals         5-1       0-1     5-2 
 
West: 
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Tennessee           2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         5-0       0-0     5-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Virginia        1-0       0-0     1-0 
Totals         2-0       0-0     2-0 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   North Carolina       1-0       0-0      1-0 
   South Carolina       1-0       0-0     1-0 
Totals          3-1       0-0     3-1 
 
Grand Totals      21-2       1-4   22-6 
 
Source: 17 Annals of Cong. 51 (1807). 
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APPENDIX G: EMBARGO ACT OF 1807 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       0-7     0-7 
   Massachusetts     10-0       0-6   10-6 
   New Hampshire       5-0       0-0     5-0 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        2-0       0-2     2-2 
Totals       19-0     0-15             19-15 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       0-0      0-0 
   New Jersey        5-0       0-0     5-0 
   New York        7-4       0-2     7-6 
   Pennsylvania     11-2       0-3   11-5 
Totals       23-6       0-5             23-11 
 
West: 
   Kentucky        4-2       0-0     4-2 
   Ohio         1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Tennessee        3-0       0-0     3-0 
Totals         8-2       0-0     8-2 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        4-1       0-3     4-4 
   Virginia      14-3       0-1   14-4 
Totals       18-4       0-4   18-8 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-3       0-0     1-3 
   North Carolina       6-4       0-1      6-5 
   South Carolina       7-0       0-0     7-0 
Totals        14-7       0-1   14-8 
 
Grand Totals     82-19     0-25             82-44 
 
Source: 17 Annals of Cong. 1221-1222 (1807).   
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APPENDIX H: NON-INTERCOURSE ACT OF 1809 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Massachusetts       0-0       0-2     0-2 
   New Hampshire       0-2       0-0     0-2 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        1-0       0-0     1-0 
Totals         3-2       0-4     3-6 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Pennsylvania       2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         6-0       0-2     6-2 
 
West: 
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Tennessee           2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         6-0       0-0     6-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   Virginia        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         3-1       0-0     3-1 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   North Carolina       1-1       0-0      1-1 
   South Carolina       1-1       0-0     1-1 
Totals          3-3       0-0     3-3 
 
Grand Totals      21-6       0-6   21-12 
 
Source: 19 Annals of Cong. 436 (1809).    
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APPENDIX I: NON-INTERCOURSE ACT OF 1809 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       0-6     0-6 
   Massachusetts       7-0       0-4     7-4 
   New Hampshire       3-1       0-0     3-1 
   Rhode Island       1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Vermont        2-0       0-2     2-2 
Totals       13-1     0-13             13-14 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       0-1      0-1 
   New Jersey        5-1       0-0     5-1 
   New York      13-1       0-2   13-3 
   Pennsylvania     10-4       0-2   10-6 
Totals       28-6       0-5             28-11 
 
West: 
   Kentucky        5-1       0-0     5-1 
   Ohio         0-0       0-0     0-0 
   Tennessee        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         7-1       0-0     7-1 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        6-0       1-1     7-1 
   Virginia      13-5       1-0   14-5 
Totals       19-5       2-1   21-6 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-2       0-0     1-2 
   North Carolina       6-4       1-0      7-4 
   South Carolina       4-2       0-0     4-2 
Totals        11-8       1-0   12-8 
 
Grand Totals     78-21     3-19             81-40 
 
Source: 19 Annals of Cong. 1541 (1809).    
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APPENDIX J: TARIFF OF 1816 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       1-0     1-0 
   Massachusetts       1-0       0-1     1-1 
   New Hampshire       0-0       1-1     1-1 
   Rhode Island       0-0       1-0     1-0 
   Vermont        1-0       1-0     2-0 
Totals         2-0       4-2     6-2 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       2-0     2-0 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Pennsylvania       2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         5-0       3-0     8-0 
 
West: 
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Tennessee           2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         8-0       0-0     8-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Virginia        1-0       0-1     1-1 
Totals         1-0       0-3     1-3 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   North Carolina       0-2       0-0      0-2 
   South Carolina       1-0       0-0     1-0 
Totals          2-2       0-0     2-2 
 
Grand Totals      18-2       7-5   25-7 
 
Source: 29 Annals of Cong. 331 (1816).    
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APPENDIX K: TARIFF OF 1816 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       2-2     2-2 
   Massachusetts       1-0       6-4     7-4 
   New Hampshire       0-0       1-3     1-3 
   Rhode Island       0-0       2-0     2-0 
   Vermont        0-0       5-1     5-1 
Totals         1-0     16-10             17-10 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       0-0      0-0 
   New Jersey        5-0       0-0     5-0 
   New York      16-1       4-1   20-2 
   Pennsylvania     13-3       4-0   17-3 
Totals       34-4       8-1              42-5 
 
West: 
   Kentucky        6-1       0-0     6-1 
   Louisiana        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Ohio         4-0       0-0     4-0 
   Tennessee        3-2       0-0     3-2 
Totals       13-4       0-0   13-4 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        2-1       0-4     2-5 
   Virginia        7-9       0-4     7-13 
Totals         9-10       0-8     9-18 
 
South: 
   Georgia        3-3       0-0     3-3 
   North Carolina       0-9       0-2      0-11 
   South Carolina       4-2       0-1     4-3   
Totals        7-14       0-3     7-17 
 
Grand Totals     64-32    24-22              88-54 
 
Source: 29 Annals of Cong. 1352 (1816).    
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APPENDIX L: TARIFF OF 1818 (IRON BILL) ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
     
State/Region            Republican           Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       2-4     2-4 
   Massachusetts       2-3       3-4     5-7 
   New Hampshire       2-3       0-0     2-3 
   Rhode Island       0-0       1-0     1-0 
   Vermont        6-0       0-0     6-0 
Totals       10-6       6-8              16-14 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-0       0-0      1-0 
   New Jersey        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   New York      19-0       1-0   20-0 
   Pennsylvania     17-0       3-0   20-0 
Totals       43-0       4-0              47-0 
 
West: 
   Indiana        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Kentucky        4-2       0-0     4-2 
   Louisiana        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Mississippi        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Ohio         6-0       0-0     6-0 
   Tennessee        0-5       0-0     0-5 
Totals       11-9       0-0   11-9 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        3-1       0-3     3-4 
   Virginia        2-12       3-0     5-12 
Totals         5-13       3-3     8-16 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   North Carolina       3-4       0-1      3-5 
   South Carolina       2-2       0-0     2-2   
Totals          6-7       0-1     6-8 
 
Grand Totals     75-35    13-12              88-47 
 
Source: 32 Annals of Cong. 1740-1741 (1818).   
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APPENDIX M: TARIFF OF 1818 (EXTENSION) ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       7-0     7-0 
   Massachusetts       5-0       5-1       10-1 
   New Hampshire       5-0       0-0     5-0 
   Rhode Island       0-0       2-0     2-0 
   Vermont        5-0       0-0     5-0 
Totals       15-0     14-1              29-1 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-0       0-0      1-0 
   New Jersey        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   New York      21-0       3-1   24-1 
   Pennsylvania     15-0       3-0   18-0 
Totals       43-0       6-1              49-1 
 
West: 
   Indiana        1-0       0-0     1-0  
   Kentucky        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   Louisiana        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Mississippi        0-0       0-0     0-0  
   Ohio         5-1       0-0     5-1 
   Tennessee        0-4       0-0     0-4 
Totals       13-5       0-0   13-5 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        3-1       0-2     3-3 
   Virginia        3-8       0-3     3-11 
Totals         6-9       0-5     6-14 
 
South: 
   Georgia        4-1       0-0     4-1 
   North Carolina       2-7       0-2      2-9 
   South Carolina       3-3       0-0     3-3   
Totals        9-11       0-2     9-13 
 
Grand Totals     86-25     20-9            106-34 
 
Source: 32 Annals of Cong. 1742-1743 (1818).   
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APPENDIX N: TARIFF OF 1820 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Massachusetts       0-0       0-2     0-2 
   New Hampshire       1-1       0-0     1-1 
   Rhode Island       0-0       2-0     2-0 
   Vermont        0-1       1-0     1-1 
Totals         2-2       4-2     6-4 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       2-0     2-0 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Pennsylvania       2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         5-0       3-0     8-0 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   Indiana        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   Ohio         2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         4-2       0-0     4-2 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Virginia        0-2       0-0     0-2 
Totals         0-3       0-0     0-3 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-2       0-0     0-2 
   North Carolina       0-2       0-0      0-2 
   South Carolina       0-2       0-0     0-2 
Totals          0-6       0-0     0-6 
 
Southwest 
   Alabama        0-2          0-0     0-2  
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Louisiana        0-2       0-0     0-2 
   Mississippi          0-2       0-0     0-2 
   Tennessee           1-1       0-0     1-1 
Totals         3-7       0-0     3-7 
 
Grand Totals      14-20       7-2   21-22 
 
Source: 35 Annals of Cong. 672 (1820).   
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APPENDIX O: TARIFF OF 1820 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
State/Region    Republican   Federalist  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        4-1       1-0     5-1 
   Massachusetts       7-5       3-2   10-7 
   New Hampshire       0-5       0-0     0-5 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        1-4       0-0     1-4 
Totals       14-15       4-2             18-17 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        2-0       0-0      2-0 
   New Jersey        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   New York      19-0       6-0   25-0 
   Pennsylvania     18-1       4-0   22-1 
Totals       45-1     10-0              55-1 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Indiana        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Ohio         6-0       0-0     6-0 
Totals         8-0       0-0     8-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        2-4       0-3     2-7 
   Virginia        1-16       0-2     1-18 
Totals         3-20       0-5     3-25 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-6       0-0     0-6 
   North Carolina       1-9       0-3      1-12 
   South Carolina       1-7       0-0     1-7   
Totals        2-22       0-3     2-25 
 
Southwest: 
   Alabama        0-0       0-0     0-0 
   Kentucky         4-3       0-0     4-3 
   Louisiana        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Mississippi        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Tennessee        0-5       0-0     0-5 
Totals         4-10       0-0               4-10 
 
Grand Totals     76-68    14-10              90-78 
 
Source: 36 Annals of Cong. 2155-2156 (1820); note that although the Annals reported the 
House roll call vote as 91 to 78, only 90 aye votes are recorded.     
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APPENDIX P: TARIFF OF 1824 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region   Adams  Crawford Jackson  Totals 
New England: 
   Connecticut     0-0    1-0    1-0     2-0 
   Maine     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Massachusetts    0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   New Hampshire    1-1    0-0    0-0     1-1 
   Rhode Island    0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Vermont     2-0    0-0    0-0     2-0 
Totals      3-3     5-0    1-0     9-3 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware     0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   New Jersey     1-0    1-0    0-0     2-0 
   New York     0-1    1-0    0-0     1-1 
   Pennsylvania    0-0    1-0    1-0     2-0 
Totals      1-3    3-0    1-0     5-3 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois     0-0    1-0    0-0     1-0 
   Indiana     1-0    1-0    0-0     2-0 
   Ohio      1-0    1-0    0-0     2-0 
Totals      2-0    3-0    0-0     5-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland     0-0    0-1    0-0     0-1 
   Virginia     0-0    0-2    0-0     0-2 
Totals      0-0    0-3    0-0     0-3 
 
South: 
   Georgia     0-0    0-2    0-0     0-2 
   North Carolina    0-0    0-2    0-0     0-2 
   South Carolina    0-0    0-1    0-1     0-2 
Totals       0-0    0-5    0-1     0-6 
 
Southwest 
   Alabama     0-0    0-0    0-2     0-2  
   Kentucky     1-0    0-0    1-0     2-0 
   Louisiana     0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   Mississippi       0-0    0-0    0-2     0-2  
   Missouri     1-0    0-0    1-0     2-0 
   Tennessee        0-0    0-0    2-0     2-0 
Totals      2-2    0-0    4-4     6-6 
 
Grand Totals     8-8  11-8    6-5     25-21 
 
Source: 41 Annals of Cong. 743-744 (1824)  
462 
 
 
 
APPENDIX Q: TARIFF OF 1824 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
 
State/Region   Adams  Crawford Jackson  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut     5-1    0-0    0-0     5-1 
   Maine     1-6    0-0    0-0     1-6 
   Massachusetts    1-10    0-0    0-1     1-11 
   New Hampshire    1-5    0-0    0-0     1-5 
   Rhode Island    2-0    0-0    0-0     2-0 
   Vermont     5-0    0-0    0-0     5-0 
Totals    15-22    0-0    0-1   15-23 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware     0-0    1-0    0-0     1-0 
   New Jersey     1-0    0-0    5-0     6-0 
   New York   17-1    7-7    2-0   26-8 
   Pennsylvania    0-1    0-0  24-0   24-1   
Totals    18-2    8-7  31-0   57-9 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois     1-0    0-0    0-0     1-0 
   Indiana     0-0    0-0    2-0     2-0 
   Ohio    10-0    2-0    2-0   14-0 
Totals    11-0    2-0    4-0   17-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland     1-4    0-1    2-1     3-6 
   Virginia     0-1    0-20    1-0     1-21 
Totals      1-5    0-21    3-1     4-27 
 
South: 
   Georgia     0-0    0-7    0-0     0-7 
   North Carolina    0-1    0-10    0-2     0-13 
   South Carolina    0-0    0-0    0-9     0-9 
Totals       0-1    0-17    0-11     0-29 
 
Southwest: 
   Alabama     0-0    0-0    0-3     0-3 
   Kentucky      7-0    0-0    4-0   11-0 
   Louisiana     0-2    0-0    0-1     0-3 
   Mississippi     0-0    0-0    0-1     0-1 
   Missouri     1-0    0-0    0-0     1-0 
   Tennessee     0-0    0-0    2-7     2-7 
Totals      8-2    0-0    6-12   14-14 
 
Grand Totals   53-32  10-45  44-25            107-102 
 
Source: 42 Annals of Cong. 2429-2430 (1824).   
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APPENDIX R: WOOL TARIFF OF 1827 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
 
State/Region    Adams   Jackson  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0       1-0     1-0 
   Maine        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Massachusetts       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Hampshire       1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        1-0       0-0     1-0 
Totals         7-0       3-0   10-0 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-1       0-1     0-2 
   New Jersey        0-0       1-0     1-0 
   New York        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Pennsylvania       1-0       1-0     2-0 
Totals         2-1       2-1     4-2 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Indiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         5-0       0-1     5-1 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        0-1       0-1     0-2 
   Virginia        0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         0-1       0-3     0-4 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   North Carolina       0-0       0-2      0-2 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals          0-0       0-6     0-6 
 
Southwest 
   Alabama        0-0          0-0     0-0  
   Kentucky        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Louisiana        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Mississippi          0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Missouri        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Tennessee           0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         1-0       0-7     1-7 
 
Grand Totals      15-2       5-18   20-20 
 
Source: 4 Reg. Deb. 496 (1827).   
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APPENDIX S: WOOL TARIFF OF 1827 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region    Adams   Jackson  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   Maine        3-2       0-2     3-4 
   Massachusetts     12-0       0-1   12-1 
   New Hampshire       5-0       1-0     6-0 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        4-0       1-0     5-0 
Totals       32-2       2-3   34-5 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       0-1      0-1 
   New Jersey        3-0       3-0     6-0 
   New York      22-0       4-5   26-5 
   Pennsylvania       5-1     13-6   18-7 
Totals       30-1     20-12              50-13 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Indiana        1-1       0-1     1-2 
   Ohio       12-0       1-1   13-1 
Totals       13-2       1-2   14-4 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        2-1       0-3     2-4 
   Virginia        0-5       1-14     1-19 
Totals         2-6       1-17     3-23 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-0       0-5     0-5 
   North Carolina       0-2       0-11     0-13 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-9     1-7   
Totals          0-2       0-25     0-27 
 
Southwest: 
   Alabama        0-0       0-3     0-3 
Kentucky         4-3       0-4     4-7                
Louisiana        0-2       0-1     0-3 
   Mississippi        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Missouri        1-0       0-0     1-0  
   Tennessee        0-0       0-9     0-9 
Totals         5-5       0-18               5-23 
 
Grand Totals     82-18    24-77            106-95 
 
Source: 4 Reg. Deb. 1099 (1827).     
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APPENDIX T: TARIFF OF 1828 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region    Adams   Jackson  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Maine        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Massachusetts       1-1       0-0     1-1 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Rhode Island       1-1       0-0     1-1 
   Vermont        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         6-2       0-3     6-5 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0       2-0     2-0 
   New Jersey        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   New York        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Pennsylvania       1-0       1-0     2-0 
Totals         3-0       5-0     8-0 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Indiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         5-0       1-0     6-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        0-1       0-1     0-2 
   Virginia        0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         0-1       0-3     0-4 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   North Carolina       0-0       0-2      0-2 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals          0-0       0-6     0-6 
 
Southwest 
   Alabama        0-0          0-2     0-2  
   Kentucky        0-0       2-0     2-0 
   Louisiana        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   Mississippi          0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Missouri        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Tennessee           0-0       1-1     1-1 
Totals         2-1       4-5     6-6 
 
Grand Totals      16-4     10-17   26-21 
 
Source: 5 Reg. Deb. 786 (1828).   
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 APPENDIX U: TARIFF OF 1828 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
State/Region    Adams   Jackson  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        4-2       0-0     4-2 
   Maine        0-4       0-3      0-7 
   Massachusetts       2-11       0-0     2-11 
   New Hampshire       3-2       1-0     4-2 
   Rhode Island       1-1       0-0     1-1 
   Vermont        5-0       0-0     5-0 
Totals       15-20       1-3              16-23 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-0       0-0      1-0 
   New Jersey        5-0       0-0     5-0 
   New York      14-0     13-6   27-6 
   Pennsylvania        6-0     17-0   23-0 
Totals       26-0     30-6              56-6 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0       1-0     1-0 
   Indiana        3-0       0-0     3-0 
   Ohio       10-0       3-0   13-0 
Totals       13-0       4-0   17-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        1-3       0-2     1-5 
   Virginia        3-4       0-11     3-15 
Totals         4-7       0-13     4-20 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-0       0-7     0-7 
   North Carolina       0-4       0-9      0-13 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-7     0-7   
Totals          0-4       0-23     0-27 
 
Southwest: 
   Alabama        0-0       0-3     0-3 
   Kentucky         4-0       8-0   12-0 
   Louisiana        0-2       0-1     0-3 
   Mississippi        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Missouri        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Tennessee        0-0       0-9     0-9 
Totals         4-3       8-14             12-17 
 
Grand Totals     62-34     43-59           105-93 
 
Source: 6 Reg. Deb. 2471-2472 (1828); note that although the Register reported the House roll 
call vote as 105 to 94, only 93 nay votes are recorded.   
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APPENDIX V: TARIFF OF 1832 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region  Jackson      Anti-Jackson    American    Know Nothing Totals  
New England: 
   Connecticut    0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0      2-0 
   Maine    0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    2-0  
   Massachusetts   0-0            2-0             0-0                0-0                       2-0 
   New Hampshire   1-0            1-0             0-0          0-0    2-0 
   Rhode Island   0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    2-0 
   Vermont    0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    2-0 
Totals     1-0           11-0             0-0          0-0  12-0 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    0-0            2-0             0-0                0-0    2-0 
   New Jersey    1-0            1-0                    0-0               0-0                        2-0 
   New York    2-0                0-0                   0-0                0-0    2-0 
   Pennsylvania   2-0            0-0                    0-0               0-0    2-0 
Totals     5-0            3-0                    0-0               0-0                        8-0 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois    1-1            0-0            0-0          0-0    1-1 
   Indiana    1-0            1-0               0-0          0-0                        2-0       
   Ohio     0-0            2-0            0-0          0-0    2-0 
Totals     2-1            3-0            0-0          0-0    5-1 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    1-0            1-0            0-0          0-0    2-0 
   Virginia    0-2            0-0                   0-0            0-0    0-2  
Totals     1-2            1-0            0-0          0-0    2-2 
 
South: 
   Georgia    0-2            0-0            0-0          0-0      0-2 
   North Carolina   0-2            0-0            0-0          0-0    0-2 
   South Carolina   0-0            0-0              0-0          0-2    0-2     
Totals      0-4            0-0            0-0          0-2    0-6  
 
Southwest 
   Alabama    0-2            0-0            0-0          0-0    0-2  
   Kentucky    0-1            1-0            0-0          0-0    1-1  
   Louisiana    0-0            2-0            0-0          0-0    2-0 
   Mississippi      0-2            0-0            0-0          0-0    0-2  
   Missouri    2-0            0-0            0-0          0-0    2-0  
   Tennessee       0-2            0-0            0-0          0-0    0-2 
Totals     2-7            3-0            0-0          0-0    5-7 
 
Grand Totals  11-14           21-0            0-0          0-2             32-16  
 
Source: 11 Reg. Deb. 1219 (1832)   
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APPENDIX W: TARIFF OF 1832 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region  Jackson      Anti-Jackson    American    Know Nothing Totals  
New England: 
   Connecticut    0-0            2-3             0-0           0-0      2-3 
   Maine    5-1            1-0             0-0           0-0    6-1  
   Massachusetts   0-0            4-8             0-0                   0-0                          4-8 
   New Hampshire   5-0            0-0             0-0           0-0    5-0 
   Rhode Island     0-0            0-2             0-0           0-0    0-2 
   Vermont    0-0            0-2             0-1           0-0    0-3 
Totals   10-1             7-15             0-1           0-0  17-17 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    0-0            0-1             0-0                   0-0    0-1 
   New Jersey    0-0            3-3                      0-0                   0-0                          3-3 
   New York  17-1                2-1                       7-0                   0-0  26-2 
   Pennsylvania  13-4            0-2                      1-6                   0-0  14-12 
Totals   30-5            5-5                      8-6                   0-0                       43-18 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois    1-0            0-0             0-0           0-0    1-0 
   Indiana    3-0            0-0                0-0           0-0                          3-0       
   Ohio     6-0            7-0             0-0           0-0  13-0 
Totals   10-0            7-0             0-0           0-0  17-0 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    3-0            5-0             0-0           0-0    8-0 
   Virginia    6-8            5-0                      0-0             0-0  11-8  
Totals     9-8          10-0             0-0           0-0  19-8 
 
South: 
   Georgia    1-6            0-0             0-0           0-0      1-6 
   North Carolina   7-4            1-0             0-0           0-0    8-4 
   South Carolina   3-2            0-0               0-0           0-4    3-6     
Totals    11-12            1-0             0-0           0-4  12-16  
 
Southwest 
   Alabama    2-1            0-0             0-0           0-0    2-1  
   Kentucky    5-3            4-0             0-0           0-0    9-3  
   Louisiana    1-0            0-2             0-0           0-0    1-2 
   Mississippi       1-0            0-0             0-0           0-0    1-0  
   Missouri    0-0            1-0             0-0           0-0    1-0  
   Tennessee        8-0            1-0             0-0           0-0    9-0 
Totals   17-4            6-2             0-0           0-0  23-6 
 
Grand Totals  67-10          36-22             8-7           0-4            131-65 
 
Source: 13 Reg. Deb. 3830-3831 (1832); note that although the Register reported the House roll 
call vote as 132 to 65, only 131 aye votes are recorded.     
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APPENDIX X: DISTRIBUTION BILL OF 1832 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
 
State/Region  Jackson      Anti-Jackson    American    Know Nothing Totals  
New England: 
   Connecticut    0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0      2-0 
   Maine    0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    2-0  
   Massachusetts     0-0            2-0             0-0                  0-0                           2-0 
   New Hampshire   0-1            1-0             0-0          0-0    1-1 
   Rhode Island     0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    2-0 
   Vermont    0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    2-0 
Totals     0-1           11-0             0-0          0-0  11-1 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    0-0            2-0             0-0                  0-0   2-0 
   New Jersey    1-0            1-0                      0-0                  0-0                          2-0 
   New York    1-1                 0-0                      0-0                  0-0    1-1 
   Pennsylvania     2-0            0-0                      0-0                  0-0    2-0 
Totals     4-1            3-0                      0-0                  0-0                          7-1 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois    0-2            0-0              0-0           0-0    0-2 
   Indiana    0-0            1-0                 0-0           0-0                          1-0       
   Ohio     0-0            2-0              0-0           0-0    2-0 
Totals     0-2            3-0              0-0           0-0    3-2 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    0-1            1-0              0-0           0-0    1-1 
   Virginia    0-2            0-0                       0-0             0-0    0-2  
Totals     0-3            1-0              0-0           0-0    1-3 
 
South: 
   Georgia    0-2            0-0              0-0           0-0      0-2 
   North Carolina   0-2            0-0              0-0           0-0    0-2 
   South Carolina   0-0            0-0                0-0           0-2    0-2     
Totals      0-4            0-0              0-0           0-2    0-6  
 
Southwest 
   Alabama    0-1            0-0              0-0           0-0    0-1  
   Kentucky    0-0            1-0              0-0           0-0    1-0  
   Louisiana    0-0            2-0              0-0           0-0    2-0 
   Mississippi                   1-1            0-0              0-0           0-0    1-1  
   Missouri    0-1            0-0              0-0           0-0    0-1  
   Tennessee        0-2            0-0              0-0           0-0    0-2 
Totals     1-5            3-0              0-0           0-0    4-5 
  
Grand Totals    5-16           21-0              0-0           0-2              26-18  
 
Source: 14 Reg. Deb. 1174 (1833).   
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APPENDIX Y: DISTRIBUTION BILL OF 1832 ROLL CALL BY STATE  
AND REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region  Jackson      Anti-Jackson    American    Know Nothing Totals  
New England: 
   Connecticut    0-0            3-0             0-0          0-0      3-0 
   Maine    1-2            1-0             0-0          0-0    2-2  
   Massachusetts   0-0          10-0             0-0                0-0                     10-0 
   New Hampshire   0-0            0-0             0-0          0-0    0-0 
   Rhode Island   0-0            1-0             0-0          0-0    1-0 
   Vermont    0-0            3-0             1-0          0-0    4-0 
Totals     1-2           18-0             1-0          0-0  20-2 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    0-0            1-0             0-0                0-0    1-0 
   New Jersey    0-0            4-0                    0-0               0-0                        4-0 
   New York    7-3                3-0                   5-0                0-0  15-3 
   Pennsylvania 13-1            2-0                    6-0               0-0  21-1 
Totals   20-4          10-0                  11-0               0-0                      41-4 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois    0-1            0-0             0-0          0-0    0-1 
   Indiana    1-2            0-0                0-0          0-0                        1-2       
   Ohio     5-0            7-0             0-0          0-0  12-0 
Totals     6-3            7-0             0-0          0-0  13-3 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    0-2            3-0             0-0          0-0    3-2 
   Virginia    2-9            3-0                    0-0            0-0    5-9  
Totals     2-11            6-0             0-0          0-0    8-11 
 
South: 
   Georgia    0-1            0-0             0-0          0-0      0-1 
   North Carolina   2-3            1-0             0-0          0-0    3-3 
   South Carolina   0-1            0-0               0-0          0-2    0-3     
Totals      2-5            1-0             0-0          0-2    3-7  
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Southwest 
   Alabama    0-3            0-0             0-0          0-0    0-3  
   Kentucky    2-3            4-0             0-0          0-0    6-3  
   Louisiana    1-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    3-0 
   Mississippi      0-1            0-0             0-0          0-0    0-1  
   Missouri    0-0            0-1             0-0          0-0    0-1  
   Tennessee       0-4            1-0             0-0          0-0    1-4 
Totals     3-11            7-1             0-0          0-0  10-12 
 
Grand Totals  34-36          49-1           12-0          0-2             95-39 
 
Source: 15 Reg. Deb. 1920-1921 (1833); note that although the Register reported the 
House roll call vote as 96 to 40, only 95 aye and 39 nay votes are recorded.   
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APPENDIX Z: TARIFF OF 1833 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region  Jackson      Anti-Jackson    American    Know Nothing Totals  
New England: 
   Connecticut    0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0      2-0 
   Maine    0-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    2-0  
   Massachusetts   0-0            0-2             0-0                0-0                       0-2 
   New Hampshire   1-0            1-0             0-0          0-0    2-0 
   Rhode Island   0-0            0-2             0-0          0-0    0-2 
   Vermont    0-0            0-2             0-0          0-0    0-2 
Totals     1-0             5-6             0-0          0-0    6-6 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    0-0            2-0             0-0                0-0    2-0 
   New Jersey    0-1            1-0                    0-0               0-0                        1-1 
   New York    1-1                0-0                   0-0                0-0    1-1 
   Pennsylvania   0-2            0-0                    0-0               0-0    0-2 
Totals     1-4            3-0                    0-0               0-0                        4-4 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois    1-0            0-0            0-0          0-0    1-0 
   Indiana    0-1            0-1               0-0          0-0                        0-2       
   Ohio     0-0            1-1            0-0          0-0    1-1 
Totals     1-1            1-2            0-0          0-0    2-3 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    0-1            1-0            0-0          0-0    1-1 
   Virginia    2-0            0-0                   0-0            0-0    2-0  
Totals     2-1            1-0            0-0          0-0    3-1 
 
South: 
   Georgia    1-0            0-0            0-0          0-0      1-0 
   North Carolina   1-0            0-0            0-0          0-0    1-0 
   South Carolina   0-0            0-0              0-0          2-0    2-0     
Totals      2-0            0-0            0-0          2-0    4-0  
 
Southwest 
   Alabama    2-0            0-0            0-0          0-0    2-0  
   Kentucky    1-0            1-0            0-0          0-0    2-0  
   Louisiana    0-0            2-0            0-0          0-0    2-0 
   Mississippi      2-0            0-0            0-0          0-0    2-0  
   Missouri    0-2            0-0            0-0          0-0    0-2  
   Tennessee       2-0            0-0            0-0          0-0    2-0 
Totals     7-2            3-0            0-0          0-0  10-2 
 
Grand Totals  14-8           13-8            0-0          2-0             29-16  
 
Source: 14 Reg. Deb. 808-809 (1833).   
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APPENDIX AA: TARIFF OF 1833 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region  Jackson      Anti-Jackson    American    Know Nothing Totals  
New England: 
   Connecticut    0-0            0-6             0-0          0-0      0-6 
   Maine    6-0            0-1             0-0          0-0    6-1  
   Massachusetts   0-0            0-13             0-0                0-0                       0-13 
   New Hampshire   4-1            0-0             0-0          0-0    4-1 
   Rhode Island   0-0            0-2             0-0          0-0    0-2 
   Vermont    0-0            0-3             0-2          0-0    0-5 
Totals   10-1             0-25             0-2          0-0  10-28 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    0-0            0-1             0-0                0-0    0-1 
   New Jersey    0-0            0-6                    0-0               0-0                        0-6 
   New York  11-9                0-3                   0-7                0-0  11-19 
   Pennsylvania  4-13            0-2                    0-6               0-0    4-21 
Totals             15-22            0-12                  0-13             0-0                      15-47 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois    1-0            0-0             0-0          0-0    1-0 
   Indiana    2-1            0-0                0-0          0-0                        2-1       
   Ohio     3-3            4-3             0-0          0-0    7-6 
Totals     6-4            4-3             0-0          0-0  10-7 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    4-0            5-0             0-0          0-0    9-0 
   Virginia  17-0            3-1                    0-0            0-0  20-1  
Totals   21-0            8-1             0-0          0-0  29-1 
 
South: 
   Georgia    6-0            0-0             0-0          0-0      6-0 
   North Carolina 11-0            2-0             0-0          0-0  13-0 
   South Carolina   5-0            0-0               0-0          4-0    9-0     
Totals    22-0            2-0             0-0          4-0  28-0  
 
Southwest 
   Alabama    3-0            0-0             0-0          0-0    3-0  
   Kentucky    8-0            4-0             0-0          0-0  12-0  
   Louisiana    1-0            2-0             0-0          0-0    3-0 
   Mississippi      1-0            0-0             0-0          0-0    1-0  
   Missouri    0-0            0-1             0-0          0-0    0-1  
   Tennessee       8-0            0-1             0-0          0-0    8-1 
Totals   21-0            6-2             0-0          0-0  27-2 
 
Grand Totals            95-27          20-43             0-15          4-0           119-85 
 
Source: 15 Reg. Deb. 1810-1811 (1833).   
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APPENDIX BB: TARIFF OF 1841 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Maine        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Massachusetts       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        1-0       0-0     1-0 
Totals         7-0       0-1     7-1 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Pennsylvania       0-0       2-0     2-0 
Totals         5-0       2-1     7-1 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0       1-0     1-0 
   Indiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Michigan         1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Ohio         0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         3-0       1-2     4-2 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Virginia        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         3-0       0-0     3-0 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   North Carolina       2-0       0-0      2-0 
   South Carolina       0-0       1-1     1-1 
Totals          3-0       1-2     4-2 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest 
   Alabama        0-0          2-0     2-0  
   Arkansas        0-0          2-0     2-0 
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Louisiana        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Mississippi          1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2                   
   Tennessee           0-0       0-1     0-1 
Totals         4-0       4-5     8-5 
 
Grand Totals      25-0       8-11   33-11 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 438 (1841).   
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APPENDIX CC: TARIFF OF 1841 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, 
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   Maine        4-0       0-4      4-4 
   Massachusetts       7-3       0-1     7-4 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-4     0-4 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        3-2       0-0     3-2 
Totals       22-5       0-9              22-14 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-0       0-0      1-0 
   New Jersey        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   New York      16-1       0-19   16-20 
   Pennsylvania       9-3       0-14     9-17 
Totals       32-4       0-33              32-37 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0       0-0     0-0 
   Indiana        5-1       0-1     5-2 
   Michigan        1-0       0-0     1-0  
   Ohio       12-0       0-6   12-6 
Totals       18-1       0-7   18-8 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        4-0       0-1     4-1 
   Virginia        7-4       0-8     7-12 
Totals       11-4       0-9   11-13 
 
South: 
   Georgia        7-1       0-0     7-1 
   North Carolina       7-0       0-5      7-5 
   South Carolina       1-0       0-6     1-6   
Totals        15-1       0-11   15-12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
477 
 
 
 
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest: 
   Alabama        0-0       0-5     0-5 
   Arkansas        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Kentucky         8-1       0-2     8-3 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-1     2-1 
   Mississippi        0-0       0-0     0-0 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Tennessee        8-0       0-5     8-5 
Totals       18-1       0-16             18-17 
 
Grand Totals              116-16       0-85           116-101 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1841).    
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APPENDIX DD: DISTRIBUTION BILL OF 1841 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
 
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Maine        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Massachusetts       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         8-0       0-4     8-4 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Pennsylvania       0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         5-0       0-3     5-3 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Indiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Michigan         2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         4-0       0-4     4-4 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Virginia        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         4-0       0-0     4-0 
 
South: 
   Georgia        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   North Carolina       2-0       0-0      2-0 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals          3-0       0-3     3-3 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest 
   Alabama        0-0          0-2     0-2  
   Arkansas        0-0          0-2     0-2 
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Louisiana        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Mississippi          1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2                   
   Tennessee           0-0       0-1     0-1 
Totals         4-0       0-9     4-9 
 
Grand Totals      28-0       0-23   28-23 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 388 (1841).   
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APPENDIX EE: DISTRIBUTION BILL OF 1841 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND 
REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   Maine        4-0       0-4      4-4 
   Massachusetts     11-0       0-1   11-1 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-5     0-5 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        5-0       0-0     5-0 
Totals       28-0       0-10              28-10 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-0       0-0      1-0 
   New Jersey        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   New York      18-0       0-20   18-20 
   Pennsylvania     12-0       0-12   12-12 
Totals       37-0       0-32              37-32 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0       0-0     0-0 
   Indiana        6-0       0-1     6-1 
   Michigan        0-0       0-0     0-0  
   Ohio       12-0       0-7   12-7 
Totals       18-0       0-8   18-8 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        6-0       0-2     6-2 
   Virginia        6-4       0-10     6-14 
Totals       12-4       0-12   12-16 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-8       0-0     0-8 
   North Carolina       5-3       0-5      5-8 
   South Carolina       0-1       0-8     0-9   
Totals          5-12       0-13     5-25 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest: 
   Alabama        0-0       0-5     0-5 
   Arkansas        0-0       0-0     0-0 
   Kentucky         9-0       0-2     9-2 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-1     2-1 
   Mississippi        0-0       0-0     0-0 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Tennessee        5-1       0-5     5-6 
Totals       16-1       0-15             16-16 
 
Grand Totals              116-17       0-90           116-107 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1841).   
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APPENDIX FF: “LITTLE TARIFF” OF 1842 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
 
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Maine        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Massachusetts       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Rhode Island       1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Vermont        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         7-0       0-3     7-3 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Jersey        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   New York        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Pennsylvania       0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         4-0       0-3     4-3 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Indiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Michigan         2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         4-0       0-4     4-4 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        1-0       0-0     1-0 
   Virginia        1-1       0-0     1-1 
Totals         2-1       0-0     2-1 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-1       0-1     0-2 
   North Carolina       2-0       0-0      2-0 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-1     0-1 
Totals          2-1       0-2     2-3 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest 
   Alabama        0-0          0-1     0-1  
   Arkansas        0-0          0-1     0-1 
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Mississippi          1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2                   
   Tennessee           0-0       0-0     0-0 
Totals         5-0       0-5     5-5 
 
Grand Totals      24-2       0-17   24-19 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 679 (1842).   
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APPENDIX GG: “LITTLE TARIFF” OF 1842 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND 
REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   Maine        4-0       0-4      4-4 
   Massachusetts       9-0       1-0   10-0 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-5     0-5 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        5-0       0-0     5-0 
Totals       26-0       1-9              27-9 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-0       0-0      1-0 
   New Jersey        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   New York      16-0       0-19   16-19 
   Pennsylvania     12-1       0-12   12-13 
Totals       35-1       0-31              35-32 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        1-0       1-1     2-1 
   Indiana        5-1       0-1     5-2 
   Michigan        1-0       0-0     1-0  
   Ohio       12-0       0-6   12-6 
Totals       19-1       1-8   20-9 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        5-0       0-1     5-1 
   Virginia        6-3       0-8     6-11 
Totals       11-3       0-9   11-12 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-5       0-3     0-8 
   North Carolina       6-1       0-4      6-5 
   South Carolina       0-1       0-7     0-8   
Totals          6-7       0-14     6-21 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest: 
   Alabama        0-0       0-5     0-5 
   Arkansas        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Kentucky         9-0       0-2     9-2 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-1     2-1 
   Mississippi        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Tennessee        5-0       0-5     5-5 
Totals       16-0       0-18             16-18 
 
Grand Totals              113-12       2-89           115-101 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 637 (1842);  note that although the Globe 
reported the House roll call vote as 116 to 103, only 115 aye and 101 nay votes are 
recorded.   
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APPENDIX HH: “PERMANENT TARIFF” OF 1842 ROLL CALL BY  
STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
 
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Maine        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Massachusetts       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         8-0       0-4     8-4 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Pennsylvania       0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         5-0       0-3     5-3 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Indiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Michigan         2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         4-0       0-4     4-4 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Virginia        1-1       0-0     1-1 
Totals         3-1       0-0     3-1 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   North Carolina       1-1       0-0      1-1 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals          1-1       0-3     1-4 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest 
   Alabama        0-0          0-2     0-2  
   Arkansas        0-0          0-2     0-2 
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Mississippi          0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2                   
   Tennessee           0-0       0-0     0-0 
Totals         4-0       0-7     4-7 
 
Grand Totals      25-2       0-21   25-23 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 852 (1842).   
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APPENDIX II: “PERMANENT TARIFF” OF 1842 ROLL CALL BY STATE  
AND REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        5-0       0-0     5-0 
   Maine        4-0       0-3      4-3 
   Massachusetts     10-1       1-0   11-1 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-5     0-5 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        5-0       0-0     5-0 
Totals       26-1       1-8              27-9 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-0       0-0      1-0 
   New Jersey        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   New York      18-0       0-19   18-19 
   Pennsylvania     12-1       0-13   12-14 
Totals       37-1       0-32              37-33 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        1-0       0-2     1-2 
   Indiana        5-0       0-1     5-1 
   Michigan        1-0       0-0     1-0  
   Ohio       12-0       0-6   12-6 
Totals       19-0       0-9   19-9 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        6-0       0-2     6-2 
   Virginia        7-3       0-10     7-13 
Totals       13-3       0-12   13-15 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-5       0-2     0-7 
   North Carolina       4-3       0-5      4-8 
   South Carolina       0-1       0-8     0-9   
Totals          4-9       0-15     4-24 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest: 
   Alabama        0-0       0-5     0-5 
   Arkansas        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Kentucky       10-0       0-2   10-2 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-1     2-1 
   Mississippi        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Tennessee        4-4       0-5     4-9 
Totals       16-4       0-18             16-22 
 
Grand Totals              115-18       1-94           116-112 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 762 (1842).   
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APPENDIX JJ: REVISED “PERMANENT TARIFF” OF 1842 ROLL CALL 
BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
    
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        1-0       0-1     1-1 
   Maine        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Massachusetts       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        2-0       0-0     2-0 
Totals         8-0       1-2     9-2 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-1       0-0     1-1 
   New Jersey        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   New York        1-0       1-0     2-0 
   Pennsylvania       0-0       2-0     2-0 
Totals         4-1       3-0     7-1 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Indiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Michigan         2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Ohio         0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals         4-0       0-3     4-3 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        0-1       0-0     0-1 
   Virginia        0-2       0-0     0-2 
Totals         0-3       0-0     0-3 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-1       0-1     0-2 
   North Carolina       0-2       0-0      0-2 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-2     0-2 
Totals          0-3       0-3     0-6 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest 
   Alabama        0-0          0-2     0-2  
   Arkansas        0-0          0-2     0-2 
   Kentucky        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Mississippi          0-1       0-1     0-2 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2                   
   Tennessee           0-0       0-0     0-0 
Totals         4-1       0-7     4-8 
 
Grand Totals      20-8       4-15   24-23 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 960 (1842).   
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APPENDIX KK: REVISED “PERMANENT TARIFF” OF 1842 ROLL CALL BY 
STATE AND REGION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
New England: 
   Connecticut        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   Maine        3-0       0-2      3-2 
   Massachusetts       9-1       1-0   10-1 
   New Hampshire       0-0       0-4     0-4 
   Rhode Island       2-0       0-0     2-0 
   Vermont        5-0       0-0     5-0 
Totals       25-1       1-6              26-7 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        1-0       0-0      1-0 
   New Jersey        6-0       0-0     6-0 
   New York      17-2       9-7   26-9 
   Pennsylvania     10-1     10-0   20-1 
Totals       34-3     19-7               53-10 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        1-0       0-2     1-2 
   Indiana        3-2       0-1     3-3 
   Michigan        1-0       0-0     1-0  
   Ohio         9-1       0-6     9-7 
Totals       14-3       0-9   14-12 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        3-1       0-2     3-3 
   Virginia        3-7       0-10     3-17 
Totals         6-8       0-12     6-20 
 
South: 
   Georgia        0-5       0-3     0-8 
   North Carolina       0-6       0-5      0-11 
   South Carolina       0-0       0-5     0-5   
Totals          0-11       0-13     0-24 
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State/Region       Whig           Democrat  Total 
Southwest: 
   Alabama        0-0       0-4     0-4 
   Arkansas        0-0       0-1     0-1 
   Kentucky         3-6       0-2     3-8 
   Louisiana        2-0       0-1     2-1 
   Mississippi        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Missouri        0-0       0-2     0-2 
   Tennessee        1-7       0-5     1-12 
Totals         6-13       0-17                6-30 
 
Grand Totals                 85-39     20-64            105-103 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 27
th
 Cong., 2nd Sess. 926 (1842).   
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APPENDIX LL: TARIFF OF 1846 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region   Whig  Democrat American  Totals 
New England: 
   Connecticut     0-1    0-1    0-0     0-2 
   Maine     0-1    1-0    0-0     1-1 
   Massachusetts    0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   New Hampshire    0-0    1-1    0-0     1-1 
   Rhode Island    0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   Vermont     0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
Totals      0-8     2-2    0-0     2-10 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware     0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   New Jersey     0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   New York     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Pennsylvania    0-0    0-2    0-0     0-2 
Totals      0-4    2-2    0-0     2-6 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Indiana     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Michigan     0-1    1-0    0-0     1-1 
   Ohio      0-1    1-0    0-0     1-1 
Totals      0-2    6-0    0-0     6-2 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland     0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   Virginia     0-1    1-0    0-0     1-1 
Totals      0-3    1-0    0-0     1-3 
 
South: 
   Florida     0-0                 2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Georgia     0-1    1-0    0-0     1-1 
   North Carolina    0-1    0-0    0-0     0-1 
   South Carolina    0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
Totals       0-2    5-0    0-0     5-2 
 
Southwest: 
   Alabama     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Kentucky      0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   Mississippi     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Tennessee     1-0    1-0    0-0     2-0 
Totals      1-2    5-0    0-0     6-2 
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State/Region   Whig  Democrat American  Totals 
Trans-South 
   Arkansas     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Louisiana     0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   Missouri     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
   Texas     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0  
Totals      0-2    6-0    0-0     6-2 
 
Grand Totals     1-23  27-4    0-0     28-27 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 29
th
 Cong., 1st Sess., 1158 (1846).   
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APPENDIX MM: TARIFF OF 1846 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region   Whig  Democrat American  Totals  
New England: 
   Connecticut     0-4    0-0    0-0     0-4 
   Maine     0-1    6-0    0-0     6-1 
   Massachusetts    0-9    0-0    0-0     0-9 
   New Hampshire    0-0    3-0    0-0     3-0 
   Rhode Island    0-2    0-0    0-0     0-2 
   Vermont     0-3    0-0    0-0     0-3 
Totals      0-19    9-0    0-0     9-19 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware     0-1    0-0    0-0     0-1 
   New Jersey     0-3    0-2    0-0     0-5 
   New York     0-8  16-4    0-4   16-16 
   Pennsylvania    0-10    2-10    0-2     2-22   
Totals      0-22  18-16    0-6   18-44 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois     0-0    5-0    0-0     5-0 
   Indiana     0-2    6-0    0-0     6-2 
   Michigan     0-0    3-0    0-0     3-0 
   Ohio      0-8  12-0    0-0   12-8 
Totals      0-10  26-0    0-0   26-10 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland     0-1    1-1    0-0     1-2 
   Virginia     1-1  13-0    0-0   14-1 
Totals      1-2  14-1    0-0   15-3 
 
South: 
   Florida     0-0    1-0    0-0     1-0 
   Georgia     0-2    5-0    0-0     5-2 
   North Carolina    0-3    6-0    0-0     6-3 
   South Carolina    0-0    6-1    0-0     6-1 
Totals       0-5  18-1    0-0   18-6 
 
Southwest: 
   Alabama     1-0    6-0    0-0     7-0 
   Kentucky      0-7    3-0    0-0     3-7 
   Mississippi     0-0    4-0    0-0     4-0 
   Tennessee     0-5    6-0    0-0     6-5 
Totals      1-12  19-0    0-0   20-12 
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State/Region   Whig  Democrat American  Totals  
Trans-South 
   Arkansas     0-0    0-0    0-0     0-0 
   Louisiana     0-1    3-0    0-0     3-1 
   Missouri     0-0    4-0    0-0     4-0 
   Texas     0-0    2-0    0-0     2-0 
Totals      0-1    9-0    0-0     9-1 
 
Grand Totals     2-71           113-18    0-6            115-95 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 29
th
 Cong., 1st Sess., 1053 (1846); note that although the Globe 
reported the House roll call vote as 114 to 95, only 115 aye votes are recorded.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
498 
 
 
 
APPENDIX NN: TARIFF OF 1857 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, SENATE 
State/Region  Whig  Democrat Republican  American Totals  
New England: 
   Connecticut    0-0        1-0      1-0      0-0    2-0 
   Maine    0-0        0-0        1-0      0-0    1-0 
   Massachusetts   0-0      0-0      1-0        0-0    1-0 
   New Hampshire   0-0        0-0      0-0      0-0    0-0 
   Rhode Island   0-0        0-2      0-0      0-0    0-2 
   Vermont    0-0      0-0      0-2      0-0    0-2 
Totals     0-0      1-2      3-2      0-0    4-4 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware    0-0      0-0      0-0      0-0    0-0 
   New Jersey    0-0        0-1      0-0      0-0    0-1 
   New York    1-0        0-0      1-0      0-0    2-0 
   Pennsylvania   0-0      1-1      0-0      0-0      1-1 
Totals     1-0      1-2      1-0      0-0    3-2 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois    0-0      2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
   Indiana    0-0      1-0      0-0      0-0    1-0 
   Iowa       0-0      0-0      0-0      0-0    0-0 
   Michigan    0-0      1-0      0-0      0-0    1-0 
   Ohio     0-0      1-0      0-1      0-0    1-1  
   Wisconsin    0-0      0-0      0-0      0-0    0-0 
Totals     0-0        5-0      0-1      0-0    5-1 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland    0-0      0-0      0-0      0-0    0-0 
   Virginia    0-0      2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
Totals     0-0      2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
 
South: 
   Florida    0-0      2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
   Georgia    0-0      1-0      0-0      0-0    1-0 
   North Carolina   0-0      2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
   South Carolina   0-0      2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
Totals      0-0      7-0      0-0      0-0      7-0 
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State/Region  Whig  Democrat Republican  American Totals  
Southwest: 
   Alabama    0-0      2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
   Kentucky     0-0      0-0      0-0      0-0    0-0 
   Mississippi    0-0      1-0      0-0      0-0    1-0 
   Tennessee    1-0      0-0      0-0      0-0    1-0 
Totals     1-0      3-0      0-0      0-0    4-0 
 
 
Trans-South 
   Arkansas    0-0      2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
   Louisiana    1-0         0-0      0-0      0-0    1-0 
   Missouri    0-1        1-0      0-0      0-0    1-1 
   Texas    0-0      1-0      0-0      1-0    2-0 
Totals     1-1      4-0      0-0      1-0    6-1 
 
California    0-0       2-0      0-0      0-0    2-0 
 
Grand Totals    3-1      25-4         4-3      1-0  33-8         
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 34
th
 Cong., 3rd Sess., 1062 (1857).   
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APPENDIX OO: TARIFF OF 1857 ROLL CALL BY STATE AND REGION, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
    
State/Region     Whig   Democrat Republican  Opposition American Totals 
New England: 
   Connecticut        0-0         0-0      0-0       0-0       4-0    4-0 
   Maine        0-0         0-0      2-0       3-0       0-0    5-0  
   Massachusetts     0-0         0-0      0-0       0-0     10-0     10-0     
   New Hampshire  0-0         0-0      0-0       0-0       3-0    3-0 
   Rhode Island       0-0         0-0      0-0       0-0       2-0    2-0 
   Vermont        1-0         0-0      1-0       1-0       0-0    3-0  
Totals         1-0         0-0      3-0       4-0     19-0  27-0 
 
Atlantic: 
   Delaware        0-0         0-0      0-0       0-0       1-0    1-0 
   New Jersey        0-0         1-0      0-0       4-0       0-0    5-0 
   New York        1-0         1-3      0-0     14-4       1-0  17-7 
   Pennsylvania       1-0        2-0      1-0     13-0       1-0  18-0 
Totals         2-0         4-3      1-0     31-4       3-0  41-7 
 
Northwest: 
   Illinois        0-0         0-4      1-1       0-0       1-1    2-6 
   Indiana        0-0         0-1      0-1       3-5       0-0    3-7 
   Iowa         1-0         1-0      0-0       0-0       0-0    2-0  
   Michigan        0-0         0-1      1-1       1-0       0-0    2-2 
   Ohio         0-0         0-0      1-2       8-9       0-0    9-11 
   Wisconsin        0-0         1-0      1-0       0-0       0-0    2-0 
Totals         1-0         2-6      4-5     12-14      1-1  20-26 
 
Chesapeake: 
   Maryland        0-0         1-1      0-0       0-0       4-0    5-1 
   Virginia        0-0         0-11      0-0       0-0       0-1    0-12 
Totals         0-0         1-12      0-0       0-0       4-1    5-13 
 
South: 
   Florida        0-0         0-1      0-0       0-0       0-0    0-1 
   Georgia        0-0         0-4      0-0       0-0         1-0    1-4 
   North Carolina    0-0         0-4      0-0       0-0       2-0    2-4 
   South Carolina    0-0         0-4      0-0       0-0       0-0    0-4 
Totals          0-0         0-13          0-0       0-0       3-0    3-13 
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State/Region    Whig    Democrat Republican  Opposition American Totals 
Southwest: 
   Alabama      0-0          0-5      0-0       0-0       1-1    1-6 
   Kentucky       0-0          0-3      0-0       0-0       4-2    4-5 
   Mississippi      0-0          0-4      0-0       0-0       1-0    1-4 
   Tennessee      0-0          0-4      0-0       0-0       1-3    1-7 
Totals       0-0           0-16      0-0       0-0       7-6    7-22  
 
Trans-South 
   Arkansas      0-0          0-1      0-0       0-0       0-0    0-1  
   Louisiana      0-0          1-2      0-0       0-0       1-0    2-2 
   Missouri      0-0          0-0      0-0       5-0       1-0    6-0  
   Texas      0-0          0-0      0-0       0-0       0-0    0-0  
Totals       0-0          1-3      0-0       5-0       2-0    8-3 
 
Grand Totals      4-0          8-53      8-5      52-18    39-8           111-84 
 
Source: Cong. Globe, 34
th
 Cong., 3rd Sess., 791 (1857).   
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APPENDIX PP: AMERICAN FOREIGN TRADE, 1790 – 1860 (IN MILLIONS) 
 Nominal        Imports &  
Year    GDP       Imports     Exports     Exports  Import%    Export%    Openness% 
  
1790      187    23        20    43     12%           11%      23%   
1791      204    29             19    48     14%             9%      23%  
1792      223    32        19     51     14%             9%      23% 
1793       249    31             24    55          12%           10%      22% 
1794      312    35             27    62          11%             9%      20%  
1795      380      70             40  110          18%           11%      29%  
1796      413    81             32  113          19%             8%      27% 
1797      405      75             24    99          18%  6%      24%  
1798      409    69             28    97          17%             7%            24% 
1799      437    79             33  112     18%  8%      26%  
1800      476    91             32  123     19%  7%      26% 
 
1801      509  111             46  157          22%  9%      31%  
1802      446    76             36  112          17%             8%      25%  
1803      482    65             42  107     13%             9%      22%  
1804      527    85             41  126     16%             8%            24% 
1805      556  121             42  163          22%             7%      29% 
1806      611  129             41  170     21%             7%      28% 
1807      583  139             49  188     24%             8%      32% 
1808      640    57               9    66       9%  1%      10% 
1809      680    59             31    90       9%             4%      13%  
1810      699    85             42  127     12%  6%      18% 
 
1811      760    53             45    98       7%  6%      13% 
1812      779    77        30  107     10%  4%      14% 
1813      960    22             25    47       2%  3%        5% 
1814   1,068    13               7    20       1%  1%        2% 
1815      916  113             46  159     12%             5%      17%   
1816      811  147             65  212          18%  8%      26% 
1817      761    99             68  167     13%  9%      22% 
1818      730  122             74  196     17%           10%      27%  
1819      720    87             51  138     12%       7%      19%  
1820      703    74             52  126     11%  7%      18% 
 
1821      728    55             41    96       7%  6%      13% 
1822      798    80             50  130     10%  6%      16% 
1823      752    72             47  119     10%  6%      16% 
1824      747    72             51  123       9%  7%      16% 
1825      814    90             67  157     11%  8%      19% 
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 Nominal        Imports &  
Year    GDP       Imports     Exports     Exports  Import%    Export%    Openness%  
1826      858    78         52 130       9%  6%      15% 
1827      907    71         58 129       8%  6%      14%  
1828      888    81          50 131       9%  6%      15% 
1829      921    67         55 122       7%  6%      13% 
1830   1,012    63         59 122       6%  6%      12% 
 
1831   1,042    96         59 155       9%  6%      15% 
1832   1,118    95         62 157       8%  6%      14% 
1833   1,147  101         70 171       9%  6%      15% 
1834   1,207  109         81 190       9%  7%      16%  
1835   1,327   137       100 237     10%  8%      18% 
1836   1,465   177       107 284     12%  7%      19% 
1837   1,539  130         94 224            9%  6%      15% 
1838   1,582    96         96 192            6%  6%      12%  
1839   1,645  156       102 258          10%           6%      16% 
1840   1,559    98       112 210       6%  7%      13%  
 
1841   1,636  123            104 227       8%  6%      14% 
1842   1,602    96              92 188       6%  6%      12% 
1843   1,553    56            104 160       3%  7%      10% 
1844   1,686  103            100 203       6%           6%      12% 
1845   1,842  113              98 211       6%  5%      11% 
1846   2,045  118            102 220       6%  5%      11% 
1847   2,387  122            151 273       5%  6%      11%  
1848   2,404  149            130 279       6%  6%      12% 
1849   2,395  141            132 273       6%  5%      11% 
1850   2,556  174            135 309       7%  5%      12% 
 
1851   2,698  211            179 390       8%  6%      14% 
1852   3,037  207            155 362       7%  5%      12%  
1853   3,279  264            190 454       8%  6%      14% 
1854   3,677  298            215 513       8%  6%      14%  
1855   3,937  258            193 451       6%  5%      11% 
1856   4,009  310            266 576       8%  6%      14% 
1857   4,140  348            279 627       8%  7%      15%  
1858   4,054  263            251 514       7%  6%      13% 
1859   4,383  331            278 609       8%  6%      14% 
1860   4,345  354            316 670       8%  7%      15% 
 
 
Source: Carter, et al., eds., Historical Statistics, 5:498-499; “Measuring Worth,” 
http://www. measuringworth.org/usgdp/. 
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APPENDIX QQ: A LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE VOTING PATTERNS 
FOR THE TARIFFS OF 1841 AND 1842 
 
     The thesis in this dissertation argues that from the early 1840s onward, trade policy became a 
political issue that was national in character, with significant blocs of both protectionist and free 
trade support present in all regions of the United States.  It emphasizes that industrialization, and 
the chronologically staggered manner in which it spread throughout the United States, influenced 
trade policy more than any other factor.  This differs from assertions in most of the existing 
literature: that the distinctly different free and slave labor systems functioning in the North and 
South caused economic issues, including trade policy, to be delineated on a geographic basis.  As 
industrial takeoff spread throughout the United States, economic interests in previously non-
industrial regions became more sympathetic to legislation that promoted the industrialization 
process.  The tariff roll calls from the Twenty-Seventh Congress in 1841 and 1842 mark a 
turning point in antebellum tariff policy because these legislative acts were the first significant 
attempt to set trade policy after the industrial “takeoff” of the 1830s.1  
     Statistical modeling provides a quantitative basis upon which to either validate or reject the 
primary thesis of this research – the primacy of an industrialization model versus a geographic 
model.  This appendix summarizes the results of a statistical analysis of the congressional roll 
call voted in 1841 and 1842 and economic data from the 1840 census.  Data was collected from 
the roll call votes to determine whether a senator or representative was pro-tariff (protectionist) 
or anti-tariff (free trade).  The analysis considered three bills which sought to make trade policy, 
including the Tariff of 1841, the Little Tariff (1842), and the Permanent Tariff (1842).  The 
                                                 
1
 The foremost advocates of a labor system / geographic divide are Eugene Genovese and John Ashworth.  See 
Eugene D. Genovese. The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South. 
(Middleton, Connecticut.: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 34; John Ashworth. Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics 
in the Antebellum Republic, Volume 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995. 
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Revised Permanent Tariff (1842) has been omitted from the analysis because, as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 9, this vote only came about as a result of President Tyler’s veto, and was 
motivated by political pragmatism rather than any policy initiatives.   
     Economic data from the 1840 census was compiled on a “political unit” basis.  In the case of 
senators and at-large congressmen, the political unit was their native state.  In the case of all 
other representatives, the data was compiled for the congressional district that they represented.
2
    
     The total population of political units corresponds to all active Senate and House seats 
(Combined model, n = 295).
3
  If a Senate or House seat turned over during the Twenty-Seventh 
Congress (due to death, resignation, or for any other reason), the coding for that seat represents 
the compiled voting actions of all people sitting in that particular seat.  Regression models were 
also estimated for just the Senate (Senator Only model, n = 51) and just the House 
(Representatives-Only model, n = 244).   
     If a specific Senate or House seat consistently voted for protectionist bills, they were coded as 
being pro-tariff.  If the recorded votes were consistently against, they were coded as anti-tariff.  
The consistently pro-tariff votes totaled 46.1% of the population and the consistently anti-tariff 
votes totaled 46.8% of the population.  The remaining 7.1% of the votes were identified as pro-
tariff or anti-tariff based on the majority pattern of their tariff bill voting record.  In any case 
where the voting pattern was equally divided, the vote on the Revised Permanent Tariff was used 
to categorize the vote.   
     In this study the outcome variable of interest, how a political unit (Senate or House seat) 
voted on the tariff bills, is a dichotomous variable; that is, having only two possible values: a 
                                                 
2
 Note that seven states selected their representatives on an “at-large” basis.  These included Alabama(5), Georgia 
(9), Missouri (2), Mississippi (2), New Hampshire (5), New Jersey (6), and Rhode Island (2).  This represents 12.7% 
of the total House sample. 
3
 Note that one senate seat from Tennessee and one House seat from Kentucky never participated in the trade policy 
debates of 1841 and 1842. 
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vote in the aggregate against the tariff bills (anti-tariff = 0), or for them (pro-tariff = 1).  Ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression is not the optimal method to study this type of outcome variable 
because it violates several required assumptions.  Among these assumptions is that the dependent 
variable must be continuous, unbounded, and measured on an interval or ratio scale; clearly this 
is not the case with a dichotomous outcome measure.  Logistic regression accommodates a 
dichotomous dependent variable as well as non-continuous independent variables, as is the case 
here.
4
 
     In logistic regression, instead of calculating the expected value of the dependent variable as in 
OLS or linear regression, the dependent variable is the log-odds that a particular event will 
occur.  The logistic regression model is described mathematically as follows:
5
 
ln 
P 
= ln (odds) =  + 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 +4X4 +   1 - P 
 
Where P is the probability that a political unit voted pro-tariff and 1-P is the probability of an 
anti-tariff voting position.  X1, X2, X3, and X4 are the independent variables described below.  
and  are regression coefficients to be estimated, and  is a random error term that is logistically 
distributed.  The dependent variable in the regression equation is the natural logarithm of the 
odds (log odds) of a particular political unit voting pro- or anti-tariff.  Interpreting the regression 
coefficients is discussed below.
6
 
     Key independent variables were derived from available economic data contained in the 1840 
census, and include the following: 
A. SLAVE/FREE STATE: Each political unit (Senate or House seat) was identified as 
residing in either a slave or free state.  At the time of the Twenty-Seventh Congress 
                                                 
4
 Manard, 2001. 
5
 DesJardins, 1999. 
6
 Ibid. 
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(1841-1843), the twenty-six states in the Union were equally divided.  Traditional views 
of the tariff suppose that free states traditionally supported protectionist trade legislation 
while slave states did not.
7
  
B. SLAVE POPULATION: For each political unit (either a district or state for a representative 
or a state for a senator) the percentage of total population that was slave compared to the 
total overall population of each political unit was computed.  The results ranged from 
0.0% in Maine’s 5th congressional district to 80.1% in South Carolina’s 2nd congressional 
district.  This variable is related to SLAVE/FREE STATE in measuring whether states that 
had high slave populations were more prone to oppose protectionist tariff legislation. 
C. AGRICULTURAL POPULATION: For each political unit the percentage of the total 
working labor force engaged in agriculture compared to the total population of each 
political unit was computed.  The results ranged from 1.5% in Pennsylvania’s 1st, 2nd, and 
3
rd
 districts to 50.4% in New York’s 21st congressional district.  This variable was 
included to measure the impact of whether more heavily agricultural states were more 
inclined to oppose protectionist tariff legislation..
8
 
D. CAPITAL PER CAPITA: For each political unit, the dollars invested in manufacturing 
plant and equipment was divided by the total population of each political unit, in order to 
calculate a measure of invested manufacturing capital on a per capita basis.  The results 
ranged from $1.27 in Virginia’s 10th congressional district to $125.71 in Massachusetts’ 
                                                 
7
 The slave states were AL, AR, DE, GA, KY, LA, MD, MO, MS, NC, SC, TN and VA.  The free states were CT, 
IL, IN, MA, ME, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI and VT.    
8
 The 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 Pennsylvania congressional  districts all represented the city of Philadelphia.  New York’s  21st 
district was located in the western part of the state.  
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4
th
 congressional district.  This variable was included to measure the impact of 
industrialization upon tariff legislation.
9
 
     Political party was not used as an independent variable in the regression analysis.  Previous 
studies have already demonstrated the extremely high correlation between party and tariff policy 
stance.  The correlation between votes and party is so strong (r
2
 = 0.863) that it overwhelms all 
other variables included in the analysis.
10
   
     Collinearity or multicollinearity describe a situation where there is a close relationship among 
the independent variables to be used in a regression model, indicating that there is some degree 
of redundancy or overlap among the variables.  A Pearson correlation table was generated that 
calculates pairwise correlations between each of the variables used in the model. Examination of 
the table revealed no correlations exceeding the benchmark of .700.
11
  Using all of the variables 
in the model, an OLS regression model was estimated and collinearity diagnostics generated to 
test for multicollinearity problems in the data.  There is no statistical evidence for the existence 
of multicollinearity since: (1) the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all variables are very low 
(the highest VIF was 1.98, well below the benchmark of 10.0); and (2) none of the variables had 
condition index values that exceed the commonly used threshold value of 30.0.
12
  
     Logistic regression analysis was performed to examine relationship between the various 
independent variables in the model and the pro-/anti- tariff vote outcome.  If the proposed thesis 
is valid, high CAPITAL PER CAPITA should be a significant predictor in the regression model.  If 
a geographical model is valid, the designation of SLAVE/FREE STATE, high SLAVE 
                                                 
9
 Virginia’s 10th district was located in the southwestern portion of the state.  Massachusetts’ 4th was located near 
Boston. 
10
 Historians have already well documented this fact.  See Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting 
Behavior, 1841-1852. (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), 65; Thomas B. Alexander. 
Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Computer Analysis of Roll Call Patterns in the United States House of 
Representatives, 1836-1860. (Nashville, Tennessee, 1967), 44. 
11
 Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989.  
12
 Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995 
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POPULATION and high AGRICULTURAL POPULATION variables would be more likely to exert 
significance on the model.  The independent variables were entered together as a single block. 
     The results of the logistic regression, using a pro- or anti-tariff voting record as the 
dichotomous dependent variable, and tested against the five aforementioned independent 
variables, are as follows: 
Table QQ.1. Results of Logistic Regression Analysis 
Combined Model 
 Log- 
odds   Sig. Odds Ratio Inverse Odds Ratio 
Slave/free state  -0.082   1.086 
Slave population  -0.166   1.181 
Agricultural population  -3.547   34.483 
Capital per capita  0.025   1.025  
Constant  0.548  1.730  
     
-2 Log Likelihood 
 
381.243    
Degrees of freedom  4    
      
Nagelkerke pseudo R
2
  0.117    
     
Representative-Only Model     
Slave/free state  -0.142   1.152 
Slave population  -0.573   1.773 
Agricultural population  -3.211   25.000 
Capital per capita  0.023   1.024  
Constant  0.565  1.759  
     
-2 Log Likelihood 
 
313.243    
Degrees of freedom  4    
       
Nagelkerke pseudo R
2
  0.127    
 p<.05, p<.01, p<.001 
 
     The estimated regression coefficients produced in the analyses are changes in the log-odds of 
the event (pro- versus anti-tariff vote) occurring due to incremental changes in the values of the 
coefficients.  Interpretation of changes in log-odds is conceptually difficult; however a 
transformation can be applied to facilitate interpretation by taking the log of both sides of the 
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equation described above.  This changes the log-odds to an odds ratio, which allows for 
interpretation of a one-unit change in an independent variable as a change in the odds of the 
event occurring.
13
  
     In interpreting these coefficients, it is important to remember that because the dependent 
variable is coded as “anti-tariff” = 0 and “pro-tariff” = 1, a negative coefficient indicates that 
increased response values to the variable will reduce the probability of a pro-tariff vote, while a 
positive coefficient will increase the probability of a pro-tariff vote.  The Combined and 
Representative-Only models are significant (p<.001) with CAPITAL PER CAPITA the sole 
significant variable (p<.05).  The estimated regression coefficient for CAPITAL PER CAPITA is 
0.025, indicating that the log-odds of voting pro-tariff is 0.025 units higher for districts with 
higher levels of invested capital.  The corresponding odds ratio for this variable is 1.025, 
indicating that the odds of casting an anti-tariff vote are 1.025 times (or 2.5%) higher in districts 
with higher levels of invested capital.  As importantly, the other three variables were determined 
not to be significant in either model.  In the case of the Senator-Only model, neither the model 
nor any of the independent variables was found to be significant. 
     It can be concluded that invested CAPITAL PER CAPITA, a proxy for industrialization, 
influenced the tariff voting patterns in 1841 and 1842.  This data supports the thesis that takeoff 
in the 1830s had made the tariff a national issue.  Conversely, the fact that SLAVE/FREE STATE, 
SLAVE POPULATION, and AGRICULTURAL POPULATION were not significant also supports 
that the traditional regional paradigm associated with antebellum tariffs was broken by the early 
1840s. 
     The fact that CAPITAL PER CAPITA was a significant variable in the Representative-Only, 
but not the Senate-Only model, is not surprising.  The House membership turned over more 
                                                 
13
 DesJardins, 2001. 
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rapidly due to biennial elections, and in most cases members represented relatively small 
geographic districts with very distinct economic characteristics.  In contrast, senators were 
elected by state legislatures for six year terms and they represented all citizens of their native 
state, which meant that the economic interests of their constituencies were typically more 
diversified.  An example of this would be New York, a heavily industrialized state that also 
included the heavily agricultural 21
st
 district.  The interests of the state could be pro-tariff, while 
the interests of a particular district could be the opposite.  Consequently, as a result of faster 
turnover and the smaller size of the corresponding political units, the House was more “current” 
in reflecting constituent sentiments and the influence of industrialization than the Senate. 
     While the above analysis demonstrates that industrialization influenced the tariff votes in 
1841 and 1842, it should be stressed that this relationship is not causal.  The data does, however, 
provide additional evidence to support the thesis that American industrial takeoff in the 1830s 
dramatically altered the nature of trade policy from the 1840s forward.  The tariff transitioned 
from a geography-based issue, which it was from 1824 through 1833, back to a national one.      
 
Sources: 
 
DesJardins, S. L., Dundar, H., & Hendel, D. D. Modeling the College Application Decision 
Process in a Land Grant University. Economics of Education Review, (1999): 18, 117-
132. 
 
DesJardins, S. L. A Comment on Interpreting Odds-Ratios When Logistic Regression 
Coefficients Are Negative. AIR Professional File (81), 2001. 
 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. Multivariate Data Analysis. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995. 
 
Menard, S. Applied Logistic Regression Analysis (Vol. 07-106). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2001.  
 
Pampel, Fred C. Logistic Regression, a Primer. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 2000. 
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Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. Using Multivariate Statistics. Philadelphia, PA: Harper & 
Row, 1989. 
 
Portions of the above appendix narrative reprinted by permission from Dr. Louise Purcell 
August, “A Study of Attrition Among Female Tenure-Track Faculty” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 2005) 
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     Trade policy was a prominent economic and political issue in the United States between 1789 
and 1860, culminating in the Civil War.  Many historians have characterized this period as 
pitting mutually exclusive economic systems, an industrializing, free-labor North and a slave-
based agricultural South, against one another.  The traditional interpretation is that the North 
eagerly supported tariffs and economic protection that they provided, while the South stood in 
opposition.  The Nullification Crisis of 1832-1833 is frequently cited as evidence that the tariff 
was a sectional issue and some historians go so far as to describe the tariff as a significant cause 
of the Civil War. 
     This traditional view of early American trade policy merits reconsideration.  The First 
Industrial Revolution, rather than competing labor systems, provides the appropriate context 
through which antebellum trade policy ought to be viewed and understood.  An examination of 
congressional roll call votes on important trade policy legislation, coupled with economic census 
data, provides compelling evidence that the tariff was national in scope, pitting economic 
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nationalists, who supported protective principles, against liberals, who supported free trade.  By 
the time of the Civil War, the tariff issue was clearly not demarcated by geographical region.   
     The debates over trade policy before the Civil War were dynamic, and highly influenced by 
interests and ideas.  As industrialization spread throughout the United States, local economic 
interests were susceptible to change, which were manifested through the votes of elected 
legislators.  Likewise, ideas played an important role, as Americans debated the respective merits 
of a strong national policy to serve the community-at-large through national military and 
economic strength versus a desire for an egalitarian approach involving minimal federal 
government involvement.           
     The American trade policy debate was sectional in nature for a brief period between 1824 and 
1833.  Prior to that time, trade policy was shaped by foreign relations.  By 1824 the First 
Industrial Revolution had commenced in the United States, though it was limited to the 
northeastern part of the nation.  Between 1824 and 1833 there were bitter debates over the tariff, 
caused by the industrialization had been introduced to part, but not all, of the nation.  However, 
by the 1830s other portions of the country, including the South, began experiencing an 
industrialization “takeoff” process.  An examination of various tariff bills in 1841 and 1842, 
when subjected to statistical modeling, demonstrates that the relationship between capital 
investment in manufactures per capita for a political unit (congressional district or state) and the 
trade policy voting pattern of its senators or representatives was significant.  In comparison, 
geographical region and slave population were not significant factors.   
     By the time of the tariffs of 1841 and 1842, trade policy was again a national issue and it 
remained so up to the Civil War.  Economic interests and ideas, shaped by the Industrial 
Revolution, were the factors that most profoundly shaped antebellum American trade policy.      
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